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
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A NOTE TO THE READER

Photography is, by common agreement, *the* most popular medium of our time, unique both for communicating visual images and for interpreting them. In this issue, a half-dozen writers try to define the specialness of the camera, as an instrument with which people all over the world record their experiences and share them.

Our authors examine photography as both art and science, high art and popular culture. Douglas Davis and his colleagues trace the history of the medium and its most current forms. Isaac Asimov, with his usual lucidity, gives a clear exposition for the layman of holography—three-dimensional, lenseless photography that makes use of the laser beam.

The achievements of the master photographer Ansel Adams are described with informed enthusiasm by Wallace Stegner. Elegantly, Rudolf Arnheim and John Szarkowski analyze the distinctions between photography and other arts, and its distinctiveness. And the photographer-teacher Lee Battaglia, with searching comments on four of the many photographs reproduced in this issue, demonstrates that a profound appreciation of this medium requires well-educated practitioners and viewers.

Readers interested in the 1976 American presidential elections will find food for thought in an article by Gerald Pomper focusing on the characteristics of the American electorate and the American political system—both institutions that have undergone noteworthy changes in the past decade.

Other readers may be stirred by Stanley Kunitz's eloquent defense of modern literature and art against the charge of disorderly anarchism; or reassured by Horace Judson's explanation of why we need not go around in abject terror of being remade by science; or intrigued by the remarkable insights into interpersonal behavior in the works of Erving Goffman.

To each reader his own—and to all, in the words of a recent visitor to our *Dialogue* office, "a good read."

J.S.

PROFILE OF THE AMERICAN VOTER

By Gerald M. Pomper

With the 1976 American elections rapidly approaching, the question of who is going to become the next President of the United States is of paramount interest. In the final analysis, this choice is made by the collectivity of American voters. Who are these voters? On what basis do they make their decision? Party? Ideology? Class interests? Regional interests? These are the questions to which Dr. Pomper addresses himself.

Gerald Pomper is a professor and chairman of the political science department at Rutgers University, in New Jersey. This article is abridged from his latest book *Voters' Choice: Varieties of American Electoral Behavior*, published by Dodd, Mead and Co. He has also written *Nominating the President: The Politics of Convention Choice* (Northwestern University Press) and *Elections in America* (Dodd, Mead, and Co.).

Who is the American voter? Founded on the premise that legitimate government requires "the consent of the governed," the United States has long puzzled over its own electorate. The power of the voters has been both proclaimed and restrained; the wisdom of their choices, praised and condemned. The portrait of the American voter that has emerged has been of one who is both a hero and a villain.

This conflicting attitude toward the voter has been evident throughout the two hundred years of American existence as a separate nation. Alexander Hamilton, the first secretary of the Treasury and the leader of the early conservative forces, contemptuously concluded "Your people, sir, are a great beast"; and yet he argued for direct popular election of Congress. On the other hand, George Mason, a delegate from Virginia at the Constitutional Convention of 1787, was one of its most democratic members; yet he believed that to elect a president of the United States by popular vote was as irrational as "to refer a trial of colors to a blind man." While James Madison, later the fourth president, insisted that "a dependence on the people is the primary safeguard of good government," he supported institutional barriers against "the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority." As Hamilton wryly observed, the persons "most tenacious of republicanism [at the convention] were as loud as any in declaring against the vices of democracy."

Americans evince the same ambiguity toward the voters, in a variety of institutions. They recognize the principles of popular sovereignty in leaving to the electorate the choice of a half million officials, from the lowly precinct committeeman to the lofty president. They assume the wisdom of voters in asking them to

decide for or against state constitutional amendments and legislation by referendum, as well as to determine the details of local school budgets.

Yet these same important popular decisions are severely curtailed in fact. There are restrictions on the length of term elected officials may serve and on their powers, while important functions are left to nonelected commissions and public authorities. The courts have the right to review and overturn legislation passed by the electorate. Paradoxically, the world's first mass democracy imposes elaborate legal restrictions on the very right to vote.

Changing Constitution

Ordinarily, in calm times, the United States has been able to live comfortably with this somewhat equivocal electoral situation. But the last decade has been one of turmoil in American society. No politically conscious adult today needs to be convinced that, in response to this turmoil, great changes have occurred in American politics. Since 1960 the Constitution has been amended four times; three of those amendments concerned the electorate, the last (twenty-sixth) lowering the voting age to eighteen years, in recognition of the growing strength of youth in American society. A fifth revision impends: a proposed equal rights for women amendment, in response to the national movement for women's liberation from age-old disabilities.

Other recent proposals for constitutional change have ranged from conservative campaigns to permit prayers in public schools and to prohibit abortion, to fundamental redrafts of the basic document itself. For instance, in 1970, the liberal Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions drafted a model constitution which called for an expansion of federal powers and a consequent reduction of those of the states. During the same year, the then radical Black Panther party's "Revolutionary People's Constitutional Convention" proposed the creation of independent self-governing communities from which power would flow upward.

Protest marches, civil disobedience, and mass demonstrations have become accepted methods of political action.

The ultimate effect of these social and political changes is still unclear. The history of American politics would lead us to predict that the new forces will eventually be peacefully absorbed by the political system. Having survived for so long, governmental institutions are likely to persist. The voices of dissent and protest are clamorous, but disaffection is overt only among relatively small and isolated minorities—and even their violent protest has apparently diminished. In the larger society, there has been no breakdown or revolution: the airplanes still run on time; officials receive their pay

regularly; drivers stop at red lights.

Yet, the recent turmoil has revived basic political issues, leading to renewed debate over the premises and practices of American democracy. The challenge to political institutions has necessarily called into question the role of voting, the character of the electorate, and the quality of its choices. As Americans have tried to understand the national crisis, they have also tried to understand themselves, as voters.

Twenty-five years ago, academic observers and practicing politicians alike were convinced that the United States had reached "the end of ideology," and that politics had become nothing more than disputes over which men should apply what means to achieve widely accepted goals. The storms that broke after 1960 have revived interest in ideology and in the character of political parties and the electorate. A new portrait of the American voter emerged, sharply at variance with an earlier one.

The Dependent Voter

Based upon a series of surveys of presidential elections beginning in 1940 with Paul Lazarsfeld's study of the voting behavior of the Erie County, Pennsylvania, electorate and extending to nation-wide studies by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center, a portrait of the so-called "dependent" voter emerged. These surveys, stressing the long-range factors affecting how people voted, characterized the "dependent" voter as paying limited attention to *contemporary* issues and individuals. The American electorate, composed of a majority of "dependent" voters, was described as choosing candidates on the basis of their own social characteristics or out of longheld loyalty to a particular party. The dependent voter, according to the interpretations of Survey Research Center, paid scant attention to political events generally and even less to specific issues of public policy. Instead, he relied on the cues of the social group he belonged to—his peers, his fellow workers, his race, or his religion. True, it was often personally advantageous to him to follow these cues, since they represented his objective individual interests. But the association was highly contingent and accidental.

Thus, for example, on the two vital issues of the 1948 presidential campaign, only one-sixth of the voters could report accurately the opposing positions of the Democratic candidate Harry S. Truman and the Republican one, Thomas E. Dewey. In 1956, no more than one-third of the voters questioned was able to offer an informed opinion on any particular policy related to the election of that year. A broader perspective on politics was still rarer. In 1956, only 2.5 percent of the population studied could be classified as "ideologues"—that is, able to perceive fundamental questions of

principle over which liberals and conservatives quarreled. When asked to explain the very terms "liberal" and "conservative," only 15 percent could do so.

This portrait of the dependent voter was widely accepted as a faithful likeness, but the consequences that flow from it were interpreted differently, depending on the ideology of the interpreter.

Democratic Elitism

Conservatives used the findings about the dependent voter to develop a new theory of democracy, one of "democratic elitism," in the phrase of Peter Bachrach. This theory held that the dependent voter was potentially dangerous because of his ignorance and his unresponsiveness to the crucial issues of the age. Hence, it was best for policy decisions to be left to others, those who were better informed, and more supportive of American institutions. Paradoxically, it was argued, voter apathy, ignorance and lack of principle were actually beneficial, for such attitudes promoted stability and moderation—there were fewer intense partisans and ideologists to clash with one another. So the individual vices became public virtues!

Radical social scientists interpreted the figure of the dependent voter delineated by these studies far more pessimistically. To them, the studies demonstrated the disappearance of democracy in America, the reduction of the citizen to a mass man. Sociologist C. Wright Mills argued that since "[the voter] has no projects of his own . . . he fulfills the routines that exist." Under this condition, the voter's choice is easily manipulated. Or, in the words of the political philosopher Herbert Marcuse, "The prevailing level of opinion has become a level of falsehood," where officials are "elected under conditions of effective and freely accepted indoctrination."

However different in their conclusions, both conservative and radical interpreters shared a basic contempt for the dependent voter: irrational, ignorant, easily influenced, he was deemed a fit subject for attention-getting but irrelevant electoral campaigns based on empty slogans and "merchandized" candidates.

The Responsive Voter

In the early 1960s, the portrait of the dependent voter was called into question with the publication of *The Responsible Electorate* by the late V.O. Key, Jr., of Harvard University. Analyzing Gallup poll data for the presidential elections of 1936-1960, Key came to the conclusion that the American voter *did* cast his ballot according to his policy preferences, an interpretation at variance to the dependent voter earlier described.

The events of the past fifteen years have tended to support Key's

Interpretation: the political involvement of Americans has clearly become more visible—not only at the polling stations, but even more in marches, petitions, and demonstrations. Accepted party and regional distinctions that were assumed to determine the electoral patterns of the dependent voters have fallen; so has the view that ideology is unimportant. The Republican Party nominated for President in 1964 a pure ideological conservative, Barry Goldwater, the Democratic Party in 1972 a pure ideological liberal, George McGovern; the South, traditionally Democratic, became heavily Republican, the Congress consistently Democratic.

In this context, then, students of American politics have been increasingly drawn to the alternative portrait of the electorate—the “responsive” voter. The dependent voter theory assumed that the American voter was fixed forever in his political stance, subject to long-term economic and ethnic forces over which he had no control and which he did not try to control. The “responsive” voter theory envisaged neither the character of the voter nor the factors that influenced his choices as being permanent. These were now believed to change with the circumstances of his life and in response to larger political events and specific issues of public policy. Hence, issues could often become important for him; the candidate’s positions on these issues could become critical to the electoral decision. Where the portrait of the dependent voter was drawn against a background of *determinism*, that of the responsive voter was drawn against one of *variety*.

The argument in support of the “responsive” voter as characteristic of the American electorate runs somewhat along these lines: True, voters are affected by such permanent social characteristics as race and economic position. But, if these alone determined ballot choices, every selection would have the same result, and there would be no shift in voting patterns, either short-term or long-term. The fact is that shifts take place from one election to the next; this means that electoral choices cannot be understood simply on the basis of single, permanent factors, however important.

Changing Partisanship

Nor does the deterministic, dependent voter approach explain why members of particular social groups vote for certain candidates and parties at one time, for others at another time. Thus, American businessmen and blacks have distinct group interests. But there is no inherent, nonpolitical reason why these interests must always be expressed as black support of Democratic representatives, business backing for Republicans. Historically, in fact, each group has changed its partisanship: the black vote, formerly Republican, became identified with the Democratic party under the Franklin D.

Roosevelt New Deal of the 1930s, the Republican party the stronghold of conservative businessmen and industrialists in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

Besides, though the American voter evidences party loyalty, this attachment influences but does not *determine* his vote. His defections from party loyalty are temporary, and both the defections and the loyalty are "normal," indications of a dynamic, responsive electorate. For, being a partisan need not necessarily mean that one is mindlessly loyal to party regardless of issue—actually, it may be a *rational* course of conduct. The voter who votes along party lines with which he basically agrees is acting in an efficient manner. To use an economic analogy, as Anthony Downs does in *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, the voter is reducing the personal costs of partisan participation while still expressing his general political judgment, which coincides with that of his party.

The responsive voter approach affirms that there is a clear, rational component in a voter's identification with a particular party in response to the norms of the group he belongs to; for the interests of a group (and of the voters who belong to that group) may indeed be best expressed by support of a particular party. The blacks' support of the Democrats, or businessmen's support of the Republicans may not be thoughtless group conformity at all, but an expression of a *policy preference*. Moreover, in time one perceives that the position an electorate takes on certain issues parallels ever more closely the candidates it votes for.

As we see, a voter's group or party loyalty can be viewed in two, completely different ways: Where the voter is limned as dependent, his partisanship and group identification are interpreted as demonstrative of his inattentiveness to political issues and incapacity for political judgment. But where he is limned as responsive, the same loyalty and partisanship can be interpreted as consistent with his interest in certain issues and preference for candidates who share his view of those issues. A businessman voting Republican to follow his social group is dependent on that group for political guidance; but a businessman voting Republican to promote his policy objectives is responsive to contemporary issues.

Ideological Awareness

Why did it seem for so long to observers that the American voter was dependent, rather than responsive? Because, the advocates of the responsive voter theory maintain, the voter may be reasonable in his voting choice, but inarticulate in expressing the reasons for that choice. Direct questions may have underestimated voter awareness of issues. Interviewers in 1956 using indepth techniques concluded that as much as 20 percent of the electorate was ideologi-

cally aware; voters used terms such as liberalism and conservatism either explicitly or by implication when referring, in free conversation, to such concepts as the individual and the state, the role and power of government, welfare, free enterprise, etc. The proportion of those ideologically aware increased substantially in studies of later elections.

The public judgments of the responsive voter can affect his vote substantially—exactly how much depending on the salience of the issues and the campaign strategies of a particular election. Many voters change the party they vote for from election to election, depending on specific issues and specific candidates.

Nor does the responsive voter tend to regard the two parties as mirror images of one another, or perfectly matched competitors. Rather, he sees each party as having a different strength, handling some problems relatively better, others relatively poorly. For example, in the election of 1972 the electorate in general believed that the Democrats were better equipped to deal with questions of economics, welfare, and corruption in government; they believed that the Republicans were better in handling the questions of race and Vietnam. Yet, the electorate did not draw any black-and-white distinctions between the two parties. About half of the voters studied saw no difference between Republicans and Democrats on most other issues, and on certain issues, two-thirds gave the nod to neither party. The Republicans may have won the 1972 election because the issues where they were considered stronger than the Democrats (peace in Vietnam and control of public disorder) were of more concern to the voters than the issues where the Democrats were considered stronger (economics and social welfare).

However, the choices open to the voter are not always clear. Parties and candidates may present alternative courses of action that are not always distinctly different from one another on a particular issue. Even when the choices are relatively clear, the voter is unlikely to agree fully with one candidate on all questions. Voters often have to take the intermediate position—to vote “the lesser evil.” A voter may believe in the *gradual* integration of black children into the public school system. Suppose there is a contest between, on the one hand, a candidate who is ardently opposed to integration, and advocates continuation of the system where white and black children attend different segregated schools; and on the other hand, a candidate who favors the compulsory busing of children from one school district to another in order to make sure that all schools have equal numbers of black and white children. Which candidate is this voter, who has taken a middle position, to vote for? He is likely either to ignore the issue in his choice of candidate, or to select the candidate whom he considers closer to his own intermediate position.

Importance of Issues

As in the 1972 election, voters in those of 1964 and 1968 were obviously responsive to specific issues rather than their traditional affiliations. Thus, Richard M. Nixon was elected in 1968 because of voter dissatisfaction with the policy of the administration of Lyndon B. Johnson on the issues of Vietnam and civil rights. Electors voted more on that basis than on the basis of their party allegiance.

Of course, the portrait of the responsive voter may be no more definitive than that of the portrait of the dependent voter. For, conclusions drawn from a given election may reflect not permanent voter characteristics but rather that contest's particular elements—the composition of the parties, the specific issues (present or absent), the given candidates.

The dependent voter may be more characteristic in a period of relative domestic tranquility such as that of the Eisenhower administration during the 1950s, while the responsive voter is more characteristic in times of turmoil such as during the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon years.

There is then no single answer to the question, "Who is the American voter?" The question must specify when and where. Certainly, American voters are not persistently interested and active; the Jeffersonian dream of independent yeomen learnedly discussing politics is unachievable. Coherent and well-argued political philosophies are no more to be expected at shopping centers than in college classrooms.

Yet, though American voters are no philosopher-kings, they are not mindless helots either, concerned only with their immediate pleasures. Americans are concerned about their futures and that of their country. Recent research argues that they can understand issues and can express their concerns—at the polling place as well as in the streets. Not unalterably fixed in their allegiances by party tradition or party memberships, the electorate can respond to change when the times demand it. For the future, the behavior of the American voter will depend on what the future brings.


The Camera and the World

CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN PHOTOGRAPHY

Douglas Davis et al

Originally a French invention, the camera has become in a century and a half the favorite tool of tourist and artist alike. Characteristically, Americans have developed the technological side of the new medium. New American photographers, say our authors, have been experimenting with the expressive possibilities of the black box, as well as the journalistic surface of things: their aim is to illuminate personal reality.

Douglas Davis, who wrote this article for *Newsweek* with a group of colleagues, is an editor of that magazine's art section. An artist and art critic in his own right, he has lectured, exhibited and created mixed media events at various places. A regular contributor to such magazines as *Art in America* and *Evergreen Review*, his book *Art and Technology: the New Metaphor* was published by Praeger.



The world's first photograph—a hazy, grainy rendering of a humble French garden in the sun—had instant reverberations even in 1826. "It is one of the most useful and brilliant discoveries of the century," said Claude, the brother of the pioneer photographer, Nicéphore Niépce. Now, deep into its second century, photography is still exploding, far beyond the boundaries of its birth. Once the mere recorder of reality, the camera is now a part of life itself, present at Everyman's birth, marriage, death and most significant occasions in between. Most important of all, the photograph—in all its guises, from simple snapshot to instant color—is at last the handmaiden of art as well as journalism, advancing in the hands of the present generation of photographer-artists into new realms of perception and expression. Laszlo Moholy-Nagy once predicted that the man without a camera would be nothing less

than "the illiterate of the future." This day—when Americans alone take and develop 6 billion pictures per year—has come.

It is also an era in which the camera is reaching hitherto unimaginable technical perfection. Ironically, technically sophisticated cameras have arrived at precisely the moment when the art of photography is shaking free from its obsession with craft and mechanics, when the camera is being valued less for its technical perfection than for its quick response to the mind and to the imagination. For most young photographers the more public kind of statement has been replaced with very private understandings, observations and sensibilities.


The Golden Age

This does not mean that the great "public" photographers who flourished in the golden age of photojournalism when *Life* and *Look* magazines were at their peak—giants like Alfred Eisenstaedt, Henri Cartier-Bresson and W. Eugene Smith—are no longer functioning. It is simply a matter of change, in their work and in their markets. "The esthetic has turned from documentation to a more personal reportage," says Gerald Rosenkrantz, photo librarian of Magnum, the elite agency founded in 1947 by Cartier-Bresson and others. "It has shifted from the external to the internal environment." Along with this development has come a generation of university-trained photographers determined to establish the photograph as something more than news alone. The first signs of this change surfaced in the late 1950s and 1960s in the work of photographers like Robert Frank, Diane Arbus and Ralph

Gibson—who rose to prominence through privately printed books, exhibitions and small-circulation magazines, not in the mass press.

Now their followers are legion, including fresh talents like Danny Lyon, Geoff Winingham, Duane Michals, Emmet Gowin, Leslie Krims, William Eggleston, Judy Dater, Jerry N. Uelsmann and Jack Welpott. The new "market" for these artists is primarily the book and the collector—as it is for the classic American photographers like Imogen Cunningham, Paul Strand, Ansel Adams, Minor White and Walker Evans, all still active and innovative.

Imogen Cunningham, *Morris Graves*



The number of "art books" devoted purely to photography, new and old, has jumped astonishingly in recent years, as have the university courses and departments devoted to photography, and the museums actively buying, exhibiting and collecting. Work by living photographers has spurred in value, in some cases approaching the price of limited-edition print making.

As prescient as the brothers Niépce were, they did not foresee this latest swerve in the fortunes of their invention. Nor did Louis Daguerre, who converted Niépce's early researches into a practical and salable commodity—the "daguerreotype," that allowed images to be recorded on a copper plate in minutes. Upon seeing one of Daguerre's pictures, painter Paul Delaroche announced: "From today, painting is dead." What he meant was that the new medium could not be beaten at reproducing reality. And Delaroche could not imagine a function for painting (or photography) beyond realism.

A Kodak for Everyman

In both Europe and America, the early rise of photography was marked by an obsession with the precise recording of buildings, faces, great events and nature itself: Cameron's pinpoint portraits of poet Robert Browning and naturalist Charles Darwin, every line and blemish alive; Mathew Brady's remorseless studies of the American Civil War; E.J. Muybridge's feat in 1878, when he proved—by placing cameras at intervals around a California racetrack—that horses lift all four legs off the ground in full gallop. The few photographers who viewed their craft as "art"—like D.O. Hill and O.G. Rejlander—tried to imitate painting by hand-tinting and collaging.

The technical feats of Muybridge and others were fully in league with popular interest, fanned by the arrival in 1888 of Everyman's camera, the Kodak. Invented by George Eastman, this camera offered for \$10 instant gratification and unparalleled ease ("Press the button," announced the Kodak slogan. "We do the rest"). The Kodak camera recorded 100 images on rolled paper: it was mailed to the factory for processing, whence it was returned, reloaded, along with the processed prints. More important, the Kodak camera was easy to focus and to carry; the age of tripods, portable darkrooms and technical magic was gone. The age of instant, hand-held photography had come, and is still here. With every new camera since—the Leica, the Rolleiflex, the Instamatic, the SX-70 and the Polaroid Land Camera—the act of picture taking has become swifter and simpler.

All this is symbolized by today's most popular camera, the ubiquitous 35-mm. single-lens reflex, the standby of the overwhelming majority of serious photographers from amateurs to globe-girdling professionals. The SLR's ease of handling, accuracy of image (the

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photographer sees the image through the lens itself) and built-in metering capability, which makes correct exposure virtually automatic, free the photographer to concentrate on what Cartier-Bresson calls the "decisive moment."

This tool is nowhere better used than by the professional photo-journalist, the alert (and sometimes lucky) professional who is catapulted from anonymity when he captures a dark or blazing moment in contemporary history, as Boris Yaro did in his pictures of Robert Kennedy's assassination. Unsung staff photographers for the news agencies, newspapers and newsmagazines, working under the most rigorous conditions of immediacy, have time and again come up with strong and significant images. A man like British photographer Donald McCullin, in his devastating book of war pictures *Is Anyone Taking Any Notice?*, epitomizes the fast-shooting, keen-eyed news photographer who is part reporter and part inadvertent poet of a violent time.

The first "serious" photographer to explore these "candid," fast-action qualities was Alfred Stieglitz, who took a hand camera into the streets of New York as early as 1893, returning with memorable

Alfred Stieglitz, *City Street*





Dorothea Lange, *Spring Plowing*: "by a powerful social documentor of the late 1930s."

images caught in the roughest conditions: snow, mist, fog, rain and darkening night. Stieglitz believed deeply in photography as art—but as photography, not as painting. He was the first to boast that his prints were indeed "snapshots" and "explorations of the familiar." The indoor world of studio, still life and delicate lighting was not for Stieglitz—or for any of his followers: they preferred the raw outdoors, whether city street, open field or a passenger ship teeming with life. Photography as a serious medium dates—in the United States—from the early experiments of Stieglitz, the magazine (*Camera Work*) he founded in 1903, and his legendary gallery "291," the first to give equal billing to the avant-garde in both painting and photography.

The Personal Vision

Stieglitz's insistence on "direct photography" influenced all the great American photographers to follow, from his friends Clarence White, Paul Strand and Edward Steichen (who later created "The Family of Man," the most popular photography exhibition ever organized), to the late landscape photographer Edward Weston, Ansel Adams and powerful social documentors of the 1930s like Dorothea Lange. Even the great photojournalists who flourished in the 1940s and 1950s were heirs of Stieglitz.

In the best of the work produced by Cartier-Bresson, Eisenstaedt, David Douglas Duncan, Eugene Smith, Bruce Davidson and the late Eliot Elisofon there is that balance between reportage and interpretation—the imprint of the personal vision—that Stieglitz prized. Cornell Capa, founder of the new International Center of Photography, calls them "graphic journalists" and calls the development of the magazine "photo-essay," grounded in news and

Edward Steichen, *Gloria Swanson "New York, 1924."*



people, a major step in the maturation of photography.

But the very existence of the ICP points toward a new future for photography. With the big picture magazines gone, the image must excel on its own and not merely as a record of a well-known face or spectacular event. Nearly all of the established "public photographers" are involved in books and projects with a deeply personal turn.


Cartier-Bresson has published *About Russia*, a photo-memoir of his journey through the Soviet Union. Bruce Davidson's close-up study of a Harlem block—"East 100th Street"—came out as an exhibition plus book at the Museum of Modern Art in 1970. Richard Avedon—who is noted as a chronicler of beautiful faces—in 1974 exhibited eight searching portraits of his aging father at the New York Museum of Modern Art. Irving Penn, in his book *Worlds in a Small Room*, makes luminous personal statements by combining studio techniques with exotic subjects from places like Africa, India—and California. Eugene Smith's pictures made in Minimata, Japan, a village ravaged by pollution-induced disease, are equally searing as reporting and art. Charles Harbutt, a veteran of photojournalism, has published *Travelog*, a book of intricate and experimental photographs that won the Grand Prix du Festival d'Arles in Europe in 1974.

Breaking the Boundaries

Cornell Capa blames the decline of photojournalism on the hypnotizing immediacy of television. But there are deeper forces at work, based on the growing awareness that the photograph is only a "document" in the most ambiguous sense. Robert Frank's crucial book *The Americans*, published in 1959, was blatantly opinionated and antiheroic, filled with grotesque shopping centers, lonely six-lane highways, and vapid, brutalized faces. It was a new and for some a disturbing kind of book, discarding the photograph-as-document for the photograph-as-viewpoint.

The success of *The Americans*—it quickly became an underground and university-student icon—was followed by an explosion of new photographic talent, shattering the old boundaries of the medium, in form and in content. A young woman named Diane Arbus, influenced by Frank and by the legendary Frenchman Eugène Atget, whose work was little known until recently, began to photograph men and women on the margins of society—giants, dwarfs, transvestites, paraplegics—in all their disturbing humanity.

Lee Friendlander and Gary Winogrand launched a whole genre of contemporary picture making, using the instant camera to catch not arty, "significant" images, but the whiff of everyday life—cars, animals, people and store windows, juxtaposed awkwardly against



Minor White, *Knothole*, 1967: "a tree trunk near Dark Canyon Lake, Utah—a visual feast of splintery texture."

the harsh and sometimes shocking background of the city. Ralph Gibson went a step beyond Frank, publishing a book (*The Insomniacs*) in which the pictures act as poems, each one carefully prepared before the magic button is pressed, to reveal macabre images—a hand silhouetted against an open doorway, a half face pressed against a rain-streaked window.

Another turning point occurred when veteran photographer Minor White came to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1965 to found a radically new department of creative photography which shifted the emphasis from craft to philosophy, politics and the body unashamed. White's 1970 exhibition, "Being Without Clothes," freed nude photography from titillation and soft-focus sentimentality. The nudes, submitted from all over the U.S., were frank and sharp-focused, with all ages, shapes and sexes revealed to the lens.

It is the work of these post-Frank artists that has established American photography as a medium at once of major and of

popular importance. The traveling Diane Arbus retrospective, organized in 1972 after her tragic suicide, attracted hundreds of thousands of viewers across the United States and abroad; the book published with it by Aperture Press has sold more than 60,000 copies. Her work has inspired a breed of younger artists to photograph reality without preconception or inhibition.

For Duane Michals, the photograph is the flashpoint of an idea. His pictures are organized in the form of tiny photo-stories, through which the viewer moves to a mysterious climax. Michals' photo sequences reveal the surprise that often lurks behind mundane reality. "Photography to me is a matter of thinking rather than looking," says Michals. "It's revelation, not description."



Diane Arbus, *Identical Twins*: "reality without preconception or inhibition."

Exploring the Frontiers

For Judy Dater, photography is still description, but mixed with revelation. With her husband, Jack Welpott, an important photographer in his own right, she has been exploring the frontier of the portrait and the female nude for more than five years. Dater's women are unique: alert, full-bodied, rich with inner vibrance and strength. Dater and Welpott published the results of their work in a book—*A Soft Answer*—that went further with the nude, into yet franker studies of the body, male as well as female.

These photographers accept the image recorded by the lens, the "straight" photograph, without any tampering. For them the revolution occurs beforehand—in the choice of subject. Larry Clark's "Tulsa," a candid diary of a teenage gang high on amphetamines, is a prime example of this, as is his book, *Kid Crump*, an investigation into adolescent sex rites.

Danny Lyon and Geoff Winningham are pioneers in documentary themes. Lyon is the photographer par excellence of the motorcycle gang and the agricultural workers of the Southwest and Mexico. Winningham is the poet of the sports subculture—from baseball at the Houston Astrodome to professional wrestling, which he limns in

huge, finely structured pictures in his book *Friday Night at the Coliseum*. Like Duane Michals, Les Krims works in photo-stories, but his are irreverently and scatologically funny: his own mother is a frequent subject (in one picture, she is covered from head to toe with snapshots), as is a squadron of heavy-breasted nudes, walking the line between sex and satire.

The Color of Life

The "straight" photography has been the basis of the remarkable rise of serious color photography. Despite the achievements of a Marc Riboud or an Eliot Porter, color has been scorned in the past by many photographers for its "prettiness." But in recent years the color photograph has been taken to a new pitch of excellence by men and women like William Eggleston, Helen Levitt and the team of José Lopez and Luis Medina. Eggleston specializes in landing his camera on real-life images that come to life and meaning only in color: shabby store fronts in glowing orange, a bathroom lined in garish green cabinets, graveyard bouquets laid out in pastel blues. The "street realism" of Levitt and Lopez-Medina excels in the same way: using color as a means of heightening the life and meaning of the subject. "Our colors are harsher than life," says Medina.

Meanwhile, Polaroid's revolutionary SX-70 has already won the respect of several major talents. Prime among these is Walker Evans, whose *Let Us Now Praise Famous Men* (with the collaboration of writer James Agee) was the most brilliant of all the documentaries of the 1930s Depression. In his seventies, Evans is still a living influence on American photography. He has already produced several surprising images with the SX-70, focusing on the paradoxical beauty of such detritus as spattered road signs and wrecked, rusting automobiles, in the manner of his younger colleagues like Emmet Gowin, Les Krims, and Mark Cohen.

But there is another wave—running strong and clear alongside the Stieglitz-Evans-Arbus-Gowin wave—that is changing the very nature of the photographic image, as well as its shape. To photographers in this group, neither the camera nor the image it records on the film is in any sense sacred. The leader of this rambunctious "school" is Jerry N. Uelsmann, who began more than a decade ago to double-focus, overexpose and reverse his negatives—and then, finally, to collage together images from many different photographs to "create" his end print. In Uelsmann's work, trees, rivers, rocks and faces recorded on different days come together in unpredictable ways. "The camera," he says, "is a fluid way of encountering that other reality."

Others have gone even further than Uelsmann in the manipulation of the photographic image, in the darkroom and beyond. Todd



Jerry N. Uelsmann, *Nude with Pod in Hand*, 1972.

Walker solarizes his prints (exposing them early to light), producing a silvery, metallic texture. Naomi Savage etches her negatives deep into copper plates, preserving them virtually as tone objects. Lynton Wells and Robert Heinecken print their photographs on linen shaped like the photographed objects themselves—Wells' life-sized photographic "statue" uses this method. Sonia Sheridan and Texas artist Robert Wade produce thirty- to fifty-foot images on canvas and on cloth.

Manipulating the Image

But these processes—among them multiple-image photography, holography and 3M color copying—are simply means. The meaning implicit in these photographs of unprecedented shape, texture and size is far more important than the techniques. "It is conceptual expansion," says William Jenkins, curator of modern photography at the venerable George Eastman House in Rochester, in New York State. "At last the photograph is being accepted as something ordinary, not special: it can be painted on or walked on. The idea has made the medium more exciting and more sophisticated. That's one reason that collectors are now interested."

Behind the sophistication inherent in the new manipulation of the image is the sophistication inherent in the photographers themselves. They have grown up in a climate quite different from

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the climate against which Stieglitz, Steichen, Evans and even Frank, in the 1950s, had to struggle. It is a time when the photograph is accepted completely among painters, print makers and vanguard conceptual artists. Andy Warhol and Robert Rauschenberg both incorporate the photograph in their work. With his groundbreaking book *Twenty-six Gasoline Stations*, Ed Ruscha escalated the snapshot-as-document to a new respectability in the early 1960s. Conceptualist Douglas Huebler bases much of his work upon the photograph's raw virtues (a current goal is "photographing everyone alive"). And the "photo-realism" movement in painting owes its very existence to the camera image.

The new photographers are acutely conscious of the photograph as an instrument of culture. Says Peter C. Bunnell, professor of the history of photography at Princeton University: "They are aware—and their successors will be even more so—that photography lies within the largest whole of social, political and cultural thought."

Everybody's Family Album

Who will employ all of these finely trained photographers, as well as critics and teachers? It is a question that troubles many, particularly those who remember the day when the goal of a young photographer was simple and straightforward: to get his pictures into *Life* magazine. The situation is now neither so simple nor so lucrative, but it is richer and freer. The function of photography is changing—from serving as the prime means of recording events (now the growing chore of television) to serving as an instrument of personal expression, close to painting but quicker, cheaper, and more available. American society, meanwhile, as if on cue, has built a support structure for this function—not only in the schools but in foundation funds: in 1974, the National Endowment for the Arts awarded \$250,000 to fifty photographers, an event inconceivable to Stieglitz.

Not that the humble photograph will ever lose its earthy connotations. Jonathan Green's book, *The Snapshot*, exhaustively documents the symbiotic link between the work of finest American photographers and their first experience of photography—through the family album of snapshots. "Every one of us has been moved by the beauty of such pictures," says photographer Tod Papageorge. "They are charms and proverbs...like lightning and wild strawberries."

There is something of this feeling in everyone who looks at a photograph, even the most sophisticated observer. There is no gainsaying the strong emotional power of a medium that is inseparable from itself, and that is now a part of its highest culture.

A HOLOGRAPHY PRIMER

By Isaac Asimov

Did you ever wish you could do something about a blurry but admired photograph of a relative, or see the face behind an object in a photo? According to a noted science writer, science can now do just that. The advent of the laser has opened up a new field of three-dimensional, lensless photography that, Isaac Asimov says, may be the greatest advance in recording and reproducing images since the evolution of that marvelous organ, the human eye.

Isaac Asimov is professor of biochemistry at Boston University Medical School and one of America's foremost science authors. He has written more than a hundred volumes of both interpretative science writing and imaginative science fiction. Recent works include *The New Intelligent Man's Guide to Science*, *The Genetic Code*, and *Of Time Space and Other Things*. The following article is reprinted from the *Saturday Review of Science*.



In 1971 the Nobel Prize for physics went to Dennis Gabor, a Hungarian-born British subject now working in America. He had earned the award in 1947, nearly a quarter-century before, by inventing a process of recording images in a way that reproduced far more information than could be done by any other technique known. Because it contained virtually all the information, Gabor named the process "holography," from Greek words meaning "the whole message."

For sixteen years the process and the name slumbered in technical journals. Then in 1963 two electrical engineers at the University of Michigan, Emmett N. Leith and Juris Upatnieks, carried the Gabor technique a step further and made the front pages of newspapers.

Where Gabor had worked with electron waves and had applied his technique to improving the images formed by electron microscopes, Leith and Upatnieks applied the techniques to light. Using the then newly developed laser, they produced a transparent sheet of film that was grayish in color, like an underexposed photographic film, and used it to form a three-dimensional image in remarkably fine detail, and they did it without lenses.

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How was it done?

To begin with, let us consider photography, a process that is by now quite familiar to us (though when it was first developed over a century ago, it seemed just as mysterious to the general public).

Photography depends on the ability of light to initiate certain chemical changes. Without going into detail, we can say that light causes a colorless solution of a certain type to precipitate tiny black granules. If the solution is mixed with gelatin, coated on a film, and allowed to dry, the entire film will turn dark if it is exposed to light briefly and then treated with appropriate chemicals.

Suppose, however, that the film is exposed to light only indirectly, that the light is allowed to shine on some object, and that only the portion of the light that is reflected off the object in the proper direction strikes the film. Some parts of the object will reflect light more efficiently than other parts will; some parts will reflect light directly toward the film, while other parts direct the light more or less away from the film; some parts will scatter the light that falls on them, sending it in many directions, while others will reflect the light without scattering.

The result of these differences in detail is this: The reflected beam of light will possess fine differences in brightness from point to point. When such a reflected beam of light enters our eyes, the pattern of varying light and dark is turned into a pattern of electrical impulses in the optic nerve. Our brain interprets the pattern in such a way as to give us an idea of the shape, the color, the texture, and so on, of the object that has reflected the light. We "see" the object.

Patterns of Varying Brightness

But what if the same reflected beam of light falls on the photographic film? The pattern of varying brightness in the beam would then reproduce itself on the film. At a point on the film where there impinges a portion of the light beam that is quite bright, a considerable amount of chemical change is induced. Upon proper treatment, that point becomes dark indeed. Where there impinges a dim portion of the light beam, there is little chemical change, and that part of the film remains light.

Producing a proper pattern on the film requires that the film be enclosed in a box. This prevents light from striking the film from anything other than the object we want to record. Also, from each point on the object a sheaf of reflected light fans out. If all this light entered the opening in the box, each part of the film would be subject to some light from every part of the object, and the result would be a featureless blurring of the entire film. To prevent this, a lens is placed in the opening. Light passing through the lens is collected into a focus and brought to the film in an orderly fashion.

(The light-recording part of the eye, the retina, is also enclosed in a "box," the eyeball; and behind the eye's opening, the pupil, there is also a lens.)

The light focused on the film by the lens in the camera produces an image of the object that reflected the light—but in reverse. The brighter portions of the beam are recorded as dark spots on the film, and the dim portions as light spots. The result is a "photographic negative."

If featureless light is made to shine through a photographic negative so that the light falls on a fresh film, the process is reversed again. All the dark places on the negative produce a dim portion of the beam passing through and are recorded as light places on the new film, and vice versa. The new result is a "photographic positive" that records the light-and-dark pattern of the beam, exactly as it was reflected from the object.

If certain dyes are added to the film, advantage can be taken of the fact that some objects reflect light of particular wave lengths. If three images are superimposed on the film, each involving a different wave length of light, a photographic positive is produced that shows color rather than a mere dark-and-light pattern.

Assuming that the photography has been properly conducted, that the proper amount of light has entered the camera, and that the lens has been properly focused, one "sees" the object on the film as in reality, and the image is recorded for as long as the film endures.

Incomplete Reality

But is the image really *exactly* like the reality? No, not really. Actually, the aspect of reality that the photographic image produces is quite incomplete. Suppose you look at an object—say two chessmen on a chessboard—through a small rectangular picture frame so as to make the object and its surroundings appear similar to the photographed image on the rectangular film. What then are the differences between the real object and the image? (Of course, you can touch and feel the real object and not the photographic image, but let us confine ourselves to visual properties only.)

Clearly it is possible to tell image from reality by vision alone. Suppose you shift your head slightly as you look at the real object through the frame. What you see also shifts. From one position, the nearer chessman may obscure the one behind it; but as you move your head, the farther chessman seems to move out somewhat from behind the closer one. You see the real object in three dimensions, and can look around an obstacle by moving your head.

This is not possible with the film. The film may give an illusion of three dimensions; a more distant object will look smaller than a

similar object that is closer; the lines of a chessboard may show perspective. Still, however clever the photographic image, the appearance of three dimensions remains an illusion and nothing more. No matter how you shift the position of your head, the image that you see never changes. You see one view and one view only.

Another difference is this. In looking at a real setting, you can focus your eyes on a nearer object, leaving a farther one out of focus, or, in reverse, you can focus on the farther at the expense of the nearer. You can move back and forth at will from one focus to the other. The image has a single focus. If the farther chessman is photographed a bit out of focus so that the nearer one is clear and sharp (or vice versa), nothing you can do with your eyes can bring the out-of-focus portion into focus.

The reason for these limitations of the ordinary photograph is that it is the recording of the intersection of the light pattern with a flat, featureless surface (the photographic film). The intersection, not surprisingly, has the properties of a flat surface, and in the process the reflected beam of light loses all its dimensional information. Photography ("the light message") is not holography ("the whole message").

But suppose you record the intersection of the light pattern with something more complex than a featureless, flat surface. Suppose you record the intersection of the light pattern with *another light pattern*.

A beam of light consists of very tiny waves. The pattern in a beam exists because some light waves have a greater amplitude than others do (they move farther up and down). This means the pattern is brighter in some places than it is in others. The pattern also exists because some light waves are longer than others, which means that the pattern shows different colors from place to place.

Changing Patterns of Light

If two beams of light cross each other at an angle, particular waves in one beam may happen to match particular waves in the other. Both waves move up and down together. The result is that they reinforce each other. In combination the two move up and down farther than either would separately. The combination of waves is brighter than either alone would be.

In this way, when two patterns cross, the waves interfere with each other to form a new pattern of light and dark that wasn't present in either of the two original patterns. The new pattern is called an "interference pattern."

If you have an interference pattern, you can, in theory, work out two patterns that could, in combination, form the interference pattern. The trouble is that any of an infinite number of combinations

could have formed the interference pattern, and there would be no way of deciding exactly which combinations did the job in reality.

Of course, if you knew one pattern of the two that formed the combination, you could calculate the other. To do this most easily, however, you would want the pattern to be as uniform as possible. If one beam of light were simply uniform from one side to the other, with no variations in brightness or color, then the pattern of the other beam could be determined from the resultant interference pattern.

But how are we going to get a beam of uniform light—a “reference beam”? Ordinary sunlight won’t do. Sunlight might look blank and patternless, but it consists of a mixture of many colors of light waves in a whole range of wave lengths. To work out the components of an interference pattern, where the simpler of the combining beams is as complicated as apparently featureless sunlight, is impractical.

But how about producing a single color of light by heating some chemical substance that will then emit a single wave length of light? Even that is not enough, for some of the light waves go in one direction, some in another. Even a beam of ordinary monochromatic (one-color) light is not really featureless.

In fact, when Dennis Gabor first worked out the techniques of using interference patterns, there was no conceivable way these techniques could be employed for light waves. Nowhere, either in nature or in the laboratory, did a beam of light exist in which all the waves were of exactly the same length and moving in exactly the same direction. Unless such a beam could be made, there was no reference beam blank enough to allow us to calculate the pattern of the other beam with certainty from the interference pattern of the two. Gabor used his technique for wave-forms other than light waves where a calculation could be made.


Advent of the Laser

But then in 1960 the American physicist Theodore Howard Maiman constructed the first laser. The laser is a device that produces a powerful beam of light in which all the waves are of exactly the same length and in which all the waves move in exactly the same direction. At last the truly blank reference beam existed. The laser beam contains no pattern, no “information.” When it crosses a reflected beam, all the information in the interference pattern can be referred to the reflected beam alone.

Suppose, then, we set up a situation as follows. A laser beam is made to shine obliquely on a piece of glass that is so treated as to allow half the beam to pass through, while the other half is reflected. The half of the beam that passes through continues to travel in a straight line until it passes through a rectangular opening.

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The half of the beam that is reflected strikes some object, and some of it is reflected again in such a way as to pass through the same rectangular opening.



The Holographic Process. "Laser light is filtered into two beams, a reflected beam and an object beam. The reflected beam strikes a mirror, bounces off and hits a photographic plate. The object beam strikes the object, bounces off and hits the plate at the same location. The successfully exposed film is the 'hologram'."

The original laser beam (without a pattern) crosses over the richly patterned reflected beam and produces an interference pattern. All the information of the interference pattern would refer to the pattern of the reflected beam. If you were to look through the opening from the other side, you would see the object clearly despite the interference pattern formed with the laser beam.

However, instead of allowing the eye to look through the opening, suppose we put a photographic film in the opening. In that case a photograph will be taken of the interference pattern. All the light and dark areas will be recorded. The pattern could be so fine, however—the alternate patches of light and dark so tiny—that nothing would be visible to the eye. The film would merely take on a slight grayness.

The successfully exposed and fixed film, carrying the interference pattern, is a "hologram."

Now suppose that a laser beam is made to shine on the hologram at the same angle as the original laser beam when the hologram was formed. The laser beam illuminates the same interference pattern that had been set up when, originally, it had crossed the reflected beam. (Techniques have been developed whereby ordinary white light can be substituted for laser light at *this* stage.)

The Whole Message


If you look through the hologram illuminated by the laser beam, matters will be exactly the same (from the visual angle) as when you looked through the opening previously. You will see the object as if it were actually there. You will see it in its actual size, its actual appearance, and even its actual three-dimensional characteristics. The hologram is the whole message.

If, through the hologram, you are looking at the image of the two chessmen, one partly behind the other, and you move your head in one direction, you will see less of it. Furthermore, you can focus on the nearer chessman, allowing the rear one to go somewhat out of focus.

Of course, you can't do more to the image than you could do to the real object; it would be unreasonable to expect to do so. When you look at the real object through a rectangular opening, there is a limit to how far you can see around an obstacle. If you move your head too far in one direction or another, you can move yourself out of the range of vision through the opening. The hologram fixes the opening, and you can't move beyond it. In the case of the real image, you can move around and behind it to look at its rear but only at the expense of getting entirely away from the opening. Therefore, you can't do that in the case of the holographic image.

Then, too, you can expect no surprises in a single photograph of a

Three Views of a Shark. "Three exposures of a single hologram plate taken from different angles."



holographic image. A photograph taken of such an image is only a photograph, quite two-dimensional, and in itself has no holographic properties. However, you can take different photographs of the same holographic image; you can take photographs at different focuses and from different angles. The individual photographs may be ordinary, but a number of them taken together will give you a hint of the versatility of the holographic image.

There are some important ways in which a hologram that has recorded an interference pattern differs from an ordinary photograph that has recorded a flat intersection of a reflection pattern. For one thing, there is no such thing as a hologram negative or a hologram positive. If all the white-and-dark areas of an interference pattern were reversed, it would still be the same interference pattern carrying the same information.

Then, too, a hologram is recorded without a lens. Different parts of the interference pattern are not focused on different parts of the hologram. Instead, every portion of the hologram is bathed in the crossing over of the two beams of light so that the interference pattern is recorded again and again on every part of the hologram.

If you cut a hologram in half, you would not be left with two halves of a complete picture. Each half of the hologram could be used to produce the complete holographic image. If you tore the hologram into ten ragged pieces, each piece could be used to produce the complete holographic image. If you scratched the hologram, the part actually scratched would be spoiled, but all the rest would still produce the complete holographic image with no signs of a scratch upon it. If you punched a hole in the hologram, you would still get an image with no sign of a hole. Dust upon the hologram would not interfere either, because the portions not covered by dust particles would still do the work.

Repetition of Patterns

There is, however, a limitation.

The interference patterns on the different parts of the hologram—actually repetitions of the same pattern—reinforce one another. The more repetitions there are on the pattern, the sharper and clearer the image is. As the hologram is torn into smaller and smaller pieces, or as it is subjected to more and more holes and scratches or to a thicker and thicker dust cover, the dimmer and fuzzier the image becomes.

You can see this if you imagine someone writing his name with a very light pressure on a hard pencil and with a very shaky stroke. The name may be too dim and shaky to make out. If he repeats the process, though, writing his name over and over again in the same place, there will be repeated places where the pencil strokes will

cross one another and where the result will be a darkening.

In the end, after hundreds of repetitions, there may be a gray area around the main thrust of his pencil strokes, but the crossings will concentrate along the lines and curves the writer is trying to make. The result will be that this name will appear sharper, darker, and more even than any single pencil stroke could have made it.

If you then imagine the pencil strokes removed one by one, the whole name will still be there, but it will gradually grow dimmer and fuzzier. This is analogous to removing more and more of the pattern repetitions on the hologram by tearing, piercing, scratching, or dusting.

What are the applications of holography? To what use can it be put?

It is not revolutionizing the world all at once, for there is more to technological innovation than the mere working out of a new concept. It has to be made competitive; the concept has to be translated into hardware that will do something not only better than before but more conveniently, more simply, more cheaply, or all three.

For instance, holograms can be made of some structure in double exposure. The object being holographed is left unstressed the first time and is placed under some stress the second. The difference in the interference patterns produced represents defects of one sort or another in specific places in the structure being holographed. In this way holography can be used to test airplane wings, for instance, nondestructively. However, such objects can also be tested by X-rays and ultrasonic sound, and holographic techniques are not as yet sufficiently better or cheaper or more convenient to cause a wholesale shift in nondestructive testing.

Holographic techniques could be used to produce three-dimensional television or movie effects, but holography produces too much information for television or movie techniques to handle just yet. Holography must wait for the older systems to catch up to its advances.

Making Fuzzy Photos Sharp

Nevertheless, holography can do some things right now that cannot be done otherwise. One interesting application is its use in de-blurring fuzzy photographs. It was the desire to do this that led Gabor to the original invention of the technique with respect to electron microphotographs.

Photographs can be blurred through known failings in the system used. However, a laser beam can be passed through the blurred photograph, and an interference pattern can be produced that will cancel out the effects of the failings. A new photograph appears in which the blurring has been greatly reduced.

The technique has been applied very successfully to the photographs taken by electron microscopes. Such deblurring extends the range through which electron microscopes can produce successful magnifications. By use of the technique, the double helix of virus nucleic acid was shown for the first time, and eventually single atoms may be made out.

It is also quite possible that holograms will be employed for the storage of information, a use for which their three-dimensional properties are not needed. For instance, holograms might replace ordinary photographic techniques in many cases, since the holograms would be insensitive to scratching and minor damages that would be sufficient to spoil ordinary photographic film. Television cassettes may therefore become holographic eventually.

Then, too, hundreds of pictures can be recorded holographically on a single piece of film. When laser light is made to shine through the film at a series of angles, each differing slightly from the next, a whole series of different interference patterns is formed with a whole series of different objects. These can then all be projected as a laser beam shines on the completed hologram, first at one angle, then at another. Image after image appears; the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* might be stored on a hologram the size of a sheet of typing paper—a sheet that under ordinary photographic techniques could record but one image and no more. This same ability to store enormous quantities of information may result in the development of holographic memories for computers.


However, it is useless to attempt prediction too closely in order to see what holographic techniques might do, for instance, to aid medical diagnoses or surgical methods. Technology often takes surprising turns. Holography is a versatile means of handling large quantities of information, and exactly how it may be applied could depend on ingenious discoveries that would prove as sudden, as unexpected, and as productive as Gabor's original inspiration proved to be.

ANSEL ADAMS AND THE SEARCH FOR PERFECTION

By Wallace Stegner

The Ansel Adams signature in photography is bold and incisive, as large as that of John Hancock, the signer of the Declaration of Independence, and as easy to read. Austerity, severity, precision, sharpness of focus, seriousness of technique—all are devoted to recording with an inward passion the grandeur and strictness of nature and man. Mr. Stegner, an ardent writer about the American West, the subject of so many of Adams photographs, relates the great American photographer to the workshop of the pioneer Alfred Stieglitz; both were artists who rigorously sought to see into the world with the hard-won vision of their craft.

A prolific writer, Wallace Stegner has won acclaim for his books, *Angle of Repose* (Pulitzer Prize, 1972), *All the Little Live Things* (Commonwealth Club gold medal, 1967), and *Remembering Laughter* (Little, Brown & Company's prize for a novelette). He won the O. Henry first prize for a short story in 1950. He is editor-in-chief of *American West*.



A photograph is made, not taken," Ansel Adams says. In that single statement are subsumed his more than fifty years in pursuit of excellence in photography: his exploration of its expressive possibilities; his mastery of its techniques, processes, practical chemistry, and physics; his development of the zone system, which has taught tens of thousands to see like a camera and to pre-visualize the finished print before they ever set shutter and lens; and his consistent effort to deal with photography as a fine art.

"The simple statement of the lens" is what he says he is after. But he is the first to insist that the lens can do nothing its operator does not make it do. It is as sensitive as he is, no more. Photography is not button-pushing; the camera does not make its pictures automatically, the way a lighthouse blinks its lights. It is a concept, a vision of the world translated into shades of gray, and communicated "in terms of simple devotion to the medium—a statement of the utmost clarity and perfection possible."


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Adams was converted to the "brilliant image" in 1930, when, in Taos, New Mexico, he looked at some negatives of Paul Strand's and saw in them a luminousness and clarity he had not believed could be captured by a camera. For years he had been in training to be a concert pianist, and was already teaching and performing; but photography had been an increasingly urgent diversion. What Strand showed him ended the indecision about his career. Adams put aside not only the concert career but the soft focus, the atmospheric effects, and the imitation of painting that had marked many of his early photographs, and dedicated himself to "straight" photography; the uncompromising statement of the lens.

By 1932 he had his first one-man show, and with Edward Weston, Imogen Cunningham, and others had founded Group f/64, whose inaugural exhibition at the De Young Museum in San Francisco was a benchmark in the establishment of photography as a legitimate and distinct art, in which the camera is not a substitute brush but a way of seeing. Though f/64 held together only about a year (Adams and Weston both encouraged its breakup because they feared the formation of a coterie), neither Adams nor Weston, nor indeed any of the group, ever abandoned the ideal of precision and sharp focus that had been their reason for coming together, and whose influence persists.

Apprentice Years

His old friend Francis Farquhar, who as editor of the *Sierra Club Bulletin* published many of Adams' early writings and photographs, has remarked on how swiftly, once he saw his way, Adams achieved a reputation as one of the great photographers of the world. But no one should forget how long the apprenticeship actually was. From the time when he made his first photographs with a box Brownie camera in Yosemite in the summer of 1916, when he was fourteen years old, he had been an enthusiastic, precocious, and energetic amateur. In successive years, mostly during the summers when he traded the piano for the mountains, he developed into an increasingly able professional. Nevertheless, Adams did not make a negative that completely pleased him until he caught Banner Peak and Thousand Island Lake in a clearing storm in 1923—and that was seven years after his beginnings as a photographer. It was three years more before he made another negative—that splendid: *Monolith: the Face of Half Dome*, so massive, serene, and eternal that it might be the throne of God. Those two still rank among the magnificent statements of his lens, but they were isolated peaks in a range of high competence. After the Taos revelation of 1930 Adams dedicated himself to the kind of perfection they had half-accidentally achieved.



Ansel Adams, *Monolith: the Face of Half-Dome*, 1925; "massive, serene, and eternal"

His training in music guided and greatly subtilized his development as an artist with the camera. It taught him to think of the negative as the score, and the print as the performance, and he transferred from music to photography the effort to achieve the purest clarity of tone. It also taught him that technique is of the essence. If you want to be a pianist, you practice seven or eight hours a day, until your keyboard technique is capable of everything you might demand of it. If you want to be a photographer, you practice until the camera is an extension of eye and hand; you seek the technical means to handle every expressive need. Though in music you deal in sound, in musical tones, and in photography you deal in light, in tones of brightness, perfection is as difficult and as much to be desired in one medium as in the other.

Perfection, Adams decided, meant the achievement of the artist's vision, which was not a merely visual perception but a complex act of perception and transference, a conception of the finished print bounded by enclosing lines and translated into tones of brightness from almost pure white to almost pure black. In nature, Adams points out, there are colors, brilliant or subtle, that the photographer must see as equivalents on the brightness scale of grays; and in nature there are—properly speaking—no forms, only shapes. Imagination transmutes shapes into forms, and technique painstakingly realizes the forms in the symbolic system of photographic art, so that a sheet of paper printed in tones of gray can actually strike the viewer with more force and suggestiveness than would the natural objects from which it was made.

Zone System

Not many photographers had ever taken photography with such seriousness as young Adams, and few if any had ever possessed his double gift of artistic vision and proficiency with all kinds of apparatus and machinery. In only a few years, he was acknowledged to be one of the most gifted technicians in the entire history of photography, and he has maintained his proficiency, constantly testing the art's ultimate possibilities, constantly experimenting, constantly refreshing and enlarging his skill. Even now, when he is past seventy, he experiments all the time, though he has long since determined the capacity and usefulness of every existing sort of lens, filter, light meter, film, exposure technique, paper, developer, and darkroom process. His "zone system" of exposing according to the placement of subject luminances on the exposure scale of the negative has made the principles of sensitometry available to everyone, and gone a long way toward eliminating the guesswork and "averaging" from exposure. But his is not a rigid system. The vision must dictate the technique.

What he has learned he has made available. His five books, which together are called *Basic Photo*, as well as his *Polaroid Land Photography Manual* and the series of workshops and seminars that he began for *U.S. Camera* in Yosemite in 1940, renewed at the museum of Modern Art in 1945, and has conducted annually in Yosemite since 1946—all those continue to give practical and theoretical instruction to amateurs and professionals alike. In recent years he has added a series of workshops at the University of California, Santa Cruz. He has been artist and technician, teacher and consultant, and always a complete professional.

Yet having become probably the most skilled practitioner of his complex art, Adams values skill only for what it lets him do. "The excellence of the mechanics is taken for granted," he said. He is not the sort of rigid purist who will never tamper even slightly with negative or print—as though the camera's wink were the blink of God and must not be questioned. He does spot his negatives and prints. But he is not in the slightest a trickster or gadgeteer. Despite his interest in the expansion of photographic possibility (he did long service as a consultant to the Polaroid Corporation), he dislikes gadgetry and the photographic magazines, whose purpose seems to be to persuade people that they can buy their way to artistry by multiplying equipment. Anyone who studies the photographic data Adams customarily provides with his prints and books will discover that he habitually uses only two or three cameras and a few basic lenses and filters, together with the developers and papers he has found best. Limitation, he is convinced, breeds expertise. "I like to believe that if I found myself restricted to a simple box camera I could create a legitimate and expressive technique around it," he says, for "what the photographer sees, and what he says about what he sees, have far greater importance than the possession of mere mechanical equipment."

Analogy with Literature

The arts have a reassuring way of corroborating one another. Joseph Conrad once similarly disparaged the mere gift of words, remarking that possession of a firearm did not necessarily make a hunter or warrior. And when he came to define the intention of his writing, in the celebrated preface to *The Nigger of the Narcissus*, he might have been speaking of photography, and out of the mouth of Ansel Adams: "My task which I am trying to achieve is . . . before all, to make you see. That—and no more, and it is everything." No more than Conrad, would Adams interpret the word "see" literally, as referring only to the "recording" of "reality." When Adams asks us to see, he is asking us to see *into*. His mysteries, like his shadows, are never totally black; ghostly textures of meaning lurk in them.

His middle tones are rich with detail. His clouds and snow are almost never bleached white, and his skies are rarely bland.

There is a sense, he says, in which any subject is only a collection of brightness. But his brightnesses, high or low in the scale, are complex—he dislikes the violence of harsh unmodulated contrasts—and they are somehow more than simply the light values that make up rocks, trees, and falling water. They communicate a reverence for the forms of the world. Without yielding a particle of their precision and clarity, they tend always to become hymns to the strength, delicacy, and beauty of the earth. By the time we have examined a characteristic Adams print long enough to say with certainty, “I see,” we mean that we not only see, we understand and feel.

Far from using his camera simply to record the external world in the way that is suggested by the cant phrase “photographic realism,” Adams believes that as photography “approaches the simulation of reality it withdraws from the aesthetic experience of reality.” That is one reason he prefers black and white to color. In black and white there is a cooler distance between the world and its symbolic representation. Black and white demands the act of artistic transformation; it does not allow the easy and vulgar effects he suggests in his ironic motto for color photographers: “If you can’t make it good, make it red.”

Adams is like the poet Walt Whitman in his affection for “the simpler things of the world, humbly or mystically seen.” What he

Ansel Adams, *Self-Portrait*



focusses on his ground glass is not a reproduction but a vision, an experience, and therefore it is, like all true art that I know anything about, to some extent a self-portrait. “A great photograph is a full expression of what one feels about what is being photographed . . . and is, thereby, a true expression of what one feels about life in its entirety.” At the same time, his kind of photography is an art of “found objects,” not of organization and manipulation and self-conscious composition. Composition for Adams is simply the best way of seeing. He will not tinker with a subject beyond removing extraneous objects; he works by nat-


ural light, and he rejects the excessive "dodging" and darkroom tricks that attempt to make bad negatives into good ones. The extent of his manipulation is whatever the negative or print demands to become what he previsualized. A magician of the darkroom, he will not use his magic to cheat, and by the same token he is unwilling to be at the mercy of someone else's incompetence or dishonesty. By preference he sells his photographs as prints or portfolios. When they are reproduced by printing processes, he stands over the printer—and he long ago learned enough about the printer's trade to instruct most professionals.

Influence of Stieglitz

Any discussion of Adams' view of art and life comes around eventually to Alfred Stieglitz, whom he first met in 1933 and who, in 1936, gave him a one-man show at An American Place—the first one-man show Stieglitz gave a photographer since he introduced Paul Strand in 1917. Admiration of the kind that Adams felt for Stieglitz is always to some degree recognition of qualities the admirer already possessed in himself. Stieglitz corroborated Adams' perception of photography as a fine art, and he set him an example of the highest personal and artistic integrity. No one, not even Strand, Georgia O'Keeffe, John Marin, and the people who had made Taos luminous for him at the end of the 1920s, had a stronger influence on him. When in 1948 he published *Portfolio One*, he dedicated it to Stieglitz and took pains to speak of its twelve photographs in Stieglitz's own term: "equivalents." He wanted them understood as what both he and Stieglitz believed art should be, testimonials to "a spiritual identification with the world."

The belief is basic, and has not changed. There are no periods in Ansel Adams' work, though in recent years he has worked more with small cameras and with the Polaroid Land processes. As an artist, he found his way early, and has pursued the way he found. On his seventieth birthday, speaking at the Metropolitan Museum of Art, he reasserted the Stieglitz position as if fifty years of artistic nihilism, experimentation, iconoclasm, cynicism, spiritual muckraking, and the arrogance of fashionable despairs had never intervened: "I believe, with Alfred Stieglitz, that art is the affirmation of life."

As a professional, Adams has photographed all sorts of things for no reason more artistic than that the interests of his clients demanded their reproduction. He does not apologize for that. In fact, every now and then the chance that is an element in all art, and especially in art concerned principally with found objects, can let a photographer transcend the practical limitations of a job, and bring him face to face with something that he leaps to interpret. Thus *Rails and Jet Trails* came out of an assignment to record the history



Ansel Adams, *Rails and Jet Trails, Roseville, California, 1958*

of Northern California for the American Trust Company, and *Mount Williamson* out of Adams selfimposed task of rendering justice to the Japanese-American internees at the Manzanar Relocation Camp. Accident favors the prepared. When Hamlet said, "The readiness is all," he might have been voicing a motto for photographers.

Adams feels deeply about what he sees, he has a reverence for the earth in all its variety, delicacy, and strength, but he is the absolute

reverse of effusive: he sees with such austerity, even severity, that some have mistakenly called him cold. He has an incomparable technical expertness in communicating what he sees and feels, and for a half century and more he has gone on making photographs so plainly stamped with his personal artistry that they hardly need his signature.

The Adams Signature

That a great Adams photograph literally signs itself is due partly to his qualities as seer and interpreter, but it would be foolish to deny that his most characteristic subject matter has had a good deal to do with it too. He has photographed in all sorts of places—Hawaii, New England, the Southwest, California, Alaska, the Canadian Rockies—and all sort of subjects—faces, streets, houses, road signs, architectural details, industrial machinery, gravestones, the textures of weathered or charred wood, seascapes, landscapes, peeling bark and growing seaweed and hidden ferns—all sorts of shapes which the eye of the artist and camera transmute into forms of beauty and meaning. Nevertheless, to many people Ansel Adams is the photographer par excellence of grand Nature, especially but not exclusively mountains, and especially but not exclusively the Sierra Nevada, that “great Earth gesture” he has been interpreting since the age of fourteen.

The public that celebrates him only as a romantic Nature photographer does him a disservice. It ignores whole areas of his art, which is of extraordinary variety. (When the “Eloquent Light” exhibition was shown around the world in 1964, reviewers agreed that not a photographer in the world could have matched it either in sheer bulk or in the quality and variety of the images.) Admirers of Nature photography praise Adams for being a champion of conservation, which he is; but they do not always distinguish clearly between his qualities as environmentalist and his qualities as artist, or between his artistry and his subject matter. Conversely, the limited view of Adams as a Nature photographer has led a few advocates of the faces-in-the-street and industrial-ugliness and human-predicament schools to disparage him as an old man of the mountains, a maker of glorified postcards, a western romantic who goes around re-shooting scenes that others did better a hundred years ago, and who is, if not indifferent to social justice and human suffering, at least incapable of photographing humanity as passionately as he photographs cliffs and clouds and snow.

The “glorified postcard” charge needs no comment. Nor does the “anti-human” criticism carry any weight. But there is a certain validity to the comments on the photographic portraits, or at least some of them.

Limitations

Not even Adams' most fervent admirers have been able to make a persuasive case for one kind of portrait, the kind that Adams himself defends on grounds of artistic theory. One critic complains that he photographs rocks as if they were heads, and heads as if they were rocks. Adams does not believe that "expressiveness," as it is usually conceived, amounts to much. He is not a candid camera man; he does not want to photograph grimaces. "I photograph heads as I would photograph sculpture," he has written. "The head or figure is clearly presented as an object. The edge, mass, texture of the skin and the general architecture of the face and form is revealed with great intensity. The expression—many possible expressions—are implied."

But a few of the more formally-posed portraits seem somewhat static and stony, rather like Roman heroes, portraits of qualities rather than of people. Happily for such viewers as myself, many of the portraits are "expressive" in the best sense, and some of the more candid ones, such as that of Georgia O'Keeffe leering over her shoulder at a New Mexican guide, contradict Adam's theory outright. It is simply too austere a theory for most of us; no purely photographic qualities of intensity, luminosity, purity of line, texture, or range of values are going to compensate for a face from which vivacity has been deliberately erased.

Though some of the portraits do speak to us like churchbells, they are a kind of photography that others have done just as well, and there is a degree of truth in the generalization that Adams is less successful with people than with Nature. With nature he is not only successful, he is in a class by himself. The observation from which both his few unfavorable critics and his most uncritical admirers take off is that he is, before all else, a poetic and mystical interpreter of Nature. And many of his most impressive images do reflect Nature in her grandest, most overwhelming, and most manless aspects.

The Subject is Nature

Nature, one says, not scenery. Scenery for Adams is a dirty word, an invention of the tourist business, an oversized curio. Scenery is for profit, Nature is for reverence, and the fewer tracks of man there are in it, the better. "Man, in the contemplation of Nature, need not contemplate his external self," Adams says. With an occasional exception, I cannot think of a single great Adams landscape in which a human figure appears, even for the usual purpose of scale. Scale, power, size, grandeur, are achieved by other and more difficult means. It is as if man and his petty self-scrutiny had been shrunk back into the camera's eye; as if all subjective emotion were no more

than a coating on the lens, a means of purer clarity of vision. Response is *implied*, like expression in the portraits; but what does not seem to me to work consistently in the formal portraits works powerfully in the landscape.


One has the impression that it was the Sierra Nevada mountains that taught Adams to see, and conditioned what he would ever after see most vividly. Growing up in another part of the West, in Arizona or southern Utah, he would have had to come to terms with color, and might have been influenced by the radically different natural forms of the plateau country. But Yosemite, with its gray granite, cliff shadows, snow, clouds, dark coniferous forests, and light-stung rims, came first. It helped make him the black and white photographer he is. It taught him that even the deepest shadow has half-perceived forms, just as the purest snow or cloud will be pregnant with implicit shadows, and that all the world's wonder lies between nearly black and nearly-white. Watching Yosemite Valley under sunlight, moonlight, skylight, starlight, stormlight, in greenery and in snow, changing with the passage of every cloud, he had to learn not only to see, but to find the photographic techniques that would capture such changefulness. There is no place in the world that could have shown him more eloquent contrasts: the poetry of ferns under a sheer half-mile cliff, the suddenness of dogwood bursting out from a dark wall of forest.

Catching the Moment

Photography is the art of miraculous instants—instants of expression, of composition, of gesture, or of light, depending on what kind of photography is going on. It is an art which often has to seize and fix what is already vanishing by the time it is perceived. Of all the varieties of photography, landscape, Adams believes, is the supreme test for the photographer. He has to *catch* the fortunate combination of earth, sky, and cloud—he can't compose or position them, nor does it help him much to move his own point of view. When dealing with near objects, he can achieve great changes by moving his camera a few inches; when photographing landscape he can often move it a hundred yards, or a half mile, and gain little. And there are problems of haze, low color saturation, scale. The camera must, in the small space of the print, convey the very presence of the scene. And finally there is the need to catch the moment when the light is most eloquent, and to expose before that moment is gone. To capture the moments when landscape is revealed under a light supernal in its vividness, the photographer must carry his trained sensibility around with him like a loaded and cocked gun. And also, like any hunter, he must sometimes have the patience to stalk.

Consider two of Adams' best-known images. One he saw as he was

driving back to Santa Fe at dusk and glanced over his shoulder at a village he was passing. The sun was down, but dull light still lay against the church and the adobe houses of the town, and on the faded white crosses of the graveyard. In the east, the full moon was well up above the snowy Sangre de Cristo range, and between mountains and moon a lens of stratus cloud floated high in the sunlight that had already left the earth. Sky, cloud, mountains, the long alluvial slope, the broken barranca, the town, the foreground of sagebrush flat, stretched in bands of bright and gray and dark from left to right. And almost dark, going as he looked.



Ansel Adams, *Moonrise, Hernandez, New Mexico*, 1944


He estimates that he had sixty seconds to stop, leap out, set up tripod and camera, guess the place on the brightness scale for which he wanted to expose, set shutter and lens, focus, and expose. Almost before he took the film from the camera, the light faded. But what he caught on that negative, called *Moonrise, Hernandez, New Mexico*, is not dark. It glows with a reserved, dusky clarity, it has the "illusion of light" that marks so many of Adams' great photographs. Only the most fantastic purist would complain that the cemetery crosses glow a more ghostly white, almost as if with a light of their own, than they could have had in the light he exposed by. The darkroom magician has interfered there. For this is not a reproduction of Hernandez, New Mexico, at dusky moonrise. It is a vision translated, a concept realized. And done in sixty seconds or less. "Sometimes," Adams says, "I think I do get to places just when God is ready to have somebody click the shutter."

• Or take another, made in the same year, 1944. On the west side of the Owens Valley the land rolls once, a rock and sagebrush foothill, and then in one surge goes up 10,000 feet. Seen from the valley in winter, the escarpment is white with snow. The intermediate hill is dun or tan or mottled, depending on the light, and on its flank it wears a whitewashed brand *LP*, to indicate that it belongs to Lone Pine High School. The Owens River flows along its foot through a belt of tall, leafless cottonwoods. In the foreground is a flat, yellow meadow, with horses grazing in it.

Made at any hour, in any light, it is a picture, a splendid snapshot, in spite of the documentary *LP*. Adams did not grab the image when he came upon it. He studied it, visualizing the finished print. He estimated it as it would appear in various directional lights. Then he went to dinner and to bed. In the chilly predawn blackness of the next morning, he came back. As he waited, clear gray sourceless light grew until it showed him the meadow with its shadowy horses, the mottled foothill, the impressive loom of the Sierra fault-block. He set up the camera and went under the cloth; then he came out and waited. Eventually, the sun, breaking over the White Mountains to the eastward, lit and burned like a laser beam on the highest Sierra peak. He watched the pinkish light flood downward until nearly the whole face of the range was blazing with it. He went under the cloth and came out again, and waited.

Then another laser beam slipped past the eastern mountains and tangled itself in the tops of the cottonwoods in the left middle-ground. The roll of foothills was still in shadow, the range coldly alight. Nearly at his own level the little smolder of sun grew in the cottonwood branches. He went under the cloth and watched a while, and came out yet again. By then the light had burst past the leftward cottonwoods and was brightening other trees and a patch of meadow along the creek farther to the right. There was a horse grazing there. The light pooled behind the horse, turning it into a black cut-out. Adams went under the cloth again, waited for the precise instant, and clicked the shutter.

The resulting image, called either *Winter Sunrise, Sierra Nevada*, or *Sierra Nevada from Lone Pine*, represents no seizing of the accidental moment. It was made by patient waiting for the instant that Adams knew must come. But just as surely as *Moonrise, Hernandez*, it is an authentic rendering of miracle. The sky beyond the range is slightly darkened to accentuate the drift of morning clouds. The white magnificence of the Sierra, shadowed with crags and gulches, ripples like a banner across the photograph. Below, as if propping it, the almost-black hill has just enough light on it to show the texture of sage and rock. And it wears no brand. The ugly mantrack has been erased from the negative. Below the dark hill, almost as if we



Ansel Adams, *Winter Sunrise, Sierra Nevada, Sierra Nevada or Sierra Nevada from Lone Pine*, 1944: "made by patient waiting"

were watching it grow and brighten, the finger of dawn reaches into the meadow along the creekside. It comes like renewal, rebirth, reassurance. In a moment, as we watch, it will touch and warm the dark silhouette of the grazing horse, as any dawn might touch and warm any life.

One returns to Conrad and his definition of the artist's aim:

To arrest, for the space of a breath, the hands busy about the work of the earth, and compel men entranced by the sight of distant goals to glance for a moment at the surrounding vision of form and color, of sunshine and shadows: to make them pause for a look, for a sigh, for a smile—such is the aim, difficult and evanescent, and reserved only for the very few to achieve.


Among the few, Ansel Adams.

PHOTOGRAPHY: A NEW KIND OF ART

By John Szarkowski

Attempts to analyze photography by comparing it with other arts—usually painting or literature—have failed, says our author. For, he explains, photography is *different* in many ways: e.g., in the way the camera defines the subject, in the ample variety of decisions it offers the photographer, in the large number of amateur practitioners. Yet, Mr. Szarkowski maintains, for all its specialness, photography is a true art form, and is capable of expressing visions and values as compelling as those of the other arts. This article is reprinted from *The New York Times*.

John Szarkowski is director of the department of photography of New York City's Museum of Modern Art and author of *Looking at Photographs*, a survey of 100 pictures from the museum's collection.



Until recently, photography was an activity that almost everyone enjoyed, and almost no one analyzed in public. After some one hundred thirty-five years, the question of what photographs really mean is being considered along a fairly broad intellectual front. Having become a public issue, the question in unlikely simply to go away.

Suddenly—within the past decade—a sizable portion of the sophisticated public has come to regard photographs as repositories not only of dumb facts but of personal visions. Since Michelangelo, approximately, this is the touchstone that we have used to distinguish art from nonart. In consequence, there has occurred a great flowering of photography appreciation. This interest has grown to the point where the work of famous dead photographers sells very well indeed, at prices that would have seemed visionary a decade ago. Even famous living photographers, especially those over the age of seventy, now do a brisk trade in signed prints.

Perhaps the remarkable part of all this is that it has taken so long coming. From the moment in 1839 when Louis Jacques Mandé Daguerre unveiled his daguerreotype—the first species of photog-

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raphy to be made public—everyone agreed that it was marvelous, but no one, it seems, said anything enormously helpful bearing on the question of what the new system meant. Those few who attempted the broad historical view were perhaps embarrassed to reread their comments later. The painter Paul Delaroche supposedly said, "From this moment, painting is dead," and then returned to his studio to paint. Baudelaire said that photography could be used honorably only to reproduce works done in the traditional media, and retired to the studio of the photographer Carjat to have his portrait made. The historian of photography is puzzled by the paucity of large-caliber intellectual comment on this enormously radical new development in the history of pictures. Consider what Henry Adams did for the dynamo, and Ernest Hemingway for the automobile—both devices surely no more than examples of applied technology, in comparison with photography, which has changed our way of understanding and remembering experience.

The fact that photography has not been satisfactorily explained to us should not, I think, be taken as evidence of irrational prejudice on the part of our best intellectuals and poets, but rather as an indication that the problem is a very difficult one, to which no one has yet found the precisely appropriate key. We have therefore attempted to explain photography by metaphor, either in terms of the traditional visual arts, or in terms of the storyteller's narrative—neither of which has proved a very satisfactory model.

Analogy with Painting

Photography is a picture-making system; it has therefore been natural to compare it to older picture-making systems, especially to painting, which has a very old and honorable history. In this comparison, it has not been difficult to point out the ways in which painting is different and, by presumption, better. Most of these arguments revolve around two central points: First, the painter can synthesize one picture out of a thousand discrete bits of perception, imagination, and traditional skills and schemes, while the photographer's act is not synthetic but analytic, and depends fundamentally on perception. Second, painting is a very difficult craft, while photography is quite easy.

It seems to me that both of these claims are correct. The special genius of photography depends on the seamless coherence of its description; the camera shows us a particular cone of space during a specific parcel of time. This makes it a perfect tool for visual exploration and discovery, but a rather clumsy one for realizing the inventions of pure imagination. As to the second claim, it would seem beyond question that the craft of painting is more complex and more demanding than the craft of photography, although probably

neither is as difficult as the nonpractitioner might think.

A word of amplification might be added concerning the claim that photography is mechanically easy. Obviously, even the commonest of skills can be practiced with progressively greater degrees of perfection. Almost anyone can make competent photographs. Photographs that embody surprise, distinctive grace, wit or original intelligence are, on the other hand, made with fair consistency only by photographers of exceptional talent who work seriously at their calling. For them, the craft is neither easier nor more difficult than it is for the great armies of dilettantes and earnest drudges; they are simply more available to its gifts.

After painting, the next most popular metaphor that has been used to explain the nature of photography has been language. In this view, photographs can be considered the rough equivalents of words (or sentences, or paragraphs) which, if laid end to end in the proper sequence, will form stories, or essays, or haiku. The best known example of this idea, though by no means the only one, survives in the dusty bound volumes of the popular picture magazines that flourished for a quarter-century beginning in the mid-thirties. *Life* magazine, the best and most famous of these journals, is remembered with gratitude and affection.

But if we challenge our memories, I think our gratitude will focus on the recollection of individually memorable pictures, not coherent narratives. The idea of the picture story worked, in a primitive way, as long as the stories were entitled "Twenty-four Hours in the Life of a Jockey" or something similar, where it was understood that there was no story; or in stories on rising young

Walker Evans, *Floyd Burroughs, Hale County, Alabama*, 1936



movie starlets, where the story was already universally known, under the title of *Cinderella*. When the narrative line became slightly more demanding, captions assumed a progressively more important role, until finally the photographs became a dependent ornamentation of the text.

The precious lesson of the picture magazines is this: There is no equivalent of the syllogism in pictures. The photograph may suggest, but cannot define, intellectual or philosophical or political values. It can only describe appearances. For example, a

photograph by Walker Evans cannot distinguish a poor but noble Elizabethan sharecropper from a racist redneck, for these are intellectual distinctions that may well describe the same man.

I suspect that many of the very greatest of photographers might think of their art as a kind of wordless literature, but emphasis would be put on the word "wordless." In sum, the notion that photography should aspire to the function of language seems to have been even farther from the mark than the notion that it should emulate painting.

Far From Literature

Once it is granted that photography is profoundly different from the older media, one can proceed to a more interesting question: What are the special qualities and prejudices of the new technique?

I think that most advanced photographers today would name as the most challenging creative possibilities of their medium the same attributes that for so long made it comprehensible in terms of traditional artistic values: It is mechanically quick and easy, and it is the best method so far devised for the precise description of the most complex, specific, private and ephemeral matters of visual experience. Consider Ansel Adams' *Surf Sequence #3, 1940*. This picture is one of a series of five, all made within the span of a few minutes from the same camera position. Each defines in photographic terms a momentary configuration of water and light that is unique and unrepeatable, and only half apprehensible to the most alert trained eye.

The larger meaning of the ease of photography relates to its ability to identify, consider and resolve a dozen, or a hundred, complex visual ideas in the time that it took a Barbizon painter to produce one preliminary oil sketch. The point of this unrestrained fecundity is not to produce more pictures—the world long ago had more pictures than it could properly deal with—but rather to work deeper into the endlessly seductive puzzle of sight: how to know the world better through our eyes. As the act of making becomes simpler and quicker, the act of seeing is freed to assume progressively more complex and difficult problems. In this sense, the camera stands in relation to the brush or pencil as the computer stands to the abacus. It can deal with great numbers of complex problems, beyond the most ambitious dreams of the hand worker.

Independence of Subject?

The plodding deliberateness of traditional painting was, in fact, so definitive a limitation that painters could not hope to respond freely to experience; it was necessary that they hoard their energies, and explore, one difficult step at a time, those few motifs that had been

proved promising. This condition gave rise to the concept of *subjects*, which referred to the very short list of existing picture types which one might attempt to improve. Thus, most of the literature of art history is based on the assumption that the subject exists independent of, and prior to, the picture. This notion suggests that an artist begins with his subject, and then does something to it—deforms it somehow, according to some personal sense of style. This idea, though once convenient, does not correspond to what artists actually do in any medium; it is especially irrelevant in the case of photography, where the artist's entire effort is directed toward the problem of defining precisely what the subject is.

This is meant not poetically but literally. The subject is not a figure, or a room, or the shape and graphic weight of a light window against a dark ground, but every element within the frame, and their precisely just relationship.

The visceral decision to trip the shutter implies a thousand prior decisions, beginning with such gross (and important) decisions as whether the photographer should stay home or go to Chichén Itzá, and ending with such subtle (and important) issues as whether he should cock his knees and lean two inches to the left. Later, if the negative seems good, it demands that the decision to shoot be recalled and confirmed in the print: How hot or somber or luminous was the light, how smooth or brittle were the textures, what is the just resolution of the conflicting claims of pattern, line, surface and volume? Each of these decisions, conscious and intuitive, contributes to the final definition of the subject. For one cannot say the same thing in two ways. A change in form is a change in content.

This is true in all the arts. The distinctive thing about photography is the terrific richness of possible choices, which have increased as the mechanics of execution have grown easier. Most photographers who learned their craft in terms of the relatively deliberate pace of the large tripod camera came close to panic when first confronted with the miniature machines. The choices available to the stand camera were more than rich enough, but with the Leica almost anything seemed possible; the mind reeled and the eyes glazed at the sheer excess of possibilities. Yet, the best of contemporary photographers have learned to use the easy prolificity of the miniature camera, and have harnessed it to their individual intelligences.

Using photography as a method of defining one's subject, rather than a machine for describing casual appearances, is a difficult problem under the best of circumstances. It is even more difficult for the professional photographer, who, by the nature of his role, generally works for some functionary who believes that he or she already

knows what the subject is. It may be not wholly coincidence that the appreciation of photography as an art has grown as the ability of a photographer to support himself as a professional has declined. A generation ago, photography was still regarded by most people as an arcane specialty, practiced by men closely related to alchemists, with stained fingernails, who squinted in the bright light and carried with them the pungent smell of the darkroom. The function of these men was generally comparable to that of the ancient scribe: They executed documents commissioned by others. The professional would of course reshape the problem a little, according to his own technical or esthetic standards, but he tried not to let the client notice, for he made his living by humoring the popular belief that photography told—in some unspecified sense—the truth. In any given situation, there are a million potential photographic truths, mostly contradictory and all ambiguous.

Professional vs. Amateur

Respect for the professional—the professional *anything*—is a deep-seated article in the American creed. We have agreed with Robert Frost that the goal of life is to make our vocation and our avocation one. In practice, however, things have worked differently. Among our best artists, Thomas Jefferson and William Carlos Williams and Alfred Stieglitz and Charles Ives—all amateurs—are perhaps closer to the rule than the exception. Even Mathew Brady, who made a fortune as a professional photographer, lost it as an amateur, while directing the work for which we remember him—his great pictorial record of the Civil War.

In photography, as in belles lettres, we have reached the point of understanding that anyone can do it, and must now explore the more difficult fact that some do it better, and with better reason, than others. In choosing the work to which we will give our fullest attention, we will now perhaps credit original perception and intelligence above luscious prints, clever inventions or large pretensions. The distinction is, of course, not always obvious.

Some contemporary artists who began as painters, and who have in recent years worked their way through a succession of non-pictorial art forms (happenings, conceptual art, earth works, systems art, etc.) have demonstrated a quick appreciation of the idea of photography as a technique, particularly well-suited to record the infinite variegation of human experience. Such artists, having been taught by Duchamp, Tinguely and others that the act of art need not be married to the crafting of fine manufactures, have been quick to realize that a photograph can be a work of art without being a flagrantly beautiful object.

Some artists who make photographs prefer to be thought of as



Alfred Stieglitz, *Sun Rays-Paula-Berlin* (circa 1889): "photographs can be made anywhere there is light"

post-painting painters, who use photography toward ends somehow separate and distinct from those of artists who call themselves photographers. Even critics and curators, traditionally known for their devotion to clear thinking and accurate cataloguing, have been known to suggest that a photograph made by one trained as a painter is really a sort of a painting, notwithstanding the contrary precedents. Luckily, cameras are unimpressed by such claptrap, and perform equally well for those who use them equally well, regardless of the user's previous condition of servitude. So far, cameras have performed best for those who have called themselves photographers.

It is probably true that some vestigial doubts do linger in the public conscience about the propriety of making works of art with a machine, especially such a sophisticated machine as the modern camera. Our ancient sense of art is more available to things that are done by hand; it is surely easier to write a poem about "The Man With the Hoe" than one about "The Man on the Tractor." Hand work seems, paradoxically, more *spiritual*, especially to those of us who do not do much of it.

Spiritual Values

Critics and other nonartists do tend to think of the arts as belonging to the world of the spirit, rather than that of the flesh. The critics may even be right in this. Standing on the high, dry ground that surrounds the treacherous bogs where artists work, we may enjoy a clearer and more objective view. Matisse may have spoken of the problem in terms of color and line, but we remember him for his grace.


To their credit, good lawyers do not speak readily of justice, and good poets do not feel obliged to harp on truth and beauty, John Keats having already said it. Good photographers speak of their medium in terms of visual intelligence, precise reflexes and clear description—matters that relate largely to the carpentry of photographic picture making. But these craft virtues in a photographer of genius result in original pictures which cannot be wholly rationalized in terms of purely photographic values.

It seems clear that we cherish the great living masters of the art for gifts received that cannot be defined completely in photographic terms. We are grateful to Paul Strand not finally for his glowing prints and rock-solid designs but for the somber, transcendental humanism that they define. We are grateful to Henri Cartier-Bresson not so much for the sophistication of his graphics as for his demonstration that the large and small facts of our time can be recorded with style and eloquence, like the remembered facts of other times. Walker Evans has given us not only the example of a knife-sharp and incorruptible visual intelligence but a richer knowledge of the esthetic potentials that are so specially ours as Americans. André Kertész is not merely the one who sketched out the special role of the miniature camera; at the age of eighty, he continues to describe the deliciously strange, subtly devious discoveries that are still available to childlike eyes. The list of such debts is much too long to complete.

The best photographers have learned that the art of photography is nothing more or less than photography done wonderfully. Like Molière's M. Jourdain, who in middle age discovered to his delight that he spoke prose, photography has discovered during the past

Photography: A New Kind of Art

generation that its own native genius has been, and is potentially, glorious. Photographers of talent realize that photography can help us know, rationalize and share levels of experience that have been untouchable and uncommunicable. Approached in this spirit, the future of the medium is so exciting that the photographer has little time to concern himself if the world at large does not completely understand what a beautiful art he practices.



WHAT IS PHOTOGRAPHY?

By Rudolf Arnheim



Photographs, as we all know, are uniquely capable of capturing what strikes the viewer as the true appearance of things and events. How is this accomplished? Professor Arnheim analyzes some ways in which photography is different from other arts—in the role of the artist as both observer and participant, and in the characteristics of the camera itself. Photography, he concludes, though more limited than other arts in its possibility for interpretation, is perhaps closest of all to the physical life of human beings, and fills the most important social function.

Rudolf Arnheim is visiting professor at the University of Michigan. He is the author of a series of notable works, including *Art and Visual Perception*, *Film as Art*, *Toward a Psychology of Art*, *Visual Thinking*, and *Entropy and Art*. His article is abridged from the magazine *Critical Inquiry*.

In the olden days, when a painter set up his easel at some corner to do a picture of the market square, he was an outsider, looked at with curiosity and awe, perhaps with amusement. It is the prerogative of the stranger to contemplate things instead of dealing with them. Apart from sometimes being bodily in the way, the painter did not interfere with the private life of the public around him. Nobody felt spied upon or even observed unless he or she was sitting quietly on a bench, for it was evident that the painter was looking at and putting down something other than the facts of the moment. Only the moment is private, and the painter looked right through the coming and going at something that was not there at all because it was always there. The painting denounced nobody in particular.

In the portrait studio again, a different social code protected both participants. The sitter, his spontaneity suspended and his best appearance displayed, there was no need for conversation, and the I was fully authorized to stare at the Thou as though it were an It.

This was true for the early phase of photography as well. The equipment was too bulky to catch anybody unawares, and the ex-

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posure time was long enough to wipe the accidents of the moment from face and gesture. Hence the enviable timelessness of the early photographs. A sort of otherworldly wisdom was symbolized by the fact that any momentary motion vanished automatically from those metallic plates.

Whatever the style and purpose of art, its goal had always been the representation of the lasting character of things and actions. Even when depicting motion, it was the abiding nature of that motion which the artist portrayed. This remained true also for the paintings of the nineteenth century, although we are accustomed to saying that the impressionists cultivated the fleeting moment.

Significance of the Extrinsic

If one looks carefully, one realizes that those contemporaries of the first generations of photographers were not intent primarily on replacing scenes of some permanence with quickly passing ones. It was not a matter of duration. Rather one might say that they supplemented the fundamental attitudes of the human mind and body—the expression of thought and sorrow, of care and love and repose and attack—with the more extrinsic gestures of daily behavior, and that they found a new significance in them. They often replaced the root stance of the classical poses with a more casual slouch or stretch or yawn, or the steady illumination of a scene with a twinkling one.

But if one compares those washerwomen, *midinettes*, or *boulevardiers*, those smoke-filled railroad yards or milling street crowds, with photographic snapshots, one realizes that, for the most part, even those “momentary” poses had none of the incompleteness of the fraction of a second lifted from the context of time. In terms of time, a Degas ballerina fastening her shoulder strap is just as collected and reposes as firmly as the winged goddess of victory untying her sandal on a marble relief of ancient Athens.

The same is true for many photographs. But it is not true for the typical snapshot, and the snapshot quality of photographs manifests a unique character trait of the medium. Photography does something unheard-of when it catches motion in the act. The accidental shape of its appearance reveals the snapshot as a fragment, a sample extirpated from an action whose integrity resides beyond the realm of the picture. If one compares Degas' dancers with a photograph of a similar subject, it is evident that the attitudes of the painted figures, although brought about by a trifling occupation, have an almost classical finality; whereas in the photograph the tensely open mouth and the placement of the fingers applying the makeup rely for their visual validity on the action of which they are a phase.

Opting Against Form?

Photography reaches into the world as an intruder, and therefore it also creates a disturbance, just as in the physics of light the single photon at the atomic level upsets the facts on which it reports. The photographer takes a hunter's pride in capturing the spontaneity of life without leaving traces of his presence. News reporters enjoy recording the uncontrolled fatigue or embarrassment of a public figure, and the photographic manuals never tire of warning the amateur against the frozen poses of the family lined up for their picture in front of some famous landmark. Animals and infants, the prototypes of unself-consciousness, are the darlings of the trade. But the need for such precaution and trickery highlights the congenital problem of photography: inevitably the photographer is a part of the situation he depicts. A court order may be necessary to keep him away, and the more skillfully he hides and surprises, the more acute is the social problem he creates. It is in this connection that we should think of the irresistible fascination which photography, film, and video have for young people today.

Only a malicious observer would unduly emphasize the fact that the opportunity to produce acceptable pictures without much training, toil, or talent is tempting in itself. More relevantly, it can be noted that if someone opts for the camera, he may be demonstrating against form. Form is the characteristic distinction of all traditional art. Form is suspected of serving the establishment, of detracting from the raw impact of passions and dreams psychologically, and from injustice, brutality, and deprivation politically and socially. In reply to such accusations, one can only say that good form, far from emasculating the message, is, on the contrary, the only way of making it accessible to the mind. We need only glance at the work of a great social photographer such as Dorothea Lange to realize the forceful eloquence of form. On the other side, the kind of current video work which records interviews, debates, and other events without sufficient control of perspective, light, and camera movement proves negatively that the gray evasiveness of the noncommittal image sabotages communication.

The Present Photographer

Form is unavoidable. However, the way in which photographs are taken reminds us furthermore that there is not only form of observation but also form of action. In the other arts, the problem of how to reconcile these two arises only indirectly. Should the poet write revolutionary hymns at home or mount the barricade in person? In photography, there is no geographic escape from the conflict. The photographer must be present where the action is. It is true that limiting oneself to observing and recording in the midst of battle,

destruction, and tragedy may require as much courage as does participation; however, when one takes pictures one also transforms life and death into a spectacle to be watched with detachment. The detachment of the artist becomes more of a problem in the photographic media precisely because the media immerse him bodily in situations that call for human solidarity. In a broader sense, photography serves as an effective instrument of activist revelation; but at the same time it enables a person to be busy in the midst of things without having to take part, and to overcome alienation bodily without having to give up detachment. Self-deception comes easy in the twilight of such ambiguous conditions.

So far I have mentioned two phases in the development of photography: the early period during which the image, as it were, transcended the momentary presence of the portrayed objects because of the length of exposure and the bulkiness of the equipment; and the second phase, which exploited the technical possibility of capturing motion in a fraction of time. The ambition of instantaneous photography, I noted, was that of preserving the spontaneity of action and avoiding any indication that the presence of the picture taker had a modifying influence on what was going on. Characteristically enough, however, our own century has discovered a new attraction in the very artificiality of picture taking, and has endeavored to use it deliberately for the symbolic representation of an age that has fallen from innocence. This stylistic trend has two main aspects: the introduction of surrealist apparitions, and the frank acknowledgment of photography as an exposure.

Illusion and Reality

By its very nature, surrealism depended on the *trompe l'oeil* illusion of the settings it presented. Here the painter has a powerful competitor in the photographer; for, although the incisive presence of realistically painted images is not easily matched by the camera, a photograph has an authenticity from which painting is barred by birth. Fashion photography may have started the trend by showing in the midst of an authentic setting, on a hotel terrace at the Riviera or on the Spanish Steps in Rome, a grotesquely stylized model, the body reduced to a scaffold and the face to a mask, in a deliberately angular pose. Startling though such apparitions in the public domain were for a while, they looked too obviously like artifacts truly to stir the sense of the superreal. They were more like pranks than like creations of the bona fide world; and only as an outgrowth of reality can apparitions work their spell. A surrealist shiver was more effectively produced by the more recent practice of photographing nude figures in a forest or living room or abandoned cottage. Here was indubitably real human flesh; but

since such appearances of nude figures were known only from the visions of painters, the reality of the scene was transfigured into a dream—pleasant perhaps but also frightening, because it invaded the mind as a hallucination.

I have referred to still another way in which photographers of our time have exploited the artificiality of their medium. Not by accident perhaps, it is often in documentary reportage that we see persons acknowledging the presence of the photographer, either by displaying themselves for him cheerfully or ceremoniously, or by watching him with suspicious attention. What we seem to be shown here is a man and woman after they have eaten from the tree of knowledge. "And the eyes of them both were opened," says the book of Genesis, "and they knew that they were naked." This is man under observation, in need of a *persona*, concerned with his image, exposed to danger or to the prospect of great fortune by simply being looked at.

All I have said derives ultimately from the fundamental peculiarity of the photographic medium: the physical objects themselves print their image by means of the optical and chemical action of light. This fact has always been acknowledged but treated in a variety of different ways by the writers on the subject. I am thinking back to my own way of dealing with the psychology and aesthetics of the film in *Film as Art*. In that 1932 book I attempted to refute the accusation that photography was nothing but a mechanical copy of nature. My approach was a reaction to the narrow notion that had prevailed ever since 1859, when Baudelaire predicted the value of photography for the faithful documentation of sights and scientific facts. But he also denounced it as an act of a revengeful god who, by sending Daguerre as his messiah, granted the prayer of a vulgar multitude that wanted art to be an exact imitation of nature. In those early days, the mechanical procedure of photography was doubly suspect as an attempt by industry to replace the manual work of the artist with a mass production of cheap pictures. My strategy was to describe the differences between the images we obtain when we look at the physical world and the images perceived on the motion picture screen. These differences could then be shown to be a source of artistic expression.

In and Out of Nature

In a sense mine was a negative approach, because I defended the new medium by measuring it according to the standards of the traditional ones, that is, by pointing to the range of interpretation it offered to the artist, very much like painting and sculpture, in spite of its mechanical nature. Only secondarily was I concerned with the positive virtues that photography derives precisely from the mechanical quality of its images.

Pictures produced by a camera can resemble paintings or drawings in presenting recognizable images of physical objects. But they have also characteristics of their own: (1) the picture is coproduced by nature and man, and in some ways looks strikingly like nature, and (2) the picture is viewed as something made by nature. The distinction between these two characteristics matters whenever the viewer is sophisticated enough to realize the difference between an image and the objects it represents. A primitive tribesman or peasant knows that the effigy he worships is not materially identical with the god or saint, but he treats it as though it actually were that superior power, and he does not acknowledge the qualities introduced by the judgment and skill of the image maker. For the purposes of modern man these differences count. Regardless of whether he is actually aware of any particular qualities that distinguish a photograph from a handmade painting, his conviction that the picture was generated by a camera profoundly influences the way he views and uses it.

Photography, observed André Bazin in 1945, profits from the absence of man, while all other arts are based on his presence. "Photography affects us like a phenomenon in nature, like a flower or a snowflake whose vegetable, or earthly origins are an inseparable part of their beauty." Looking in a museum at a Flemish tavern scene, we are interested in what objects the painter introduced and which occupations he gave his characters. Only indirectly do we use his picture as a documentary testimony on what life was like in the seventeenth century.

Criteria for Evaluation

How different is the attitude in which we approach a photograph showing, say, a lunch counter! "Where was this taken?" we want to know. The word "caliente" that we discover on the lists of foods in the background of the picture points to a Spanish element, but the paunchy policeman at the door, the hot dogs and the orange drinks assure us that we are in the United States. With the delighted curiosity of the tourist we explore the scene. The glove near the wastepaper basket must have been dropped by a customer; it was not placed there by an artist as a compositional touch. We are on vacation from artifice. Also the different attitude toward time is characteristic. "When was this painted?" means mostly that we want to know to which stage of the artist's life the work belongs. "When was this taken?" means typically that we are concerned with the historical locus of the subject. Is it a view of Chicago from before the great fire? Or did Chicago look that way after 1871?

In evaluating the documentary qualities of a photograph, we ask three questions: Is it authentic? Is it correct? Is it true? Authentic-

ity, vouched for by certain features and uses of the picture, requires that the scene has not been tampered with. The masked burglar leaving the bank is not posed, the clouds are not printed from another negative, the lion is not taken in front of a painted oasis. Correctness is another matter. It calls for the assurance that the picture corresponds to what the camera took: the colors are not off, the lens does not distort the proportions.

Truth, finally, does not deal with the picture as a statement about what was present in front of the camera but refers to the depicted scene as a statement about facts the picture is supposed to convey. We ask whether the picture is characteristic of what it purports to show. A photograph may be authentic but untrue, or true though inauthentic. When, in Jean Genêt's play *The Balcony*, a photographer of the queen sends one of the arrested revolutionaries to get him a pack of cigarettes and pays a police officer to shoot the man, the picture of the rebel killed while trying to escape is inauthentic but probably correctly taken and not necessarily untrue. "Monstreux!" says the queen. "C'est dans les habitudes, Majesté," says the photographer. To be sure, when it comes to truth the problem is no longer specifically photographic.

Photography as Process

One can understand why Bazin suggested that the essential factor of photography "is not to be found in the result achieved but in the way of achieving it." It is equally important, however, to consider what the mechanical recording process does to the visual qualities of the photographic image.

Here we are helped by Siegfried Kracauer, who based his book, *Theory of Film*, on the observation that the photographic image is a kind of compromise product between physical reality as it impresses its own image on the film and the picture maker's ability to select, shape, and organize the raw material. The optically projected image, Kracauer suggested, is characterized by the visual accidents of a world that has not been created for the convenience of the photographer, and it would be a mistake to force these unwieldy data of reality into the straitjacket of pictorial composition. Indefiniteness, endlessness, random arrangement should be considered legitimate, and indeed necessary qualities of film as a photographic product.

If, with Kracauer's observation in mind, we look attentively at the texture of a typical photographic image we find, perhaps to our surprise, that the subject matter is represented mostly by visual hints and approximations. In a successful painting or drawing every stroke of the pen, every touch of color, is an intentional statement of the artist about shape, space, volume, unity, separation, lighting, etc. The texture of the pictorial image amounts to a pattern of the

explicit information.

If we approach photographs with an expectation trained by the perusal of handmade images, we find that the work of the camera lets us down. Shapes peter out in muddy darkness, volumes are elusive, streaks of light arrive from nowhere, neighboring items are not clearly connected or separate, details do not add up. The fault is ours, of course, because we are looking at the photograph as though it were made and controlled by man and not as a mechanical deposit of light. As soon as we take the picture for what it is, it hangs together and may even be beautiful.

Whence the Message?

But surely there is a problem here. If what I affirmed earlier is true, it takes definite form to make a picture readable. How, then, can an agglomerate of vague approximations deliver its message? To speak of "reading" a picture is appropriate, but dangerous at the same time, because it suggests a comparison with verbal language, and linguistic analogies, although fashionable, have greatly complicated our understanding of perceptual experiences everywhere.

If we are correct in asserting that the messages conveyed by pictures cannot be reduced to a sign language, then our problem of how to read them is still with us. Here we need to realize, first of all, that a picture is "continuous" only when we scan it mechanically with a photometer. Human perception is no such instrument. Visual perception is pattern perception; it organizes and structures the shapes offered by the optical projections in the eye. These organized shapes, not sets of conventional ideographs, yield the visual concepts that make pictures readable. They are the keys that give us access to the rich complexity of the image.

When the viewer looks at the world around him, these shapes are delivered to him entirely by the physical objects out there. In a photograph, the shapes are selected, partially transformed, and treated by the picture taker and his optical and chemical equipment. Thus, in order to make sense of photographs, one must look at them as encounters between physical reality and the creative mind of man—not simply as a reflection of that reality in the mind, but as a middle ground on which the two formative powers, man and world, meet as equal antagonists and partners, each contributing its particular resources. The unshaped quality of the optical raw materials exerts its influence not only when the viewer recognizes the objects that have been projected on the sensitive coating of the film but more manifestly in highly abstract photographs in which objects have been reduced to pure shapes.

Even so, a medium that limits the creations of the mind by powerful material constraints must have corresponding limitations. In

fact, when the artistic development of photography from the days of David Octavius Hill to the great photographers of our own time is compared with the range of painting from Manet to, say, Jackson Pollock, or of music from Wagner's *Tristan and Isolde* to, say Arnold Schonberg, we may come to the conclusion that there has been photographic work of high quality but consistently limited in its range of expression as well as in the depth of its insights. The photographic medium seems to operate under a definite ceiling. To be sure, every artistic medium limits the range of successful expression, and needs to do so. But there is a difference between the productive limitations that intensify the statement by confining it to a few formal dimensions, and a narrowing of expressive freedom within the range of a particular medium.

Limitations

If this diagnosis is correct, I think the difference is not due to the relative youth of the photographic art, but to intimate physical connection with the activities of human life. I would also suggest that this is a liability when looked at from the point of view of the painter, the composer, or the poet, but it is an enviable privilege when we consider its function in human society.

Let us consult another medium of artistic expression, one of the most ancient but equally bound to physical conditions, namely, the dance. Here too we seem to find that, when we compare the dances of remote times and places to our own, the resemblance outweighs the difference, and the visions conveyed, though beautiful and impressive, remain at a relatively simple level. This is so, I believe, because the dance is essentially a ritualized extension of the expressive and rhythmical movement of the human body in its daily activities, its mental manifestations and communications. As such, it lacks the almost unconditional freedom of imagination granted to the other media; but it is also spared the remoteness that separates the great private visions of the poets, composers, or painters from the commerce of social existence.

Perhaps the same is true for photography. Wedded to the physical nature of landscape and human settlement, animal and man, to our exploits, sufferings, and joys, photography is privileged to help man view himself, expand and preserve his experiences, and exchange vital communications—a faithful instrument whose reach need not extend farther than that of the way of life it reflects.

EDUCATION FOR PHOTOGRAPHY

By Lee Battaglia

The camera is so popular all over the world that many fans are not aware of the demands this twentieth century medium makes upon its true devotees. A knowledgeable practitioner of the art argues that a thorough humanistic education is indispensable for all who would seriously practice (or view) photography. He demonstrates his point by a detailed analysis of four selected photographs.

Lee Battaglia is director of photography of *Horizons USA* and a member of the faculty of the art department of George Washington University. A former picture editor of *National Geographic* magazine, his photographic work has appeared in many national and foreign magazines. He has lectured on photography in Europe and Asia.



It is hard to believe that in an age like ours, in which education is so highly valued, there are still people who feel that photographers need not learn their profession at universities or professional schools, but can "master the tricks of the trade" through a rigorous apprenticeship.

True, some of the great photographers of the past, as well as contemporary ones, have succeeded in doing outstanding work without any formal training—just as the Wright brothers were able to fly their primitive plane at Kitty Hawk in 1903 though they had no deep knowledge of engineering, aerodynamics, or navigation.

True, too, the pioneers of photography lacked a body of knowledge painstakingly accumulated by predecessors from which to draw and build upon. Since its earliest days, photography has indeed been practiced by thousands who shared no common tradition or training, and were disciplined and united by no academy or guild; who considered their medium variously as an art, a science, a trade or an entertainment—and who were often unaware of each other's work.

The inventors of photography were painters and scientists, but its professional practitioners were a different breed.

Photographer as Jack-of-all Trades

Holgrave, the daguerreotypist hero of Nathaniel Hawthorne's novel, *The House of Seven Gables*, published in 1851, was perhaps typical. Here is the author's ironic description:

The American Review

Though now but twenty-two years old, he had already been a country schoolmaster, salesman in a country store; and a political editor of a country newspaper.

He had subsequently traveled as a peddler of cologne water and other essences—he had studied and practiced dentistry. Still more recently, he had been a public lecturer on mesmerism, for which science he had very remarkable endowments.

By the late 1850s millions of daguerreotypes were being produced by Holgrave and his fellows. Some were the product of skill and knowledge, invention and sensibility; others, of accident, improvisation, misunderstanding and empirical experiment.

But whether produced by art or luck, each photograph was part of an unprecedented assault on our traditional habits of seeing. Photographs bombard our senses with the sheer number of images as well as their variety. These are presented in an impersonal way very different from the traditional, selective, personalized images of painters, engravers, sculptors.

With the advent of the hand-held camera and the dry plate, photography became easy, and the flood of images became a deluge.

The Autodidacts

In 1893, observing the spawning of thousands of new photographers, the English writer E.E. Cohen complained that new technical advances had

created an army of photographers who run rampant over the globe, photographing objects of all sorts, sizes and shapes...without even pausing to ask themselves is this or that artistic?...To them composition, light, shade, form and texture are so many catch phrases.

The vast majority of images produced by these early photographers was often accidental and formless (like so many produced by their equally uninformed counterparts today). But some were memorable and significant beyond their initial intention. These survived, to come down to us as an early stage in the evolution of photography as art and science. What was significant, of course, in this evolutionary process, was not only the dramatic increase of the number of photographers and photographs, but what they chose to describe: personal glimpses into both the exceptional and the mundane, but together forming a total image that would otherwise have been lost to us. The traditional artists had the traditional “art” subjects; the new cameraman, lacking the “artist’s” sophistication and artifice, did not filter out what was unfashionable from what was fashionable; the camera has been called the most democratic of all arts.

How did the early photographer learn his craft?

The photographer learned in two ways: first, from a worker's intimate understanding of his tools and materials; and second, he learned from other photographers, who presented themselves in an unending stream....The photographer's tradition was formed by all the photographs that had impressed themselves upon his consciousness. Yet, because the early photographers who sought to produce creative work had no tradition to guide them, they began to borrow a ready-made one from the painters.

The conviction grew that photography was just a new kind of painting, and its exponents attempted by every means possible to make the camera produce painter-like results.

Thus, the influence of the painter's tradition delayed recognition of the real creative field photography had provided.

These two basic (and contradictory) misconceptions—that photography was merely a craft to be learned like woodcarving, and that it was, to the contrary, but a pallid reflection of a true art, painting—led to training that was thoroughly superficial for what should be a serious and profound profession.

While we demand professional standards from our doctors and lawyers, we do nothing to protect ourselves from untrained artists. We demand training lasting up to eight years in the major professions, yet we turn photographers loose on the world with only a superficial knowledge of their craft and little or no practical experience. Often we are misled by an occasional fine image by a practitioner, and we overlook the fact that the momentum derived from mechanical facilities carries truly unworthy work far beyond its inherent worth. We must remember that a photograph can hold just as much as we put into it and that no one has ever approached the full possibilities of the medium.

Needed: A Humanistic Education

It is difficult, of course, to plot a course of study that, upon completion, will produce such photographers as Alfred Stieglitz, Ansel Adams, Walker Evans, or Jerry Uelsmann. But we certainly know that an excellent liberal education, coupled with a mind inquisitive about the world in which we live, are the essential ingredients. Add to this a sound technical knowledge of the medium—and a certain sixth sense—and you have a fine photographer.

The world is not filled with individuals possessing all of these qualities, inside or outside of the field. But we must start somewhere. Steps have been taken to elevate the teaching of photography from the darkroom to the classroom. Every major institution of learning in the United States is offering studies in photography along with courses in art, history, journalism, philosophy, etc., all

leading to a photography degree. An effort is being made to develop a total professional rather than a technician-photographer.

The latter will still bring a contribution to the field of photographic expression, but it will be a pragmatic one—it is the professional who will push the limits further out, who will open new chapters in man's search for truth, be it artistic, journalistic, or scientific.

To my mind, a humanistic education is needed—no other substitutes will be found.

Let me now try to illustrate the special sensibility and humanistic background that photography, in my view, demands of both the photographer and the informed viewer. As a teacher of photography, I often have occasion to ask my students to study particular photographs, and to describe what they see there—not with the physical eye alone, but with the mind's eye as well. Here are some observations of my own on four photographs reproduced in this issue.

Jerry Uelsmann's, "Nude with Pod in Hand"

The first photograph, by Jerry Uelsmann, shows a man's hand holding the figure of a woman. Our first task is to be aware of our immediate visual response, on both the emotional and the intellectual levels. Do I like this or not? A photograph is not much different from any other experience we have in the visual world, whether it be a landscape, or a pleasing architectural form—or a beautiful woman.

Our first impression is of mystery. We wonder what the picture means. We are presented with shapes that we know are not real—that is, not in scale: a woman does not fit in a man's hand. To me, it is a kind of *surrealistic* figure, a *surrealistic* representation.

This mystery, this surrealism, is an element inherent in photography. A photograph, after all, is an *abstract*, converting the colors of reality into a basic gradation of greys; there's a flat surface (everything is on one plane) a lack of plasticity, a reduction in size, reality diminished.

Now, Uelsmann takes these shapes, these elements, and further removes them from the accepted reality of photography: he places the woman, whom we know to be relatively large, in a hand that we know to be relatively small.

So the photographer has presented us with a further intellectual problem, another disproportion in addition to the usual diminution of the photograph. How is the viewer to solve this problem? He has to bring his own cultural and psychological background to bear on the problem of the photograph. (The photographer has posed a

question and left it to the viewer to find the answer—as in much of modern art, poetry and music as well.)

Is this meant to be a dream? A representation of the womb, in the form of a hand, holding a newborn creature? Does it imply protection for the uterus itself? Our modern education has prepared us for Freudian symbolism.

We begin to go further, to look more closely. We discover new things: the expression on the woman's face. It's beautiful, but without passion. And the woman's nude body—beautiful again, but devoid of sensuality. One gropes for words to describe one's feelings: Mother? pretty child? So, just at the emotional-intellectual level, we have ten or twelve unanswerable questions.

What *does* the photograph mean? A photograph, like any good work of art, poses more questions than it answers. The viewer cannot question the photographer and hope to get a satisfactory answer. Instead he must question the photograph.



Jerry Uelsmann, *Nude with Pod in Hand*, 1972: "a surrealistic representation"

The Pleasure of Discomfort

The *oval shape*: here our familiarity with the history of art and of photography is useful. The oval goes back to the early madonna ovals we find in the painters of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—it's a religious motif.

Why does Uelsmann use the oval? Why present the contemporary viewer with this unfamiliar photographic shape—we are so used to the rectangle and the square. He does it to add to the mystery, the unfamiliarity, the discomfort—which, paradoxically, is *pleasing*. The oval does not jar, does not offend—but it makes us aware of itself, its shape. Esthetically, perhaps, Uelsmann may have needed this shape to hold the inner image together; the oval shape reinforces the womb image, the idea of beginning. It's like a dish, and you need some concave shape to hold it. The oval echoes the shape of the hand and its function; it holds the hand that holds the woman.

Yet, miraculously, the detached hand (remember, it is not attached to any body) does not terrify us. It is not the gorilla hand of a King Kong in that movie where the horrible monster holds the poor, frantically struggling, sensuous, half-naked figure of the actress. Here, one's impression is of calm, of detachment, of repose, not of struggle and fear.

Let us go further, look deeper into the photograph. Suddenly we come upon a pea pod. It seems to emerge, not really dominant. To reinforce the sense of womb and seed? The photographer has put the germ of the thought in the photograph, has let it lie there, for the viewer to find, gradually, not all at once. Is this an unspoken message from the photographer: You are on the right track—keep looking! Let the idea of the photograph germinate in your sensibility. Accept the photograph as a kind of lyrical poem; there is no struggle, no stress, the woman is passive, she is not giving birth, she is simply *there*. She is like the photograph itself; her state is as hard to define as the state of the photograph.

What title would you give this photograph? More than one, perhaps: Dream, Birth of Woman; Possession. But to me it does not have a feeling of compassion. On the contrary, it is compelling.

Distortion

Obviously this photograph is contemporary, but it has its roots, again, technically, in an early, nineteenth century photographer the Dutch Oscar Rejlander (whom, incidentally, Uelsmann acknowledges his debt to). You notice, if you look again, the manipulation of the negative—there's an overlap of images. The intention is to get past everyday reality, to add another element, to avoid the documentary, straight representational type of image. Why? Because Uelsmann is probing the inner world, and he has to use other tech-

niques than naturalism. Distortion? Yes, of course. Uelsmann's trick here is to give us distortion in a canvas that has non-distorted elements as well. If everything was distorted, we would accept distortion as reality. Here, only one element is distorted: How can the woman be smaller than the hand of a man (which is not distorted)? So we assume a symbolic, unconscious element at play.

How contemporary this photograph is, with all its seventeenth and eighteenth and nineteenth century references! To arrive at this image, photographer and viewer both have to be contemporary twentieth century people. Faced with the photograph of a contrail, only a twentieth century person will understand that it is the trail left behind an aircraft by condensation—and only that viewer will draw symbolic references from the contrail.

This is the case with Uelsmann's double (or rather multiple) exposure. Rejlander used the same technique to achieve a conventional artistic experience (his subject is *The Last Supper*). But Uelsmann uses multiple exposure to reach beyond that traditional artistic experience, to internalize a psychic experience.

The psyche internalized—is the photographer using his photograph to examine his inner world? What is unique is that the basic sense of the photograph is curiosity about its subject (the woman in the palm); but there is also curiosity about the possibilities of the medium itself. It is as though the photographer is asking, How far can I go in expressing my inner thoughts, and expressing the meaning of the medium? (By general consensus, the camera is the most curious of media.) So the photographer is both his subject and his medium.

But the photograph has extra-photographic associations...with the makers of icons, with iconographic representation of elemental forces (woman, seed, palm), with primitivism. Each image in this photograph is a kind of celebration of life, but not in the antique or classical mode or a social one. It is a romantic, individualistic celebration—definitely part of the post-eighteenth century tradition. (So here, again, viewer and photographer need a broad humanistic education to recognize the modernity of this photograph.)

A last observation: No, this is not a world-shaking photograph. There's no sense of tragedy, no cathartic purging of the soul. It is more like a chambers of horrors which one walks through and emerges from—not unscathed, certainly surprised, singularly composed, touched, with a sense of another reality. We have gone through an experience of *uncertainty*—and enjoyed it, throughout. This photograph has, all in all, been a pleasant experience, like walking on the moon, confident that the spaceship will bring us back.

Alfred Stieglitz, "The Street"

Stieglitz was most important as an influence, as a seer, as a man of ideas, not necessarily as a photographer (though he was a fine one). After a period in Europe where he was exposed to the most advanced thinking about photography, he came back to the United States, and was appalled at the state of the art. He brought back with him a new view of realism, influenced by P.H. Emerson. He founded the Photo-secessionist movement, to break away from all the pseudo-fakery.

Take this photo of the street. It was part of the movement toward realism, around 1910-12. Nobody had ever taken any pictures of rain and snow before. He was the first, expanded the technical limits. He shot in soft light—at that period considered not the time to take photographs. The idea in those days was that the photographer follow Kodak's dictum: Put the light behind you and shoot. But Stieglitz was a pioneer; he explored. There's an illustrative story about his curiosity: At the beginning of his career, Stieglitz locked himself in a basement and photographed a dynamo a thousand times, to see its possibilities, all of them, what could be done with a dynamo.

To come back to "The Street." An ordinary street scene, taxi cabs waiting. Putting the horse in the foreground creates a sense of depth. Other planes—the rail, the space in back of the man, the tree—all the planes suggest depth. Essentially, the picture is an attempt to get away from the artificiality of the usual documentary. You can sense the presence of Stieglitz (unlike Uelsmann and Adams, absent from their pictures). Emerging from a period of false feeling, Stieglitz gives us a documentary, but one without a message. What comes through is the physical mood, rather than some grandiose ideas about poverty or social conditions in New York City.

"The Street" is like a Tibetan tonka, whose border is never finished, that continues on, suggesting an unfinished, an unlimited world; the carriage leads us to another scene, another street, elsewhere. At first glance, this is a moment in time. The next glance reveals something more permanent; the moment expands within the picture.

There is a sense of mood, rather than detail. To me, the mood of the evening before Christmas, everyone rushing to be home, snow falling.

Stieglitz advanced the intellectual level of photography: he gave us the possibility of meaning without overt interpretation. This is a landmark picture in American photography. The English and the French were further ahead of us at that time. To understand this picture you need a historical sense—even to understand its purity as a work of art.



Alfred Stieglitz, *The Street*: "nobody had ever photographed rain or snow before"

Ansel Adams' "Moonrise"

What comes through immediately in an Adams picture is superb technical quality. There's a tremendous range of gray from white to black. He has all the shades from one to one hundred from a very black sky to a pure white cloud, and then all the range of greys between, in the grass, in the light; gradations between the mountains and buildings, in the starkness of the tombstone, in the shadows of the mountain ranges—what one refers to in a photograph as "tone." The tones flow into one another, yet the images themselves are sharp; the tones almost follow the contours of the landscape.

Adams is important because he shows you what you can achieve with complete pre-planning.

Ansel Adams, *Moonrise, Hernandez, New Mexico*, 1944: "enormous landscape one does not feel lost"




• When Adams takes a photograph, he can see what it is going to be. Most other photographers leave something to chance—or are enslaved by the element of chance. But for Adams, the readiness is all. He can seize the opportunity when it comes, because he pre-visualizes it and is waiting for it. Note the lyrical quality of the clouds and the sense of motion there; the same motif is repeated in more than one plane.

Adams' photographs look like beautiful postcards at first glance. But reject that notion! Look closely and you will find the sensitivity for the subject he is photographing, a sense of awe for nature. Surprisingly, though Adams photographs enormous landscapes, you don't feel lost in them. He brings us a sense of human scale, a sense of being comfortable in and with nature. Contrast this with the discom-

fort Jerry Uelsmann brings us.

Adams is thoroughly unsentimental. He is capable of coming to grips with nature without injecting his own feelings. There are no human beings in Adams' natural scenes. Nature is not a backdrop for human beings to pose against—a human being who walked into this scene would disappear. The photo leaves you cold, uninvolved, yet relaxed in an unsentimental way. The photographer is absent. There is no intellectual challenge as there is in Uelsmann. It's all there at first glance, on the surface, the message does not become much deeper as we dig. The more we look, the more we notice the magnificent quality, the sharpness, how he captures the light. Adams' success rests in his honesty and his lack of complication. The exact opposite of Uelsmann's surrealistic mystery and symbolism and ambiguity. But both equally honest—no false sentimentality—which is to say, no feelings or thoughts that are disproportionate to the occasion—no crocodile tears. Again, a very modern approach to art, all art.



Walker Evans, "Floyd Burroughs"

Believe it or not, this is the most difficult of all the photographs I have looked at. The difficulty is in identifying the specific context of the man in the photograph. There is simply no clue, outside the title, "Floyd Burroughs, Hale County, Alabama, 1936." And the title should not count. The meaning of the photograph should be in the photograph, not its title.

Perhaps the value of this photograph lies in the very fact that it is not tied to a particular, discernible event. The image alone does not recall it; we do not know from the picture that it was taken in the rural South during the period of the Great Depression. It conveys the picture of a farmer who has seen a tornado moving toward him. It goes to the essence of man's concern and tragedy and struggle.

Now we know from other evidence that this picture belongs to the history of photojournalism. A photograph is at its best in recording a particular emotion of a particular man. But this photograph does not reveal the particular moment that gave rise to this particular emotion—as a documentary photograph presumably should. The farmer's clothes are no different here from what they were yesterday—just farm clothing. There is no definite prop to suggest a specific time—no car of a certain make and year, no calendar.

True, we have a very powerful image—but the photograph is not as a social document. Perhaps this is one of those photographs that should not be looked at out of context. It requires supporting evidence, textual or photographic. (Actually, it was first presented in this way, in a book, accompanying James Agee's *Let Us Now Praise Famous Men*.)

So here we have both the limitation and the strength of the genre of documentary photography. As a rule, it has to be judged not only from the point of view of esthetic and photographic quality but also in its entire context.

Importance of Context

A small example: There is a photograph by Louis Hime of a child working at a loom. It was very important at the time because it awakened people's consciences to the nastiness of child labor. If you take that photograph out of context, it is a very ordinary, warm photo!

Here too, in "Floyd Burroughs," we have a famous, often displayed picture. We are aware of some drama taking place, but the image itself does not reveal what the drama is.

Moreover, this photograph does not yield the same sense of mystery or reverence we get from the Uelsmann and Adams pictures. It yields only a question mark—why is the man in trouble?



Walker Evans, *Floyd Burroughs, Hale County, Alabama, 1936*: "no clue outside the title"

No matter how carefully you scrutinize it, you will never come up with the answer: the American depression of the 1930s. Your eye bounces off the struggle, off the troubled eyes of the farmer. There is really no room for any kind of larger speculation. Documentary photography requires a certain kind of knowledge—on the part of the viewer—emotional as well as factual. In the documentary the factual is terribly important. You don't have to know the name of the mountain in Ansel Adams' "Moonrise."

But in documentary photography, the viewer has to know the context. Think of the famous photograph of General Eisenhower grimacing, the puzzled look on his face—you have to know that at that moment someone had told him that General MacArthur had been fired in Korea. Or the famous picture of the naval petty officer crying as F.D. Roosevelt's body was being carried down Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington.

A documentary photograph becomes a group experience; the experience in a way is part of the message, and one that is all the stronger for being shared with a certain society at a certain time. The images provide a given bit of information at the emotional level, the soul of the experience—but you need the label.

On the other hand, a photograph of a man crying may be a nice experience, evoking our compassion—but we may also need to ask, what is the man crying about?

Technique is not so essential in reportorial photography as in the kind of photographs Ansel Adams takes. What is important is to capture what Henri Cartier-Bresson calls "the decisive moment."

The decisive moment in documentary photography is when the emotion, the light, the expression, the photographic reaction, the subject reaction all come together to give us a distillation of an entire situation. In literature we speak of a distillation of an age. The fleeting moment sculpted into a lasting experience—that is the challenge of documentary journalism.

The Educated Viewer

What do these four individual photographs have in common? *The demands they make on the viewer.* It is a fallacy to believe that photography is an easy means of communication. Unless you bring something to it, you get nothing out of it. To Uelsmann you bring a feeling for poetry, imagination, humor; to Adams, appreciation of Nature, the Romantic idea, craft—art itself; to Stieglitz, a knowledge of the history of photography, and the struggle to establish it as an independent medium, not just imitation of art. Finally, to Evans you must come with a sense of the importance of context, of history, in understanding the nature of man and of suffering.


And the photographer? He needs the widest, most liberal education, in life and the university, as well as the studio. For his role is to teach the rest of us how to see.

ART AND ORDER

By Stanley Kunitz

Modern art and literature are often charged with being needlessly subjective, irrational, fragmented, and obscure. Stanley Kunitz connects such difficulties in contemporary art with the uncertainties prevalent in science, religion, and morality. The artist, he asserts, responds to the disorder in society and in himself by achieving a complex and hard-earned order in works which themselves include contradictory elements.

Stanley Kunitz is poetry consultant to the Library of Congress, and a distinguished poet, critic and translator. His books include *Selected Poems* and *A Kind of Order, A Kind of Folly*, published in 1975, from which his article is reprinted.



The vision of reality that marks the man of our time owes an incalculable debt to a familiar quartet of intellectual giants, the prime agents in the revolution of modern thought: Darwin, who destroyed the innocence of nature; Marx, who destroyed the innocence of the state; Freud, who destroyed the innocence of the mind; Einstein, who destroyed the innocence of time and space. These are the scientists of our new world, those who employed reason to overthrow the reasonable world into which they were born.

And how much does our vision owe, as we compose the scene of an era, to the fabrications of Cézanne and Picasso, Rimbaud and Eliot, Whitman and Lawrence, Dostoevski and Joyce? They were explorers at the frontiers of the creative intuition. Their images brought us news. I think too of our debt to Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, artists in the realm of philosophy and theology, the broad dominion of the speculative mind.

We are the children of Kierkegaard, who meditated on dread, on the sickness-unto-death, on fear and trembling; who fought against Hegelian rationalism; who defined the significance of the act of choice as an expression of Being; who rejected the claims of objectivity, insisting on truth as inwardness, relational truth, realizable only by an individual in action; who stressed the necessity of commitment, the greatest commitment being the irrational act of faith, the faith that is priceless because it is absurd.

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And we are the children of Nietzsche who wrote, "All truth is bloody truth for me"; who questioned the whole structure of good and evil; who attacked the Christian ideal of asceticism as a lie from life, the expression of a diseased will; who deplored the nature of the sickness, of self-contempt, who heard in himself man's desperate voice crying, "I have got lost; I am everything that has been lost." And who replied implacably, "What does your conscience say? You shall become who you are."

It was Nietzsche who said, before it really happened: "We live in a period of atoms, of atomic chaos"; who foresaw the Nuclear State; who predicted, "The hunt for happiness will never be greater than when it must be caught between today and tomorrow because the day after tomorrow all hunting time may have come to an end altogether."

Truth is not the exclusive property of scientific intelligences and intuitions, new modes of perception, new ranges of metaphysical aspects of the same reality as theirs and potentially even more comprehensive in view, since they incorporate into a world of thought, a world of feeling. Artists and scientists comprise a fraternity of the imagination, subject to the same pressures of history and interdependent in their development.

A Capricious Universe

The central observations of modern science are to be found crystallized in Planck's Quantum Theory, Einstein's Theory of Relativity, and Heisenberg's Principle of Uncertainty. They imply a universe bereft of time and space, which have been pushed back to the human consciousness as forms of intuition; a universe without cause and effect, the cornerstones of the old science, which have been replaced by fields of statistics and probabilities; a universe then, of indeterminacy and caprice, not stabilized by things, but storming with energy and motion; a universe whose objective reality, if it has any, we can never hope to know.

The most recent explorations of inner and outer space lead us further along the road to nowhere. The atom, which used to be immutable and eternal, turns out to be neither. It has been broken down into more than 100 elementary particles—or what are called particles—and the quest is far from ended. Beyond matter we find strange stories about the properties of anti-matter, the most mysterious inhabitant of the zoo of modern physics, since it destroys both ordinary matter and anti-matter at once when the two approach each other. Now astronomers point to the existence of "black holes" in the signals of the ultimate collapse of the entire universe into a density of nothingness, a forever without matter, Shakespearean physical law.

Three centuries ago Pascal could write in words that still ring majestically:

Man is only a reed, the feeblest reed in nature, but he is a thinking reed. There is no need for the entire universe to arm itself in order to annihilate him: a vapor, a drop of water, suffices to kill him. But were the universe to crush him, a man would yet be more noble than that which slays him, because he knows he dies, and the advantage that the universe has over him; of this the universe knows nothing.

The pride of Pascal, who gloried in the blessed gift of reason, rests on the conviction that man is man, nature is nature—the one subject, the other object. But a man of our time no longer stands separate from, and superior to, the natural universe. He has become part of his very field of perception; he is scattered into the drifting cosmic dust; and the dust blows through him.

Heisenberg, who demonstrated that the very act of observation changes the phenomena to be observed, quietly asserted, "Modern physics, in the final analysis, has already discredited the concept of the truly real." Probing the universe, man finds everywhere himself. "We are both spectators and actors in the great drama of existence," wrote another Nobel Prize physicist, Nils Bohr. These are speculations that offer us at least an entrance to a new vision of heaven and hell, a vision that may have its portents of terror but is not without grandeur. Its equivalent in art would be works of spiritual assertion, of heroic confrontation, of tragic dimension.

The Many Faces of Disorder

We live in one of the most violent epochs of history, in which none of us can claim ignorance of the many faces of disorder. A man of this century has witnessed great seismic shifts of power; the rise and fall of dictators; the convulsions of nations; the slaughter of innocents; unprecedented scandals in high places, brutalities, terrors. "Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold," Yeats wrote.

Since the Industrial Revolution the mainstays of order have been religion, science and bourgeois morality. We need not discuss the last, since it scarcely exists, save as hypocrisy or parody. As for religion the rationalists who preoccupied themselves with setting up proofs of divinity have perished and we are left with the followers of Nietzsche, proclaiming, "God is dead," and of Kierkegaard, preaching, "Believe—but know that your belief is absurd." The third member of this trinity of order, science, is the craziest of the lot—that is, if common sense is your criterion. No scientist worth his salt would pretend for a moment that ordinary reason is equipped to cope

with the structure of the universe.

Science, in fact, has fathered a crucial paradox: on the one hand, by way of technology, it has served to effect the triumph of mechanization and mediocrity; on the other, by way of theory, it has opened the gates of the universe to mystery. "Pure logicity," wrote Einstein, "cannot yield us any knowledge of the empirical world." He also remarked that common sense is nothing more than a deposit of prejudices laid down in the mind prior to the age of eighteen.

People are always complaining that modern art is unintelligible. Is there anything else on earth of any importance that they can truly profess to understand?

The first symptoms of the disintegration of our ordered universe appeared in the arts before it became generally obvious. The landscape begins to tremble in the paintings of Cézanne. A century ago Carlyle stated that the fine arts had got into "an insane condition and walk abroad without keepers, nobody suspecting their bad state, and do phantastick tricks."

Irrationality may well be the safest of all disguises for the modern artist—the mask, or persona, that permits him the greatest freedom of expression with a certain degree of immunity, though there is a danger, to be sure, that the mask may eventually usurp the face. As Yeats noted, "Seeming that goes on for a lifetime is no different from reality."

At a time when man does not have a steady gaze on a fixed reality, when reality as such is atomized, and when the psyche, separated from society, split between thought and feeling, no longer appears to be a coherent entity, poetry inevitably tends to become increasingly aware of itself, to turn inward. The medium becomes the subject, the flow of the poem is equated with the flow of the mind, the associational flow. The poetry is in the *process*. As Wallace Stevens wrote:

Poetry is the subject of the poem.
From this the poem issues and

To this returns. Between the two,
Between issue and return, there is

An absence in reality,
Things as they are. Or so we say.

But are these separate? Is it
An absence for the poem, which acquires

Its true appearances there, sun's green,
Cloud's red, earth feeling, sky that thinks.

From these it takes. Perhaps it gives
In the universal intercourse.

The difficulty with so impersonal a theory of poetics is that it takes no note of the indispensable encounter between the artist and his medium. Art doesn't simply happen: the artist must *do* something. After Franz Kline had abandoned representational painting and applied himself to the transmutation of energy into bold ideograms, he made a typically wry comment: "The subject has become the problem. You can say 'painting is the subject,' but you just can't stand by with a shelf full of paint cans." Once he said to me, "Art has nothing to do with knowing, it has to do with giving." Stevens would have resisted that dictum as romantic overstatement, but in the passage quoted he stresses the same verb: "Perhaps it *gives*/ In the universal intercourse."

One of the characteristic postures of the modern poet is the contemplation not of his own navel, but of his own mind at work. "An idea cannot be fixed," wrote Valéry. "The only thing that can be fixed (if anything can be) is something that is not an idea. An idea is an alteration—or rather a mode of alteration—indeed, the most discontinuous mode of alteration." His M. Teste remarks: "I am existing and seeing myself; seeing myself see myself, and so on." The work modifies the author, we are told, as a woman modifies herself in front of a mirror. I think of those women in the paintings of de Kooning who sit in front of a window that is also a mirror and also a picture on a wall. How can you tell the inside from the outside, the reality from its reflection? Yeats had asked the question before, "How can we know the dancer from the dance?" In a letter to Mallarmé, Valéry abandoned the distinction between form and content: "What they call the content is only impure (that is to say, *muddled*) form."

Changing Ideas of Order

To perpetuate any kind of truth about human experience is ultimately to be on the side of order, but the concept of order is among the things that change. Consider, for example, how lunatic the flow of traffic in our streets would seem to our pre-automotive ancestors. We ourselves would be inclined to throw a fit every time we crossed the street if we did not believe, however mistakenly, that the mobility we have gained through the invention of the automobile is worth the risk we take with our pedestrian lives. The disorder becomes bearable because it fits into the structure of our twentieth century values. The human organism is equipped to tolerate only a limited amount of confusion. One of the prime tasks of the imagination is to create an illusion of order.

Cubism followed hard on the heels of Relativity in the first decade of the century, but it would be foolish to argue that Picasso or Braque was illustrating Einstein. Scientist and painter made the

same metaphysical leap, discovering for themselves, each according to his genius, the equivocations of space, time and location, where neither the scene nor the implied observer of the scene is at rest.

Since the art of our time is the only art we can get, I must defend it against the enemies of art, however much I quarrel with certain of its aspects. One can no more make a case against modern art than one can make a case against history. The argument from within is the only one worth listening to. The first obligation is the effort toward compassionate understanding, tied to the realization that it is the artist's historic consciousness that prevents him from being optimistic, as it is his esthetic conscience that prevents him from becoming popular.

Every work of art of any interest must be considered an event. The word "event" has a peculiar vibration in the vocabulary of contemporary physics, for it is tantamount to a definition of reality. It is not the particle of matter or the point in space or the instant in time at which something happens that has physical reality, but only the event itself, the event embedded in its four-dimensional continuum. Einstein was born into a world of substances; he died in a world of events.

The Cult of Spontaneity

In the 1950s a painting began to look like a scarred battleground in which there was as much evidence of destruction as of creation. The corrections, the rejections, the mistakes had become incorporated into the final work. It is as though the artist were intent on showing us the painting as a process rather than a thing. Behind this esthetic lurks the ghost of the Dada movement, which—against the background of the Russian Revolution in a time of the breaking of nations—had borrowed from the revolutionary Bakunin the slogan: destruction is also creation.

Though the Dadaists loved nothing more than to create a scandal, their purpose was serious. The art that they rejected was an art they despised for serving as a safety valve for the preservation of bourgeois society. They were against all systems that stultified human spontaneity. If they did nothing else, they demonstrated the creative power of unreason and violence—how they could be used for the sake of man instead of against him. Their cult of spontaneity is still very much with us. And all the arts, since the moustache was painted on the Mona Lisa, have moved in the direction of anti-art.

When belief in miracle was an article of faith, the irrational could enter art ceremoniously by way of the front door, with hat and calling card in hand, and be confident of a gracious welcome. Today, when the house is burning, we hear the irrational tramping up the cellar stairs, but we cannot be really sure, hearing the blows of its

axe, whether it comes to kill us or to save. It seems to me no accident that so many wizards, astrologists, magicians and clairvoyants, readers of Tarot cards, not to speak of primitivistic fetishes less than half-believed in, populate our poems. They are the mocking agents of the degraded miracle. To misquote Emerson: "When the Gods go, half-gods arrive." No doubt it would be preferable to have full-time, hard-working gods to light up our verses, but they do not seem to be in supply at the moment.

With young writers I make a nuisance of myself talking about order, for the good reason that order is teachable; but in my bones I know that only the troubled spirits among them, those who recognize the disorder without and within, have a chance to become poets, for only they are capable of producing a language galvanic with the contradictions of the actual.

The Library and the Wilderness

It was Lionel Johnson, of the child's body and the hieratic brain, who said to Yeats on one occasion, "Yeats, you need ten years in the library, but I have need of ten years in a wilderness." The library and the wilderness, order and disorder, reason and madness, technique and imagination—the poet to be complete must polarize the contradictions.

I would not even try to put my finger on the exact spot where craft ends and art begins. The match spurts fire, and flame begets flame. Clichés of speech, clichés of observation and thought, clichés of feeling—when these are driven from the temple, the self stirs and the imagination begins to taste its freedom. That is one reason why all poetry, no matter how tragic its theme, seems strangely rooted in joy. Of course nobody goes to school to learn about wilderness. Each artist can be trusted to discover his own.

Yeats taught us that out of our quarrel with others we make rhetoric; out of our quarrel with ourselves, poetry. Different quarrels make different kinds of poems, and our quarrels today are quite different from those, let us say, of the eighteenth century. Our quarrel with sex, for example, is enormously complicated by our quarrel with mechanization. The kind of poetry we get is not so much what the age demands—our age demands nothing from the artist but his submission—as what it deserves, and sometimes better than it deserves.

The arts do not characteristically attack the ills of an age with drastic remedies, for the artist is more than merely the physician: he is, in good measure, the patient as well. Order is treated with homeopathic doses of order; disorder with disorder. One might say, stretching the point, that the Age of Reason died of a surfeit of heroic couplets. Fine couplets, too, so many of them were!

The American Review

Nature and Nature's laws lay hid in night:
God said "Let Newton be!" and all was light.

Who among us today could match the brilliance and sure confidence of Alexander Pope's lines? A twentieth century parodist could only reply:

It did not last: the Devil howling "Ho,
Let Einstein be," restored the status quo.

The Role of Imagination

The more man achieves, the more aware he becomes of his limitations, including the limitations of his senses. The human eye, for example, is sensitive only to the narrow band of radiation that lies between the red and the violet. Most of the "lights of the world" are suppressed. For those missing lights we must substitute the light of the imagination. The prison-house, said Plato long ago, is the world of sight. One of the characteristic escape routes, for the modern artist, is to dive into the flux of his own sensibility, the space river, and to ride with the current. In the opposite camp are those who seek the purity of a system, the crystal palace of geometry; few dare to submit themselves to the ordeal of walking through fire of selfhood into a world of archetypal forms.

To make any kind of affirmation, in the midst of this random and absurd universe, one must begin by affirming the value of one's own existence; but the affirmation must not be too glib or too cheaply won; it must rise out of the wrestling with all that denies it, to the very point of negation.

That order is greatest which holds in suspension the most contradictory; holds it in such precarious balance that each instant threatens its overthrow. In life and in art, consistent with the precept of Tillich, "the self-affirmation of a being is the stronger the more nonbeing it can take into itself."

Where else but in the free country of art is it possible to tell the whole unspeakable truth about the human condition?

UNIVERSITIES AND MANPOWER NEEDS

By Howard R. Bowen

Should higher education be planned and rationed to meet the requirements of a nation's economy, or should students freely choose the kind of education they want? The author examines the arguments advanced in the current debate and opts for free choice as both more humane and, in the long run, more efficient.

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A nation's system of higher education can be managed according to two basic principles: the *manpower principle*, where the objective is to produce the right number of persons for various vocations and professions; and the *free-choice principle*, where the objective is to supply education in response to the choices of students.

The nations of the world differ in their relative emphasis on these two principles. In general, the socialist and developing nations stress the manpower principle. The United States throughout its history has stressed the free-choice principle. The preferences of the nations of western Europe lie somewhere between the extremes.

In the United States, the free-choice principle is under attack, and increasing attention is given to the manpower principle. American higher education is widely criticized for allegedly producing too many of certain kinds of manpower, especially engineers and Ph.D.s, or for simply producing too many persons with higher education. It is often asserted that the labor market cannot absorb the numbers being educated in specific fields or all fields, and that higher education should be rationed according to manpower requirements.

Essentially, the manpower approach is based on the following

argument: As the economy evolves, it will need certain inventories of trained manpower at successive future dates; these needs can be predicted in some detail; and education at all levels should be geared to meet these needs. The evolution of technology and economic organization is regarded as a predestined process determining future employment opportunities. People, and therefore the educational system, should adjust to this evolutionary process.

This line of thought has some truth in it. Obviously, a degree of balance in distribution of people among vocations and professions is desirable. Nevertheless, these ideas are riddled with fallacies. Before turning to a more defensible and useful approach to higher educational planning, let us consider these misconceptions.

Widespread Misconceptions

Misconception 1: The economy requires a more or less fixed inventory of occupational skills at each stage in its evolution.

On the contrary, the economy is highly flexible in its ability to adapt to different mixes of skills. If it lacks certain skills, it can train people—often quickly—for the necessary jobs, or it can invent machines to substitute for people. In some cases, if people cannot be found to perform certain work—for example, that of domestic servants—the economy can learn to do without and we invent washing machines and TV dinners to serve as substitutes.

It is true that the use of, and compensation for, different skills will depend on relative supplies. If certain skills are scarce—for example, physicians' services—society economizes on them and rewards their owners handsomely. If certain skills are abundant, new and less urgent uses are found for them, and the rewards are reduced. For example, if many more physicians were trained in the next decade, some would do different and less urgent kinds of work, and all would earn less money. One purpose of training more physicians would be to reduce the cost of health care, but physicians would not be unemployed.

That the skill requirements of the economy are not fixed and predetermined is demonstrated by the speed with which the country can mobilize for war and reconvert to peace, conditions that provide quite different jobs. It is also demonstrated when different countries, such as Japan, Germany, Russia, Britain, and the United States, operate advanced, fully employed industrial economies with quite different inventories of educational backgrounds and occupational skills.

Misconception 2: The character of the economy and its skill requirements can be predicted for periods long enough to be pertinent to educational planning.

Education has a time perspective of forty-sixty years. Despite the current fad of futurism, an estimate of the detailed specifications of the economy over several decades is clearly beyond reach. Future skill requirements are quite indefinite. They depend on whether the nation is at war or peace; exploring space, oceans, and the earth's interior; concentrating on domestic problems, such as the environment or the city; emphasizing private consumption of material goods or personal services. They also depend on whether unforeseen technological changes give rise to new occupations or eliminate old ones; whether the country decides to reap more of its riches in the form of leisure and less in products; whether leisure is devoted to contemplative and artistic pursuits rather than conventional recreation and entertainment; whether production methods change to deemphasize assembly lines and repetitive operations and emphasize more creativity and meaning in work.

Manpower requirements depend on what the country wants to do. But, what the country wants to do or can do will be affected by the kind of manpower available—by the way people have been educated, by the values they cherish, by the tasks they think worth accomplishing.

Education is an active generator of values, not merely a passive adjuster to them.

Misconception 3: An expanding technology will lead to increasing unemployment, with, eventually, only a fraction of the labor force fully employed.

This widespread idea about the relationship of technology and unemployment has persisted for at least two centuries. Economists since Adam Smith have been busy dispelling it. Only a few years ago, the National Commission on Technology, Automation, and Economic Progress had, as its main purpose, to determine whether U.S. unemployment, which had exceeded 7 percent of the labor force in the late 1950s and early 1960s, was due to the cumulative effect of technological change. The commission of well-known economists, business men, and labor leaders unanimously rejected this idea. It concluded, with some qualifications, that unemployment was due to inadequate fiscal and labor market policy and could be corrected.

No one could deny that many individuals lose their jobs because of changes in production methods. Such unemployment is often personally traumatic. In a dynamic economy, a certain number of people are at all times unemployed because they are between jobs. But two centuries of history have revealed no lasting trend toward greater unemployment as technology advances. Indeed, the employment pattern of the past thirty years has been better than that of most comparable earlier periods. For as technology advances and fewer people are needed to produce food, clothing,

automobiles, and other physical things, attention turns to services. The number of persons who could be usefully employed in the service industries is virtually unlimited. And many professional persons—physicians, engineers, lawyers, artists—can be employed if all the legitimate needs for their services were met.

Misconception 4: People in the foreseeable future will enjoy large amounts of leisure, and education should be directed toward leisure rather than labor.

It is true that society can give up some nonessential production in favor of greater leisure. It is also true that many people—especially the young—are questioning material values, and that there is an increasing production of things. A few are deliberately choosing lives less cluttered with material possessions. These same people, however, are advocating that the cities be improved, the environment cleaned up, the culture enriched, health services be made more work humanized, and so on. The new antimaterialism is thus unlikely to result in a redirection of the economy toward new goals, with no diminution in work to be done and a sharp increase in professional services needed.

It is true that the average work week has declined somewhat in recent decades, and that paid vacation leaves have increased. But the number of people in the labor force as a percentage of the total working age population has slowly but steadily risen from 57 to 60 since 1945, mainly due to the increasing participation of women. The prevalence of overtime work, dual jobs, and overwork has increased, especially for those in the higher echelons of management—so that many people do not necessarily wish to work shorter hours.

Perhaps more importantly, Americans are not getting increasing amounts of genuine free time—in the sense of rest, recreation, and contemplation—even in their nonworking hours. The potential leisure gets lost because of the time involved in commuting, in shopping for possessions, and in pursuing the many time-consuming activities that make up a high standard of living.

Misconception 5: Unemployment is widespread among young people.

That there has been unemployment among aerospace engineers and some difficulty in moving recent university graduates into the labor force is true. This unemployment has been due primarily to shifts in the defense budget, to a pause in economic growth, and to the many young people entering the labor force, not to a surplus of people or to a lack of useful work. Indeed, unemployment among the uneducated are far greater than among the educated.

Misconception 6: The market for educated workers should be conceived solely as a national market.

Even if the United States were saturated with education talent, the world as a whole would still be desperately short of engineers, physicians, businessmen, economists, teachers, and agronomists. A reverse "brain drain," especially one directed toward the developing world, would be extraordinarily constructive.

Misconception 7: The basic purpose of education is to prepare people for quite specific jobs; it is somehow wrong or wasteful to provide an education that will not be used directly in a vocation.

This deeply ingrained and widespread opinion is based in part on the singular concepts of a rigid, one-to-one relationship between education and jobs. Someone who apprentices as a plumber should be a plumber, a chemistry student should be a chemist, a Ph.D. in English should be a college teacher of English, and so on. Any deviation is often regarded as a failure either of the educational system or of the individual. This view overlooks several facts.

Education, including quite specific vocational and professional education, produces learning, personal traits, and outlooks of wide applicability. A young woman who trains as a teacher may apply her learning to personnel or social work or to being a better mother. A chemistry student may apply some of his learning to an executive position in toy manufacturing. A Ph.D. in English or history may find his destiny in journalism, in the Department of State, in publishing, or in secondary education.

It is a mark of success rather than failure that education—even a strictly vocational education—has wide applicability and produces flexible and versatile people. Career change is desirable in a dynamic economy; and the entry of people of diverse educations, interests, and backgrounds into business and public affairs can be a fruitful source of new ideas and outlooks.

Misconception 8: Higher education is being opened to too many people.

This idea is based on the assumption that as enrollments grow, academic standards will fall. This is decidedly not the case. A recent study shows that during the years 1925-63, when enrollments increased several times over, the average ability level of students entering college actually rose. Moreover, all evidence indicates that millions of students not in higher education are basically as bright and able as those who are. Clearly, simple morality urges the opening of opportunities to these people as fast as possible. Education should not be shut off on the pretext that too many people have too much of it.

Adaptability of the Economy

Let us assume that all of these misconceptions were rejected, the United States became a nation where almost everyone completed high school, where the great majority completed secondary education in colleges or vocational schools, and a substantial minority completed advanced study. Two questions arise: Can a population of this kind be employed? and: Who is available for and psychologically conditioned to the dirty, non-monotonous jobs?

To the first question, Can this population be employed?, the answer is yes. The proportion of unskilled workers has long been diminishing while that of skilled, white-collar, technical, and managerial workers has been increasing. These shifts have doubt been due in part to opportunities created by changing technology and in part to a system of education that has produced characteristic mixes of skills and competencies. This trend probably will continue.

As to the second question of who will do the menial work, I would reply that the economy adjusts to the manpower available. Every economy learns to use its particular mix. If it cannot get people to do repetitive assembly-line jobs, incentives are created to automate or change these jobs. If it cannot get people to do hard labor or dig ditches, it has incentives to invent and substitute suitable machines. If it cannot find people to be pliant household servants, it simply goes without them and produces package household appliances, and housing of different size and design. If it cannot find people to collect garbage, it will invent new ways to handle solid waste disposal or, better yet, to eliminate unnecessary containers, thick Sunday newspapers, and other refuse that waste precious resources and degrade the environment.

In the past, America has relied on immigrants and migrant labor from the poorer areas of the country to do the dirty work. Similar to the way more advanced European countries are today importing labor from southern Italy, North Africa, the former British colonies, and elsewhere. However, if such practices decline or are abandoned, developed countries would have to operate their economies with indigenous and highly educated people. The result would be to raise up the relative wages of those willing to do the menial work and to reduce the relative wages of those who limit themselves to white-collar occupations. With such a new wage structure, many educated people might choose blue-collar jobs. This would draw criticism from those who believe that education and jobs should closely correspond. But what is wrong with having an educated truck driver or garbage collector or television repairman? Rather we should view with alarm a society in which blue-collar work gains increasing respect and compensation.

Some people are shocked that a truck driver, a fruit picker, or garbage collector may make more money than a teacher or lawyer. What is wrong in this? In fact, it is wrong that those who do the backbreaking, monotonous, toilsome jobs of society receive the least compensation, personal security, and recognition, while those who perform the interesting and comfortable work and who have tenure and social status receive the most compensation. Who of the latter would exchange with a garbage collector or a dishwasher, even with equal compensation? One of the greatest challenges facing every advanced industrial nation is to learn to operate an economy that includes a highly educated labor force without a large cadre of ignorant and docile workers.

Free Student Choice

Thus both from an economic and a moral point of view, we should support an educational system that continues and extends the tradition of responding to the free choice of students. Such a system would not only accommodate students in conventional age groups but also provide ample second chances for students who may have erred in youthful decisions or who may want additional education in midcareer. The number of places in various programs and in the whole system would be set in response to student choices, not in response to dubious labor market projections.

My argument is not that the mixture of vocational skills makes no difference and that the economy can operate with any set of skills, no matter how extreme or bizarre. Rather I believe that free choice—which is a good in itself—will also lead to a tolerable mixture of vocational skills. One can have at least as much faith in students—as they respond to their own interests and to prospective labor market conditions—as in bureaucratic manpower planners.

Student choices of course are sometimes erratic, based on fashion and fad. Colleges and universities cannot adjust instantly to every shift in student demand. But they should adjust with reasonable promptness to shifts that are legitimate, solidly based, and likely to persist.

Clearly, reliable information on labor market conditions and vocational options should be available to students. Vocational guidance programs in secondary schools and colleges are probably about as good as governmental systems in predicting manpower requirements, but that is not saying much. What saves the day is that students are fairly perceptive about the market outlook, and mistakes are rectified through flexibility in the relationship of education to jobs. The wider provision of second-chance education would help further in correcting youthful mistakes.

A Question of Values

Ultimately, however, the reasons for adopting an education system based on free choice are philosophical rather than practical. They have to do with our system of values. In my view, freedom to choose one's area of study and one's vocation, according to personal talents, interests, and market opportunities, is perhaps the most sacred of all freedoms. If students are to give their time and effort and to forego income for education, society should do no less than provide the institutional support and facilities. And if students of limited resources cannot pay their living costs while studying, provisions should be made through a combination of grants, loans, and work—which will result in heavy life-long indebtedness.

The manpower theory of educational planning is based on a misconception that permeates society. The world is regarded as divided into inputs, primarily in the form of effort or work, and outputs, primarily in the form of economic goods and services. The so-called inputs are as much a part of life as the outputs are overlooked. The inputs can be painful and costly in human terms; they can also be interesting, rewarding, and even exhilarating. Similarly, the outputs can be stultifying and debilitating; they can also be constructive and gratifying. Life is simply not divisible into categories of inputs and outputs. It may be quite legitimate for people to choose vocations and work styles that are personally rewarding even if they are not as productive, in the sense of adding to the Gross National Product, as other employment.

Education is not designed to prepare people to do whatever is demanded by the blind and predestined imperative of technology; rather, it is intended to educate people of vision and sensitivity who will be motivated to direct technology into humanly constructive channels. Society clearly needs to conquer poverty, achieve racial justice, renew the cities and the environment, restore and improve health and education, develop the arts, keep the population in check, restrain world population growth, and aid developing nations. These tasks will stretch society's resources of educated, sensitive, and capable people. Education is still the main hope for coping with these problems. The limits of education have by no means been reached.

FEARFUL OF SCIENCE

By Horace Freeland Judson



Scientists and laymen alike are currently expressing anxiety over the possibly dire consequences that may flow from the latest biological research. People are afraid these experiments may lead to "genetic engineering" by authoritarian figures—control over the minds and bodies of the innocent. To Mr. Judson, veteran reporter of scientific developments, this anxiety is basically ungrounded. He calls on us to distinguish between the real and the fancied dangers implicit in the new biology, and between the urgent ethical questions that have arisen, and those that are unreasonable. His article is excerpted from *Harper's* magazine.

Horace Judson, a former arts and sciences correspondent for *Time* magazine, is the author of *Heroin Addiction in Britain*. He is now finishing a book on molecular biology.

What are we afraid of? A great lot has been written, in the past few years, about the powers and dangers soon to be thrust on us by science, in particular by the new biology. Coursing somewhat ahead of the actual accomplishments so far, journalists and even biologists have extrapolated a future when man himself, body and mind, will be a designed and manufactured product. He is to be conceived when the naked, artificially matured oocyte meets the centrifuged and incubated spermatozoon in a piece of laboratory glassware, and from that moment to the day, seventy years and nine months later, when the life-support machines are turned off, he will be deprived of a creative or controlling part in the manufacturing process—the worker dissociated from the product in the ultimate alienation. Is that really where science is taking us? Can any step in that direction be justified? Are there not some lines of research that are so repugnant, or so dangerous, that they ought to be stopped? Who shall keep watch over what the scientists are doing?

We are now into the third or fourth cycle of alarms about all this; the subject is intrinsically sensational, as can be seen from the examples that recur. What do you think, then, of choosing the sex of your children-to-be? Of growing human embryos outside the

body and experimenting with them? Of genetic screening, the trash out of the gene pool by determining who shall be permitted to breed? Of cloning, or the multiplication of large numbers of genetically identical individuals—what one entirely new writer has described as the “asexual reproduction of 10,000 Tse-tungs”? Of genetic engineering, or the creation of post-human creatures with new or magnified bodily or mental strength?

Biology today presents issues of the gravest import. Truly genuinely new ethical problems are rare, one or two of these may be unprecedented, even though much of that vision of a synthetic future is solemn nonsense. Yet such fears have a wide audience, not just in the general educated public, but among scientists, too. The subject is sadly confused by the failure to distinguish between research findings that are imminent or remotely prospective, between the consequent dangers that are real or simple, between ethical questions that are new or the old grown. Moreover, discussion of the new biology borrows heat and light from problems of medical ethics—abortion at the woman's will, the suppression of newborn monstrosities, suicide, extreme illness, experimentation with human subjects—in which the correct terms are ancient ones of civil liberties and social justice. “Our ethical predicament is genuinely new,” a biologist wrote to me recently. The discussion of it is in terrible disarray.

Three Sources of Danger

Why are we afraid? Our detestation, perfectly appropriate, of the uses to which certain discoveries might be put, is amplified and generalized by some powerful underlying reasons for fear. We are desperate for the primary gifts of technology. But, as the very threshold of the gate of fear, we identify science with technology, although they are not merely separable but in important respects antithetical; and then we flinch, most of us, from embracing an understanding of science. The error of identifying science with technology is widely cited as a defense of scientists, as though they are not to be held responsible for the uses that others make of their discoveries. But the error runs much deeper. It's not that we've got the wrong culprit—we may well have got the right culprit—but we have arraigned him for the wrong crime, and we design the wrong sorts of institutions to control him, abandoning useful institutions that already exist.

But what in particular have we reason to be afraid of? As told by travelers, reports from the future demand checking. There is the logical paradox that a breakthrough, a really new discovery cannot be known before it is known. Many of the biological possibilities scientists play with may not be so likely, or so close,

allow us to think: the most interesting predictions cannot, after all, be affirmed or denied. Yet when we scrutinize the lines of biological research that have been publicized, we can identify three sorts of possible dangers. Some discoveries that seem useful, or at least harmless, could have unforeseen consequences if applied on a large scale; the archetype is the sorcerer's apprentice. At the other extreme, some research is leading directly and deliberately to new things we may think should not be done at all, not even as experiments. The archetype is Dr. Frankenstein, creator of the monster. Still other recent biological research, in a broad middle that seems much more typical of the ethical ambivalence of science, is fascinating in itself and is potentially of the highest value—say, in food production or in medicine—yet is unacceptable if applied to people in other more radical ways. The archetype is Prospero, the scientific wizard of Shakespeare's *The Tempest*.

The mischief that can be done by the biologist as sorcerer's apprentice is exemplified to most people, no doubt, by DDT. But surely the relevant lesson of DDT is that, when the tap was at last turned down, it was done at the urging of scientists in alliance with publicists. The campaign got started late, however, when an axis of chemical manufacturers, industrialized farming corporations and governments had become entrenched. Such institutional couplings seem psychopathic in their heedless intelligence and energy. The hope of prevention comes from scientists warning us early enough to intercept the couplings.

Research in Production

Listen and you will hear the sorcerer's apprentice whistling his tune in several of the world's liveliest biological laboratories, the ones where they're investigating the reproductive process, including methods of choosing the sex of offspring. This research cannot possibly be turned off. It is inextricably linked with what is now the central problem of biology—namely, embryology, the differentiation of cell types and functions in the developing organism. It has ties with immunology, and of course with birth control. Animal breeders want sex choice: it would be immensely profitable, for example, to be able to get females every time in a breed of dairy cows. The hot idea just now is sperm sorting. Advances in sperm sorting were announced in the spring of 1974 from Berlin, with rabbits, and from New York, with mice. But the inaccuracy of proposed methods, the danger of damage to sperm and so to offspring, and the expense and inconvenience of artificial insemination, all will make sperm sorting impractical for widespread use by people.

Some choice of sex is already being exercised through amniocentesis, the technique in which a needle is used to puncture a pregnant

woman's belly, press into the womb and through the sac itself, and pick up and bring out a few cells floating in the waters. Amniocentesis is now regularly used to detect abnormalities such as mongolism, which can be read from the chromosomes of the fetal cells. But amniocentesis is an elaborate hospital procedure, performed fairly late, and entailing a risk to the infant if the mother decides to keep it. Sex choice by amniocentesis is practically as well as ethically limited to the detection and abortion of male children of women who may be carriers of sex-linked hereditary diseases such as muscular dystrophy or hemophilia.

No highly accurate technique for sex choice exists that does not require late abortion or artificial insemination. Biologists looking for the line of breakthrough speculate that it may come with new techniques for finding out the sex of the embryo much earlier, and without invading the womb—ideally, a blood test. But the fact is, there is no research in this area that claims detection of fetal cells in the mother's blood before the fourteenth week of pregnancy. Further, the accuracy of such sex-typing is by no means perfect, and the difficulty may be worse than technical: in women who have had a child, fetal cells apparently continue to circulate. Success through this or any other method looks several jumps away—not one or two years but ten or twenty before sex choice could be cheaply, safely, widely available.

The scheme for an early blood test, followed by a pill, sharpens the ethical question to this: With any such ideally safe method of choosing sex, can we suppose that it is the proper and ethical practice of medicine to be treating no disease, no clinical defect, but doing something quite different, satisfying a *désire*? This objection has been put with force and persuasiveness, for example, by Paul Ramsey, a theologian at Princeton University.

Are such objections absolute? One unnoticed practical consequence of making the choice of sex of offspring available to everyone might be extremely valuable. All discussions of the consequences of unrestricted sex choice begin with the assumption that boys would be chosen more often than girls. Even a very mild preference for boys would quickly produce an imbalance: it has been calculated that if every family had a boy as their first choice, the eventual ratio would be 30 percent female, 70 percent male. The sociological consequences of such an imbalance have fascinated commentators. Some foresee immense social strains, increased homosexuality and prostitution, increased aggression and crime (since the preference for boys is especially marked in lower-class families, or so that argument is stated), a great retreat from the variety of gender roles now permitted the young, a reversal of the emancipation of women—in short, a return of the frontier mentality.

Effect on Population

These consequences are conjectural. Almost nobody has mentioned a simple, astonishing fact: even a single generation of marked, worldwide preference for boys over girls will produce, in the very next generation, a marked, worldwide reduction in population. This is no conjecture. A stable, self-perpetuating population is not correctly described as one child for every adult, plus enough to compensate for immature deaths and a stable average age of death, but rather as one *female* child for every *woman*, plus enough to compensate for deaths of immature girls. Now, there is no way that we are going to avoid appalling disorder as the population crisis persists in the next thirty years. Choosing population reduction by the entirely voluntary (if indirect) means of sex choice, and thus preventing the miseries of famine, shortage, and economic collapse that are otherwise inevitable—at the price of whatever disorders may accompany an unbalanced sex ratio—seems to me an extraordinary opportunity. It would provide the only conceivable alternative to universal compulsory birth control, which otherwise, I believe, must soon be imposed.

The most immediate candidate for Frankenstein's monster—the experiment that ought not to be performed at all—has been the fertilization of human eggs outside the body and the implantation of the embryo in a woman's womb to grow. On July 15, 1974, at the annual meeting of the British Medical Association, Douglas Bevis, professor of obstetrics and gynecology at Leeds University Hospital, announced that three babies had successfully been conceived this way, implanted, and born; the three children, he said, were between a year and eighteen months old and, so far as he knew, were normal.

Again, accurate perception of the ethical issues requires a grasp of exactly what is being done. The original and most difficult problem was to learn to fertilize human eggs outside the body. The first trustworthy report that this feat had been accomplished came from Robert G. Edwards, an embryologist at the University of Cambridge, and Patrick Steptoe, a gynecologist in Lancashire. The basic procedure is to stimulate the woman with hormones to produce several eggs in a single menstrual cycle. Under general anesthesia, two small slits are cut in her abdomen. A thin telescope is inserted through one slit, and through the other a miniature vacuum-cleaner tube. The bulging follicles of the ripe eggs are spotted and punctured, and three or four eggs collected. This is "minor surgery . . . a procedure that can be done repeatedly," Edwards has explained. "The ova are then fertilized with the husband's sperm, and within five days or so they have grown in the laboratory to more than thirty-two cells"—that is, beyond the moment when the embryo would normally lodge in the uterine wall.

Experiments in Cloning

Scientists responded hesitantly at first. There was considerable curiosity about the details of the conditions and events around the moment of conception. Soon a feeling of distaste and objection began to spread. There are technical difficulties in the fine hormonal adjustment of the uterus to receive the embryo. Professor Bevis' claimed successes were suspected to be not his implanted embryo at all, but the result of normal pregnancies following the fertility treatment that produced the multiple ovulations.

Look ahead, however. The success of embryo transfer is a prerequisite—one of many—for cloning in mammals. A clone is a genetic starburst: a set of cells or of individuals all descended from a single cell, in other words from only one parent instead of the two engaged by normal plants and animals. Every member of a clone carries exactly the same genetic material, not reshuffled and recombined through their parents' sexual mating.

In a series of experiments in the 1960s, John Gurdon, a biologist then at Oxford, learned how to clone a frog. Gurdon's work had great and precise scientific significance, which his opponents did not: Gurdon proved for the first time what biologists have long believed and would be dismayed to have to give up: that the specialized cells of a grown animal retain the full library of genetic instructions that direct the building of that individual, so that the great differences between the various types of cells can be explained by control mechanisms that determine which pages of the genetic library get read. It was only incidentally the case that Gurdon could make, with a lot of donor cells from the same tadpole, a lot of identical copies of the donor tadpole. This was cloning, and a great rush of publicity followed. And myriads of identical soldiers for an ant-heap world were aborning.

Severe difficulties must be overcome before cloning can be attempted with mammals and humans. Mammalian eggs are a hundredth the size of frogs' eggs, so that the manipulations necessary have not yet proved possible—or not yet. Gurdon, even with his frogs, succeeded about once in every 100 tries. The few mouse embryos that have been born at all have grown with gross deformities and have spontaneously aborted. Though biologists have by no means tested all the methods they can imagine, mammalian cloning may well prove impossible.

Questions of Ethics

Should these lines of research be pursued with human eggs and sperm, *in vitro* fertilization and embryo transfer, as both the active field and the prerequisite to cloning, have stimulated the most searching questions. But the arguments have been exceptionally varied and confused, deaf men shouting past each other. The defense that

wards, Bevis, and others have offered publicly for this line of research has been narrow: essentially, that this is legitimate investigation of reproductive biology, indispensable for birth control on the one hand and treatment of infertility on the other, with a more remote possibility that it can contribute to efforts to prevent genetic defects. Edwards demands that his work be considered humanitarian.

The charge that Edwards' work is unethical has been made on several grounds. Many people, including many scientists, find the work repugnant: they hold the conviction—primary, irreducible, unadorned with reasons—that human embryos are not to be brought into being at will, in a Petri dish, as objects, manipulated, washed down the sink.

Others justify their revulsion. In December 1972, in London, the Ciba Foundation held a symposium on artificial insemination and embryo transfer, which Edwards, Bevis, and Steptoe attended. There an anthropologist from Paris, Massimo Piatelli-Palmarini, asserted that, by using artificial insemination or embryo transfer,

it is a different kind of man we obtain, at least from a social and evolutionary perspective. If the desire of a relatively disadvantaged sterile woman for a child is fulfilled in this way, the notion that we have of a human being is likely to change. I fully subscribe to the Kantian criterion that every human being should be treated as an end in himself. . . . Test tubes can produce viable organisms, but the machinery itself is an obstacle to the accomplishment of the very operation it triggers.

Other scientists, reluctant perhaps to sound too lofty, have raised narrower issues. The first of these is the use to which embryos may be put. Max Perutz, a British molecular biologist and Nobel Prize winner, who attended the Ciba symposium, fears that the next step will be to try one day embryological experiments on the fertilized eggs in their jars. The most pressing statement of the ethical case against these experiments was made by Paul Ramsey in two articles in the *Journal of the American Medical Association* in June 1972. Ramsey wrote:

I must judge that in vitro fertilization constitutes unethical medical experimentation on possible future human beings, and therefore it is subject to absolute moral prohibition. I ask that my exact language be noted: I said, unethical experimentation on possible future human beings.

Within a week of Bevis' announcement that he had brought to term three embryos fertilized in vitro, the Medical Research Council, the British equivalent of the U.S. National Institutes of Health for the allocation of funds, requested British laboratories to stop

further research with human embryos, in order to permit an undisturbed reexamination of the ethical problems, including most importantly the problem of the children that might be born as the

Improbability of Cloning

Are we now to be afraid that cloning is next? Ramsey says that "incipiently and intrinsically" the kind of reasoning that justifies in vitro fertilization already in principle embraces other manipulation of the embryo. But our ethical fiber stiffened, surely, by two other categories of reason why cloning never be widespread.

The first is the genuine difficulty of cloning mammals to date. We must not be seduced by all the other breakthroughs that have been achieved by science and technology into supposing that science can necessarily achieve every result we can imagine. In logic, it would be better to recall that science is getting harder conceptually and technically, as in high-energy physics, where every genuine breakthrough achieved may bring us closer to the limits of the possible.

Second, besides the difficulty of cloning mammals, is its impracticality. Consider livestock. Neoclassical genetics has brought about something remarkably like identity among the flocks and herds for the short list of most desirable characteristics. Mass cloning of livestock could do proportionately little more than raise the average quality of the best flocks and herds we have; but it would put them in immediate danger of extinction. Eliminating all differences among individuals would leave each animal in the herd identically susceptible to the first serious danger, say, the next potent new virus, that arose. The danger is prohibitive. To overcome such objections, where is the coupling of an interest or an investment to the technology which could lead to cloning people on any but the smallest, try-it-once scale?

Some biologists are beginning to experiment with artificial placentas for animal embryos, because there is a lot to be learned from the attempts. The requirements are so great they cannot be fully defined yet, except to say that they may include the total vocabulary and grammar of embryology reduced to a computer program. If multiple breakthroughs were achieved, cloning humans would be closer—at monstrous and certain risk to the first generation, while the problems of embryology were solved all over again for humans.

Even then, the attraction of the idea is not visible. Would even the most fanatical among the women's movement, in pursuit of physiological equality with men, be so rash as to abandon the fruits of their physiological superiority? Consider only the cost: a

mother works her passage. What would cloning be used to produce? Soldiers? The war would have to be twenty years away. To speak more formally, a future that includes cloning of humans, more than a very few, can be imagined, but I assert that no road goes there. The economic, cultural, and political discontinuities prohibit it. The fears are fantasies. Why are they so strong?

Genetic Engineering

There remains the broad middle category of discoveries ruled by Prospero's wand: those that could be used either beneficially or maliciously. No doubt they include most of science, but the research that's interesting here comes under the head of genetic engineering, if that term be rightly understood. At present the term covers too much and says too little.

For example, a recent book on the ethics of medicine and science treated "genetic counseling and genetic engineering" as if they were much the same, and similarly bracketed "genetic engineering, especially positive eugenics." Such usage seems a willful confounding of two different applications of different kinds of biology.

Genetic counseling consists of advice or reassurance given by a geneticist to couples who want to know whether they are particularly at risk of having a defective child. The scope of genetic counseling at present is limited. The list of defects caused by the doubling, in a fetus, of single recessive genes received from both parents, and where it is possible to tell that a parent is a carrier, is short and growing only slowly. Most of these diseases are rare. There are also the few defects, like mongolism, which are detectable after amniocentesis. For most other conditions, even when the couple has already had one child with a serious abnormality, all the counselor can say now is that the chances of the next child being defective are about the same as in the general population—which is, in fact, as bad as 5 percent, or one birth in twenty.

Nonetheless, if we were willing through more widespread and more directive use of genetic counseling to discourage a certain very small proportion of marriages—those that would mate carriers of defects where tests can detect them—between one generation and the next we could reduce markedly the overt incidence of diseases such as phenylketonuria and other inborn errors of metabolism, and sickle-cell anemia, though the number of carriers would consequently increase and the counseling would continue to be needed for future generations. Such use of genetic counseling, sometimes called negative eugenics, need not be coercive.

Positive eugenics would have a different object from the interception of identifiable, deleterious gene pairings. It would aim to breed men to an ideal type, or several, as for 5,000 years we have bred bulls

or dogs. For geneticists, though, the difference between eliminating a single deleterious gene and promoting a general quality—such as intelligence, cheerfulness, or beauty—is absolute. Most geneticists would agree with the quiet observation of their colleague at the University of Edinburgh, Anne McLaren (who herself cites a passage by P.B. Medawar); she wrote:

The principles of selective breeding have been known for centuries, but no serious attempt has ever been made to apply them to our own species Medawar concluded on genetic grounds that the goal of positive eugenics could never be achieved, since "the human genetic system does not lend itself to improvement by selective inbreedings." We are genetically very diverse and our well-being depends on this diversity.

Positive eugenics is a myth about the powers of science that scientists themselves have abandoned; it's time the rest of us gave up, too.

Modifying the DNA

Genetic engineering, to be a useful term at all, must mean something beyond modern-day neoclassical genetics, however powerful. I propose that genetic engineering be defined as the useful change in the cellular machinery of a higher organism, and so of the organism's structure or performance, by modifying the genetic material—the DNA—of the cells through methods other than sexual fertilization. Genetic engineering may involve the somatic cells, affecting the present organism, or the germ cells, so showing up in the next generation, or both. This definition puts cloning just outside the line, which seems right. Genetic engineering can be done on the relatively large scale of the entire cell. For example, I. L. Harris, a cell biologist at Oxford, has developed a technique of cell fusion; some experimenters are fusing somatic cells from humans with cells from mice, and growing the results like bacteria in a nutritious soup, to try to locate which human genes lie on which chromosomes.

In another line of experiments, two very early mouse embryo cells were fused, implanted in receptive females, and grown like clones to produce new creatures with four parents and compound characteristics. These are the chimeras. All have been monstrosities and quickly died.

Or one can imagine that genetic engineering could be done through microsurgery, *molecular* surgery on chromosomes, or deleting DNA at exactly the right place; the scalpels and scissors would be the ones appropriate to work at that scale, the enzymes that slice and splice, nick, and knit up and repair DNA in the

This is all entirely speculative. Nobody knows in any detail how a chromosome is constructed or how it functions. Such modifications of higher organisms are decades away, or may prove impossible.

One scheme for genetic engineering which has attracted wide interest is the cure of certain genetic deficiencies in man. These are chiefly the inborn errors of metabolism, where the insertion of a single functioning gene into the correct cells of an infant could enable it to manufacture an essential enzyme it has been missing.

The problems of gene therapy are difficult enough for scientists to explain to each other. Finding the right gene. Getting hold of it. Finding the vehicle to get it into the cells. Finding the right target cells. Getting the gene past the body's skillful defenses against invasion, and past the cell's own still subtler defenses. All the while avoiding contaminants. At last making sure the new genetic material has the right conditions and neighbors within the cell in order to function. At every step ensuring that no harm is done the patient. A start has been made on one or two of these problems; others now appear intractable. Decades before gene therapy could ever be ready to treat genetic defects, they could be all but eliminated by a program of genetic counseling.

The first productive use of genetic engineering will probably be with plants. To see the promise, recall the problems of the green revolution. The new varieties of grain introduced in the 1950s and 1960s were not themselves the product of genetic engineering; they were the highest achievement of neoclassical genetics. The new grains have drawbacks—the worst being that the enormous quantities of fertilizers are made from nitrogen, manufactured at great cost, particularly in energy. Such costs penalize first the countries of the green revolution. But some crops—peas, soybeans, alfalfa, clover, and the other legumes—provide their own nitrogen: in their roots live bacteria that fix the nitrogen for them.

No Need to Fear

In June 1974, at a symposium in Pullman, Washington, on nitrogen fixation, Johanna Dobreiner, a biologist working in Brazil, said she has found several kinds of tropical grasses that grow in symbiosis with nitrogen-fixing bacteria of a new kind in their roots. Could such bacteria be persuaded to live with one of the new high-yield, tropical-climate grains by modifying the genetic makeup of the bacteria or the grains? Cereals that could provide their own fertilizer are beyond doubt the biggest prize of all in the gift of the new biology—far bigger in terms of lives to be saved than even the conquest of cancer or a cow that can digest sawdust.

Again: what are we afraid of?

The fear has been growing a long time. We have been told, so often,

of the shock of the Copernican revolution to man's pride, but, than that, there was the shock to his confidence that reality forms to the firm message of his senses; and then the humiliation of the Darwinian revolution to man's pride, but, more than that, senses of the inviolability of his own form—we've been told of historical events so often that we dismiss them. They happen to every child of six and ten and twelve—the lesson that one distrust the shapes of the world.

The revolution is not over. It is gaining momentum, and has been carried within. When we say that the most difficult intellectual task of the first part of our century was to come to terms with the psychoanalytical postulate of the unconscious—dethroning even in the self—we forget sometimes that Freud was to psychology what we now say Franklin D. Roosevelt was to the American economy, namely conservative, saving all he could of the old order. The unconscious was called into being to preserve the possibility of consciousness. The most radical attack on psychoanalysis was not to deny the reality of the unconscious but, precisely, the reality of the conscious. It is an indication of our confusion that Skinner is thought by some behaviorists to be a man of the right to others, Skinner is a man of the far left. The most difficult intellectual task of the last part of our century is to understand and come to terms with the ways in which the individual is shaped by his form and content—even to his unconscious—by societal forces from without. The self itself is a dying metaphor, no more than a knot in a tangle, an intersection in the social network, a phase shaped by fields of force that compress it into life—the person is pinched at the heart of a controlled fusion.

Now the revolution moves, with the new biology, to the center from the contained: from the self, to the crucible in which it is shaped. A scientist, an old friend, said to me: "If we accept that man is not noble, not really a discrete entity, but rather a kind of pliable, malleable creature whose very structure can be modified to suit the needs of others, then our own self-image must begin to change. In the end, of a collection of possibly exalted individuals, we become a mass. I think we are afraid of the plasticity of man."

BOOK REVIEWS

THE LEGEND OF SAINT JANE

By Kenneth O. Morgan

Kenneth O. Morgan is a fellow in modern history and politics at Queens College. He was formerly a senior lecturer in history at University College of Wales, and has lectured widely in American universities. He is the author of several books, including *David Lloyd George, Wales in British Politics* and *Freedom or Sacrilege*.

American Heroine: The Life and Legend of Jane Addams. By Allen F. Davis. Oxford University Press. 339 pp.

"Old America is gone. There is new times," a young Chicago immigrant proclaimed at the turn of the century. Few movements in American history have been subjected to more intensive dissection than the progressivism of the years up to 1914. It has been variously portrayed as a single, broad campaign for humanitarian and civic reform, and as a series of disparate clashes between economic interest groups; as the last hurrah of the evangelical conscience, and the first crusade of the "muckraking" yellow press; as a release for the status anxieties of the Anglo-Saxon, Protestant middle-class, left behind by the social upheavals of the Gilded Age, and as an avenue for public service for the urban immigrant.

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One major theme, however, now emerges with a new clarity—that American Progressivism was a crucial phase in the liberation of the American woman. Particularly in the social justice movement, it drew heavily on female leadership and motivation. Foremost among the small groups vital to the achievements of Progressivism was the first generation of college-trained American women in the late nineteenth century. Drawn in the main from secure middle-class, middle-American backgrounds, but fired with a rare sense of public mission, they dedicated themselves to the salvation of the American city, and decisively stamped their ideals and personalities on the Progressive movement from the late 1880s on.

The outstanding figure among them was Jane Addams. An up-to-date biography has long been needed, since Addams' own book, *Twenty Years at Hull House* (1912), revealing and moving in many ways, has done her reputation some disservice. It tended to depict her commitment to social welfare as almost fortuitous, the product of social guilt or even neurosis, an over-subjective reaction to her loneliness and lack of physical charms, as much as to moral or intellectual conviction. Allen F. Davis' impressively

researched and splendidly written new biography, *American Heroine*, decisively redresses the balance. It is a major contribution both to urban and to intellectual history.

The Reform Tradition

Dispassionately and methodically exploring Addams' personality with much subtlety, Davis has placed Addams' personal odyssey firmly in its social and intellectual context. In addition to outlining the achievement of a towering figure in American Progressivism, he has reinterpreted some essential features of the American reform tradition. Jane Addams emerges here as a more credible and human figure than the "Saint Jane" of legend, the executive-organizer and publicist as well as the inspiration of the social justice movement. In peeling away the accretions of myth, Davis ensures that Addams' greatness remains undiminished.

Jane Addams was a typical product of the new women's college movement in the Midwest in the 1870s. Her training at Rockford Seminary was strongly permeated with evangelicalism—but it was a creed that sought grace as much through works, through the joy of social service, as through faith and conversion. Addams' autobiography laid stress on the "subjective necessities" that impelled her towards work in the slums of American cities. This made her career almost irrational in its motivation, the product of guilt complexes, destructive self-analysis, and mystical exaltations.

Professor Davis, while not ignoring the personal despair and disillusionment that led Addams to

her chosen career, rightly emphasizes the objective forces that led her into social reform. In part he shows the impact on her, she was still in her twenties, of a series of visits to Europe between 1885 and 1888. This transatlantic aspect of Progressivism is an aspect which American historians, perhaps to stress the pure origins of American reformations, have been strangely reluctant to explore. In fact, it is clear that a major inspiration for the social reform in the New World from the 1890s onwards was the example of the Old World. In Europe, and especially in Britain, Germany, and Denmark, there existed laboratories of humanitarian and civic reform, some privately and some publicly maintained.

Jane Addams



propounded constructive and systematic solutions for urban poverty that went far beyond haphazard charitable relief.

A decisive inspiration for Addams was her visit to the East End of London in the summer of 1888, where she met men like Canons, Barnett and Fremantle, and viewed at first hand the settlement house at Toynbee Hall. The impact upon her was overpowering. Henceforth, her career as a social worker was inevitable and self-sustaining. For her, Toynbee Hall was refreshingly free from "professional doing good"; it struck just the right balance between moral commitment and professional relief work.

A Community in the City

The outcome was Hull House in Chicago, founded in 1889, the prototype for scores of other settlement houses in American cities, and the inspiration for generations of social workers in years to come. Even in the New Deal era, Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins and presidential aide Harry Hopkins, to name only two, were still spurred on by earlier memories of Hull House. Hull House was Jane Addams' supreme legacy for the Progressive movement and for modern America. Symbolically, in that same year of 1889, she entered the Presbyterian Church. In terms of faith as well as of public fulfillment, the years of torment and self-questioning were over.

It is clear that the aims of Hull House changed subtly over the years. At first, its basic objective was to create a human, face-to-face

community in which the urban poor could be protected from the size and anonymity of the modern American city. It sought, too, to bridge the gulf between the middle and working classes, to replace social conflict with reconciliation, with what Addams called "the higher civic and social life." It would be morally valuable to the middle-class social worker no less than practically beneficial for the working-class residents.

Addams reviewed with deep sympathy, even tenderness, the cultural and religious heritage of the immigrant poor. She encouraged them to preserve their national customs, dress and craft traditions. Some of this, perhaps, was the product of a sentimental regard for peasant culture—but still a humane antidote to the crude nativism with which immigrants were increasingly bombarded in the America in the 1890s.

Toward Larger Social Reform

As the years went on, however, the aims of Hull House became somewhat broader. In part, this was the result of Addams' increasing collaboration with Florence Kelley, a tougher-minded, more combative reformer and a socialist. Addams was thus led towards a deeper appreciation of the problems of urban sociology, and into the structural causes of poverty and social deprivation in the American cities. She started up Hull House as an optimistic evangelical; by 1914, she had become a social justice progressive.

Until 1914 Hull House was Addams' essential concern, and the basis of her towering national reputation. Inevitably, however, it led

her into a vast range of other humanitarian and moral campaigns. She wrote extensively and perceptively on juvenile delinquency and the problems of the adolescent. She campaigned hard for the prohibitionist cause. She was active in the women's suffrage movement, though slower to involve herself here than were many of her contemporaries. Addams thought that self-liberation transcended political liberation.

In August 1914 Addams was at the peak of her reputation, the symbol of altruistic service in a business-dominated, materialistic society. She was an angel of mercy for some, priestess and sage for many more. She was compared with Florence Nightingale or Joan of Arc, according to taste. The "Angel of Hull House" had turned, she wrote, into a kind of "earth mother," to provide a sure moral touchstone by which American democracy would be tested. Yet the later years of her life saw this almost flawless reputation suddenly shattered by a quite different and more transcendent issue, one which she took up with equal courage and determination—the cause of pacifism.

A Quaker by origin, she had always been attracted to Tolstoyan doctrines of non-resistance. She was deeply moved by a meeting with the Russian sage at Yasnaya Polyana in 1896—"one of the gentlest and kindest of human creatures I ever saw." When war broke out in 1914 she turned her energies to the Women's Peace Party; she was foremost in the anti-militarist cause. To some extent, she adopted the same premises

as in her work at Hull House, insisting that women had a unique commitment to the gentler virtues of the cause of peace. But she broadened her activities into a moral crusade against war. During war years, hers was a rare sanity, calling for peace negotiations and an end to the ceaseless slaughter at the front. After the war she struggled with equal courage to preserve civil liberties against the crude hysteria of the "Red Scare." She was denounced for anti-Americanism, Bolshevism and other national crimes, often by those who had praised her with equal lack of restraint before 1914. In the opinion of the conservative Daughters of the American Revolution, Addams became "the most dangerous woman in America today."

Back in the Pantheon

It took many years for her reputation to be fully rehabilitated. Without doubt, she was deepened by this strange torrent of attack. It was not until Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal in 1933, that septuagenarian Addams became again an honored figure. Since then the old magic surrounding her has returned. The delayed award of the Nobel Peace Prize helped bring her wounds, too. When she died her place in the pantheon of social reformers was again secure.

It is clear that Jane Addams occupies a unique place in the history of American social reform. She was in some ways a restricted reformer. Her links with the urban reform movement of the 1930s, still more of the 1920s, were tenuous enough. Like most Progressives, Addams

was deeply colored by evangelicalism, even puritanism; she sought to remold human nature, rather than to remodel the structure of society. Her outlook differed fundamentally from the tougher-minded realism of the New Dealers, even if some of them had been trained at Hull House; the gulf between Addams' attack on gambling, drink and sexual indulgence and Harry Hopkins' freewheeling days at the races points the contrast.

An Optimistic Outlook

Addams, again, was essentially optimistic about her world. She was convinced that American society could ultimately cope with the problems posed by urban growth, without undue strain, still less revolution. Jane Addams' vision was one of consensus; she viewed the working-class world from outside, for all her sincere sympathy for the cause of labor, and sought to build bridges between the classes. Later reformers had perhaps a less naive appreciation of those underlying class

and status tensions which were beyond the mental grasp of the altruistic middle-class reformer of pre-1914.

But to suggest that her legacy for later generations has its limitations in no way diminishes her achievements in her own day. More than any other American of her generation, she touched the national conscience about "how the other half lived" in the urban ghettos. More than any other American, too, she created practical instruments for solving the problems which she had so compellingly diagnosed. Contemporaries who viewed her as saint and statesman combined were not far wrong. She civilized and humanized a cruel, competitive society. She reminded it of "the solidarity of the human race." And she achieved this with a dignity and a restraint that seem far more attractive than the strident self-indulgence of many of her "liberated" successors. Jane Addams' life remains a legend in many ways but, as this excellent biography suggests, the legend remains a highly usable one.

FABRICATING OUR IDENTITY

By Philip Rosenberg

The reviewer is the author of *The Seventh Hero: Thomas Carlyle and the Theory of Radical Nativism*, and a 1975 novel, *Contract on Cherry Street*. His review is from *The New York Times*.

Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience. By Erving Goffman. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 586 pp.

On a series of strikingly original, often brilliant books, Erving Goffman, a Canadian by birth who has taught at Chicago and Berkeley and at present occupies a chair in sociology and anthropology at the University of Pennsylvania, has exhaustively examined the petty transactions that make up everyday life. Virtually everything he writes is informed by the same impish dialectic; for Goffman delights in making us see the most simple transactions as complex and mysterious game-like strategies, and then in exposing the rules of the game to reduce the whole once again to a comprehensible simplicity. Not since Thorsten Veblen [in his theory of "conspicuous consumption"] laid bare the socio-economic significance of walking sticks and Pekingese dogs has there been an author capable, as Goffman is, of explaining why there are mirrors facing the counters in lunchrooms, why a man mutters an oath when he stumbles over a crack in the pavement, or why loitering,

the simple act of standing still on a public sidewalk, constitutes a part of civic order.

The small change of social interaction course obsessively fascinates man because he senses instinctively the drama behind the most ordinary bits of social business—senses, I think, that what we do routinely is "routine," our bit of stage business. In *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1959), the first of his books, Goffman argued that we are all essentially performers. We spend less time making things, getting things, spending them, than we do trying to put the stamp of our own individuality upon them, for our main business is, in a sense, the fabrication of our own identities.

Onstage and Off

For centuries Western culture has assumed that self and society are the polar moments of our sense of what it is like to be alive in the world. The social world may provide us with masks to wear on public occasions, but it is comforting to feel that there are faces behind the masks, and that they remain inviolate through contextual vicissitudes. Yet in Goffman's world this seems not so. In the theatrical vocabulary he uses, the term "offstage" does occur; when we are not onstage we are backstage, and the backstage area is a theater in its own right.

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with its own performance standards.

Consider what happens when I am walking with a friend and am accosted by another friend with a long and sad story to tell. As I listen to the story, I give off all the conventional signs of sympathetic attention, but if an opportunity presents itself I may signal to the first friend with a gesture or glance that I am doing my best to end the conversation and will be rejoining him as soon as possible. Is my show of concern to my second friend's story, then, phony? Goffman insists that there is no valid sociological ground for assuming that my impatience in any way compromises my attentiveness, or vice versa. I am simply playing two roles to two audiences at the same time, as we all must do with surprising frequency. "All the world is not, of course, a stage," he concedes at one point, then adds the characteristically Goffmanian punch line: "but the crucial ways in which it isn't are not easy to specify."

If this approach suggests a shockingly disrespectful regard for the sense of self we like to maintain, Goffman seems not to mind, seems in fact to enjoy reducing us to something like puppets in an elaborate Punch and Judy show, "A correctly staged and performed scene," he writes in *The Presentation of Self*, "leads the audience to impute a self to a performed character, but this imputation—this self—is a product of a scene that comes off, and is not a cause of it." When the performance "comes off," he adds, "the firm self accorded each performed character will appear to emanate intrinsically from its performer."

Social Authenticity

What Goffman seems to be denying, then, is the possibility of precisely the sort of authenticity our society values most highly. A being is authentic, Lionel Trilling tells us in *Sincerity and Authenticity*, "by reason of its entire self-definition: it is understood to exist wholly by laws of its own being." Conversely, inauthenticity is a condition to which we fall when "the sentiment of individual being depends upon other people."

If, then, in Goffman's world the self is no more than an optical illusion that merely "appears" to emanate from the actor—if the self is, as Goffman says, an "imputation"—the notion of personal authenticity can hardly be more than an arrogant conceit. "In this enterprise of presenting the self, of putting ourselves on the social stage, sincerity itself plays a curiously compromised part," Trilling observes. "Society requires of us that we present ourselves as being sincere, and the most efficacious way of satisfying this demand is to see to it that we really are sincere, that we actually are what we want our community to know we are. In short, we play the role of being ourselves, we sincerely act the part of the sincere person, with the result that a judgment can be passed upon our sincerity that it is not authentic."

And yet, after all this is said, I seem to be able to find in Goffman's work a sense of self at once more real and more substantial than might have been thought possible, a sense of self, moreover, free of the self-indulgent cant which, as Trilling

points out, mars so much of the contemporary apotheosis of authenticity. To be sure, it probably would not have been possible to say this before the appearance of *Frame Analysis*, Goffman's most recent book. Nor is it easy to say it even now, for while *Frame Analysis* is in many respects a welcome extension of his earlier work, it is also in some ways merely a summary and recapitulation of its author's marked tendency to cynical reductionism.

Thus, when Goffman quotes the following newspaper item, virtually without comment, one senses uneasily that at bottom a man who finds this one-sentence story meaningful must see society not merely as a staged performance but in fact as bad slapstick: "In Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, two pickpockets kneeling in a church robbed Andres Quinonez of his wallet and \$13 while he was praying, [and then] were arrested by a policeman kneeling behind them."

Modified Cynicism

For the most part, though, *Frame Analysis* rises above this sort of petty scoffery. Although the "coldness" and "remoteness" that critics have complained of in Goffman's earlier books are still very much in evidence, there seems to be a new slant to his work that makes his message sensibly larger and more generous in what it has to say about human beings. In marked contrast with his earlier works, which generally purported to be about action and behavior, *Frame Analysis* is as its subtitle announces, a study of "The Organization of Experience."

As Goffman uses it, the term "ex-

perience" carries much of its original etymological meaning: it signifies an experiment, a test, a preservation of facts or events. His concern here is less with how we behave than with how we perceive. "I am not addressing the structure of social life but the structure of experience individuals have at a particular moment of their social lives," he explains at the outset. "My perspective is situational, meaning here a concern for what one individual is alive to at a particular moment."

According to Goffman, our experience of reality is mediated through a system of "frames." Simply put, a "frame" is what we might in everyday language call a context or a frame of reference. The term "frames" means that human experience makes the inchoate data of life comprehensible by locating them in intelligible contexts.

In itself, this is a banal observation, but Goffman applies it in a strikingly original way. Experience, he insists again and again, is nearly so straightforward a thing as we commonly suppose—or rather, as we suppose we suppose, for deep down we are all perfectly aware of the complexity of life, especially of our own life. If we listen to ourselves and to others carefully, as Goffman suggests we cannot help noticing, for example, that our words and actions rarely can be taken at face value.

When we greet an acquaintance with "Hi, how have you been?" we are not asking for a report on his well-being. Nor are we pretending to ask for such a report. We are using a conventional verbal formula that generally signifies an op-

friendly relationship, that establishes a context or frame for the rest of our face-to-face encounter with this person. (This convention, incidentally, is so deeply ingrained that a friendly family physician may say, "How are you?" as you step into his office, but when you sit down opposite his desk he has to ask, "What's the trouble?" in order to find out how you are.)

Frame Clues

Pushing the point a bit further, we can see that when an individual enters any given situation, he looks for the context clues that establish frame, that tell him how to take what is going on. Conversely, if the people already in the situation are at all disposed toward helpfulness, they will make some effort to provide such clues. Frame clues come, of course, not only from the demeanor of the individuals involved in the situation, but also from the setting in which they are found. An office, for example, establishes a more businesslike and impersonal frame than a living room. Thus a businessman may unknot his tie during a friendly chat in his office, using this personal "looseness" to reframe what might otherwise have been felt as a tight situation.

Such an act need not imply bad faith or feigning. In his earlier writings Goffman probably would have said that the businessman undoes his tie in order to "present himself" as friendly, and the suggestion was inescapable that the show of friendliness was somehow distinct from friendliness itself. Now, however, Goffman's attention is on the situa-

tion itself and our experience of it. In this light, the businessman should be seen as establishing a context in which friendly relationship is possible, as facilitating friendliness by making it perceptible.

Exploiting Frames

To be sure, it is possible to exploit framing conventions for self-serving purposes. There are and always have been "operators" who set their prey at ease by telling jokes and passing out cigars before moving in for the kill, as does the salesman who closes a deal in a night club. On the other hand, frames can be manipulated for benign purposes as well as sinister ones. Some salesmen may like to close deals while taking the client out on the town as a way of signifying their gratitude for his business.

Fortunately for our sanity, the exploitative manipulation of framing conventions is both dangerous to practice and difficult to maintain. Dangerous because the manipulator is in a peculiarly vulnerable position. If this misframing is discovered in time, the intended victim can turn the tables on the manipulator simply by going along with the game, accepting his version of reality at face value. This is what people do when they go to night clubs "on the salesman." And difficult, because in most cases as soon as the manipulator gets what he wants, the frame he attempted to establish is discredited. The film, *The Sting*, was so much fun because Paul Newman and Robert Redford's misframing not only succeeded but was never exposed. Anyone who saw the movie,

though, will have a reasonably good idea of how rare such durable misframings are. In most cases, the victim will retrospectively reframe the entire situation; in our night club example, that is, he not only will recognize that the evening ended up in a sale, but also will come to feel that it was a sales pitch "all along."

Note here that the phrase "all along" is almost always used in an accusatory sense and refers exclusively to the fact that an exploitative misframing has been unmasked. An index of how seriously we take the charge of framing violations is the fact that we would almost always prefer to be thought guilty of opportunism than of frame manipulation. Thus a person will be willing to admit that he has taken advantage of a situation if this admission leaves him in a position to deny that was what he had in mind "all along."

Throughout *Frame Analysis* one gets a steady and reassuring sense that the framing conventions of a society constitute, on the whole, a rather well-built structure, something not easily subject to significant tampering. The analysis of frames suggests that we are all equipped with programs and rule books that generally provide us with a dependable orientation to reality.

Does this mean that the "selves" others present to us in our interactions with them are their "real" selves, that the mask and face behind it bear the same countenance? Not in the least. We all play many roles—parent and child, subordinate and superordinate, customer, friend, listener, accuser; defender—none of which can ever contain the whole of our being. Then our real selves must

lie outside our roles? Again Goffman says no. For if we were to assume that our real selves are "somehow more than social, more real, more biological, deeper, more genuine" than the various roles we play, we must assume also that in any relationship we have to others we are necessarily betraying ourselves, compromising our real selves, surrendering our authenticity.

That is to say, if our real selves lie outside our social roles, as the champions of authenticity seem to be saying, then it follows that we can never really "be ourselves" in the presence of others—except insofar as we demonstrate our apartness from them by ignoring the interaction rules that establish social connectedness. The only authentic man is, then, the "Plain Dealer," the character from Restoration comedy whose unremitting rudeness was taken to signify that he was always true to himself. We can see the modern equivalent of the Plain Dealer syndrome in the outlandish belief that unchecked impulses are the best indicators of the true state of the self.

Goffman, it seems to me, has always done his best writing on the question of the self and its relation to society, and nowhere has he handled this theme better than in *Frame Analysis*. Although we sense ourselves, he points out, as somehow larger than any of the roles we play, we normally do not feel that these roles are alien to us. When we are being, say, an attentive listener or an angry parent, we do so without any consciousness that there is some "real" us that is significantly different from these temporary manifes-

tations. For Goffman, in short, the term "self" does not refer to any actual being who resides either inside or outside our situations; it refers, rather, to a sense we have of ourselves as somehow continuing through all the roles we play.

More specifically, it refers to the principle of continuity itself as we recognize it in the deeds we have done, and program it into our future actions. What we are capable of doing tells us who we are, and, conversely, we use our sense of who we are to determine what we will be capable of doing. Sense of self is the product of this reciprocal search for consistency. Fourteen years ago Goffman expressed this relationship perfectly in *Asylums*:

An important implication of being a good friend or a loyal brother is that one is the sort of person who can be a good friend or loyal brother. In failing to support one's wife and four children, one becomes the sort of person who can fail in this way.

In the final analysis, Goffman has

provided us with a new definition of the self and a new touchstone for authenticity. At a time when it is being widely proclaimed that our true selves can be expressed only through impulse and spontaneity, Goffman holds out for what seems to me an immeasurably more generous interpretation. According to the apostles of authenticity, the retrospective statement "What I should have done was" is a tip-off to what our real selves wanted us to do: "I should have told him to go to hell," "What I really wanted to do was just throw him out," we say. And our analysts berate us for not having let our true feelings out, as though the notion that these impulses represent our true feelings were a foregone conclusion. "Well, why didn't you?" they say, as a challenge and accusation.

To which Goffman would teach us to answer, "Because that's not the sort of person I am." He will not permit ourselves to be reduced to our desires. We are, rather, what we feel ourselves to be.

DOING WHAT COMES UNNATURALLY

By Anatole Broyard

Anatole Broyard currently reviews books for *The New York Times*, from which this review is taken. He has lectured on sociology, literature, and creative writing, and has served on the faculty of New York University, Columbia University, and the New School for Social Research. He is the author of short stories and many articles on popular culture.

Ants, Indians, and Little Dinosaurs.
Edited by Alan Ternes. Scribners.
386 pp.

The wonderful thing about naturalists is that they alone seem to remember what it means to be natural. Like the defenders of some once standard but now decaying faith, they preach from the venerable pulpit of universal design. They remind us that underneath all the layers of technology and ecological catastrophe there is an archeology of essences, of what is given, of things that cannot be changed if we are to keep up any longer the pretense that we ourselves are part of the evolution of the earth.

Because we have buried our nature under artifice, because in our hubris and self-consciousness we have broken 2,000 million years of continuity, the naturalist has become the man who bears witness, like the grandfather who looks at the

harassed, heavy-drinking, discontented businessman and remembers the graceful child who chased his curiosity like a butterfly, whose senses and instincts had not yet been subdued by the process of "growing down," whose own nature was as fresh as his breath. The naturalist is also a kind of pastoral poet, writing elegies to vanishing birds, beasts, sea creatures, insects, plants and wild places.

Ants, Indians, and Little Dinosaurs is an anthology compiled by Alan Ternes from the pages of *Natural History* magazine. Like nature itself, the book is full of unexpected riches from contributors as different as anthropologist Margaret Mead and President Theodore Roosevelt. Mr. Roosevelt contributes, appropriately enough, a piece on "The Square-Mouthed Rhinoceros," in which he manages to get across the feeling that it was no match for him.

Dr. Mead compares the Melanesian culture she first visited in 1931 and the same people in 1954. Admitting that anthropologists generally dislike the encroachment of civilization on primitive societies, Dr. Mead realistically concedes that the older culture was not very attractive. What it has lost in picturesqueness, it has gained in happiness and improved health. There are some places, apparently, where progress is still a blessing.

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Object Lesson to Piglets

One of the most unusual pieces in *Ants, Indians, and Little Dinosaurs* is "Beasts Before the Bar," by Frank A. Beach. The author gives us a brief history of the attitude of the law toward animals that had "committed a crime." "In 1546," he writes, "the French Parliament, the highest court in the land, ordered the execution of a cow, which was first hanged and then burned at the stake." In 1379, Philip the Bold, Duke of Burgundy, condemned to death three sows that had fatally trampled a boy. Their piglets were spared execution as accomplices when the lawyer for the defense argued that the death of their mothers would be an object lesson to them. Dogs that committed the crime of biting or stealing were incarcerated in the same cell with humans. "Wherever possible," Mr. Beach says, "the animals were dressed in human clothes." Insects and other harvest-destroying pests that could not be caught and brought to trial were excommunicated by the clergy.

In "The Florence Floods," Richard M. Klein observed that the floods of 1966, which horrified the civilized world, might easily have been predicted after a look at that city's history, and prevented as well. In 1117, the Ponte Vecchio was swept away by a flood, and since 1333, "there has been a moderate flood in Florence every twenty-four years, a major flood every twenty-six years, and a massive flood every hundred years." In the fourteenth century, a Florentine named Vico suggested reforesting the denuded slopes sur-

rounding Florence as a means of restoring ecological balance, but his plan was dismissed by the authorities on the ground that trees were "ugly and useless."

Marston Bates contributes an article on the mosquito. Alaska and Siberia probably have the world's highest mosquito content per cubic foot of air. J. Frank Dobie tries to separate truth from tall tales in talking about the intelligence of the coyote. Colin Turnbull finds in the Ik the only society he has ever heard of that has managed to dispense altogether with the emollient influence of love. They are not improved, just in case you were wondering, by this excision.

Need for Diversity

"Man's Efficient Rush Toward Deadly Dullness," by Kenneth E.F. Watt, is a resourceful defense of diversity. He argues persuasively for sustaining the earth as a serendipitous place. Diversity, he holds, promotes stability because it spreads the risks and because "a system functions more harmoniously if it has more elements because it then has more homeostatic feedback loops." Diversity, or variety, also "utilizes more completely the sun's energy." Also, diversity is probably necessary for the optimal functioning of the human mind. When people are kept in confined quarters and deprived of sensory stimuli, they tend to hallucinate. Mr. Watt sees this "as a protective device by the mind" to provide what it needs. According to him, experiments have been carried out "indicating that extremely refractory mental pa-

tients, who had not spoken to anyone in years, showed an almost miraculous response when taken to wilderness areas." Even rodents, he says, have shown in experiments that they prefer variety to a steady diet of optimal conditions.

Ants, Indians, and Little Dinosaurs is like a family album that goes all the way back into ontogeny

and phylogeny to show you what you are and how you got there. If you sometimes feel that you "strayed from the straight path," that you are "lost in a dark forest of abstractions, you might find it useful, as well as entertaining, to come back home again" with Mr. T. and these collected caveats from the pages of *Natural History* magazine.

POEM

By Louise Glück

In the early evening, as now, a man is bending
over his writing table.
Slowly he lifts his head; a woman
appears, carrying roses.
Her face floats to the surface of the mirror,
marked with the green spokes of rose stems.

It is a form
of suffering: then always the transparent page
raised to the window until its veins emerge
as words finally filled with ink.

And I am meant to understand
what binds them together
or to the gray house held firmly in place by dusk

because I must enter their lives:
it is spring, the pear tree
filming with weak, white blossoms.

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- "Tradition in Science" by Werner Heisenberg
- "Does Literature Have a Future?" by Norman Podhoretz
- "Homage to Duke Ellington" by Ralph Ellison
- "A Race Against Time" by Robert S. McNamara
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THE AMERICAN REVIEW

AMERICA IN AUTOBIOGRAPHY

Jacob Sloan

AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND AMERICAN
CHARACTER

Raj K. Kohli

THE ODYSSEY OF HENRY ADAMS

Oscar Handlin

THE PROMISED LAND OF MARY ANTIN

Joan M. Erikson

NOTHING TO FEAR: THE MEMOIRS
OF ELEANOR ROOSEVELT

Henry F. Smith

THE AMERICAN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL TRADITION

EVERETT Ruess, Jr., *University of California, Los Angeles*
THANKSGIVING: A HISTORY OF THE HOLIDAY
AND ITS CELEBRATION

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A NOTE TO THE READER

Americans seem to have a particular fondness for writing and reading about themselves. Otherwise, how explain the stream of memoirs that come off the presses in an apparently never-ending flow? In this issue we take advantage of this national passion to show ourselves to others as we see ourselves. We present critiques of some representative American autobiographies—written by a variety of people, with different social and racial and economic backgrounds, living at different points in American time.

Jacob Sloan introduces some of the common national values and attitudes, as adumbrated in the eighteenth century autobiography of that man of versatile genius, Benjamin Franklin. Next, Benjamin Quarles, a black historian, sets the narrative of the life of an escaped slave turned eloquent propagandist—Frederick Douglass—in the mid-nineteenth century U.S. Civil War perspective. An Indian scholar, Raj J. Kohli, contemplates *The Education of Henry Adams* from a philosophical vantage point. Oscar Handlin, a leading authority on immigrant experience, sympathetically illuminates the meaning of Mary Antin's spiritual adventures in the American Promised Land at the beginning of the present century. As a social psychologist, Joan Erikson helps us to understand better Eleanor Roosevelt's account of her life, both before and after her marriage with President Franklin D. Roosevelt; Mrs. Roosevelt becomes a woman who was able to play an important and independent role in world affairs by dint of a slow, painful but ultimately triumphant maturation.

Finally, Louis Starr, a specialist in the recording of personal histories *viva voce*, writes with enthusiasm of Studs Terkel's skillful tape-recorded interviews with all manner of man and woman. From these articles it is apparent that two hundred years of American civilization have been amply recorded, by the participants themselves.

Elsewhere in the issue an Englishman, Henry Fairlie, distinguishes between the image that the United States presents to the world, and the reality; and two political scientists, Everett Carl Ladd, Jr., and Charles D. Hadley, collaborate to theorize on the radical changes currently altering the American political system.

J.S.

THE HOPE AND FEAR OF AMERICA

By Henry Fairlie

It is very often the stranger—not the tourist—in our midst who understands us best. Mr. Fairlie, a perceptive long-time observer from England, dissects two varieties of the anti-Americanism current both in America and abroad. He reminds us how closely linked are the expectations and disappointments of this country. His article is abridged from *Commentary* magazine.

Henry Fairlie is a well-known British political commentator who has been living in the United States for several years. He is the author of *The Life of Politics* and *The Kennedy Promise*. His latest book is *The Spoiled Child of the Western World: The Mis-carriage of the American Idea in Our Time*, which was published by Doubleday in 1976.

The capacity of Americans for self-criticism has often been noted by outsiders. "Nowhere else is national self-criticism practiced with a severity so relentless and a mockery so bitter," wrote L.P. Jacks in 1933. "Thoughtful people are to be met with all over the country whose minds seem to be constantly exercised in the diagnosis of the national disease." Forty years later still, in *Love-Hate Relations*, Stephen Spender has talked of "that passionate hatred of their own country which sometimes affects the most cultivated (and perhaps deeply patriotic) Americans." And the quotations could be multiplied.

What does it all signify? I was about to say that there have been times when French writers have been as uniformly and virulently critical of France as American writers of their own country, but as one begins to write the sentence, one checks it. Because there is no way in which the French can in this manner be critical of *France*. France is too old, it has already been too many things, its defeats have been as numerous as its victories, its culture has been too varied and its society too local, too many harvests (as Marc Bloch put it) have been lifted from its soil, for a French writer to be anti-French in the way in which an American writer is able to be anti-American. The bitterness of French intellectual life during the Algerian war was not anti-France in the same way in which American intellectual life was so bitterly anti-America during the Vietnam war.

But to the American, his country is so self-contained in space and in time that he can think of it—it sometimes seems, only think of it—as one. There it is, bounded by its oceans, separated from Europe and Asia and Africa, all of which are joined, from what was conceived

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to be the *Orbis Terrarum* of the Old World. Its birthday is —when it was conceived, when it was born—as no great country has a birthday; in fact, it is the only great country in the world that has a birth certificate. Everything that has happened, that now happens, that yet will happen, can therefore be understood as happening in this *unit* of space, this *unit* of time, so that the whole historical experience of the country can be justly and criminally condemned. If there is sin, it is original sin; if a crime, it is an original cause; and so it can be argued, as it in fact has been, that from the witch burnings in seventeenth-century Salem to the road led directly and inevitably to Saigon.

American Anti-Americanism

The criticism of his own country by the American can take two forms that are not so available, and in most cases not available at all, to others. He can express his bitterness that the performance of America has not fulfilled its promise—that it has not done what it was created to do, or become what it was bidden to become. Or, if that still leaves the possibility of too much hope, he can turn back from some present evil and say that there, in the beginning, was the precursor of this sinfulness: we persecuted witches, we killed Indians, we raped the land, we enslaved Negroes, we elected mad Presidents, *and so*—this the lever for the virulent cancer that has bombed peasants, and there is no health in us.

Of course, there is no *and so*; history is not like that, not in American history. As far as I know, no one in France traced the savageries of the Algerian war to Joan of Arc or the Massacre of St. Bartholomew; and no one in Britain imagined the Suez adventure was the result of a ferocious streak in the character which has been there since Queen Boadicea drove her knives to the wheels of her chariots to cut the Roman legions at the knees, which after all was not exactly cricket. But the American anti-American—who makes the historical count the target of his complaints—this confusion of past and present is necessary. The anti-American lives outside his country's present, in a myth of its past; and from this myth, he condemns what is to be the numerous possibilities of its future to be those of repetition, a curse that is never to be lifted.

This is not criticism of one's society, in fact it prohibits just effective criticism; it is a tremor in the mind of the country, never stilled and at times of difficulty can send a shock through the whole land. One reason why it can have this effect is the Americanism in America (and this is to some extent, as we know, true also of it abroad) is in some of its aspects a refle

Americanism. It is agitated by the symbols and myths and metaphors of the "American experience" as others, the Lions or the Daughters of the American Revolution or the Kiwanis, are consoled by them. Both seem tempted to reduce the whole of American history to a metaphor that will comprehend it all, then personally to be experienced—one might even say appropriated—by them, its story, their story.

Reliving the Past

Every American in each generation, it appears, must regard himself as responsible for all that his society has done, does, and will do; and in this manner the anti-American in America is able to argue that because America—i.e., he—enslaved the Negroes, it was inevitable that he—i.e., America—shot Martin Luther King. In fact, American history seems often to be conceived as a kind of psychiatric case history, doomed to be repeated in every American in each generation; as if the United States must continually pass through Erik Erikson's "Eight Stages of Man," constantly being returned to the first stage, "Basic Trust vs. Basic Mistrust," from there to repeat its journey.

No American alive today enslaved the Negroes, or was a slaveholder, just as no Englishman alive today carried on the slave trade with all the lust and greed that made Britain in its time the greatest slaving nation in the world. Yet, whereas no Englishman today feels any guilt or other responsibility for the deeds of his ancestors, the American is apparently expected to go on—and on—crying *mea culpa* for every misdeed that has been performed in his land since Christopher Newport turned his three ships into the James River almost four hundred years ago. One must be cautious of the Marxist assertion that one cannot blame the slaveholder because he was acting only as a slaveholder must in a slaveholding society. Nevertheless, the Marxist correction is needed in America if its historical society is to be perceived as existing and developing in historical time.

To take another example, a favorite one with the anti-American: it simply is not true that America is a more violent society than others. William R. Brock, one of the best British scholars in American studies, has written, with the past decade in mind:

It is frequently said that the American people are a violent people, and this is stated as though it explains much....A candid examination may throw doubt on these beliefs and it is doubtful whether the American character is specially prone to violence; indeed the long record of peaceful settlement and growth, together with an almost superstitious reverence for the law and constitutions, might suggest the opposite. It is true that

Americans have often been singularly negligent in their provisions for law enforcement; but this is to say that government failed, not that people were abnormally addicted to violence The American tradition of violence is thus a convention rather than a historical truth.

I do not understand how any serious person could want to even an inflection in those careful words. Yet the fact is that Brown had only to say, "Violence is necessary and it's as American as cherry pie," for the myth to be given an almost sacral significance.

Myth of the American Nightmare

Another British scholar in American studies, Marcus Cunliffe, put it well, not an original point, but a point stated with nervous simplicity:

For some observers the American Dream has been the American Nightmare. In either case it has supplied an extraordinary drama (or melodrama) peopled with scouts and trappers, Yankees and Cavaliers, cowboys and Indians, sheriffs and badmen, Huck Finns and Nigger Jims, Abe Lincolns and Huey Long, preachers and robber barons, do-gooders and con-men, Capones and J. Edgar Hoovers, hobos and work-bosses, lions and Babbitts. No other nation has produced so rich a cast of symbolic characters for modern times.

He is absolutely right; and the adversary characters that are again a reflection of the persistent intertwining of Americanism with anti-Americanism. Yet it is the fact that these mythical—characters in "drama" or "melodrama"—and not when they are actual persons) historical or journalistic, that are at the core of it all.

But let us look overseas, using the British example as an illustration, not merely because it is the one with which I am most familiar but because the very closeness of the English connection to American history tells its own fruitful tale.

It is important, if one is to understand the meaning of American power, to understand the meaning for other nations of the decline of their own power. The first outburst of anti-Americanism in Britain after the cooperation during World War II occurred between the end of that war and the fiasco of the British adventure in Suez. The decline of British power and influence was being felt even before the steepness of that decline was finally revealed in the Middle East. It was not only irksome to find that Britain was increasingly unable to rule its empire effectively; it was even more irksome to find that the United States had increasingly taken over the place of Britain and especially the influence to make the continuation of the empire even more difficult.

Always the Americans lectured the British, and it is hardly surprising that, in the past quarter of a century, some Englishmen and, perhaps even more, some Frenchmen have enjoyed the fact that the roles have been reversed: that it is now America that must act, and Britain and Europe that can criticize. Even sympathy for the Americans can take the patronizing form of saying that it is now their turn to take it on the chin.

Moreover, there is a counterpoint to this, evident since the collapse of the American position in Vietnam: the persistent doubt whether the United States will be willing to bear that price in the defense of Europe; in particular, the constant reproach of the English against the Americans, that they will not now manfully bear the odium that once attached to "perfidious Albion," as it kept the peace of the world in the *Pax Britannica*.

All of this may seem obvious. But there is a coda to it that makes the question more interesting. In 1872, the English historian J.A. Froude had doubts whether America would prove to be the hoped-for savior of civilization, because the Anglo-American spirit there was being overwhelmed by the mass immigration from other parts of Europe.

The obvious answer, and one that was to become even more clear during the next forty years of the immigration from Central and Eastern Europe, was that the Americans were not going to be Englishmen, and with that a dream faded.

Special Relationship with Britain

By the 1870s, Britain was beginning to feel its weakness in the face of the rising power of Germany as well as of the United States, and it was the English and not the Americans who then began to speak urgently of a special relationship. From then on this was to be one of the main English themes, and the foundation of English policy. The English let slip no opportunity of demonstrating their sympathy with the United States.

The Americans were surprised and delighted at the unanimous support which the English people gave them in the Spanish-American war, but the British public mind had been moving rapidly from the awareness of Britain's increasing weakness to the need for an American alliance.

The two obvious examples of this alliance were the Anglo-American cooperation in the two world wars, especially in World War II, because Britain's solitary position after the collapse of France made it the only *Western* ally of America—the alliance with Russia was of a very different nature—in a way in which it had not been in World War I. And from this cooperation the legend of the "special relationship" was perpetuated until Suez. "It is a mar-

riage," said Isaiah Berlin, as late as 1949, even after the collapse of British power in the Eastern Mediterranean, "from which, in the view of one of the partners at least—the Americans—their hope, or fear, of ultimate divorce. The marriage may at times be unhappy, but it cannot be annulled without destroying both partners equally." But this was wishful thinking.

What one must hold on to in all this is the troubled question that an erratically visionary English statesman, Charles Wentworth Dilke a century ago: "Who are the Americans to be?" It is a question that the Old World keeps putting about—and to—the New World, believing that it really is new. One can hear it, not only from Europe, but from old Russia; from old China, and the whole of Asia; even from old Africa: from all the *Orbis Terrarum* of the Old World, wondering what this New World yet will be, fearing, hoping at the same time, anxious but still looking to be saved.

For the pro-Americanism and the anti-Americanism in Europe, these attitudes are again interwoven. The problem was described more than twenty years ago in an article in *Encounter* by George Orwell, who had been a British correspondent in America during the period of anti-American feeling in the early 1940s. He pointed out that the United States had in the past been regarded as the European conscience. It had ideals which Europe had never possessed them, had long since had to sacrifice; it could afford to have ideals—its remoteness and its isolation, to its knowledge of its own ideology and experience, meant that it could be a teacher and an exemplar to the Old World, however unwillingly. Europeans were to be obedient pupils.

World Savior

The example of America, even without its exertions, might save the world. "To any intelligent European who comes to the United States fresh from the distractions, despairs, and inanities of the Old World," wrote Bertrand Russell around 1938, "it is clear that the future of civilization and the chief possibility of happiness for mankind is to be found in America." In spite of every disappointment, the hope always returns, for, if one cannot look to America for that hope, where on earth may it be found?

Worsthorne made the point that Europe has always expected the United States an exceptional standard of behavior. This gives an edge to every other country's criticisms of the United States and its conduct, which is not to be found in the criticism of any other country. The hope that it will be different is there, as V. S. Pritchard wrote in 1881:

The standing armies, the monarchies, the aristocracies, the huge debts, the crushing taxation, the old inveterate abuses

which flourish in Europe, can take no root in the New World. The continent of America is consecrated to simple humanity, and its institutions exist for the progress and happiness of the whole people.

But there now *are* the standing armies of America; there now *is* something that, from time to time, looks very like a monarchy; there now *is* a permitted degree of inherited wealth that is creating some of the elements of an aristocracy; there now *is* taxation that is crushing: is that all, then, that it has come to, a repetition in the New World of the inveterate abuses of the Old?

The hope, and the anxiety that it will be disappointed—that there will be found in America as in Europe only fear and failure at the heart of the world—is one of the roots in anti-Americanism, making it again a phenomenon of its own, and giving it a peculiar acrimony. Is this last and best hope of mankind, this new civilization, this final empire, only to go the way of all others? And there is in this form of anti-Americanism abroad something of the same unhistorical attitude to American history that is to be found in the anti-American within the United States. The idea that there is a manifest destiny for the United States to fulfill is not one that has been confined to the Americans, or that has taken only one form. Anti-Americanism is in this form a protest, not against Americanism, but against its apparent failure.

But the ambivalence drives deeper than that. Horace Walpole wrote in 1776 six months before the Declaration of Independence: "Europe is very worn out. It is America's turn to be fertile of genius." A century later, the social philosopher Herbert Spencer was unreserved: "The Americans may reasonably look forward to a time when they will have produced a civilization grander than any the world has known."

Cultural Distrust

The voices are powerful, and their hope confident. Yet the idea has also persisted that the United States may not really be civilized, that it cannot really be trusted with either its cultural inheritance from Europe, or even its own new culture.

"The humanity of the United States can never reach the sublime," wrote the poet John Keats to his brother and sister-in-law (emigrants to America) in 1818. To John Ruskin, the art critic, America was only an imitator: "England taught the Americans all they have of speech or thought, hitherto. What thoughts they have not learned from England are foolish thoughts; what words they have not learned from England, unseemly words; the vile among them not being able to be humorous parrots, but only obscene mocking birds." And so the voices could be multiplied into this century.

There is something deeper in all this than a mere feeling of the superiority of European civilization; and it helps to explain the uneasiness that remains even when American art and literature have proved their command. There is in fact a persistent belief—not that America is young, that is not the point—but that there is some experience that it has not yet *suffered* as have other nations and which may even be denied to it. Once again this is a link between anti-Americanism and Americanism, at home and abroad, a constant anxiety about its ability to comprehend its own challenge and opportunities.

That it has not suffered: that is the point made again and again. "America is only starting its history. It is only now that its trials, its dissensions, its conflicts are beginning," wrote Octave Gasset in *Revolt of the Masses* seventy years after the Civil War. "America has not yet suffered. It is an illusion to think it can command the power of command."

Incredible as it may seem after the experiences of the past years, it can still be claimed that the United States has not suffered. At the bottom of many attitudes to America, there is the feeling that it shrugs or shuffles off its own agonies, that proudly it even now engages in the Pursuit of Happiness, that it does not abandon its optimism, that it goes on believing that it can solve any problem, that the idea of Progress is not yet alien to it. Equally, when this notion is stood on its head—as in much of modern American literature in this century, and in the interpretations of American literature of the last century—as grotesque a myth can be maintained: as if a sense of tragedy must be *forced* into the American mind if it is to mature, as if the idea of original sin must be invented in America, as if it *must* be demonstrated that American history has been and will be like the history of the Old World, a nation forever torn in a conflict between the extremities of good and evil before it can find its soul; that, pray heaven, America must enjoy its decline, and pile its own ruins upon ruins as in Europe, so that it may be as blessed.

Rejecting History

Whichever way one looks at it, one seems always to be staring at the pole of myth. The country is not allowed to be historical; the historical is not given the flavor of journalism; the attention is turned to the quotidian—by which in fact the society from day to day survives—is diminished or rejected.

One may watch the myths as they are manufactured. The official, the officialist history to which American historians are so addicted is all too often only the replacement of one myth by another. If they are not careful, they will succeed in making the Tory Loyal

heroes of the bicentennial. The treatment of the Indians in America is being taken out of its historical context, with no reference to what was done to the Maoris in New Zealand or the Aborigines in Australia, or for that matter in this century to the Kurds in Russia.

What is more, American civilization is usually described only in material terms. The fact that this material progress has been inspired by two ideas—that men may act beneficently in their environment and their own circumstances, and that the benefits of this material progress can be made accessible to all—is ignored. The improvement of the day-to-day lives of ordinary people, which has owed so much to the inspiration of America, is disparaged. Moreover, with this material progress there has been carried also the idea that culture might equally be made accessible to all. As soon as a mining town like Central City in Colorado was settled, it built an opera house. The rude miners of Leadville, 10,000 feet up in the Rocky Mountains, invited Oscar Wilde very early to lecture them on “The Ethics of Art.” Even high culture was not presumed to be only for a minority, and this again has been an American influence on modern civilization.

The wish that America should *suffer*—more than in the harrowing early years in Jamestown? more than on the frontier of Massachusetts? more than Jonathan Edwards? more than Roger Williams? more than in the heroic endurance of the pioneers? more than in the Civil War? more than in the suffering of the immigrants? more than in the Depression? more than John Kennedy? more than Robert Kennedy? more than in Vietnam?—is in part the voice of the dying civilization of the Old World, which has wished to be saved by the New World—there is no doubt about that—but to preserve its own civilization, all that used to be understood as Christendom, and not to have to acknowledge that another civilization may have come into being.

Yet in its decline, the Old World does not trust because it cannot comprehend the new civilization that has grown outside the *Orbis Terrarum*. The future of the world lies with America—that has not been questioned for two centuries—yet in America the life of the spirit is killed “not accidentally or temporarily, but inevitably and eternally,” as Lowes Dickenson put it. If one believes this to be true, the prospect is bleak, and much of the despairing literature of Europe during the past two centuries, the literature of the “decline of the West,” may be explained in terms of this overwhelming recognition, on the one hand, that it is in the United States that “the burden of world history shall reveal itself,” as Hegel said, and on the other, that in America the life of the spirit, nourished for so long by Europe, will at last be extinguished. To understand that the leadership of the West had passed to the United States, but not to believe

in the spirit of America, or even that the spirit could live in America: was this not the empty valley of the hollow men, the broken columns, the lost kingdoms, the dead land, the broken jar, the whimper of the world's end?

Europe in Danger

The decline of the West, as it was described by Spengler at the end of World War I, was the decline of Europe; he barely mentioned the United States. Moreover, the American himself seems to be made anxious by the thought that the European culture to which he feels drawn, even as he pulls away from it, may in fact be dead, leaving him alone; and rather than bear this final separation, he too will take his stand on the ruins among which the European moves.

Whenever he strayed from the garden that he had made in his island peninsula, the European was in danger of being overcome by terror and superstition: but not the European who became an American. It was not by superstition or myth that America was made, but by the rejection of them; not out of a nightmare of "that hell which is the historical beginning of the human soul," but out of the awakening of the human reason which was the historical beginning of our democratic societies. The history of the United States has yet to be long; its art and its literature should be preparing to be long as well, to be marching with it in step, and not always to be shifting their feet from experiment to experiment, fragment to fragment, accomplishing only their own ruins, only an imitation of the ruins among which the ghosts of European culture are now doomed to exercise.

There is a deep importance in the fact that anti-Americanism abroad tends to be strongest when America itself seems to have lost confidence in its own idea. Why should the world trust America if it does not trust itself? Why should it welcome the new civilization, and find hope in it, if the Americans themselves are already imagining its decay and dissolution? Why should they understand what it means to be "Americanized," as the world is being Americanized, when the Americans themselves seem to be unsure that they like being Americans? Anti-Americanism in the rest of the world returns in cycles, because cycles of self-doubt, as I said at the beginning, keep returning in the public mind of America.

For at the root of all anti-Americanism, and of the expressions of it which have been explored here, is both the understanding that the world is being Americanized and a fear of the process. In short, anti-Americanism is a response to the strength of Americanism, the awareness of a new and powerful force in the world; and this is one reason why it is a phenomenon with no parallel in the past.

Anti-Americanism abroad, whatever the occasions for its expres-

sion, is merely one form of the continuing interest in and debate about the nature of Americanism, and of its power to Americanize. On various occasions and at exacerbating moments, it may seem more widespread and more vehement than at others. But the debate goes on, at the root of it the question to which most foreign observers have addressed themselves: what is the American to be?, and since we are becoming like Americans, what will we become?

It is the impact of Americanization that is at the core of anti-Americanism, where there is more than a scribble on a wall, "Yankee Go Home." One may think that Communism may spread from Russia or China to the rest of the globe; but no one thinks in terms of the "Russification" or "Chinafication" of the world. Even when French was the *lingua franca* of the Western world, and French culture held sway, as the American-English language and American culture today do, no one really felt that his own country was being "Frenchified."

Americanization—Welcomed and Feared

For more than a century, Britain bestrode the world, but there was never as strong a sense of "Anglicization" as there is now of Americanization; not even when the British empire was most far-flung, and the British were teaching the Indians and West Indians to speak English and read Spenser, play cricket and be gentlemen.

Yet it obviously makes sense, from London to Rome to Cairo to Colombo to Singapore to Tokyo to Sydney to say that the world is being Americanized. This process is usually observed only in its material manifestations, and it is overlooked that, with the traffic of its commerce and its arms, America carries also an idea.

The energy of the American presence in the world is both welcomed and feared, both a cause of hope and a source of anxiety, because with its idea it keeps on unsettling the established forms of the past. Not merely old but ancient customs are surrendering to a presence that is not imposed and yet seems irresistible, to an idea that appears to be more powerful than the slogans of any revolution. "All American influence on Europe," said Cyril Connolly, "however vulgar, brings with it an improvement in the standard of living and dissipates certain age-old desires." While these are wanted, they are also resisted and questioned.

Seneca's Prophecy Fulfilled

It is my own belief that the mere presence of America, what Americans have become and achieved in their own country, has done more to change the world, and improve the life of its peoples, than any revolution in the past two centuries. "An age will come after many years when the Ocean will loose the chains of things, and a

huge land will lie revealed." Against this prophecy of Seneca, that of Christopher Columbus wrote: "This prophecy was fulfilled by his father . . . the Admiral in the year 1492." But the prophecy is being fulfilled in an even deeper sense; the American is still bringing the chains of things, not merely in his own continent, but in the very *Orbis Terrarum* in which the whole of the Old World was contained. In spite of the progress of Americanization, the influence still seems strange, precisely because it comes from elsewhere, from the *Orbis Terrarum*, from that still New World.

If this is understood, anti-Americanism becomes much more interesting than is usually recognized. Was America a mistake? is the question that can be asked, as it cannot be asked of another country. It was seriously, even if one cannot say deeply, debated by the *philosophes* of the eighteenth century. Most of them had been to the New World, but that did not prevent them, as it has not prevented others in later years, from commenting freely on its conditions.

The interest of their musings is the sensation, once more, that America was a new phenomenon in the world, for good or for evil. Those who feared the results of its discovery were afraid that the degeneracy of the New World would return to corrupt the Old World; its wealth would cause inflation in Europe and therefore in the Old World; its impoverishment, and that it would be morally calamitous by bringing the Old World with articles that were either useless, such as furs and gems, or pernicious, such as tobacco. The general influence of America, in short, would be like the particular influence of venereal disease. In fact, what we find in the responses of some of the *philosophes* is an early expression of the fear that the Old World would be Americanized; a fear that turned to welcome in 1776.

In this perspective, the phenomenon of anti-Americanism in the rest of the world is hardly to be feared, as long as it is understood in a profound sense, it is the rest of the world asking of itself the question of Crèvecoeur: "Who is the American, this new man?"

TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM

By Everett Carll Ladd, Jr., with Charles D. Hadley

The American presidential elections of the 1960s and 1970s have been remarkable for the alternation between lop-sided victories and victories by a neck. Careful observers have become convinced that the entire party system is undergoing a sea change into something quite strange in American history. The authors, both political scientists, describe five various theories currently advanced to explain what is happening—and discover a central core of agreement.

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The United States has hardly been a stranger to change. It is a nation whose beginnings were framed by the breakdown of feudal norms, institutions, and social arrangements—and by the advent of the egalitarian, industrial, and scientific revolutions. Hence, response to massive societal transformations has colored all of American history. Both the rate of change and its scope, however, have been unprecedented in the contemporary period.

Just a decade or so ago, it was believed that the fundamental problems had been resolved in advanced societies like the United States. Personal consumption of goods and services in the United States had risen from under \$200 billion to about \$750 billion between 1947 and 1973. In the same quarter century, the median (average) income for all American families about doubled, jumping from \$5,665 to \$11,120. Individual families gained more purchasing power in this brief span than in all the preceding periods of American history.

Education, too, benefited from this increase in wealth and its distribution. The *increase* of six million in college and university enrollment between 1947 and 1973 was about four times greater than the *total enrollment* in 1940. Recreation gained as well: in 1947, at the start of the television age, fewer than one-tenth of 1 percent of American families (or 14,000) possessed TV sets; but in 1973, 96 percent of all families did so.

Such was the sanguine situation just a few years ago. But today, Americans look back with some dismay upon a decade marred by political assassinations, sharp racial conflict, massive domestic protests against the longest and most unpopular war in American history, and by Watergate, a political scandal of such proportions that it destroyed a President elected less than two years earlier with the largest plurality ever recorded. Further, the sense of an economic order able to sustain continuing growth indefinitely has been replaced with concern over economic stagnation and how to "cope with scarcity."

What does this mean for American politics? Epochs of transition are the stuff of which major political transformations are made. One such transformation was consummated in the great economic depression of the 1930s. American public life then witnessed the structuring of new partisan coalitions. Basic changes took place in the conflict between parties. The Democratic party attained majority status, and the Republican party receded into the background for the first time in its seventy-year history.

New Deal Party System

The Depression, which began in 1929, abruptly signaled the emergence of a new social, as well as economic setting for American life. It also accelerated the development of a new political configuration, the New Deal Party System. This party system was to dominate American political life for the next forty years, into the 1970s. The New Deal introduced a wide-reaching policy for economic recovery and growth—a policy that was to become the pivotal factor in the conflict between the Democratic and the Republican parties. It was in the context of this economic policy that the terminology of ideological conflict—liberal vs. conservative—entered common political discourse in the United States.

The New Deal saw a complete reversal of political constituencies in the two major parties. Previously, the Democrats had been the party of the provincial idea, both in the rural South and in the urban North. It had been a party of small towns and farms and urban neighborhoods, a party of localized interests, a party lacking vision for the national idea.

In contrast, before the New Deal, the Republicans were the party

of the urban middle class, the party of industrialization, and the party of reform—reform was considered at that time to come through the business corporation. The Republicans were the party of the national idea.

With the election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1932, and the consequent introduction of his New Deal economics, the Democratic party shifted direction decisively, supplanting the Republicans as the party of liberal coalition. It was now the Democrats who emphasized the use of centralized government power to meet economic problems that had previously been left to the state and local level, or to the private sector. It was the Democrats who thrust forward the claims of such beneficiary groups as labor and new immigrants.

As a result of this shift in policy, new political coalitions were formulated; each of the parties moved toward a new constituency. The Democrats, who had been a minority party, became the majority. They had long encompassed the white rural South and the urban Catholics; now, black, Jewish, and lower class voters realigned themselves with the Democrats. The Republicans, for their part, moved into a minority party status, becoming the party of the upper and middle classes and of the Protestants—particularly in the Northeast and to some extent in the West and the Middle West.

Such was the party alignment for forty years, from the 1930s through the 1960s. By the 1970s, however, the pattern set during the New Deal era had become increasingly less relevant to American society, which had undergone major changes. To date, as of the mid-1970s, no one perception of a *new pattern* of American parties has emerged as *the* single correct description. Instead, a number of theories have suggested answers to the basic questions about the future of the American party system: What interests will be decisive? What coalitions will be dominant? What lines of conflict will segment the public? Will majority status remain with the Democrats? Or will it shift to the Republicans, or to some third party? Or will there be no stable partisan majority, only temporary shifting coalitions?

The New Republican Majority

There have been five theories. The first envisages the emergence of a new Republican majority. It was most clearly articulated by the conservative Kevin Phillips in his book, *The Emerging Republican Majority*, published in 1969. Phillips argued that the familiar political agenda drafted in the New Deal era had been rewritten. Poverty was no longer the issue, as it had been during the New Deal period. Rather, public concern was over the black "socioeconomic revolution"; changes in life styles and cultural values; crime and violence. The economic crisis of the interwar depression had been replaced by

social and urban crisis as the issues of the age. It was an age of affluence and of a growing middle class—and the American middle class had long been decisively Republican. That party was clearly in the ascendancy.

Both during the Depression period and during the present, the analysis continued, the American public had been concerned with social stability, fearful of chaos. But Americans in the late 1960s and 1970s saw very different enemies and looked to different policy responses to achieve stability than they had four decades earlier. In the early 1930s the voters held a *conservative* business establishment responsible for government inaction in the face of extreme unemployment, the collapse of the farm economy, and urban workers' needs for adequate living conditions. In the early 1970s voters were anxious over the failure of a *liberal* establishment to protect social health and stability. According to this theory, a new Republican majority might emerge from the revolt of white, petit bourgeois, Southern and middle American voters.

The prophets of a new Republican majority did not assume that the ideological transformations of the late 1960s and early 1970s made such a majority inevitable—there was an opportunity, but not a necessity. By 1975 and the aftermath of the Watergate scandal, Phillips had become convinced that the opportunity was gone; the Republican party was no longer a viable claimant for conservative loyalties. A third party challenge from the right in 1976 was almost inevitable.

At its core, of course, the argument in favor of an emerging Republican majority was always based on the premise of an emerging neopopulist, neoconservative majority that *might* be brought under the Republican standard. The Republican possibility was dashed—but not the possibility of a coalition of this kind.

The New Democratic Majority

Another coalition—a collection of disparate social groups united in dissatisfaction with the status quo and in commitment to egalitarian, popular, liberal changes—was foreseen by Senator George McGovern, the 1972 Democratic presidential candidate. Senator McGovern agreed that America would be ruled in the 1970s and 1980s by a majority vastly different from the one ascendant during the first three decades after the Depression. The Democratic party coalition of the New Deal had broken up: it had lost the urban Catholic vote over the race conflicts and it had lost the white South. But, as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. put it in July 1972, McGovern was the leader of a “change coalition” as broad as F.D. Roosevelt’s coalition of 1932: a coalition of “the young, the women, the blacks, the blue-collar workers, the suburbanites, the farmers, the Mexican-

Transformation of the American Party System

Americans, the intellectuals." These people, Schlesinger concluded, were eager for a change from government by a big business elite that resisted such social and economic reforms as establishing a more equitable tax system, cutting down the bloated defense budget, assuring improved health care, and providing a system of income guarantees.

Senator McGovern lost his bid for the Presidency—the election was not even close. But the advocates of a new Democratic majority believe that the ingredients for a coalition of the change majority are still present.

Thus, Louis Harris, in his book *The Anguish of Change*, published in 1973, drawing heavily upon his survey research organization's regular inquiries into the state of the national temper, sees the American electorate as oriented to change and as tuned in to a new political agenda. He argues that the preferred candidate will be one who is "at least a moderate on the race question," and who addresses himself effectively to such new problems as the deterioration of the environment, the shortage of energy, the transportation crisis, and—above all—to effective action for peace. Voters will favor the candidate and the party that is inclined to a more activist federal role, because only the federal government can offer the broad central coordination and direction necessitated by the national and international scope of the present problems.

Harris' view of the new majority is closer to that of McGovern and Schlesinger than to that of Phillips. But serious observers on both right and left agree in seeing the potential for a durable new majority, and describe that majority in similar language: alienation, frustration, desire for change, populism, establishments, etc.

Where they disagree is over the *locus* of the new majority. The conservatives see it as located in the white bourgeoisie of suburbia, the South, Southwest, and West, the heartland of America and a neoconservative Middle America. The liberals see the new majority as composed of nonwhites demanding parity in a white-dominated society; of women demanding parity in a male-dominated society; of youth moved by visions of a less restrictive society; and of a burgeoning intelligentsia critical of the old order.

The Search for the Center

For both Democrats and Republicans the wish has been father to the thought. They have each seen what they wished to see. But this is not surprising. So fluid, indeed chaotic, have been the past five years that reasonable men and women have been able to construct quite plausible though contradictory interpretations of where the electoral majority will weigh in the coming decade.

Still a third description of the transformed American party system

is that of Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg in their *The Real Majority*, published in 1970. They begin by noting that the United States has not had a *national* party since World War II. The reason for this gap is the Democratic party's loss of a "Voting Issue"—the "one big issue—motivating millions of voters . . . of passing political interest . . . (which) continues to hold sway over the electorate for many consecutive years or even consecutive decades."

In the Depression, according to Scammon and Wattenberg, the Voting Issue was shaped around the condition of middle class society, and was decisive in giving the Democratic party an electoral majority. The Voting Issue allowed the Democrats to "control the center" of American political life. With the growing affluence of the post World War II period, the Voting Issue was displaced, and with it the Democratic control of the center. At the beginning of the 1960s a new Voting Issue came up—the Social Issue, which focused on urban problems relating to crime, education, and racial and ethnic groups.

According to Scammon and Wattenberg, both the Republicans who have tried to found a coalition on the right, and the Democrats who have tried to found one on the left, are mistaken—morally and pragmatically. Good government and winning elections alike require a "search for the center." The center in America is not a static entity, but a kind of "moveable feast." The majority of American opinion usually clusters around a position that is substantively centrist—between the polar views on both right and left, which attract only minority backing. Unfortunately, neither Republicans nor Democrats seem to possess the capability of dominating the contemporary center—and of becoming a truly national party.

The Era of Partisan Decomposition

A fourth interpretation foresees the coming epoch as one when a single party will command a base of support broad and persistent enough to claim majority status. Walter Dean Burnham, author of *Critical Elections and the Mainstreams of American Politics* (1970), is mainly responsible for this diagnosis.

In Burnham's view, fundamental "critical" electoral realignments have occurred periodically in American political life. They have taken place whenever massive social and economic changes have produced demands that could not be met by the existing political system.

Today, in the mid-1970s, many of the major elements for a "critical realignment" are present. But Burnham doubts that any will occur. He argues that the psychological cement binding citizen parties has crumbled so badly that we have an electorate that is "beyond" critical partisan realignment. American parties have never been strong nationally in the United States; in recent decades

most of the once muscular urban and state organizations have withered, as well. The proportion of voters describing themselves as independents, rather than as Republicans or Democrats, has increased notably since the 1950s. Only one of every five or six voters was independent in the 1950s; according to a poll conducted by *The New York Times* and Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), 33 to 40 percent were independent in February 1976. Among the young and the college-educated, independents today are the largest "party," their numbers exceeding those of self-identified Democrats and Republicans. Finally, with attention focused so much on the style and personal attributes of the contenders as "television personalities," party ties are weakened even further.

In this connection, Samuel Lubell, writing on the decline of American parties, has argued that success in American national politics is now primarily determined by the electorate's evaluation of the "President-manager." Parties have grown weaker, while the presidency has become the fulcrum for electorate choice. The presidents utilize their exceptional power over economic life and foreign policy to orchestrate electoral results—when things go wrong, the president is blamed and his party banished from office. Party loyalties are lightly held. Neither party holds a majority. What we have instead of national parties is "a new alignment of two incomplete, narrow-based coalitions, polarized against each other."

The More Things Change . . .

The previous projections of the American political future all predict change; our last one speaks of continuity. James Sundquist, author of *Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States* (1973), argues that the measure of change in American politics has been overstated—much under the American political sun seen as new really is not. For example, the growth of independent electoral behavior in the 1960s coincided with deep divisions over race, Vietnam, and the social issue. Because these cut across party lines, they blurred the distinctions between parties and created demands for change that could not be adequately expressed in the existing parties. So various groups of independents were spun off from the parties on each individual issue. But, to Sundquist, the spin-off was temporary. In the past few years there has been a decline in the intensity of the "big" issues of the 1960s and early 1970s; nor did these issues provide the impetus for any major realignment of the party system established during the 1930s with the New Deal.

Looking toward the future, Sundquist sees a weakening of the big crosscutting issues of the past decade, and the strengthening of economic issues and class conflicts that will serve to redefine and

sharpen the old New Deal cleavage. American politics will continue to be dominated by the heritage of the New Deal ascendancy.

Sundquist's message is clear. A national majority in the long run will support activist and egalitarian government programs. The Democratic party will occupy the agenda of the United States. True, periodically, an electorate exhausted by issues such as Vietnam, race, and violence has turned to the Republican party to buy time, peace, and tranquility. But the mood of despair has passed, and the activist-egalitarian commitments have reasserted themselves. This will happen once again. The New Deal party will be reinvigorated—according to James Sundquist.

These, then, are the five best-known attempts to interpret the changing patterns in American electoral politics, and to predict their future movement: theories in profile of the New Republican Majority; The New Democratic Majority; The Search for the Center; The Era of Partisan Decomposition; and what we have chosen to term *The More Things Change*. Almost all of these theories have in common a recognition of certain basic developments in American political life.

Weakened Parties, Independent Voters

Few observers question that the American parties have been weakened in the contemporary era, both in terms of their organization and in their command of citizen loyalties. Unlike their European counterparts, American party organizations have never been particularly strong nationwide. In the nineteenth century the party organization was able to determine candidates for national office in a closed primary convention. This is no longer the case; for example, the Democratic party convention in 1972 weakened the party structure and control of national nominees by adopting a series of reforms that favored a high degree of internal democracy and popular rule at the nominating convention.

Simultaneously, the proportion of voters describing themselves as independents rather than Republicans or Democrats has increased notably since the 1950s. Their self-descriptions have been reflected in their electoral behavior—particularly in the practice of ticket-splitting, where a voter will vote for a Republican candidate running for one office, and for a Democratic candidate for another office. By 1972, according to the Gallup polls, 62 percent of the electorate voted a split ticket, compared to 38 percent in 1948.

Why are these changes occurring?

One answer involves the changing character of the electorate and, related to it, changes in communications. The level of higher education in the population has risen dramatically; with it has gone up the proportion of voters who feel no need for parties to tell them how to

vote. The better educated the voter, the more his information on political issues, the greater his interest in issues, and the stronger his confidence in his ability to judge candidates and their programs apart from their party links.

Another precipitant of independent electoral behavior has been the emergence of television as the principal source of political information, supplanting the party activists. Television brings the candidates into the voters' living rooms, where the viewer focuses on the style and personal attributes of the contenders, rather than their party ties.

Parties surely continue to be prominent because they are useful for organizing elections and reducing alternative candidates to a manageable number; but the electorate does not regard the parties as indispensable. Historically, parties have performed an important function by linking a populace with the centers of government. Thus, people in elected office have used party organization and personnel to communicate information on government programs and to generate electoral backing. Increasingly, the national television networks are now providing those links. The candidates set up ad hoc campaign organizations to use television to speak directly to voters, without the intermediate intervention of the regular party structure.

A third reason for the weakening of party ties lies in the breakup of group alignments with the parties. In the past the collapse of old alignments (the blacks with the Republican party, for example) was succeeded by new alignments. But at present, groups are crossing party lines, and it is unlikely that a new party alignment structure comparable to that of the New Deal coalition will emerge. The key here is that party loyalties are now so lightly held. Neither the Democrats nor the Republicans will probably be able to establish decisive majority party status in national politics in the foreseeable future.

In this situation, alternating landslide victories—achieved first by one party, then by the other—become more ordinary occurrences than in the past. Less anchored to party loyalties, more inclined to independent electoral behavior, the American electorate can be expected to be moved massively by the events of the day: the particular mix of candidates, programs, and problems prevailing in a given election.

Polarization of Issue Activists

The unsuccessful candidacies of Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater in 1964 and Democratic presidential candidate George McGovern in 1972 attest to one very significant development: the growing strength in both parties of cadres of highly

involved people, "purists," who can influence, if not dictate, the outcomes of contests for presidential nominations.

The old professional political activists, the "accommodaters," believed in compromise and bargaining as essential to political survival. The "purists," in contrast, are issue-oriented, concerned with the advancement of a program. Within the Republican party nationally, the issue activists are likely to manifest a Neo-Conservative posture as they did in the nomination for Goldwater in 1964. Within the Democratic party, they are likely to assume a New Left or New Liberalism position, as they did in the nomination of McGovern in 1972. In the final analysis, both nominations were the result of grass roots, issue-oriented activist campaigns, not the choices of either the majority of the party leadership, or of the rank-and-file.

In sum: contemporary American party system is personality-oriented, issue-directed, media-utilizing, presenting media-assessed candidacies operating within the formal structure of political parties. We see no reason to lament this development. An electorate that engages in ticket-splitting is much more volatile than one marked by party regularity, but it is not inherently less capable of effective democratic participation.

As of the mid-1970s enough has changed to usher in a basic transformation of the American party system. Let us bid a fond farewell to the old New Deal coalitions. The system of which they were part, along with the social era that nurtured it, having served America well, has slipped into history. Let us turn to the new chapter that is opening, in the hope of proceeding intelligently in the quest for a full and secure democracy.



America in Autobiography

AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND AMERICAN CHARACTER

By Jacob Sloan

Contrary to the popular belief, there is no permanent national character. The English appear in the literature of the time of Elizabeth I to have been a passionate, sensual people; a century later, they are represented as controlled, logical, formal; in the nineteenth century, as something else again. But there are certain underlying patterns of belief and thought that recur in a nation's history—and these figure largely in peoples' account of their own lives. Mr. Sloan traces some common American characteristics implicit in various autobiographies written during the past two hundred years.

Jacob Sloan is the acting editor of *Dialogue*, where his article on *The Autobiography of Malcolm X* appeared in 1970. He is the author of a book of poetry, *Generation of Journey*, and has edited several important historical memoirs, notably, Emmanuel Ringblum's *Notes from the Warsaw Ghetto* (McGraw-Hill). He has lectured extensively on American writing in South Asia and Eastern Europe. This article is an elaboration of one of his lectures.



Perhaps the best index to the American character is to be found in autobiographical material." The quotation is from Henry S. Commager's admirable book on *The American Mind*, and it evokes two contrary reactions.

One's first impulse is to agree. Ordinary conversation confirms the connection between personal confidences and indication of character. What is true of the spoken word is to some extent true of the written one, as well—though not completely, because most people write less freely than they speak. Still, the careful reader of memoirs, like the careful listener to oral histories, picks up covert undertones and overtones that are as meaningful as the overt statement. We assign the person confiding in us to a certain time,

place, and role on the basis of what and how he tells us (or fails to tell us). In fact, we learn more about the teller's inner (as well as outer) world than he himself realizes, or intends us to know.

This is true of individuals. But can one discern a nation's character from the autobiographies of individuals? One suspects not. Martin E. Malia has recently pinpointed the difficulty: "A nation is homogeneous unity; its character changes over time and varies from one segment of the population to another."

Professor Malia was explaining why he could not extrapolate Leo Tolstoy's fictionalized autobiography, *Childhood, Boyhood, Youth* the "character" of mid-nineteenth century Tsarist Russia. Certainly, the same objections—the heterogeneity of the nation and its group differences—hold for the United States. So it is no wonder Malia was wise to use the word "perhaps."

Yet, granted that no single, uniform set of characteristics can embrace the personality of all Americans, there are certain commonly held attitudes, values, principles, that are generally considered influential in American thought and conduct. Can they be perceived in American autobiographies?

The Evidence

The answer must lie in the autobiographies themselves. What is the evidence? How ample is it? How representative? And how valid?

Ample enough, and quite representative. The student of American autobiography is immediately struck by its quantity and variety. Ten years ago, in 1966, *The Bibliography of American Autobiographies* listed as many as 6,377 separate items. Glancing down the index of authors by occupation, one finds extraordinary range. Under the letters A through H alone, one encounters:

actors, adventurers, advertisers, alcoholics, animal trainers, athletes, aviators; bankers, barbers, bartenders; cabinet makers, card players, clergymen, convicts, cowboys; dancers, diplomats, doctors; educators, engineers, embalmers, explorers; farmers, financiers, firemen, foreign correspondents; gardeners, guides; hairdressers, highwaymen...

Almost everyone in the United States, it would seem, is anxious to tell his life story. Indeed, this very willingness to talk about oneself may well be a distinctive American trait. In its wilder forms American garrulousness has been the object of mingled amazement and mockery. Thus, in Sinclair Lewis' fiction *The Man Who Was Coolidge*, a railroad traveler confides in a fellow passenger who is a complete stranger—and exhibits his own provincial silliness.

Where does this insistence on the publication of home truths come from? Or, in terms of our theme, what is the motivation for

widespread American practice of writing autobiography?

As in all human behavior, there is no single, all-determining motive. Critics have sorted out a number of complex and interlocking reasons. They surmise that autobiographies may be written: to justify a course of action or to apologize for it; to confess one's sins and be able to die in peace; to bear witness to some important historical event or movement; to sum up the lessons of one's life, for the benefit of posterity.

Posterity may well be the key to the writing of autobiographies, one that opens up all motivations. People put down the stories of their lives in order to leave some record of their stay on earth behind them—for the same reason, out of the same instinct, that every generation reproduces itself physically in children: the perpetuation of the human race.

The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin

In fact, it is not at all unusual for the autobiographer to state this motivation explicitly: the writer often asserts that he is recounting the story of his life for the instruction and edification of *his children*. Such is the case with the memoir generally regarded as the prototype of the genre in American literature, *The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin*.

Franklin prefaces his account of his life with a letter addressed to his son, from whom he was gradually becoming estranged: the father was a leader of the American colonial rebels, his son, Sir William Franklin, governor of the royal colony of New Jersey (paradoxically through his father's political connections), and a loyal representative of the English crown in America. So Benjamin Franklin's autobiography may be viewed as an attempt to re-establish rapport with his son. The author makes his didactic and testamentary purpose clear:

Having emerged from the poverty and obscurity in which I was born and bred, to a state of affluence and some degrees of reputation in the world, and having gone so far through life with a considerable share of felicity, the conducting means I made use of, which with the blessing of God so well succeeded, my posterity may like to know, as they may find some of them suitable to their own situations, and therefore fit to be imitated.

The stilted formula of this prolegomenon is calculated to raise modern hackles. (Happily, once past Franklin's preface one enjoys an account written without affectation, and with considerable vigor.) But D.H. Lawrence, for one, in his idiosyncratic *Studies in Classic American Literature*, is moved to a violent attack on both Franklin the man and all that he stood for. Crying, "I am a moral

animal. But I am not a moral machine [like Franklin]," Lawrence goes on to inveigh against "this unlovely, snuff-coloured little ideal, or automaton, of a pattern American . . . this dry, moral utilitarian little democrat."

The roots of Lawrence's anger run very deep. For, he tells us, as a child he himself had been enraptured by the "little anecdotes and humorisms, with a moral tag" in a copy of Franklin's *Poor Richard's Almanac*. It had found its way a century after publication to the English coal town where Lawrence was growing up. Most important for an understanding of Lawrence's animus: "Probably I haven't got over those Poor Richard tags yet. I rankle still with them. They are thorns in young flesh." To Lawrence, Franklin epitomized the puritanism out of his (Lawrence's) past and within himself with which all of his writings—indeed, his very life—contended.

It would be wrong, however, to dismiss D.H. Lawrence's distaste for Benjamin Franklin as a spiritual vendetta. Lawrence was not the first, and certainly will not be the last, to be repelled by Franklin's self-satisfaction and sanctimoniousness, by his rationalizations of self-interest as the highest good.

But we cannot share Lawrence's fury at Benjamin Franklin's manifest pride in the material success he has achieved in the world, or his injunctions to his children to seek to emulate him. To our twentieth century sensibility these may be naive or cunning; but they are not really odious.

For one thing, Franklin's self-regard was justified; one of thirteen children in the family of a poor Bostonian artisan, he *had* risen, and by his own efforts. Besides, his autobiography makes it quite clear that Franklin's rise was not exclusively—or even mostly—due to the exercise of those bourgeois virtues he preached in the person of Poor Richard: diligence, thrift, moderation—the work ethic, so much maligned nowadays. Rather, Franklin used the work ethic as a technique to organize his genius—a word we use advisedly, because Benjamin Franklin was of the same mold as his contemporary Thomas Jefferson, a true eighteenth century universal genius.

Benjamin Franklin: summing up for the benefit of posterity



Tongue in cheek, Lawrence has ticked off Franklin's scientific and social accomplishments:

1. He swept and lighted the streets of young Philadelphia.
2. He invented electrical appliances.
3. He was the center of a moralizing club in Philadelphia
4. He was a member of all the important councils of Philadelphia, and then of the American colonies.
5. He won the cause of American Independence at the French court, and was the economic father of the United States.

To Lawrence, who advocated a kind of anarchy of the instincts, the pragmatic leadership Franklin provided to a developing society was simply philistine do-goodism. But Franklin was also an intellectual, a man with a passion for ideas and books, fascinated by language and style. His autobiography shows Franklin reading the satires of Pope, and relishing their sophistication. At the same time he was capable of recognizing the literary innovation of the religious allegorist John Bunyan (his combining dialogue with narration in *Pilgrim's Progress*).

Franklin had early left the low church of his parents for the deism verging on agnosticism of eighteenth century intellectuals. But Franklin understood the power of Bunyan's heightened popular speech; his own *Poor Richard* is notable for its dramatic use of common language: "A guest and a fish stink after three days." "There is no little enemy." This is both realistic, commonsense folk proverb and fine metaphor.

Finally, Franklin possessed the saving grace of wit, one that enabled him to balance his self-assurance with self-mockery. Witness as evidence of his literary-ironic gifts, a wonderfully wry anecdote about the uses of hypocritical rationalism as he himself had practiced it:

I had stuck to my resolution of not eating animal food, and on this occasion I consider'd, with my master Tryon, the taking every fish as a kind of unprovoked murder, since none of them had, or ever could do us any injury that might justify the slaughter. All this seemed very reasonable. But I had formerly been a great lover of fish, and when this came hot out of the frying-pan, it smelt admirably well. I balanc'd some time between principle and inclination, till I recollected that, when the fish were opened I saw smaller fish taken out of their stomachs; then thought I, "If you eat one another, I don't see why we mayn't eat you." So I din'd upon it very heartily, and continued to eat with other people, returning only now and then occasionally to a vegetable diet. So convenient a thing it is to be a reasonable creature, since it enables one to find or make a reason for every thing one has a mind to do.

Franklin's *Autobiography* yields many such gems of acute casual

introspection. These considerably mitigate the didactic prescriptions. Indeed, taken with a grain of salt, and in good humor, such self-gratulatory accounts of careers of achievement are read with delight: There is really so much one can learn from them about the way of the world! Nor are the narrators all pompous and thick-

“
If you would not be forgotten, as soon as you are dead and rotten, either write things worth reading, or do things worth writing.

Benjamin Franklin
”

skinned windy bores—businessmen, politicians, generals, and the like. Just a few years ago a highly regarded editor and writer attracted considerable attention with a frank personal history of his climb to the fore of American intellectuals. Norman Podhoretz's book bore for its title a colloquial term for advancement, viz., *Making It*. The reader of such first-person success stories feels neither resentful nor condescended to: the American Dream, with its promise of equal opportunity for all, enables each reader to hope for equal good fortune.

Success and Failure

And here we find ourselves with a second American preoccupation; if the first is to talk about oneself, the second is to make something of oneself: success. American literature is replete with success stories. Indeed, Franklin's eighteenth century classic was matched in fiction a century later by the very popular inspirational creations of the clergyman Horatio Alger, works in which, typically, a hard-working but honest poor young man rises in the world to marry the boss's daughter.

But there are, inevitably, almost as many tales of failure. As students of American history and thought constantly remind us, Franklin's optimism, his view of the limitless possibilities of the American Eden, has always been balanced by a gloomy perception of the snake that lurks in that garden. This darker side of the American moon is explored most minutely in *The Education of Henry Adams*, a desperately and conscientiously unhappy book.

To begin with, the very title is ironic: Education is usually associated with success in modern society, and Henry Adams, from almost the first page, describes his failure, his *miseducation*.

Where Franklin brags of having risen by his own efforts from a situation of poverty and obscurity to one of affluence and public

esteem (he was able to retire at forty and devote himself to science and public works), Adams can only lament that he had wasted his life, failed his opportunities. Born into a distinguished family (Presidents, ambassadors, and the like), with the best formal education in America (Harvard), he had yet cut a very narrow swath. True, he had achieved some reputation as an intellectual, as Franklin had; but where Franklin was active and inventive, Adams had been only passive and critical—an uninvolved, unconsidered outsider.

Or so, at any rate, Henry Adams himself believed. The irony underlying the irony of his *Education* is that his sense of failure was an *inward* one—the world did not consider him one. The book bears evidence of a mind and sensibility that had been fully developed by intercourse with others, and their appreciation. There are brilliant perceptions, fine insights, into politics, religion, literature, science, countries, men and women. These are the mark of an *involved, well-considered insider*. And, in fact, Adams did gain recognition during his lifetime. Called to teach the history of the middle ages at Harvard, he was judged the best teacher in that renowned university. To this day, his study of the administrations of Jefferson and Madison is considered one of the major achievements of American historical writing. *Democracy*, the novel he wrote in 1880, continues to be read today with fascination—a cutting satire on American politics, it still holds up, is still relevant.

Why, then, did Henry Adams consider himself a failure, his life a miseducation? It was a case of a man's grasp exceeding his reach—because he was reaching for the wrong things, notably political power. Living in Washington on close personal terms with leaders of American political life, he himself never broke into that magical circle. During the American Civil War, as a young man he had been Charles Francis Adams' private secretary in London when his father was the American Ambassador to Great Britain. Those had been wonderful and stirring times—by persuading Great Britain not to side with the Southern rebels, Ambassador Adams had done the Union cause invaluable service. But in Washington after the war Henry Adams could find no political role waiting for him. Instead he remained on the outside looking in, only marginally influential, as confidential advisor to the secretary of state, John Hay, an old friend. Henry Adams was too independent, too critical, too captious for the world. He blamed his failure on the corrupt state of the nation and on his own upper class education; more properly, he could have blamed the goal of success as expressed in power over others that he shared with his generation.

The paradox is that Henry Adams did achieve power—intellectual power. He proposed an influential theory of history, one that is particularly interesting to us because it projects a peculiarly American dichotomy: the tension between power and order.

The Virgin and the Dynamo

Toward the end of Henry Adams' life he became convinced that the period between 1050 and 1250 was a Golden Age in the history of the West, a time when social patterns associated with order, ratic and faith had formed an organic community. In his book *Mont St. Michel and Chartres* he used the image of the Virgin of Lou personify the unifying force or energy of that Golden Age.

Adams was searching for an image to symbolize an energizing force in the modern world as well when he visited the World's Columbian Exposition held in Chicago in 1893. There he tells us in his *Education*, he found that symbol, in the form of an invention that was on exhibition. It was the dynamo, the producer of electrical energy, which—as Adams correctly foresaw—was to introduce a world technological revolution of tremendous scope. Adams was fascinated.

In Henry Adams, then, we find a paradox very characteristic of American thought, a mixture of the conservative and the revolutionary. On the one hand, he could satirize the vulgarity of the new industrial age and idealize the classic purity of the Virgin, the stasis of the Middle Ages. On the other hand, he was overwhelmed with the revolutionary possibilities of the dynamo, the principle of energy with the potential to transform society as it developed the material life of the life itself.

This ambivalence is very American. Americans are passionately attached to the concept of the dynamo—the word “dynamic” is the one most frequently used to describe American society. At the same time, from the very beginning of American history there has been a powerful movement toward recapturing the traditional virtues of stability, naturalness, organicity. The best American writers have recorded this ambivalence: Whitman, who idealized Democracy as exemplifying both the natural man and the machine; Melville, whose *Moby Dick* alternates chapters treating the whaling industry with chapters on man's tragic pursuit of the wounded whale, Nature.

Hence, too, the renewed popularity in the 1960s of Henry Thoreau and the idea of Walden—the retreat to the simple, natural life of men and women reliant on their own hands, rather than machines. In that decade young people all over America formed rural communes, where they sought to grow organic food, without the use of artificial fertilizers, eschewing the comforts of city life—no radio, television—even electricity, the dynamo itself. Now, in the 1970s there is a large and active conservation movement whose major work is to protect the imperilled natural goods of America from the incursions of polluting technology.

How reconcile these two apparently conflicting ideologies?

organic with the technological, conservation with growth? A typical American solution is: through *education*, the education of the public to the need to set limits to growth—not to try to halt the dynamic principle completely, nor to give it free sway, but to limit its growth.

Self-Education

Henry Adams' highly structured education (Harvard, the American Embassy in London) led him to expect to play an important role in American life, but it also left him incapable of coping with the changing times. Benjamin Franklin's formal education was minimal: his father withdrew him from grammar school before the year was up (although the boy had done phenomenally well), on the ground that a poor man's son would be better off with a useful trade. But Franklin was the classic gifted autodidact. "I do not remember when I could not read"; he spent all his spare time reading voraciously. Even his choice of a trade was a bookish one—that of printer. He literally educated himself, out of intellectual curiosity, and into mastery of his world.

“
We should read the lives of great men, if written by themselves, for two reasons: to find out what others really were, and what they themselves would appear to be.

C.C. Colton
”

In this absorption in self-education, Franklin once again wove what was to become a familiar American pattern. One reads time and again in American autobiographies of people who break the binds of poverty and race and religion through their readings. The key passages in the memoirs of nineteenth century black slaves are those turning points where they become literate; through the study of the Bible Nat Turner becomes a revolutionary, Frederick Douglass, a propagandist. A century later, Richard Wright describes in *Black Boy* the subterfuges he employed to borrow books from the public library, using the card of his white boss. As he reads Sinclair Lewis' *Babbitt* he was suddenly able to see his boss plain, as a comical and pathetic figure, something he had never been able to do before. Armed with this insight, Wright was able to withstand the indignity of his own situation. He went on to transcend his troubled and deprived life, and that of his people, in books that plumb their harsh situation.

The Jewish immigrant girl Mary Antin comes to the Promised Land of America from a community where learning is a path to salvation for both the individual and the group. She eagerly takes that path. American thought teaches her the Emersonian ideal of social regeneration through strong individualism. America for Mary Antin leads to personal transfiguration. That is her "life's story":

I was born, I have lived, and I have been made over. Is it not time to write my life's story? I am just as much out of the way as if I were dead, for I am absolutely other than the person whose story I have to tell.

Transformations and Will

American autobiographical literature has many such accounts of transformations through a willed self-education. The will is important, for the process is never an easy one—even for Benjamin Franklin, the paragon of "making it." There are many diversions, by-paths, dead ends, misleading guides, enemies, temptations, outright deceptions. But these autobiographers teach themselves the harsh lessons of society and are not fooled twice. They move on to a compassionate understanding of the foibles of the best, as well as the worst, of men. Thus, Franklin reflects on the royal governor of Pennsylvania. The governor had persuaded the young runaway boy to sail off to England and there perfect himself in the printing trade—with the promise of money and a helpful letter of introduction to important people. The letter never came, nor the funds. The boy found himself left high and dry, stranded two thousand miles from home.

But what shall we think of a governor's playing such pitiful tricks, and imposing so grossly on a poor ignorant boy? It was a habit he had acquired. He wish'd to please everybody; and, having little to give, he gave expectations. He was otherwise an ingenious, sensible man, a pretty good writer, and a good governor for the people . . . Several of our best laws were of his planning and passed during his administration.

Franklin emerged none the worse from this experience—wiser and stronger. In the case of Claude Brown, the *Manchild in the Promised Land*, the tooth-and-nail war in the streets of Harlem is the great educator. He learns at first to look after himself by exploiting the vices of others. But then he finds his life uptown too constricting—downtown the Promised Land beckons, however threatening and indifferent to the aspirations of a black slum boy. He makes several abortive attempts to escape, slips back. Then he comes under the influence of an unusual teacher in a school for wayward children, later meets and is surprisingly impressed by Eleanor Roosevelt (who had herself pulled out of the constriction of

her—upper-class—life to become a pragmatic social and political reformer). But Brown is not yet ready; he again relapses into the violence and crime of his environment. At a crucial turning point, he looks around him and perceives the lives of his buddies running down the drain. He pulls himself together for a last try, breaks free, almost at the last moment.

So the process of regeneration is never easy in these autobiographies, even remembered in happy retrospect. For these are real documents, of real lives.

Or are they, truly? We return to our original question: How valid, how trustworthy are these accounts by people of their own lives? To what extent, and in what ways, may the narrators be deceiving us—and themselves? All memory is selective, always. As W.H. Auden said, referring to the suicide of Ernst Toller: "We are ruled by powers we pretend to understand." But the best of autobiographers are aware that they are trying to impose logic on their lives as viewed in hindsight. Speaking of a childhood journey to Washington with his father, Henry Adams wrote:


The journey was meant as education, and as education it served the purpose of fixing in memory the stage of a boy's thought in 1850 This was the journey he remembered. The actual journey may have been quite different, but the actual journey has no interest for education. The memory was all that mattered.

Education had been the meaning of his life as a whole, as Henry Adams reviewed it—and in the summing up, it became the meaning of each journey.

Not all autobiographers are as self-perceptive and objective as Henry Adams. As there is no single American national character, so there is no single truth about any individual life. What the autobiographer gives us is, to adapt Martin Buber's pun, not the history of his life and times but *his* story. We must read American autobiography as closely between the lines as poetry, if we are to hear the feeling and thought behind the words. Read thus, with attention and with compassion, American autobiography resembles poetry in its rewards. In Robert Frost's oft-cited lines: "It begins in delight and ends in wisdom."

NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS

By Benjamin Quarles



"Narrative" was the word used in eighteenth and nineteenth century literature to introduce first-hand accounts of extraordinary true experience. Under this rubric fell journey to exotic places, missions to savage tribes, adventures, mutinies, sufferings. The word also introduced autobiographical accounts of the life and experiences of remarkable persons in American history, such as the eloquent escaped slave whose brief but poignant "narrative" won him international fame, Frederick Douglass.

Benjamin Quarles is a professor of history at Morgan State College, in Baltimore, Maryland. He is the author of *Frederick Douglass, Negro in the American Revolution*, *Lincoln and the Negro*, and *The Negro in the Making of America*. He edited *Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass*. Dr. Quarles is a member of the editorial board of the *Journal of Negro History*.

The *Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass*, a slim volume of 125 pages appearing in the spring of 1845, was a landmark in the literary crusade against slavery. It took rank among the nearly one hundred slave narratives of book-length compass, just as its author took the foremost place among the Negro Americans who made a career of striking at slavery. The wide circulation and distribution of the Douglass narrative marked it as one of the most influential pieces of reform propaganda in American literature. For it bore upon the matter at hand—human bondage—an issue potentially explosive in its power to divide the nation along sectional lines, with the northern states, where slavery no longer existed, arrayed against the southern states, where black labor was needed to produce cotton and other agricultural staples.

As a literary classic, the Douglass *Narrative* comes as a bit of surprise, its author's antecedents being what they were. Up to the time of the book's publication, most of Douglass' life had been spent in the obscure shadowland of slavery. Born in 1817 in Maryland, Douglass had just turned twenty-one when he fled from his master.

to New Bedford, Massachusetts. Here for four years he turned his hand to odd jobs, facing discrimination in getting work as a ship calker, but otherwise having no trouble in taking the giant step from slavery to freedom.

A turning point in his life came in August 1841 at Nantucket, Massachusetts, when he attended a meeting of the abolitionists, a band of earnest men and women whose denunciation of slavery was hardly less harsh than their castigation of slaveholders. While sitting in the audience watching the proceedings, Douglass was asked to say something about his experiences before he ran away. His words were halting, but he spoke with conviction, whereupon the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society hired him as a full-time lecturer. For the next four years the young former slave proved to be one of the prize speakers of the Society, often touring the reform circuit with the two best-known abolitionists in New England, the fiery William Lloyd Garrison and his colleague and close friend, the peerless orator, Wendell Phillips. Indeed the signed statements of Garrison and Phillips appear in the opening pages of the Douglass volume, the former writing the book's preface, and the latter furnishing an introductory letter.

Abolitionist Activist

The publication of his *Narrative* brought to Douglass widespread publicity in Great Britain and North America. This was all he needed; henceforth his own considerable abilities as an orator and a writer would suffice to keep his name before the public. His was among the most eventful of American personal histories. In 1847, after nearly two years of traveling throughout the British Isles, he returned to America and became editor of an anti-slavery weekly which he brought out for sixteen years. In 1848 he took a prominent part in the Seneca Falls Convention in New York, which formally inaugurated the woman's rights movement in America. During the war between the North and the South he recruited troops for the former, and he urged President Abraham Lincoln to strike forcefully against slavery. After the war he received high appointive positions from three successive presidents, becoming in turn Marshall of the District of Columbia, Recorder of Deeds for the District, and United States Minister to Haiti.


The autobiography which furnished Douglass with his passport to prominence belonged to a distinctive genre, the "heroic fugitive" school of American literature. Written by or about slaves, these narratives in some cases tended to be overdrawn, relying heavily upon the pathological. Their pages ran to stock figures, such as sadistic masters and brutal overseers. Not many narratives failed to speak of the harsh treatment and cruel punishments which befell the slaves, and fewer still failed to tell of at least one instance of the

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separation of families, particularly of a slave mother from her child.

Unquestionably, slave narratives were propagandistic. They were, after all, a weapon in the warfare, their avowed intention being to loose the bonds of the enchained. A contribution to social history, these autobiographies and biographies of former slaves loomed large in the campaign literature of abolitionism, making an emotional impact of considerable proportions in the northern states. The *Narrative* is much like the others in its general approach. It was designed as a plea for human freedom. Describing the author's experiences in slavery, it is primarily storytelling in tone, one incident

Frederick Douglass and Grandson:
among the most eventful of American personal histories



serving as a springboard for the next. But in the Douglass *Narrative* there are many points of distinction, qualities which from the viewpoint of the literary historian give his volume its pre-eminent spot. It was an arresting book on many counts.

Plea for Human Freedom

To begin with it was written wholly by Douglass himself. It was one of the total of sixteen put down on paper by former slaves themselves, the others being ghost-written, mainly by white abolitionists. The antislavery reformers much preferred to have the former slaves write their own stories, thereby striking at the notion of Negro inferiority. Hence such a work as the Douglass *Narrative*, one that had not been filtered through someone else's mind, was doubly welcome in reformist circles.

Douglass had become literate without a day of formal schooling. While he was still a slave, his mistress had begun to teach him his letters, in response to his importunities and in the hope that he might come to know the Bible. When his master put a stop to this instruction, fearful that it might undermine his control, Douglass, as he tells it in his *Narrative*, bribed white boys on the streets of Baltimore to teach him. By the time Douglass joined the abolitionist ranks he could read and write, and he was quick to improve upon his somewhat elementary skills. The anti-slavery platform was a school for the training of writers no less than of orators. His close contact with well-educated men like Wendell Phillips was a stimulus to the former slave, who was not completely untouched by the literary flowering in New England. Within a few months after he joined the abolitionists, he was sending letters to their weeklies, particularly William Lloyd Garrison's *Liberator*. Hence after nearly four years as a full-time abolitionist, Douglass was equipped to express himself intelligibly.

The Douglass autobiography had another asset, that of credibility. Obviously slave narratives were short on formal documentation, being put together without benefit of diaries, letters, plantation records, county archives, or a revisit to the old homestead for an on-the-spot rechecking. But if slave narratives were to be believed, and this was crucial to their success, they had to be as accurate as possible. Hence, aside from a handful of hoaxes, slave narratives strove for authenticity.

Certainly this was true of the one produced by Douglass. Soundly buttressed with specific data on persons and places, not a single one of them fictitious, the book conveys a sense of sincerity which gives it much of its strength. Indeed, one reason that Douglass wrote the book was to refute the charge that he was an impostor, that he had never been a slave. And shortly after the book was published he took

a trip to the British Isles, lest his former master, now no longer in the dark as to his whereabouts, would seek to repossess him.

A man of veracity, Douglass took pains to be as accurate as his memory and his knowledge permitted. With few exceptions, the white persons who entered his pages were readily identifiable. His first master, Captain Aaron Anthony, was a well-known figure on Maryland's Eastern Shore, being the general overseer for the most distinguished family in the county, the Lloyds of Wye. The name of every white person whom Douglass mentions while he was at the second place of his residence—St. Michael's—can be found in the county records located at the Easton Court House. For the years when Douglass was a slave in the city of Baltimore, his *Narrative* mentions six whites, five of whom were listed in the city directory for the period of which Douglass speaks. In a few instances Douglass has not caught the name clearly or he has misspelled it. But it is significant that no one ever seems to have questioned the existence of any person mentioned in the *Narrative*.

Exceptionally Accurate

Douglass invites the confidence of the critical reader by his avoidance of verbatim remarks from the lips of his cast of characters. Feeling that truth, however unadorned, beggars fiction, he shunned the use of reconstructed dialogue, of contrived conversations—exchanges remembered word for word. Among the *Narrative's* special points of merit is its readability. Douglass writes in simple and direct prose, free of literary allusions, and almost without quoted passages, other than a stanza from John Greenleaf Whittier, two lines from *Hamlet*, and one from William Cowper. The details are concrete, a style established in the opening lines:

I was born in Tuckahoe, near Hillsborough, and about twelve miles from Easton, in Talbot County, Maryland. I have no accurate knowledge of my age, never having seen any authentic record containing it. By far the larger part of the slaves know as little of their age as horses know of theirs, and it is the wish of most masters within my knowledge to keep their slaves thus ignorant. I do not remember to have ever met a slave who could tell of his birthday. They seldom came nearer to it than planting-time, harvest-time, cherry-time, spring-time or fall-time.

Pathos and Condemnation

Contributing to the literary effectiveness of the *Narrative* is its pathos. Douglass scorns pity, but his pages are evocative of sympathy, as he meant them to be. Deeply affecting is the paragraph on his mother, creating its mood with the opening sentence and heightening it with every line:

Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass

I never saw my mother, to know her as such, more than four or five times in my life; and each of these times was very short in duration, and at night. She was hired by a Mr. Stewart, who lived about twelve miles from my home. She made her journeys to see me in the night, traveling the whole distance on foot, after the performance of her day's work. She was a field hand, and a whipping is the penalty of not being in the field at sunrise. She would lie down with me, and get me to sleep, but long before I waked she was gone. Very little communication ever took place between us. Death soon ended what little we could have had while she lived . . . She died when I was about seven years old.

The *Narrative* is not given to flights of introspection, but it clearly reveals that its author had a reflective turn of mind. The sight of a fleet of Chesapeake Bay ships moving out to the open sea on a Sunday morning could provoke in the young slave a bitter apostrophe:

You are loosed from your moorings, and are free; I am fast in my chains, and am a slave . . . You are freedom's swift-winged angels, that fly around the world; I am confined in bands of iron! . . . The glad ship is gone; she hides in the dim distance, I am left in the hottest hell of unending slavery.

The *Narrative* is without humor or light touches. Its tone is steadily condemnatory, all roads converging to this end. For example, Douglass presents a graphic description of the holiday week, from Christmas to New Year, in which the slaves indulged in sports and merriment. But he views these holidays as a gross fraud, attributing them not to the benevolence of the masters but solely to their effectiveness in dampening the spirit of rebellion. Similarly the *Narrative* holds that singing among the slaves was not an evidence of their contentment, but a measure of their unhappiness. In perhaps the most moving passage in the volume, Douglass portrays these songs as furnishing a testimony against slavery and offering a prayer for deliverance. "The mere recurrence of those songs, even now, afflicts me," ran one passage, "and while I am writing these lines, an expression of feeling has already found its way down my cheek."

The *Narrative* is too brief and episodic to develop any single character other than that of the chronicler. But it presents a half-score or so of sharply etched portraits, among them Austin Gore, an overseer of whom we are both told and made to feel that he "was just the man for such a place, and it was just the place for such a man." In Edward Covey, a slave-breaker whose business it was to discipline the unruly, we have a cruel and cunning figure worthy of Dickens.

For all his criticisms of the slaveholders and their hirelings, Douglass did not fail to take note of certain human weaknesses among the

slaves themselves. Never given to avoiding unpleasant facts, a hallmark of his public career, Douglass tells of the quarrels between the slaves of Colonel Lloyd and those of Jacob Jepson:

Slaves are like other people, and imbibe prejudices quite common to others. They think their own better than that of others. Many, under the influence of this prejudice, think their own masters better than the masters of other slaves . . . It was so on our plantation. When Colonel Lloyd's slaves met the slaves of Jacob Jepson, they seldom parted without a quarrel about their masters; Colonel Lloyd's slaves contending that he was the richest and Mr. Jepson's slaves contending that he was the smartest. These quarrels would almost always end in a fight . . . The slaves seemed to think that the greatness of their masters was transferable to themselves. It was considered as being bad enough to be a slave; but to be a poor man's slave was deemed a disgrace indeed!

If the *Narrative* goes into detail about Douglass' experiences as a slave, it tells us nothing about his manner of getting away. This omission was deliberate. Douglass was highly critical of slaves who divulged publicly their techniques of escape. In his opinion such a practice played into the hands of the enemy, making the underground railroad an upperground railroad. "I would," he wrote, "keep the merciless slaveholder profoundly ignorant of the means of flight adopted by the slave." Douglass' own manner of escape was not particularly dramatic or novel; he rode a train from Baltimore to Philadelphia, using as his passport the borrowed "free papers" of a Negro friend who was not a slave. But however prosaic his method of escape, Douglass did not reveal it until after the Civil War.

Best Seller

The literary qualities of the *Narrative*, combined with its strong story line, made for excellent sales. As far as antislavery journals were concerned, the Douglass autobiography was the literary event of the season during its first weeks of publication. The *Narrative's* initial edition of 5,000 copies was sold in four months. Within a year four more editions of 2,000 copies each were published. In the British Isles five editions appeared, two in Ireland in 1846 and three in England in 1846 and 1847. Within five years, a total of some 30,000 copies of the *Narrative* had been published in the English-speaking world. In 1848 a French edition, a paperback, was being sold in the stalls. The brisk sales of the book reflected its good press notices. The antislavery journals described it in superlatives, frequently taking the liberty of reprinting extended passages. But it also got a lengthy front-page review in the *New York Tribune*: "Considered merely as narrative, we have never read one more simple, true, coherent and warm with genuine feeling."

Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass

The wide circulation of the *Narrative* stamped it as a work of major influence, changing many minds and leaving its impress on public opinion. In America it struck a particularly sensitive nerve. It came upon the scene in an age characterized by reformist movements—women's rights, peace, temperance, prison improvements, public school education, and experiments in communal living, among others. In the front rank of these schemes of human betterment stood the abolitionist crusade. In an age of reform it became the most unsettling and revolutionary of all reforms.

Civil Libertarians

The primary role of the abolitionist movement resulted from its emphasis on civil rights and moral obligation. During the middle decades of the nineteenth century, antislavery sentiment was widespread in the western world, but in the United States more distinctively than anywhere else, the abolitionists assumed the role of championing civil liberties—freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and the right of petition. Thus they identified themselves with a great tradition of freedom which they proposed to translate into a universal American birthright. The abolitionists insisted that slavery was the great moral issue of the times, a veritable sin against God and man. In an age more influenced by the church than ours, the abolitionists contended that slavery was un-Christian, Jesus having taught a doctrine of universal brotherhood. In the hands of some of its stalwarts, the abolitionist movement took on the tone and sometimes the substance of a religious revival. It was in this reformist milieu that the Douglass *Narrative* found its niche, at once reflecting and deepening a mood then rife. Hence in theme, in emphasis, and in spirit the *Narrative* was an American book. It reaffirmed this country's heritage of liberty by holding a mirror up to its citizens and urging them to look at themselves, but not with rose-colored glasses. The manifesto of a typical American reformer, the *Narrative* voiced a creed of liberty that all who listened would find hard to deny.

Although Douglass was not a churchgoer, his *Narrative* reflects an undertone of retributive justice, that one reaps what he sows. The passing of his grandmother who, when her usefulness ended, had been put out in a little hut in the woods to fend for herself moved him to a rhetorical question, "Will not a righteous God visit for these things?" As short as it is, the *Narrative* devotes eight of its pages to an appendix correcting any misapprehension that its author was an opponent of religion. Douglass distinguishes two kinds of doctrine. "I love the pure, peaceable, and impartial Christianity of Christ, I hate the corrupt, slaveholding, women-whipping, cradle-plundering, partial and hypocritical Christianity of this land."

Slave narratives like that of Douglass made a deep impression in the North, most readers finding their testimony quite persuasive. Outside the South, most people got their impressions about slavery from having read the life stories of runaways like Douglass. Thus when Harriet Beecher Stowe wrote *Uncle Tom's Cabin* in 1852, its sales quickly reached flood proportions, mainly because a receptive audience had already been created by its previous exposure of slave narratives like that of Douglass. Hence if President Abraham Lincoln could greet Mrs. Stowe as "the little lady who made this big war," certainly some of this credit might be shared by those former slaves who dinned their stories into the public mind and created an adverse image of slavery that helped make possible the emergence of a Mrs. Stowe and an Abraham Lincoln.

Influence Abroad

The influence of the *Narrative* extended across the Atlantic, engulfing the British Isles. Here too the soil was already fertile. In the summer of 1845 when Douglass and his *Narrative* arrived simultaneously in the British Isles, both were heartily received. For twenty months Douglass was lionized, whether in England, Ireland, or Scotland, whether in large cities or at quiet crossroads. Mayors presided over assemblies gathered to hear him. He dined with the great abolitionist Thomas Clarkson a month before his death. He spent an evening with the economist-statesman John Bright and his sister.

In his tour of the British Isles, Douglass had often carried a supply of books for display and sale. When he left England to return home, his *Narrative* continued to exert its influence, strengthening anti-slavery sentiment wherever it circulated. British hostility to American slavery became an important factor during the Civil War in the United States, making it impossible for the South to win diplomatic recognition in London. Former slaves and their writings had done much to create this antislavery mood across the Atlantic, and in this company we must number Frederick Douglass and his *Narrative*.

Father of Civil Rights

For a final evaluation of the outreach of the *Narrative* we may turn to our own times. The slim volume has been reprinted four times in the past dozen years, a period in which a bridge in the nation's capital has been named after Douglass; his homesite in the same city has been taken over as a national shrine by the United States Department of the Interior, and a twenty-five-cent Frederick Douglass stamp of general issue has been circulated by the United States Post Office. Interest in Douglass has mounted in the past decade as the problem of Negro-white relations has taken on a

Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass

new urgency. For his long career against discrimination, Douglass has been dubbed the "Father of the Civil Rights Movement."

And, of course, the *Narrative* does speak to the role of the Negro in American life, a role compounded of a struggle and, however incomplete, an overcoming. A scripture for the black man, the *Narrative* was a clear and passionate utterance of his protest and of his aspiration. But the *Narrative* does not address itself to Negroes alone or to Americans alone. It appeals to the conscience of mankind, and therein lies much of its power well over a hundred years after its initial appearance.

In a long lifetime of seventy-eight years, the prolific Douglass would turn out two additional autobiographies, plus a spate of formal lectures, magazine articles, newspaper editorials, and personal letters. These later writings would be marked by a constantly increasing factual scope and an ever-deepening social sagacity. But none of them surpassed the *Narrative* in moving eloquence and moral explicitness. It takes its place as one of the most arresting autobiographies in the entire catalog of American reform.



THE ODYSSEY OF HENRY ADAMS

By Raj K. Kohli

The Adams family has been one of the most considerable dynasties in American history. Its members have included U.S. presidents, senators, congressmen, and ambassadors, as well as historians and economists. Unfortunately, the family's lofty achievements hindered as much as they helped one of its most gifted scions, whose ironic autobiography, *The Education of Henry Adams*, is fraught with gloom. Not entirely, writes an Indian scholar. Henry Adams' education in life may have failed, Dr. Kohli says, but it was a courageous quest for meaning.

Raj K. Kohli, who died in 1975, was professor of English literature at Kirori Mal College of the University of Delhi and a fine lecturer on American literature. This article is abridged from his introduction to the Indian edition of *The Autobiography of Henry Adams*, put out by the Eurasia Publishing House (Pvt.) Ltd. (1968). The book was originally published by The Massachusetts Historical Society.



In 1847, when Henry Adams as a boy of nine was struggling with the rudiments of elementary learning in an eighteenth-century house at Quincy, Henry David Thoreau had just come back from the woods where he had gone some two years earlier because "I wished to live deliberately, to front only the essential facts of life, and see if I could not learn what it had to teach, and not, when I came to die, to discover that I had not lived." Thoreau's voyage to the woods had been undertaken from the desire for a new kind of life and he sought to explore not the visible world around Walden Pond, but an inner world which the Walden experience allowed him to explore. Having visited a truly new world, he wanted to bear testimony to what he had found; for he was sure that every individual ought to visit that world at least once.

Exactly seven years after his return from the woods, in 1854, Thoreau recorded his quest for new life, and the morning mood it engendered, in that great classic of English prose, called *Walden*. The same year Henry Adams entered Harvard College and started maintaining a private record of his thoughts and experience. Even

though he made by common standards a success of his four years at Harvard and was chosen Class Orator on Graduation Day, he felt deep in his mind that "as yet he knew nothing." Like Odysseus, therefore, he became a great voyager, a wandering scholar, an eternal gipsy in pursuit of knowledge, wisdom, and meaning, voyaging on many more seas and travelling many more continents than the prince of Ithaca. The vast steppes and the snow-bound plains of Russia, the Scandinavian lands of the midnight sun and the long nights, the shores of the Nile with the relics of an ancient civilization dotting its banks, the Near East, which had cradled so many civilizations and faiths, the tropical islands of Bali and Java, Hawaii, Samoa, Tahiti, and Fiji with their exotic and primitive cultures, the Buddhist lands of Japan and Ceylon, where the statues of the contemplating Buddha gazed with compassion on suffering humanity, the Great Plains of the American West, the temperate islands of Cuba and Sicily, the warmer zones of Mexico, where he had ridden long miles on mule-back, Germany, France, England and Italy—all these he knew and many more.

Adams' Lineage

His great-grandfather, John Adams, had been one of the makers of the American Republic, one of the four drafters of the Declaration of Independence, first minister of the successful rebels to their quondam king, first Vice-President and second President of the United States. Grandfather John Quincy Adams had been minister to Prussia, to Holland, and to Russia, Senator from Massachusetts, Secretary of State, and sixth President of the United States. Carrying his family tradition in his bones, Henry Adams himself had dined and wine in the White House with presidents from Hayes (1878) to Theodore Roosevelt (1902), and had rubbed shoulders with British and Continental diplomats like Gladstone, Parnell, Russell, and Bismarck. He had met the revolutionary Garibaldi at Palermo; discussed literature with James Russell Lowell, Henry James, Swinburne, Carlyle, and Thackeray; free will with William James, history with George Bancroft and Francis Parkman, science with Sir Charles Lyell, and art with the painter La Farge and the sculptor Saint-Gaudens. He had been to expositions and operas, to concerts and to festivals. He had explored medieval cathedrals and studied the latest in physics, geology and philosophy; had taught and written history; made a reputation as a novelist; and been as intensely interested in theology as in scientific method.

Gifted with a singular capacity for genuine friendship with women, he had been profoundly influenced in his life by his own wife, Marian Hooper Adams, who after her suicide (1885) haunted him like the voice of a phantom calling from the Beyond. He had also made


friendships with some of the most charming and cultivated women of America, England, and France, and a few even in the islands of the Pacific (among them the chieftess Hinari of Tahiti).

Order out of Chaos

Six years before his death (1912) and some five decades after he graduated from Harvard (1858), this American Odysseus published privately 100 copies of a book that sought to communicate, to a most intimate company of friends and peers, the quintessence of the wisdom he had garnered from his long encounter with experience. An attempt to achieve intellectual and moral meaning out of the welter of chaotic experience, through the order imposed on that chaos by the shaping force of intelligence and imagination, *The Education of Henry Adams* became so well-known, even though the author had modestly kept its circulation so limited, that the Massachusetts Historical Society took the manuscript out of its archives to publish it to a wider world which seemed to demand some prophet who, with stark lucidity, could present profound images of the uncertainties and perplexities of that age.

Our juxtaposition of *Walden* and *The Education*, it needs to be emphasized, is not gratuitous. While Thoreau's classic was the great spiritual autobiography written in an era of Hope, Adams' book has ever since its publication been recognized as a great intellectual autobiography written in an age of Disillusionment. *Walden* hymned the possibility of a new life and recorded a quest that ended in success, whereas *The Education* chronicled a quest that failed, reverberating with the anguish of a soul that was wandering between two worlds "the one dead, the other powerless to be born." Thoreau had brought the message of hope, of affirmation, and of the innate divinity of Man; Henry Adams could be true only by giving voice to atheism, denial, and despair. *Walden* was written when the flush of the dawning of a new civilization had not faded; it gave buoyant expression to the mood of an America that still believed in its dream. *The Education*, though written only five decades after *Walden*, yet belongs to an altogether different Amer-

Henry Adams: his education had failed, but his quest for meaning had not



ica, an America whose dream had turned into disenchantment. The voyage of Thoreau was a voyage within through stranger countries than any visible to the actual senses, while that of Henry Adams was a voyage without in the realm of actuality and events—though both were different paths to Reality and Meaning. The distance between *Walden* and *The Education* is the gulf that divides youth from age. And America, be it noted, though the youngest of the civilizations, has aged and matured so rapidly that older civilizations may now see in it the image of their own future. The two books between themselves record the intellectual history of this very paradox.

Between Two Worlds

To return to the metaphor of the soul lost between two worlds, one may very pertinently inquire: how did Adams get into this predicament? What made him feel that “he had become estray; a flotsam or jetsam of wreckage; a belated reveller; or a scholar-gipsy like Matthew Arnold’s”? Why did he feel himself to be like the Indians and buffaloes who had been ejected from their heritage by his own people? To search for an answer to these questions, we would have to turn to the history of his family and his upbringing, and to a mystical epiphany that he experienced in northern France in 1895.

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No one means all he says, and yet very few say all they mean, for words are slippery and thought is viscous.

Henry Adams

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Brought up in the tradition of Jeffersonian republicanism, Adams saw in it a great shaping force which would give concrete form in the United States to the ideals of the democratic movement. At the core of this idealism was the belief in human perfectibility, the faith that man can perfect the human order through the application of his own right reason. In his blueprint for a new and perfect civilization, Thomas Jefferson had envisaged an agrarian Utopia, where agriculture, handwork, and learning would flourish and guide the lives of men. He wished, at the same time, to keep out merchants, bankers, and industrialists—the latter more than the others; for, the American garden, when ruined, would be ruined by the Machine. He also believed that a wide dissemination of knowledge—to be achieved through the institution of the common school—would create an enlightened citizenry, and the enlightenment would lead in turn to purposeful progress toward perfection. These certainties of Jefferson had been inherited by the young Adams from his immediate

forebears, who had all been ardent Jeffersonians.

Interwoven with this Jeffersonian idealism was a strong reformist strain that could be traced back to the passionate moral intensity of Puritanism which his earliest ancestors who came to New England had brought with them. This Puritan strain had, with the passage of time, become almost totally secularized without losing any of its intensity. When New England Puritanism became softened through the filters of rationalism and Unitarianism, the Puritan conscience became politicized with the Adams. As Henry Adams himself comments in a chapter of reminiscences of his childhood: "He was a ten year old priest and politician" who had been educated to honor and to obey "the law of Resistance; of Truth; of Duty; and of Freedom." For numberless generations, "his predecessors had viewed the world chiefly as a thing to be reformed, filled with evil forces to be abolished, and they saw no reason to suppose that they had wholly succeeded in the abolition; the duty was unchanged." Like any child, he assumed *his* situation was quite ordinary. Looking back, in old age, he realized how extraordinary his own childhood had been.

Effects of Technological Revolution

A chain of events extending over some six decades of American history changed things so radically that Adams' world of moral certainties collapsed completely. These events brought in their wake moral, political, and economic chaos. The New Eden of America—conceived by thinkers like Jefferson, and sung and celebrated by poets like Whitman—became, for Adams, a field choked with weeds and infested with toads.

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Nothing in education is so astonishing as the amount of
ignorance it accumulates in the form of inert facts.

Henry Adams
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It was an irony of history that a Jeffersonian administration in 1812 had launched America on the road to technology so that by the time Adams had matured into a young man, the Jeffersonian Utopia of "agriculture, handwork, and learning" was dead—or, at least, fast dying. A new force had been released in the form of mechanical energies—coal, iron and steam—which were changing society so rapidly that society was helpless either to control it or to understand it.

As Adams saw it, the forces of rapid industrial and technological change had overwhelmed Man, their own master, and made him the

plaything of their own blind whims. Man, the perfect and perfectible, had been reduced by them to the status of a blind earthworm. These forces had tolled the bell for the Jeffersonian doctrine of perfectibility and laid it to rest for ever.

In 1844, he was too young to understand the significance of the industrial age. In 1850, when his father, Charles Francis Adams, took him to Washington, he had his first glimpses of political corruption, his first awareness that Bostonians had not, in his phrase, "solved the universe." The compromises over slavery disturbed him. More disturbing still was the fact that slavery seemed inseparable from American history.

The image of Man as a helpless victim of forces was strengthened further by the trauma of the Civil War. During the dark and bitter winter of Secession (1860-1861), Adams saw a spectacle of treason and human stupidity that compelled acceptance of the doctrine of Chance and Accident as the sole propelling force behind human history.

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Absolute liberty is absence of restraint; responsibility is restraint; therefore, the ideally free individual is responsible to himself.

Henry Adams

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One cannot but recall here how death, murder, and violence had first entered the post-lapsarian world of the Biblical Adam, in the shape of fratricide, when the hand of Cain had been turned against his own brother. What evidence other than this bitterly fought Civil War was needed to confirm America's fall from a state of innocence and grace?

And yet, perhaps, there was still a hope that this sacrifice of 600,000 lives was not in vain. It might be a ritual, performed with blood, at the altars of human dignity and the sacred cause of the Union. Like the rituals of ancient religions and myths, it might even restore the moral order and lead to the birth of a new America.

The Gilded Age

But instead of restoring moral order, it seemed to Adams that the Civil War had only ushered in the nakedly brazen and unashamed spectacle of the Gilded Age which corroded all values and coarsened the moral fibre of the entire American people. Soldier, statesman, and reformer receded into the background, leaving the centre of the stage to capitalist, banker, and the robber baron of finance. The two

decades after the end of the War had only one ethos—to disregard totally the entire system of moral, ethical, and political values, the edifice of which had been erected by Jefferson and the Founding Fathers (among whom was John Adams, the great-grandfather of Henry Adams). Public conscience, integrity, and decency were drowned in the flood-tide of self-seeking and acquisitiveness, and not even the highest of dignitaries seemed to have escaped being affected by the taint.

An overwhelming majority of American people (four-fifths, to be more precise), who were sick of the violence and the chaos of the War, had united in the election of General Ulysses S. Grant to the Presidency—Adams himself being one of them. They had been strongly influenced in their choice by the parallel they felt between Grant and Washington, both representing order and authority. But on the very day that Grant, this supposed man of destiny, inducted his Cabinet into office, his nominations “betrayed his intent as plainly as they betrayed his incompetence.” The great soldier turned out to be but a baby-politician.

“
It is impossible to underrate human intelligence—
beginning with one's own.

Henry Adams
”

With the dying of the old order, the financier, the moneylender, the bank director, the railroad magnate, and others of the capitalist tribe, had taken over the task of giving new shape to the erstwhile agrarian civilization. In this process, Adams bitterly concluded, moral, ethical, and political values had been the first casualty of their ventures. Their quest for making economic gain and prosperity as the determinants of a new order was, however, doomed from the very start because they did not understand the economic forces they sought to manipulate. As a consequence of their blindness and ignorance, the economic structure of America was whirled into the vortex of chaos and experienced a disastrous convulsion in 1893. The rich and the poor alike perished in the throes of this convulsion, and Henry Adams, who had prided himself on the judicious management of his financial matters, also found himself caught unexpectedly in the cogs of bankruptcy.

The American dream of “a perfect society” was in shambles. Blind forces and chance events had come together to turn the dream into a nightmare. Adams' moral certitudes were shaken; his reason, perplexed; his ethical sense, shocked; and his artistic sensibility alien-

ated by his contemporary America. When the American layman had lost sight of ideals and the American priest had lost sight of faith, the deeper minds of America could not but be haunted by images of atheism, denial, and despair.

Epiphany in France

Oppressed by the vision of the moral decline and disintegration of the American civilization, Adams was racked by the agonizing question whether this decay was not in itself part of a universal tendency towards decline and disintegration. The founding of the American Republic had been the natural starting-point from which to measure the distance it had traveled on the road to decay and failure. Adams had to search for a corresponding point of reference for measuring the course of universal history, and he found such a point in the century 1150-1250. These hundred years in the history of Western man had found their expression in Amiens Cathedral and the works of Thomas Aquinas, and constituted that point of history "when man held the highest idea of himself as a unit in a unified universe."

The discovery of this point of integration was not arrived at by Adams through the ordinary paths of logic and empirical reasoning, but came to him as some kind of a mystic revelation during a holiday in northern France in 1895. He found the atmosphere of the place strangely attractive, and its village churches and great cathedrals filled him with ecstatic delight. He immersed himself in the music, the poetry, and the philosophy of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and found peace: a peace which he identified with Unity, in the figure of the Virgin Mary, and also Energy, in the shape of the temples men had raised to her. And then came, like a flash of lightning, the revelation that the builders of the great cathedrals of Europe had achieved a unity of feeling and thought which the modern world had apparently lost. Unwilling to accept the way of revealed religion, he could nevertheless admit that man had realized his dream of order most successfully in the system and ritual of an organized church in the medieval ages. To use his own words:

...if he were obliged to insist on a Universe, he seemed driven to the Church. Modern science guaranteed no unity. The student seemed to feel himself, like all his predecessors, caught trapped, meshed in this eternal drag-net of religion.

And yet he felt himself and his contemporary man powerless to recover this religious instinct. Religion had ceased to be real even when he was a boy, and "could not be revived, although one made in later life many attempts to recover it." That the most powerful emotion of man, next to the sexual, should disappear "seemed to him the most curious social phenomenon."

Inadequacy of Humanism

The medieval Order and Unity were disrupted when the Christian saint-theologian's Kingdom of God (*Civitas Dei*) became subordinated, gradually but increasingly, to the temporal Kingdom of Man (the *Civitas Romae* being the secular version of the *Civitas Dei*). The stroke that kills, however, was delivered to the Kingdom of God by the Renaissance humanists and thinkers who made Man the measure of all things and preached the possibility of human perfection without the mediation of the supranatural. Once the humanists and empiricists had turned away from the medieval Order and Design, imposed through faith in the Divine, Western civilization lost its point of rest, and has ever since then been in a state of perpetual flux—in quest of a new point of rest without ever finding one.

In mid-nineteenth-century, the hope for human perfectibility had been revived with the rise of the Darwinian gospel of Evolution. In the great debate that ensued between the votaries of Science and Religion, Adams found himself in the camp of science and became a committed Darwinist even though "he was hardly trained to follow Darwin's evidence."

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Knowledge of human nature is the beginning and end of
political education.

Henry Adams
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Only some six years after Darwin had offered his grand generalization, his geological champion, Sir Charles Lyell, brought out *The Antiquity of Man* in order to support Darwin. But when Adams brought his close and critical gaze to bear on the superstructure of geological uniformity erected by Lyell, he discovered, with a shock of disbelief, that Sir Charles' views were utterly weak as hypotheses and worthless as proofs. The pessimism generated by the passing-away of the doctrine of Evolution was reinforced further by Karl Pearson (*Grammar of Science*) who concluded

In the chaos behind sensations, in the "beyond" of sense-impressions we cannot infer necessity, order or routine, for these are concepts formed by the mind of man on this side of sense-impressions Briefly, chaos is all that science can logically assert of the super-sensuous. The kinetic theory of gas is an assertion of ultimate chaos. In plain words, chaos was the law of nature, order the dream of man.

Thus, empiricism and its offspring, Science, which had set themselves the task of realizing human perfection, had only ended up, ironically, in reducing the image of man to "a frightened bird" which had always struggled "to escape the chaos that caged it."

No Refuge in Nature

Religion was dead; so was Evolution; and Science held no promise of relief. Many in the past, like Emerson, Thoreau, and Whitman, had turned in their hour of spiritual distress to Nature for solace. It smiled for them benevolently, offering promise of a peace and harmony too deep for words. Perhaps Adams also could seek refuge in Nature. But no; Nature showed itself to him not in an aspect of smiling benevolence, but of hostility and, at best, of a chilling indifference. The most bitter and traumatic lesson in the school of Nature was taught to Adams when, sojourning in London, he received a telegram from his brother-in-law at Bagni de Lucca (in Italy) telling him that his sister had been thrown from a cab and injured, and that he had better come home. By the time he reached his sister's bedside, tetanus had already set in. And then began

The last lesson—the sum and term of education. He had passed through thirty years of rather varied experience without having once felt the shell of custom broken. *He had never seen Nature—only her surface—the sugar-coating that she shows to youth. Flung suddenly in his face, with the harsh brutality of chance, the terror of the blow stayed by him thenceforth for life, until repetition made it more than the will could struggle with: more than he could call on himself to bear (italics added).*


Final Deliverance

Obsessed with this chaos of anarchic and purposeless forces, haunted by the death of religion and by a godless universe in which Nature was utterly indifferent to Man, and brooding over the ruins of past civilizations over whose debris jackals crept down in oppressive silence, Adams sought to shore up these fragments of history and personal experience in an attempt to make some connection between them. His education had failed, but his quest for meaning did not. In the advanced years of his life, he achieved an intellectual deliverance which was accompanied by the sad lucidity of a dark wisdom. Man, he realized, was a helpless plaything of some dark and inscrutable forces which he could neither understand nor master.

This was a bitter truth, but truth always fortifies and sustains. In this sad truth our American Odysseus finally found a peace and reconciliation which can never be attained by unearned optimism.

THE PROMISED LAND OF MARY AN

By Oscar Handlin



"Once I thought to write a history of the immigrants in America," wrote the author of the article twenty-five years ago in the introduction to his book *The Uprooted*. "Then I discovered that the immigrants *were* American." Mary Antin was one particularly gifted immigrant, and her account of her own experience is noteworthy for its candor and complexity. Dr. Handlin, in his preface to Mary Antin's autobiography, places it in its historical context, underlining its relevance to our own time and work of personal affirmation in a period of national malaise.

Oscar Handlin is university professor of history at Harvard University and by general consensus the leading American authority on immigration. He is the author of many books besides *The Uprooted* (1951), the most popular of which is *American People in the Twentieth Century* (1954; 1963). He is also editor of the *Library of American Biography* and of the *Harvard Guide to American History*. This article is reprinted from the book *The Promised Land*, by Mary Antin, published by Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston.

The popularity of Mary Antin's *The Promised Land* for its time after its publication was significant. The work of a virtually unknown author, it met an enthusiastic reception and sold some 85,000 copies in thirty-four printings. True, it had been serialized in *The Atlantic Monthly* and had received exceptionally favorable reviews. But these signs of attention were the indications of the cordial atmosphere in which the book appeared. An audience already existed, eager to hear what Mary Antin was saying.

The explanation of the book's popularity lies in the relation of the book to its times. It was finished in 1911 and published in a moment when Americans were plunged in one of their recurrent periods of self-doubt. A pall of concern clouded the underlying optimism of the nation. Violent disorders and group conflicts reflected the ugly effects of industrialization and of urbanization. The experiments in imperialism had borne inconclusive results. The

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had welcomed the Spanish-American War as a means of widening the American role in the world found to their surprise that the costs outweighed the rewards; others who had all along mistrusted overseas adventures, found that it was more difficult to dissolve than to criticize the unwelcome involvements. Above all, the first phase of Progressivism had drawn to a close. The enthusiasm of the Theodore Roosevelt era had given way to the indecisiveness of the administration of William H. Taft; and party divisions were confusing the presidential election.

Beneath these immediate causes was a still deeper source of anxiety. A new America had appeared in the first decade of the twentieth century. Somewhat earlier, Frederick Jackson Turner had warned that the end of the frontier would lead to profound changes. One could as yet only guess what the full effects would be, but the familiar nation of small independent farmers, drawing a livelihood from the soil, was forever gone.

Reoccurrence of Self-Doubt

The traditional policy of unlimited immigration was therefore being seriously questioned. Since there was no space on the land, the newcomers would only pile up in noxious urban slums. The movement to restrict entry to the United States had thus far yielded very meager results, but an active drive was under way to change the national policy. In 1911, the forty-two volume report of the Dillingham Commission to Congress had argued that the immigrants then entering the country from Eastern and Southern Europe were dif-

Mary Antin:

hope for the American future



ferent from, and inferior to, their predecessors from the North and West. The danger was imminent, and prompt action was necessary to guard the gates.

Fear spread. Strange, new, unassimilable people, crowding the cities, threatened to degrade all Americans. The evidence of their pernicious influence was everywhere. In 1912, newspaper readers could follow the lurid details of the Rosenthal scandal and learn how gamblers had corrupted the police and planted the seeds of professional murder. Recurrent exposures showed youth enslaved by drugs; the use of heroin, cocaine and opium in the immi-

grant slums demonstrated the hopelessness of dealing with the problems of inadequate human beings. There were, thus, apparently good grounds for the doubt that traditional American values could survive under the new conditions.

Into the dark shadows of anxiety, *The Promised Land* cast a beam of reassuring light. Writing forcefully and eloquently, Mary Antin explained that the American formula did work and did offer hope for the future. Telling the story of a single life, but through it speaking for millions of other immigrants, she affirmed that there was still power and hope in the nineteenth-century dream of the new nation. She offered her own life to prove that education and reform could sustain the blessings of freedom. That message, Louis D. Brandeis noted, enkindled the latent patriotism in many a native American.

Testimony to the American Dream

The Promised Land was a work of a complex young woman, just thirty years old when she finished it. Mary Antin had been born in 1881 in the small town of Polotzk in Russia. Her father was one of the many petty traders in whom the Jewish pale of settlement abounded, held to a lowly position both by the constraints of a backward economy and by the restrictive measures of the Czarist regime. He was a failure, partly because he was discontented with traditional life, partly because there was no scope for men like him in Polotzk. Like many others, he dreamed of a fresh start in the New World and, in 1891, left for Boston expecting to bring his family over later, after he had established himself.

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Everyone is a moon, and has a dark side which he never shows to anybody.

Mark Twain

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The New World was no more rewarding than the Old. After three years Antin still had to borrow money to pay the passage of wife and children. A refreshment stand at Revere Beach, despite a promising start, proved a failure. Nor could the family make a go of a grocery store in Chelsea, a town on the outskirts of Boston with a substantial Jewish immigrant population. The Antins finally settled in Boston's South End, where they eked out a livelihood from the combined earnings of the father, the oldest sister and the brother.

Mary, however, escaped the limitations of her environment through the public schools. She was an attentive and brilliant student, who caught the interest of sympathetic adults. Mary S. Dill-

ingham, her teacher in Chelsea, arranged for the publication of one of the young girl's compositions; and Mary, fired with enthusiasm through seeing herself in print, turned to writing poetry for newspapers. Encouraged to attend the Girls Latin School, she continued to do well in the studies that hopefully would prepare her for Radcliffe College. The venerable Edward Everett Hale welcomed her to his home, where she could browse in his library. The friendship of Hattie L. Hecht, prominent in local Jewish communal activities, was also an assurance of future support.

Letters to a Russian Uncle

While still in school, Mary Antin assembled a series of letters she had written in Yiddish to her uncle in Russia, and translated them into English. Hattie Hecht persuaded Phillip Cowen of *The American Hebrew* to arrange for their publication, and also induced Israel Zangwill, the English novelist, to write a preface to the little book, *From Polotzk to Boston* (1899), a sensitive, girlish account of the journey to America.

A personal crisis, however, disrupted her career. She had taken to attending Hale House on Garland Street in the South End and there became a member of the Natural History Club. Undoubtedly she attended the lectures on "Nature" and "Lessons in Cosmology" delivered by a handsome geologist, of a quite different background from hers.

Amadeus William Grabau was ten years older than she, the son and grandson of Lutheran pastors. Born in Cederburgh, Wisconsin, in 1870, he had been educated at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard while he held a part-time job in the Boston Society of Natural History; and he had taught at Tufts and Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. In 1901 he was about to take up a permanent post at Columbia University. He won Mary's heart and they were married in Boston on October 6, 1901. They were to have one daughter.

Spirit and Truth

Mary thus never went to Radcliffe but settled in New York. She arrived in the metropolis with impressive connections. She was by no means a lonely or helpless stranger; even as a school girl she had spent her holidays with the Phillip Cowens in the city. Now, married to a respectable scientist, she had entrée to the intellectual circles of the city. She attended classes first at Columbia Teachers College and then at Barnard, but never took a degree. Her education was being furthered in other ways.

Through Cowen, Mary Antin met Josephine Lazarus, who was to be the most important influence in her life in the next decade.

Josephine was one of the Lazarus girls, whose father, a wealthy Jewish sugar refiner, had been prominent in the mid-century cultural life of the city. The best known of the sisters had been Emma, whose poem, "The New Colossus," was inscribed on the Statue of Liberty. Emma had early abandoned the prescribed rites and usages of Judaism, which she considered obsolete and without relevance to modern life. Her prophet was Ralph Waldo Emerson, to whom her father had introduced her; and her faith was transcendentalism. Emma believed in the "absolute unity of man with nature," which at first seemed to her a completely pagan idea. In time, however, she arrived at a gratifying reconciliation of transcendentalism with Judaism, one which she found confirmed in the poetry of Heinrich Heine. The secret was "that absolute interpenetration and transfusion of spirit with body and substance which, taken literally, often reduces itself to a question of food and drink, a dietary regulation," but which could also shine out "before humanity in the prophets, teachers, and saviors of mankind." Emma had died in 1887, at the age of thirty-eight, before she could develop these concepts further.

“Autobiography is an unrivalled vehicle for telling the truth about other people.

Philip Guedalla

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Josephine carried on the work. Her first extended publication was the introduction to the posthumous collection of her sister's poetry. In latter essays, Josephine developed and expounded her sister's transcendentalist faith. Contemplating the "energizing force" of nature, Josephine insisted that "the outward, tangible world" was not the whole of man's kingdom. Life contained also spiritual elements which only the heart could perceive. People long subordinated to others were just beginning to understand the meaning of their existence. Woman, for instance, was hardly aware of her responsibility "to explore new and untried ways, in order that she may come into more complete possession of herself and her own personality, more perfect understanding of her own true and individual being; that she may more fully know and find herself—her own, her real, her whole self, not in another, but in herself."

The disabilities under which her "race" had labored were, Josephine believed, as stultifying as those which had crushed her sex. Jews, she argued, had a particular obligation to reach out toward the realm of the spirit. She often brooded about the passion of Israel. "I saw him bound to the wheel, nailed to the cross, cut off by

the sword—burned at the stake, tossed into the seas. And always the patient, resolute martyr face arose in silent rebuke and defiance." A transcendent encounter and identification with the wider spiritual universe would resolve the ancient conflict. "We do not realise how completely we have been shut out from the larger spiritual life of the world around us, from all spiritual contact and intercourse with any but our little band of so-called coreligionists." She insisted that "in God's boundless universe all truth, all spirit are one, alike for the Jew and the Christian who live in the spirit and the truth."

In Memory of Josephine

To Mary Antin, these ideas offered an attractive explanation both of her own experience and of the migration of the Jews to America. Just as her own move had carried her from the narrow confines of medieval Polotzk, through marriage with a son of Lutherans to the expansive life of science and learning, so the arrival of the Jews in America, with its broadened cultural opportunities, was the culmination of their age-long history.

In the first ten years of her life in New York, Mary Antin wrote a good deal of poetry but published little. This was not to be her appropriate mode of expression. But Josephine's death in 1910 shocked her protégé into action; some written response was the debt she owed to the memory of her friend. Mary composed and published a number of short stories and brought to completion the autobiography that Josephine had long urged her to write. It appeared as a series of articles in *The Atlantic Monthly* and in 1912 was published as *The Promised Land*. The book was dedicated to the memory of Josephine Lazarus.

Mary imagined that the book practically wrote itself. Actually, it summed up a decade's introspection about the meaning of her life, interpreted in the light of the views derived from the Lazarus sisters. The paean to nature in the concluding chapter reflected not only the personal enthusiasm connected with her marriage but also the pantheistic attitudes connected with Josephine. More important, those attitudes filtered through into significant passages of the book. They affected Mary Antin's judgment of both the Old World and the New.

From Medieval to Modern

In *The Promised Land*, Polotzk is described as a frighteningly restrictive place. There are sympathetic allusions to the emotional strength of family life; but these are offset by the somber portrayal of the environment, which depresses the populace. There poverty, superstition and isolation from the world stifle the growth of the individual and force him to assume the self-preserving vices of ab-

ject hypocrisy and double-dealing. The same attitudes appear in her stories. "Malinke's Atonement" (*The Atlantic Monthly*, September 1911), for instance, described a poor little girl's rebellion against Orthodoxy; and "The Amulet" (*The Atlantic Monthly*, January 1913) dealt with the conflict between love and super-

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A well-written life is almost as rare as a well-spent one.
Thomas Carlyle

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By contrast, the book affirms, America is liberating. Not that in the United States is easier than in Europe or that success is readily within reach. Rather it opens opportunities and makes possible what had earlier been out of reach by cutting the individual away from the past and allowing his own personality to flow. Travel from Polotzk to America was to discover one's self by moving from medieval to modern times.

A perceptive reviewer, in 1912, noted the tinge of egotism in the book which set the goal of self-expression as the supreme aim. Polotzk was inadequate because it frustrated the individual's quest for fulfillment. America was satisfying because it opened the way toward that goal. Here was the link to Emersonian individualism, the spirit of which had descended to Mary Antin by way of the Lazarus sisters.

The Ideal America

Here also was the gleam of hope welcomed by contemporaries. America was the promised land. A few years earlier another popular book by Herbert Croly had used the same term. Americans were eager for reassurance, and Mary Antin's book, like Croly's, affirmed the legacy of their past to the present and the future. It recalled the Emersonian optimism of an earlier age, reminded them that they had all once been immigrants, and refreshed their hopes about the potentialities of their society. A review in *The Outlook* made the connection clear: "We read this disclosure of an ideal America lived in the hearts of the emigrant family, and take courage, thanking God for the heritage given us by our fathers, and profiting hopefully for its preservation and increase in our hands." To the anxious and skeptical among us," *The Nation* explained, Antin's book demonstrated "our own opportunities and possibilities by pointing out the path of peace among racial antipathies, strengthening our somewhat languid faith in our own democratic institutions." Its single rival in permanent importance, wrote

Sedwick, was Booker T. Washington's *Up From Slavery*.

Success brought rewards, but also heavy costs, for Mary Antin. The fame of her book earned her popularity as a speaker. She spent a good deal of time in the next six years on the lecture platform, dealing mostly with Americanism and other patriotic themes. Believing as she did that "the Republic is still in the making," she campaigned for the Progressive Party and helped convert Theodore Roosevelt to the cause of women's suffrage. Though she enjoyed her pleasant home in suburban Scarsdale, far removed from the ghetto, she did not cut herself off from her antecedents. A short story published in both *The Outlook* and *They Who Knock at Our Gates* (Boston, 1914) justified immigration in the face of a rising sentiment for restriction. The newcomers, she argued, were "the sinew and bone of all the nations," and she urged Americans to take the lead in the drama of human unification.

The World War and the xenophobic, isolationist period which followed were a cruel disappointment. Her husband refused to conform to the fashionable anti-German passions of the time, and his position at Columbia became increasingly uncomfortable. He gave up his professorship and in 1920 went to China, where he remained until his death in 1946.

A Sense of Longing

These events took their toll of Mary Antin. She had always been frail; her editor in 1914 noted, "the clatter of our hurly-burly fatigues and deadens her." In 1918 she suffered an attack of neurasthenia, from which she never fully recovered. Thereafter she spent considerable periods with relatives and friends in Winchester and Great Barrington, Massachusetts, and in Albany and New York City. She continued to worry about the meaning of life, and was attracted by Rudolf Steiner's concept of anthroposophy, a system of knowledge produced by the higher self in man. The belief propounded by the German scientist, that an enhanced dreamlike consciousness could achieve profound perceptions of the spiritual world, meshed in nicely with the transcendental ideas drawn from Josephine Lazarus.

But except for belief flashes, the power of expression which shone in *The Promised Land* now left her. "The Soundless Trumpet," an intense mystical essay in *The Atlantic Monthly* of May 1937, described the sense of longing for and ecstasy in transcendental experience. And before she died after a long illness on May 15, 1949, she found the occasion once more to give utterance to her faith in mankind and in America. These final words appeared in the spring of 1941, just before her beloved country entered upon another agonizing crisis.

A Call for Social Justice


After she married and left Boston, she retained for Judaism a sentimental but distant attachment, which took the form of a fondness for Yiddish folk songs and for familiar festivals. But she went her own way, cut off from Jewish life and thought, free to weave other bonds. Hitler changed all that. It was one thing, she explained, "to go your separate way, leaving friends and comrades behind in peace and prosperity." It was another to fail to remember them when the world cast them out. She could no more return to the Jewish fold than to her mother's womb; but neither could she continue to enjoy her accidental personal immunity from the penalties of being a Jew in a time of virulent anti-Semitism. In a moving essay, "House of the One Father" (*Common Ground*, Spring, 1941), she expressed her solidarity with the people of Polotzk, past and present.

Nevertheless, she refused to succumb to the tragedy of the Jew, liberated but driven back into the ghetto by anti-Semitism. "I shall not let myself be stampeded," she insisted. She had found a wider realm of the spirit and prayed for the world's restoration to sanity through a larger unity, which would make the persecution of any group unthinkable. On the eve of a second war, as in 1912 on the eve of the first, she beseeched her chosen countrymen to use their spiritual heritage in the cause of universal social justice.



NOTHING TO FEAR: THE MEMOIRS OF ELEANOR ROOSEVELT

By Joan M. Erikson



Eleanor Roosevelt, the wife of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, distinguished herself by a fearless commitment to two "utopian" causes: sexual equality and international peace. In a sympathetic study of Mrs. Roosevelt's candid memoirs, the author of this article reveals how she was able to sublimate a childhood and youth fraught with rejection and domination into a maturity of free self-realization.

Joan M. Erikson is herself the wife of an eminent person: the psychiatrist and social thinker Erik H. Erikson—and also a person of achievement in her own right. Artist and educator, she is a consultant on mental health programs and author of a recent book, *Activity, Recovery, and Growth* (Norton, 1976). The article is excerpted from the book *The Woman in America*, edited by Robert Jay Lifton, published by Houghton Mifflin.

Eleanor Roosevelt's first book of memoirs is a touchingly self-revealing story of the little girl who grew up to be the wife of an American president, and a notable figure in her own right.

Her memoirs reveal, I think, the sources of her courage and her discipline, her enthusiasm and her serenity. One of her favorite quotations was "Back of tranquility lies always conquered unhappiness," and her unassuming autobiographic writings offer a better and more intuitive account of such conquest than do many more ambitious self-revelations.

Anna Eleanor Roosevelt was born in 1884 in New York. Her mother was Anna Hall Roosevelt, then twenty-one years old and according to *The New York Times*, "one of the most beautiful and popular women in New York Society." Her father was Elliot Roosevelt, aged twenty-four, at the time of her birth a dashing, handsome and adventurous man, brother of Theodore Roosevelt and also a member of one of New York's socially elite families.

Eleanor was not a pretty baby. As she grew older it became apparent that she would be an unattractive little girl and that she had inherited none of the acclaimed charm and good looks of the

women in her mother's family. This seems to have estranged her from her mother, who lavished her affection on the two sons who followed Eleanor.

...I can remember standing in the door, very often with my finger in my mouth—which was, of course, forbidden—and I can see the look in her eyes and hear the tone of her voice as she said: "Come in, Granny." If a visitor was there she might turn and say: "She is such a funny child, so old-fashioned, that we always call her 'Granny.'" I wanted to sink through the floor in shame, and I felt I was apart from the boys.

"Little Nell"

But if the little girl Eleanor's relationship with her mother was uncomfortable and cool, her delight in and closeness to her father provided warmth and tenderness to grow on. He had welcomed her as "a miracle from Heaven," later nicknaming her "Little Nell," after Little Nell in Dickens' *Old Curiosity Shop*, and he seemed to find her in all ways charming, amusing and companionable.

One senses that Eleanor's relationship to her father was never as uncomplicated as she describes it, and soon one stark complication became critical: this delightful father began to drink heavily and later became a confirmed alcoholic. He was banished from the family to visit European spas in search of a cure, and later to live in a small Virginia town.

In simple terms Eleanor Roosevelt then described a series of traumatic events. The year after her father's departure, her mother died very suddenly of diphtheria, and very shortly afterward Elliot, Jr., also died. Eleanor and her younger brother Hall were moved into their Grandmother Hall's house, and it was in this household and in their summer residence at Tivoli that she grew up.

After we were installed, my father came to see me, and I remember going down into the high-ceilinged, dim library on the first floor of the house in West 37th Street. He sat in a big chair. He was dressed all in black, looking very sad. He held out his arms and gathered me to him. In a little while he began to talk, to explain to me that my mother was gone, that she had been all the world to him, and now he had only my brothers and myself, that my brothers were very young, and that he and I must keep close together. Some day I would make a home for him again, we would travel together and do many things which he painted as interesting and pleasant, to be looked forward to in the future together.

This experience remained etched on her memory and guided her life through many years. Her father came occasionally to see his children that year in New York, and these visits were joyous ones for his lonely daughter. But Eleanor was to learn that no happiness was

secure, and that security itself was an illusion. Even this period of existing hopefully from one visit to the next was short-lived, for within the year her father was killed in a riding accident.

On August 14, 1894, just before I was ten years old, word came that my father had died. My aunts told me but I simply refused to believe it, and while I wept long and went to bed still weeping, I finally went to sleep and began the next day living in my dream world as usual.

My grandmother decided that we children should not go to the funeral, and so I had no tangible thing to make death real to me. From that time on I knew in my mind that my father was dead, and yet I lived with him more closely, probably, than I had when he was alive.

The years in Grandmother Hall's New York house and in Tivoli with her aunts and uncles must have been dreary ones by any standard. She was forbidden sweets and therefore stole them, lied, got caught and was disgraced and shamed. She was made to wear a steel brace to improve her posture. To keep her from catching colds, she alone of the family was obliged to take a cold bath every morning. Her clothes were a source of constant embarrassment to her. In addition to these physical discomforts and deprivations, this young girl was kept very much to herself under the surveillance of governesses and maids.

They always tried to talk to me, and I wished to be left alone to live in a dream world in which I was the heroine and my father was the hero. Into this world I retired as soon as I went to bed and as soon as I woke in the morning, and all the time I was walking or when anyone bored me.

Denial of Friends

The companionship of children her own age was also denied her during the long summers at Tivoli, because her Uncle Vallie had also become alcoholic and no guests were welcome at the house. Her grandmother, who was strict with her in every way, also refused to let her visit her Roosevelt relations with any frequency and denied her the opportunity to travel with a young friend and her family.

My grandmother was adamant and would not allow me to go. She gave me no reasons, either. It was sufficient that she did not think it wise. She so often said "no" that I built up the defense of saying I did not want things in order to forestall her refusals and keep down my disappointments.

When she was fifteen, however, a friend and mentor came into her life from outside the family, a woman who was destined to sponsor

what was strongest and most forward-looking in Eleanor. Grandmother Hall decided to send her to England to a private school for girls under an excellent headmistress. Intellectually, Mlle. Souvestre "shocked me into thinking," Eleanor writes. She had "an active keen mind" and she conveyed her vital interest in public affairs to her pupils. Beyond stimulating young Eleanor to independent thinking, she also undertook to increase her limited knowledge of the world by traveling with her on the continent during the holidays. Eleanor was allowed to remain three years under the tutelage of this gifted and inspiring teacher. Then, after having glimpsed new vistas of freedom, she was called home to be introduced to New York society. She was eighteen.

In decisive and "formative" years, then, Eleanor learned that the spirit can count for more than appearance and social form. However, she was as yet too young to sustain such insight, and the ways of her social class decreed that she must try to conform. "Coming out" was a gruelling experience for this shy, still rather awkward girl.

She suffered not only from strenuous and incompatible activity, but also from an inner conflict between socially approved goals and her own aspirations and emerging potentialities. The rules of her class, however, aligned her activities at first with the customary contribution of a lady to social problems: charity.

During this period of her life in New York with her Aunt Pussie she turned her attention to all kinds of charitable endeavors. From her childhood on she had been taught that people of wealth and social standing should engage in philanthropy. There was an obligation to be kind to the poor and to give to those who had less, she had always been told. So it seemed appropriate that at nineteen she should offer her services to teach fancy dancing and calisthenics at the Rivington Street Settlement House and to investigate working conditions in garment factories and department stores for the Consumers League. Later she would turn indignantly against a system that offered mere charity where it should provide the underprivileged with the right of equal opportunity to help themselves. For the time being, however, she learned to work and to care deeply.

A Memorable Wedding

In 1903 she became engaged to her distant cousin Franklin Roosevelt. There must have been general astonishment then, even as this betrothal now in retrospect astonishes. Franklin's mother, who was opposed to the marriage, promptly sent him off on a Caribbean tour.

But Franklin was adamant. A year later, after Eleanor had met Franklin's side of the family, the engagement was announced and the wedding set for March 17. Theodore Roosevelt had been elected

President. He was, in fact, inaugurated on March 4, and his first visit to New York following this ceremony was made in order to give his niece away in marriage. It followed naturally that he became the star of the festivities, with crowds forming to catch a glimpse of the President and large groups gathering around him at the reception. It was a memorable wedding and it should have warned Eleanor that her life would not be her own—until she would eventually make it her own.

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No one can make you feel inferior without your consent.
Eleanor Roosevelt

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For their honeymoon the young couple went to Hyde Park; a new era began for the bride, a kind of upper-class captivity. Holidays would be spent at Hyde Park with mother-in-law; in summer they would move to Campobello with her, and in winter they would live in a house bought for them, furnished for them, staffed with servants for them by her, and right next door to her.

Sarah Delano Roosevelt was a domineering woman who had devoted years of widowhood to the upbringing of her only son. His marriage in no way decreased her sense of responsibility, and she took over the training and management of her daughter-in-law, with a conviction and dedication which trapped the young wife in a sense of helplessness.

During the next ten years, Eleanor went through one pregnancy after another and was very occupied with her unsuccessful efforts to manage the nurses and servants, who were the experts called in to care for her babies. She could do little to express her own wishes, nor did she have the physical strength to combat the formidable team of husband and mother-in-law. But she was not unaware of what was happening to her own personality. She recognized that she was in danger of developing “into a completely colorless echo,” that she “was not developing any individual taste or initiative,” and that something within her craved to be an independent individual.

Discipline and Dedication

The World War I years in Washington when Franklin was the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, were hectic and demanding for the Roosevelts. Probably it was during this period that Eleanor’s capacity for discipline, endurance and energetic undertaking were first really challenged and confirmed. She says of this experience, too, that the exposure to all kinds of people and to the confidences of the

boys in the naval hospitals provided her with "a liberal education." Out of these contacts with human beings, she writes, "I became a more tolerant person—far less sure of my own beliefs and methods of action, but I think more determined to try for certain ultimate objectives." During Franklin's unsuccessful campaign for the Vice-Presidency in 1920 she had her first taste of traveling around on the campaign train, and she later referred to this experience as "the start of my political education."

Then a crisis occurred which threatened to contract her life space and that of her husband and to preshadow a future of severe restriction. In the summer of 1921, Franklin contracted infantile paralysis at Campobello. Eleanor became his day and night attendant and nursed him with efficient dedication.

Almost everything we have noted about Eleanor Roosevelt's development up to this point would seem to suggest that she was now offered a potentially absorbing role. Needing to be needed, eager to please, dedicated to service—how appropriate that she should now devote herself to an invalid husband's care. An amazing transformation, however, took place slowly but irrevocably, for it was at this point in her life that the woman who as a girl had bowed to domination by mother, grandmother, husband and mother-in-law, firmly stood her full height and took over the responsibility not only for her husband's care and her family's well-being, but also for their joint right to manage their own future.

Back in Politics

When it became clear that Franklin would not recover the use of his legs and that he would be permanently crippled, his mother demanded that he be brought to Hyde Park, where he could have rest and complete quiet. But she had not counted with her daughter-in-law. "That's the last thing he should do," Eleanor told her. "And I won't let him."

This was the beginning of a determined struggle between the two women, between two generations who "knew what was best" for a stricken man. Eleanor by then had found a firm ally in the person of Franklin's friend Louis Howe, who was also intent on not allowing him to become a dispirited invalid. Together they contrived to bring rewarding activities, interesting people and stimulating ideas to Franklin. Eleanor and Howe agreed that hobbies would not be enough for their charge, and even when he added a work schedule it was clear to them that his real interest was politics. So it was decided that Eleanor should become active in politics, and in this way involve Franklin in current issues. She turned her attention and amazing energy to the work of the Women's Trade Union League and brought some of her co-workers home with her to meet her

husband. She joined the Women's Division of the Democratic State Committee and began a round of public speaking, which, though frightening for her initially, proved most successful. And she traveled extensively all over the state organizing women voters into the Democratic party.

All of this activity came to a head when Al Smith, in 1924, asked Franklin Delano Roosevelt to take charge of his preconvention campaign and to nominate him as presidential nominee for the Democratic party. FDR agreed, and though his candidate ran unsuccessfully, he showed a triumphant courage by facing the Democratic convention on his own feet, even though his legs had to be supported by braces, and by giving his now famous "Happy Warrior" speech. FDR was back in the public eye. He was back in politics.

Deprivation Transcended

The rest is well known. From the childhood and young womanhood sketched here, the woman emerged who more than any woman in American history played a leading role in public affairs.

Is it possible to trace any inner logic in this story? Eleanor Roosevelt's account of her early life highlights a lesson often lost in the study of biographies. This record of her childhood experiences could, if it were offered as a case history, account for a total failure to accept the challenge of participation in an active and productive life.

Eleanor Roosevelt: the courage to face ourselves—and go beyond



Such documentation could be used, trauma for trauma, to "explain" failure. Yet Eleanor Roosevelt "succeeded," in many ways triumphantly, in other ways not without tragic overtones.

Reviewing, then, the traumatic aspects of her childhood, can we bring into focus the qualities, the strengths that were pitted against failure—and that won? What became of the shame of "Granny," the deep sadness of "Little Nell," the pervading sense of inferiority and fear of the small girl Eleanor? The inner tranquility of the Mrs. Roosevelt that the world knew and honored was indeed the fruit of actively "conquered unhappiness," of deprivation transcended.

She seems to have settled her

account with her unlucky childhood by a determined rebalancing of the scales and by projecting this shift onto an almost global screen. Once deeply ashamed of her own unattractiveness, she spent her entire life developing her capacity for empathizing with people. Having set her own needs aside, as it were, her relationships with others could be immediate and warm. She became one of the most attractive and charming women in public life.

The little girl Eleanor had been ashamed of her physical cowardice. She had been afraid of the dark and of burglars, of water, of horses, of physical exploits of many kinds. This same child became renowned as a grown woman for her endurance and her fearlessness in meeting danger. It was not a courage lightly won. Perhaps it grew out of her determination to accept all challenges actively in order to avoid that fate worse than death—public shaming. Green with seasickness on a battleship one day, the suggestion was made to her that she climb the 100-foot ladder of the skeleton mast. She did, and in time she slowly overcame her fear of height and of seasickness.

Even more than physical apprehension of danger she suffered from fear of the disapproval of those from whom she needed love. In her loneliness and perplexity she lied and she stole as a child.

Yet later she led a fearless public life, disregarding petty criticism and caricature and striking out boldly for charity in issues both big and small. And it was she who selected for her husband's tombstone the depression-conquering slogan, "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself."

Deprived in her childhood of the people she loved most, of the possibly compensatory sweets, of trips and of friends, and being exposed so often to "no" as the answer to her requests, she learned early not to ask for things, and better still not to want or hope for them, in order to avoid disappointment. But she was an observant child and noted that the grandmother who disciplined her so sternly had no discipline whatsoever where her own children were concerned. She spoiled them unrestrainedly and was helplessly outraged with their misbehavior, especially when her sons began their heavy drinking. Mrs. Roosevelt speaks of this drinking as having made a deep impression on her:

This was my first [really her second] contact with anyone who had completely lost power of self-control and I think it began to develop in me an almost exaggerated idea of the necessity of keeping all of one's desires under complete subjugation.

Organized and Self-Disciplined

Actively then she began to impose on herself the controls, the discipline to which she had been passively subjected as a little girl. She became extraordinarily self-disciplined. Her workday was

strenuous, but organized to the minute, for with the proverbial energy went control, the capacity both for renunciation and for complete relaxation.

This life-sustaining strength came somehow from the few people whom she loved and admired and with whom she identified. Who were these important people? Her relationship with her mother, at least in later childhood, was certainly not one of loving mutuality. The little Eleanor admired this glamorous mother. However, she also knew her as a stern judge who found a child who could lie despicable, but who nevertheless "made a great effort for me" obviously out of a sense of duty. Eleanor Roosevelt's own role as a mother is both fascinating and disturbing. Motherhood seems to have happened to her as an inexorable fate, before she could grasp its meaning. In her story she emphasizes how strongly she felt her responsibility for her children's welfare, how dutifully she cared for them when ill or injured, but little joy or even satisfaction in mothering shines through.

One figure stands out in the story of young Eleanor who is described by her in only the happiest and most admiring terms. This was Mlle. Souvestre, the principal of the English school where she spent three wonderfully happy years. Mlle. Souvestre was apparently the epitome of what a fine teacher should be, both intelligent and wise, dignified and motherly, disciplined in her thinking but independent. She must also have been a fine judge of character, for she took the shy awkward American girl under her wing, called her "ma chère petite" and set herself the task of developing in her pupil a sense of self-confidence and also of opening her mind to intellectual interests.

In her Eleanor found a thoughtful and intelligent woman of strong convictions, who was unafraid to represent what she believed. Under the tutelage of this devoted teacher, then, Eleanor absorbed principles which would give her commitment to her American heritage new impetus and later enlist her uncompromising involvement in the struggle for human dignity. Eleanor writes of her that she "exerted the greatest influence, after my father, on this period of my life."

Raison D'être

"After my father." What influence did her father have on the life of Eleanor Roosevelt? For the little girl who loved him so devotedly it would be almost impossible to exaggerate his role. Her life was dominated by his presence even after his death, and his wish became her will. When she went off to school she took the "letters of my father's which I always carried with me" and these were read and reread. She habitually bit her fingernails, but one day "I came

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across one in which he spoke of always making the most of one's personal appearance, and from that day forward my nails were allowed to grow."

Could one not say that the young Eleanor and the mature woman she became were the product of an act of will—the will to be the daughter that her father had lovingly preordained, the daughter that would make him proud? This deep love for her father and conviction that she was beloved and that much was expected of her was surely the source of the inner strength which upheld her and made it possible for her to transcend her misfortune.

“

One must never, for whatever reason, turn his back on life.

Eleanor Roosevelt

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And she married Franklin Roosevelt. One has the impression in this instance two emotionally immature people found one another whose needs for intimacy may have remained attuned to the demands of a more remote destiny. Hindsight, at any rate, makes probable that these two people sensed potentialities which in each could only be realized with the help that each could offer the other.

In her autobiography Eleanor Roosevelt gives us little information and only few hints about her relationship with her husband. Perhaps this is just reticence, but one is tempted to conjecture only by deliberately barring this scene-stealing actor from the stage could she highlight herself in the setting of her early married life.

FDR

What does Eleanor's story tell us of FDR's role in her development? Speaking of an annoying fault in her character, Eleanor describes how as a young wife she was given to moods and would retreat into wordless martyrdom and limelight self-effacement: "Griselda mood," she called it. Franklin was the antidote for this; he could tease her out of her gloom, and she was grateful. She mentioned too that he talked history endlessly on their honeymoon, that he informed her about the government of his country (which she was to become). "You so obviously must want that which I ought to do," she wrote. "So I took an interest in politics."

In a remark evaluating her own development at the time of the First World War, she makes an astonishing statement—astonishing because the tribute to her husband is so casual. She describes an argument with her grandmother about her brother Hall's enlistment and adds: "This was my first outspoken declaration against

the accepted standards of the surroundings in which I had spent my childhood, and marked the fact that either my husband, or an increasing ability to think for myself, was changing my point of view." Perhaps FDR's outstanding contribution to Eleanor's development was to foster that "increasing ability to think for myself." Obviously the first years of her marriage were of tremendous importance in her development—obviously she grew in stature and gained poise.

But a moment came in her life which again brought near tragedy—her husband's serious illness. Once before, as a little girl, she had been the helpless observer of the tragic destruction of a beloved person. This time she was not helpless. This time she responded with a will of iron, the patience and endurance, the love necessary to rehabilitate the man, now stricken, whom she had married. An extraordinary consolidation of her capacities seems to have taken place so that she could even take a firm stand against the pronouncements of the overprotective mother-in-law who had always dominated her. She became FDR's champion against invalidism and resignation, thereby actively redeeming her own father's tragedy. She became Eleanor Roosevelt.

The final volume of her autobiography is entitled *On My Own*. What were her "own aims"? Though warmly supporting many causes, essentially she was dedicated to two utopian ideals—Equality: equality of women in their responsible involvement in public affairs; human equality between individuals in a classless society; equality of rights and opportunities for all races, classes and creeds—for all mankind—these to be won in the service of human dignity; and Peace: a precept learned in her youth remained her conviction—that war is no solution to problems between nations or between people. Her appointment to the United Nations after FDR's death provided an ideal setting for activities toward these aims. She believed deeply in world government, and she was eminently fitted to become the chairman of the Committee on Human Rights.

Transcendence of the human condition through activity on a large scale, then, could characterize Eleanor Roosevelt's career. In the final paragraph of her book, written when she was seventy-four years old, however, we can still hear the voice of a younger Eleanor, an echo from the past:

It seems to me that we must have the courage to face ourselves in this crisis. We must regain a vision of ourselves as leaders of the world. We must join in an effort to use all knowledge for the good of all human beings.


When we do that, we shall have nothing to fear.

STUDS TERKEL AND ORAL HISTORY

By Louis M. Starr

Until the invention of writing, the spoken word was used to pass on the history of the race for future generations. In the twentieth century the tape recorder again makes it possible to hear the experience of the time related through the lips of those who have lived it. Professor Starr describes two contemporary approaches to recording oral history: that of the large organization, and that of the enterprising individual. Each has its accomplishment, each its limitations; both are part of a growing, international oral history movement.

Louis M. Starr is director of Columbia University's Oral History Research Office in New York City, and former member of the editorial staff of the *Chicago Sun*. He is the author of *Bohemian Brigade: Civil War Newsmen in Action* (Knopf), and editor of two books on oral history. This article is an expansion by the author of an article that appeared in *Chicago History*, the magazine of the Chicago Historical Society, Fall 1974.



Oral history was launched in 1948 by historian Allan Nevins at Columbia University. In another age, Nevins reflected, people with important stories to tell might have left letters or diaries or some written record behind. But now, in the era of phone, car and plane, the departed left few intimate records. Solution: coax leaders and others with something worth telling into confiding it all to historians, for the benefit of future generations. The tape-recorded results could be neatly typed and then locked up for as long as the interviewee wanted, to encourage him to speak freely.

All the energies of the office, under Nevins' aegis, went into interviewing, transcribing, processing, and submitting oral history memoirs to the Columbia library. He didn't worry about users. They would come along in succeeding generations. In 1959 we finally published a 120-page catalog.

There were stirrings of interest elsewhere, from the early 1950s on, and after our catalog something like a movement got underway. One project begot another, and today there are oral history projects in all fifty states run by universities, museums, historical societies,

corporations, labor unions, and presidential libraries. People are talking into tape recorders on subjects ranging from jazz to moon shots, from affairs of state to affairs of the heart. There is an Oral History Association with a membership of 1300—100 representing museums and universities throughout the world—the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Israel, Mexico, the Fiji Islands, Brazil, India, Singapore, France, Ireland, West Germany, and Italy—its own publications, and an annual meeting with how-to-do-it workshop attached. At Columbia an experimental summer course on all aspects of the work has blossomed into a full semester's offering in Oral History for graduate students in a range of disciplines: history, librarianship, sociology, education, and journalism among them. The current edition of *The Oral History Collection* is computerized, indexed, illustrated, and runs to 500 pages; and as to users, they are legion. For the last seven years in a row, they have included authors whose books have won various awards as outstanding works in the fields of American biography and history: Pulitzer prizes, Bancroft prizes, or Francis Parkman prizes.

One Lone Chicagoan

Meanwhile one lone Chicagoan, unattached, non-academic, free as air, has made himself just about the foremost living protagonist of oral history in the eyes of a public that, until he came along, was hardly aware there was such a thing: Studs Terkel. Terkel is the author of the three books, viz.: *Division Street: America*, (1966); *Hard Times: An Oral History of the Great Depression in America*, (1970); and *Working: People Talk About What They Do All Day and How They Feel About What They Do*, (1974). (All have been published by Pantheon Books, Inc.)

A Chicago institution, all by himself—and a fellow who could talk your grandmother into shedding her inmost thoughts, do the same with your favorite college teacher or the cop on the corner, or *you*. And with his tape recorder running the while, right alongside in plain sight. How his subjects do reveal themselves, when Studs gets to them—"the very sort of self-revelation that until recently

Studs Terkel: a fellow who could talk your grandmother into shedding her inmost thoughts ...



The American Review

could be heard only from the mouths of poets," as one reviewer said. The comment applies to all three of the Terkel excursions into oral history, all of which are compilations drawn from his taped interviews.

Studs is viewed askance in some academic quarters, but of course he is not addressing himself to scholars. Each of his works has evoked enthusiasm, aye, and wonderment from reviewers in general. He is hailed as a new champion of the common man, of history-from-the-bottom-up.

“
Biographies are but the clothes and buttons of the man
—the biography of the man himself cannot be written.

Mark Twain
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Running through much of the critical acclaim is the implication that here we have a whole new genre, a kind of literature we have never known before. It takes nothing from Studs to make the point that this is nonsense. What we have instead is the triumphant revival of a genre that in actuality last bloomed a generation ago. *The Disinherited Speak*, testimonies collected by the Southern Tenant Farmer's Union in 1936, James Agee's *Let Us Now Praise Famous Men* (1937), Benjamin Appel's *The People Talk* (1939), *These Are Our Lives* (1939) by the Federal Writers Project, and Erskine Caldwell's text for two picture books with Margaret Bourke-White, *You Have Seen Their Faces* (1937) and *Say! Is This the USA?* (1940) are random examples.

The fact that Studs uses a tape recorder, while these people had to rely on pad and pencil, only enhances the wonderment at his achievement. Many an interviewer has complained that the recorder puts his subject on guard, intimidates, promotes self-consciousness or bombast, prevents rapport. These hazards are particularly acute when your subject is not a personage long accustomed to the sound of his own voice but a plain Jane or Joe, suddenly asked leading questions and paralyzed by the inexorable turning of the reels.

Wizard Among Interviewers

Candor, or "telling it like it is," is the essence of oral history. How does Studs elicit the soul-searching confessions that, time and again in all three books, have the ring of authenticity, that tell you that this person is leveling, that is, telling the truth, about his memories, his life, his perceptions? Photographs of Studs are suggestive. This wizard among interviewers is a mere stub of a man, shock of grey

hair, bulbous nose, seamed face evocative of urban blight, humanity, warmth. His is a highly mobile face, and the eyes are attentive/reflective. He wears his clothes like his fame, loosely, and he's not above taking off his shoes and plopping socked feet on the coffee table. As opposed to your professional interviewer, (necktied, polite, precise, often a shade too formal), here is a fellow who can relax your guard, a Mr. Salt-of-the-Earth. You have, then, a man most anyone can relate to comfortably—responsive, capable of quick warmth and laughter, a listener who knows when to keep his mouth shut and when to gently prod.

Some of these attributes are shared by all effective interviewers, but Studs has others that make him rather special, as brought out in Denis Brian's interview with him, a quite revealing turning of the tables that appears in Brian's *Murderers and Other Friendly People* (1973). In it, there is this revealing passage:

BRIAN: *Has your technique changed dramatically over the years?*

TERKEL: It's hard for me to tell. You know R. D. Laing, the Scottish psychiatrist? He's a very exciting guy, I think, quite controversial in psychiatric circles. A lot of guys don't like him. One of his points is that the psychiatrist has to be the fellow-traveler with the patient: that is, he must reveal his own being to the person. That opens up the person, and, in a sense, your own vulnerability. I'm vulnerable, you see. I'm pretty terrible with a portable tape-recorder. (*Chuckles.*) And sometimes the person, particularly if it's a noncelebrated person—an old lady in a public housing project—will see my tape-recorder isn't working. She'll say: "Hey, it's not working!" And I say: "No, I goofed." Well, you see, my own vulnerability makes her feel more kinship.

BRIAN: *This is almost a contradiction of one view of you, which is that you stay very much out of the picture when the interview is written, in fact.*

TERKEL: Right. There you have it. I think that's part of the contradiction. There's a detachment, at the same time, attachment. It's both. You know what they say of Stendhal: he was objective and subjective at the same time; he was outside and inside, both. In a sense, if one could be that—I don't know if I am—but that is the (*chuckles*) desideratum, whatever. That would be it, that's devoutly to be wished.

BRIAN: *This is spontaneous with you, though?*

TERKEL: Oh, yes, I often get lost. The word they use a lot, I notice, is my enthusiasm. Perhaps I am. But always up above, way in the back, that detachment, too. It's not deliberate, it just is. There's a risk here too—to yourself as a person; the fate of Nathaniel West's *Miss Lonely Hearts* or the efficient zombiness of the "cool" Observer.

The man also has contradictions, like the rest of us. He is fervent in telling Brian how he loathes the stereotyped, the banal, despises the

typical clichés of the radio or TV interview, as you'd expect he would. Yet in the Introduction to *Working*, Studs indulges in one of the oral history world's hoariest bromides. He writes of the tape recorder:

It can be used to capture the voice of the celebrity, whose answers are ever ready and flow through all the expected straits. I have yet to be astonished by one. It can be used to capture the thoughts of the non-celebrated . . . and . . . I am constantly astonished.

It's a phoney dichotomy. His use of "celebrity" is itself pejorative. Is the fan dancer Sally Rand a celebrity? Read Studs' hilarious interview with her in *Hard Times*, and tell me he was unastonished. Scan the ones with actress Myrna Loy, labor leader Cesar Chavez, and other well-known persons in the same volume, and try picturing Studs sitting mute and bored by all he heard, the flow going through all the expected straits! Would he have printed them if they had? Conversely, it is apparent from his introductions in all three books that Studs discarded a good many Joe Doakes in the sifting process, whatever his astonishment at the time.

The point is not that oral history interviews with "celebrities" are any better or any worse than "common man" interviews. We need both. How one evaluates depends on one's quest, and no generalization about their relative merit is likely to stand examination save in the light of that quest.

Wherein does Studs' work differ from oral history as practiced by Columbia? There are major differences. To begin with, the intent is different. Studs is out for what he can publish or broadcast. Our people are not out to get material for themselves, but for future use by others with publication of any kind a remote prospect. (Ten years, on average, elapses between the final interview and the first use of the material by an author in a book, and use ranges from mere citation to extensive quotation.)

The Custodians

Who owns the material? At Columbia each oral author knows before he begins that he will own both tape and transcript, for we maintain they are his words just as if he had written them. We are their custodians. Since they are his, he has the say regarding use: whether, when, and by whom they may be read. Studs, like some medical and social science interviewers, solves the ownership problem by offering money to his interviewees. "I'm taking their life," he asserts. "Even when they are happy with how the interview turns out, I know I've stolen from them." Hence the money. Our own oral authors, large or small, don't get a cent. Presumably they are flattered by the thought their words will go echoing down the corridors of time in the same Pantheon with Nikita Khrushchev's, Dwight

Eisenhower's, Fidel Castro's.

Most of Terkel's interviews of necessity are one-session affairs. Some of ours are, too, if the thing doesn't go well, or if our subject is being interviewed for some special project, about a single phase of his life. Often, though, we go back for session after session, extracting an oral autobiography a chapter at a time. It is these longer memoirs by men and women who led fascinating lives, some celebrated, some unknown, that have proved most valuable—though I hasten to admit (as I suspect Studs' own wastebasket can testify) there are those with whom you just cannot bring it off, no matter what.

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There is not, perhaps, among the multitudes of all conditions that swarm upon the earth a single man who does not believe that he has something extraordinary to relate of himself.

Samuel Johnson

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Editing makes the biggest difference of all. Studs does his own, and here is where the scholars snipe at him: the reader has no way of knowing how much editing he has done. This is a process we oral historians leave to the oral author himself, once the typographical slips have been taken out of the transcript. It goes back to him with a letter praying he edit himself with accuracy alone in mind, rather than style, to preserve the spontaneity. There are anguished outcries—few of us speak as we would write—but eventually we get back a corrected transcript, with points rephrased and elaborated here and there, and the reader will know from the introduction that the document before him is something akin to a legal deposition. The interviewee has read it over, and stands by what he said. Knowing that makes a world of difference to the researcher who would make use of it.

Problem of Editing

Should the interviewer's questions be left in? In early years we took them out, the theory being that the final transcript should be a smoothly edited, chaptered, highly readable document that would please the oral author. We see it now as a mistake. The user was the loser. What questions were asked? How extensive were the corrections, and what were they? Twenty years ago we changed all this, let the questions stand, quit most of the editing, and let the oral author's corrections appear precisely as he made them. The scholar

knows that he is dealing with the raw material of history, not finished product, and that is precisely what he gets.

Studs is going just the other way. *Division Street* left in a few his questions, *Hard Times* fewer, and *Working* fewer still. This means more editing to achieve a smoother flow, and that in turn means a further loss in authenticity from the picky scholar's point of view.

Yet as literature, each succeeding volume seems to me better than the last. This really has to do with focus. *Division Street* was an exciting idea that succumbed to urban sprawl. It's Chicago's fault the book falls apart, Studs implies in the Introduction, but I suspect he'd do better by her today, perhaps by focusing on *Division Street* alone instead of using it as mere metaphor.

Hard Times comes off much better—one era, imaginatively explored. It isn't quite what its subtitle proclaims, *An Oral History of the Great Depression*. Oral history—specific firsthand recollection of events and the times—is mixed in with the oral tradition, or what people recall being told about the Depression itself or events they did not witness. This blurs the focus some, though the lore is in itself of interest and value.

Working has none of the problems of the first two. If there's a problem, it is that reading more than a few pages at a time leaves you drained, such is the empathy you develop for the narrators talking about the jobs that rule their lives. It also leaves you marveling that no social scientist nor writer of any breed has ever come up with anything akin to this blockbuster of a study. Lewis Mumford writes of it, "Only an interviewer of genius, exploiting the tape recorder—hardly anyone else has done, could possibly have brought it forth. One cannot lay it down, as Mumford says, without experiencing an irresistible impulse to re-examine one's own work, own day, own attitude, even one's own post-industrial society. Yet this, unlike the others, is a monograph, and the focus is relentlessly steady and clear: here is a broad cross-section of Americans today, telling what they think about what they do."

Emphasis on Substance

In contrast with Terkel's polished efforts, most of the items in the Columbia Oral History Collection (COHC) are diamonds in the rough. True, there is *Felix Frankfurter Reminisces*, a delightful recitation that became a bestseller fifteen years ago, but that is an exception for the Supreme Court Justice spoke with rare fluency. So did the late journalist Arthur Krock, whose Columbia memoir is saltier and more zestful than his published volumes, *Sixty Years on the Front Line* and *Memoirs*, in the view of savants familiar with both. There are others, too.

Yet, even so, we oral historians are not out to improve what H.

Mencken called "lovely letters," but to probe for substance, to persuade people to disgorge (however haltingly) the telling incident, the anecdote, the now-it-can-be-told story, the candid revelations about themselves and others that future researchers will treasure because they are nowhere else to be found. Turgid they may be, yet often they ring true.

What, then, are the satisfactions of generating these now 420,000 pages which are expanding in number year by year? Much of our satisfaction today arises from the obvious success of the project itself in juxtaposition to our recollections of the consummate indifference which academia bestowed upon Allan Nevins' project in its early years. Since then, countless scholars—the best among them—have come to our well, and more come every year. I mentioned prize winners earlier. They include as well T. Harry Williams, whose magnificent biography of Huey Long (Pulitzer, 1970) says in the first sentence of the preface that the work was inspired by Oral History at Columbia. Footnote fanciers will find traces of our work in other prize winners as far back as Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.'s trilogy, *The Age of Roosevelt* (Bancroft, 1957 and Parkman, 1958) and Arthur Walworth's *Woodrow Wilson: American Prophet* (Pulitzer, 1959).

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You have sent no autobiographies. Nor do I want any.
They are of the books which I give away.

Charles Lamb

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Because the collection includes, at last count, the reminiscences of an even 100 New Dealers, Roosevelt scholars have been unable to leave us alone. In addition to Schlesinger, among the most important are James MacGregor Burns, whose two-volume work, *Roosevelt, the Lion and the Fox* (1956) and *Roosevelt: the Soldier of Freedom* (Pulitzer, 1971) is the foremost popular biography of FDR; Frank Freidel, the Harvard scholar, who is now immersed in volume five of what is commonly considered to be the definitive biography of Roosevelt—COHC appearing *seriatim* in volumes two, three, and four; William E. Leuchtenburg, whose incisive *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal*, (Bancroft, Parkman, 1964) once held the record for utilizing more Oral History memoirs—thirty-two to be exact—than any other scholar. This total has since been surpassed by many authors in other fields.

Among other well-known Roosevelt scholars are Kenneth S. Davis, author of *F.D.R.: the Beckoning of Destiny* (Parkman, 1973),

Joseph P. Lash, for his extraordinarily successful *Eleanor and Franklin* (Pulitzer, 1972) and Barbara Tuchman, for her *Joseph Stilwell and the American Experience in China*. (Pulitzer, 1972).

More recently, there are Daniel J. Boorstin's *The Americans: the Democratic Experience*, (Pulitzer, 1974) and Robert A. Caro's *The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York*, (Pulitzer, 1975).

Enriching the Heritage

Hundreds of other scholars have similarly benefited from oral history collections. American historical literature is demonstrably the richer for the project. I must content myself with relating one specific instance, the special use of the project to George F. Kennan for the climactic chapter of his two-volume work, *Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920* (Pulitzer, 1954).

Kennan had originally planned this study in collaboration with his old friend DeWitt Clinton Poole, one of the last survivors of the pre-1921 U.S. Mission to Russia. Then Kennan was named ambassador to the Soviet Union, only to learn before his return that his friend had died. But Poole had not failed him. While Kennan was in Moscow—and apparently without telling a soul—Poole had recited two thick volumes of reminiscences for the Oral History Collection at Columbia. Poole, as chargé d'affairs, had been the last member of the American diplomatic corps to leave Moscow when diplomatic relations were terminated in 1920. How had he gotten out? He tells of a bizarre escape across the Finnish border, a hunted man. I recall George Kennan's emotion—there were tears in his eyes—when he came upon this. It shaped his last chapter in Volume Two, *The Decision to Intervene*, a chapter entitled, "The End at Moscow."

In such a vicarious way, then, we oral historians draw the strength to carry on. If unearthing, preserving, and disseminating knowledge while it is still fresh in the memories of living men is not central to the purpose of a great university, pray then, what is?

HUMAN DECENCY IS ANIMAL

By Edward O. Wilson



Is there truly an aggressive instinct that pervades the animal kingdom, reaching its devastating height in mankind? A leading scholar in the new discipline of sociobiology—the comparative study of human and animal societies—denies this argument, recently advanced by anthropologist Konrad Lorenz and psychiatrist Erich Fromm. Man, Professor Wilson asserts, is by no means the most aggressive of animals; he is, instead, the most altruistic—and animals too can be altruistic on occasion.

Edward O. Wilson is a professor of biology at Harvard University, whose specialty is the evolution of social insects. He is the author of *Insect Societies* (1971) and *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis* (1975), both published by the Harvard University Press. This article is abridged from *The New York Times Magazine*.

During the wars in which America was involved many Congressional Medals of Honor were awarded to men who threw themselves on top of grenades to shield comrades, aided the rescue of others from battle sites at the price of certain death to themselves, or made other, often carefully considered but extraordinary decisions that led to the same fatal end. Such altruistic suicide is the ultimate act of courage and emphatically deserves a country's highest honor. It is also the only extreme act that lies beyond the innumerable smaller performances of kindness and giving that bind societies together. One is tempted to leave the matter there, to accept altruism as simply the better side of human nature. Perhaps, to put the best possible construction on the matter, conscious altruism is a transcendental quality that distinguishes human beings from animals. Scientists are nevertheless not accustomed to declaring any phenomenon off limits, and recently there has been a renewed interest in analyzing such forms of social behavior in greater depth and as objectively as possible.

Much of the new effort falls within a discipline called sociobiology, which is defined as the systematic study of the biological basis of social behavior in every kind of organism, including man, and is being pieced together with contributions from biology, psychology

and anthropology. There is of course nothing new about analyzing social behavior, and even the word "sociobiology" has been around for some years. What is new is the way facts and ideas are being extracted from their traditional matrix of psychology and ethology (the natural history of animal behavior) and reassembled in compliance with the principles of genetics and ecology.

In sociobiology, there is a heavy emphasis on the comparison of societies of different kinds of animals and of man, not so much to draw analogies (these have often been dangerously misleading, as when aggression is compared directly in wolves and in human beings) but to devise and to test theories about the underlying hereditary basis of social behavior. With genetic evolution always in mind, sociobiologists search for the ways in which the myriad forms of social organization adapt particular species to the special opportunities and dangers encountered in their environment.

Call of the Wild

A case in point is altruism. I doubt if any higher animal, such as a hawk or a baboon, has ever deserved a Congressional Medal of Honor by the ennobling criteria used in our society. Yet minor altruism does occur frequently, in forms instantly understandable in human terms, and is bestowed not just on offspring but on other members of the species as well. Certain small birds, robins, thrushes and titmice, for example, warn others of the approach of a hawk. They crouch low and emit a distinctive thin, reedy whistle. Although the warning call has acoustic properties that make it difficult to locate in space, to whistle at all seems at the very least unselfish; the caller would be wiser not to betray its presence but rather to remain silent and let someone else fall victim.

Packs of African wild dogs, the most social of all carnivorous mammals, are organized in part by a remarkable division of labor. During the denning season, some of the adults, usually led by a dominant male, are forced to leave the pups behind in order to hunt for antelopes and other prey. At least one adult, normally the mother of the litter, stays behind as a guard. When the hunters return, they regurgitate pieces of meat to all that stayed home. Even sick and crippled adults are benefited, and as a result they are able to survive longer than would be the case in less generous societies.

Other than man, chimpanzees may be the most altruistic of all mammals. Ordinarily, chimps are vegetarians, and during their relaxed foraging excursions they feed singly in the uncoordinated manner of other monkeys and apes. But, occasionally, the males hunt monkeys and young baboons for food. During these episodes, the entire mood of the troop shifts toward what can only be characterized as a human-like state. The males stalk and chase their vic-

tims in concert; they also gang up to repulse any of the victim's adult relatives who oppose them. When the hunters have dismembered the prey and are feasting, other chimps approach to beg for morsels. They touch the meat and the faces of the males, whimpering and hooing gently, and hold out their hands—palms up—in supplication. The meat eaters sometimes pull away in refusal or walk off. But, often, they permit the other animal to chew directly on the meat or to pull off small pieces with its hands. On several occasions, chimpanzees have actually been observed to tear off pieces and drop them into the outstretched hands of others—an act of generosity unknown in other monkeys and apes.

Ultimate Altruism

Adoption is also practiced by chimpanzees. Anthropologist Jane Goodall has observed three cases at the Gombe Stream National Park in Tanzania. All involved orphaned infants taken over by adult brothers and sisters. It is of considerable interest that the altruistic behavior was displayed by the closest possible relatives rather than by experienced females with children of their own, females who might have supplied the orphans with milk and more adequate social protection.

In spite of a fair abundance of such examples among vertebrate creatures, it is only in the lower animals and in the social insects particularly, that we encounter altruistic suicide comparable to man's. A large percentage of the members of colonies of ants, bees and wasps are ready to defend their nests with insane charges against intruders. This is the reason why people move with circumspection around honeybee hives and yellowjacket burrows, but can afford to relax near the nests of solitary species such as sweat bees and mud daubers.

The social stingless bees of the tropics swarm over the heads of human beings who venture too close, locking their jaws so tightly onto tufts of hair that their bodies pull loose from their heads when they are combed out. Some of the species pour a burning glandular secretion onto the skin during these sacrificial attacks. In Brazil, they are called *cagafogos* ("fire defecators"). The great entomologist William Morton Wheeler described an encounter with the "terrible bees," during which they removed patches of skin from his face, as the worst experience of his life.

Honeybee workers have stings lined with reversed barbs like those on fishhooks. When a bee attacks an intruder at the hive, the sting catches in the skin; as the bee moves away, the sting remains embedded, pulling out the entire venom gland and much of the viscera with it. The bee soon dies, but its attack has been more effective than if it withdrew the sting intact. The reason is that the

venom gland continues to leak poison into the wound, while a banana-like odor emanating from the base of the sting incites other members of the hive into launching Kamikaze attacks of their own at the same spot. From the point of view of the colony as a whole, the suicide of an individual accomplishes more than it loses. The total worker force consists of 20,000 to 80,000 members, all sisters born from eggs laid by the mother queen. Each bee has a natural life span of only about fifty days, at the end of which it dies of old age. So to give a life is only a little thing, with no genes being spilled in the process.

Kin Selection

Sharing a capacity for extreme sacrifice does not mean that the human mind and the "mind" of an insect (if such exists) work alike. But it does mean that the impulse need not be ruled divine or otherwise transcendental, and we are justified in seeking a more conventional biological explanation. One immediately encounters a basic problem connected with such an explanation: Fallen heroes don't have any more children. If self-sacrifice results in fewer descendants, the genes, or basic units of heredity, that allow heroes to be created can be expected to disappear gradually from the population. This is the result of the narrow mode of Darwinian natural selection: Because people who are governed by selfish genes prevail over those with altruistic genes, there should be a tendency over many generations for selfish genes to increase in number and for the human population as a whole to become less and less capable of responding in an altruistic manner.

Altruism and Hostility

How can altruism persist? In the case of the social insects, there is no doubt at all. Natural selection has been broadened to include a process called kin selection. The self-sacrificing termite soldiers protect the rest of the colony, including the queen and king who are the soldier's parents. As a result, the soldier's more fertile brothers and sisters flourish, and it is they who multiply the altruistic genes that are shared with the soldier by close kinship. One's own genes are multiplied by the greater production of nephews and nieces. It is natural, then, to ask whether the capacity for altruism has also evolved in human beings through kin selection. In other words, do the emotions we feel, which on occasion in exceptional individuals climax in total self-sacrifice, stem ultimately from hereditary units that were implanted by the favoring of relatives during a period of hundreds or thousands of generations? This explanation gains some strength from the circumstance that during most of mankind's history the social unit was the immediate family and a tight network of

other close relatives. Such exceptional cohesion, combined with a detailed awareness of kinship made possible by high intelligence, might explain why kin selection has been more forceful in human beings than in monkeys and other mammals.

To anticipate a common objection raised by many social scientists and others, let me grant at once that the intensity and form of altruistic acts are to a large extent culturally determined. Human social evolution is obviously more cultural than genetic. The point is that the underlying emotion, powerfully manifested in virtually all human societies, is what is considered to evolve through genes. This sociobiological hypothesis does not therefore account for differences between societies, but it could explain why human beings differ from other mammals and why, in one narrow aspect, they more closely resemble social insects.

A peacemaking role of modern sociobiology also seems likely in the interpretation of aggression, the behavior at the opposite pole from altruism. To cite aggression as a form of social behavior is, in a way, contradictory; considered by itself, it is more accurately identified as antisocial behavior. But, when viewed in a social context, it seems to be one of the most important and widespread organizing techniques. Animals use it to stake out their own territories and to establish their rank in the pecking orders. And because members of one group often cooperate for the purpose of directing aggression at competitor groups, altruism and hostility have come to be opposite sides of the same coin.

Territorial Instinct

Konrad Lorenz, in his celebrated book *On Aggression*, argued that human beings share a general instinct for aggressive behavior with animals, and that this instinct must somehow be relieved, if only through competitive sport. Erich Fromm, in *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness*, took the still dimmer view that man's behavior is subject to a unique death instinct that often leads to pathological aggression beyond that encountered in animals. Both of these interpretations are essentially wrong. A close look at aggressive behavior in a variety of animal societies, many of which have been carefully studied only since the time Lorenz drew his conclusions, shows that aggression occurs in a myriad of forms and is subject to rapid evolution.

We commonly find one species of bird or mammal to be highly territorial, employing elaborate, aggressive displays and attacks, while a second, otherwise similar species shows little or no territorial behavior. In short, the case for a pervasive aggressive instinct does not exist.

The reason for the lack of a general drive seems quite clear. Most

kinds of aggressive behavior are perceived by biologists as particular responses to crowding in the environment. Animals use aggression to gain control over necessities—usually food or shelter—which are in short supply at some time during the life cycle. Many species seldom, if ever, run short of these necessities; rather, their numbers are controlled by predators, parasites or emigration. Such animals are characteristically pacific in their behavior toward one another.

The Laughing Hyena?

Mankind, let me add at once, happens to be one of the aggressive species. But we are far from being the most aggressive. Recent studies of hyenas, lions and langur monkeys, to take three familiar species, have disclosed that under natural conditions these animals engage in lethal fighting, infanticide and even cannibalism at a rate far above that found in human beings. When a count is made of the number of murders committed per thousand individuals per year, human beings are well down the list of aggressive creatures, and I am fairly confident that this would still be the case even if our episodic wars were to be averaged in.

Although some aggressive behavior in one form or another is characteristic of virtually all human societies (even the gentle Kung Bushmen until recently had a murder rate comparable to that of Detroit and Houston), I know of no evidence that it constitutes a drive searching for an outlet. Certainly, the conduct of animals cannot be used as an argument for the widespread existence of such a drive.

In general, animals display a spectrum of possible actions, ranging from no response at all, through threats and feints, to an all-out attack; and they select the action that best fits the circumstances of each particular threat. A rhesus monkey, for example, signals a peaceful intention toward another troop member by averting its gaze or approaching with conciliatory lip-smacking. A low intensity of hostility is conveyed by an alert, level stare. The hard look you receive from a rhesus when you enter a laboratory or the primate building of a zoo is not simple curiosity—it is a threat.

Is Aggression Natural?

From that point onward, the monkey conveys increasing levels of confidence and readiness by adding new components one by one, or in combination: The mouth opens in an apparent expression of astonishment, the head bobs up and down, explosive ho's! are uttered and the hands slap the ground. By the time the rhesus has performed all of these displays, and perhaps taken little forward lunges as well, it is prepared to fight. The ritualized performance, which up to this point served to demonstrate precisely the mood of the ani-

mal, may then give way to a shrieking, rough-and-tumble assault in which hands, feet and teeth are used as weapons.

Despite the fact that many kinds of animals are capable of a rich, graduated repertory of aggressive actions, and despite the fact that aggression is important in the organization of their societies, it is possible for individuals to go through a normal life, rearing offspring, with nothing more than occasional bouts of play-fighting and exchanges of lesser hostile displays. The key is the environment: Frequent intense display and escalated fighting are adaptive responses to certain kinds of social stress which a particular animal may or may not be fortunate enough to avoid during its lifetime. By the same token, we should not be surprised to find a few human cultures, such as the Hopi or the newly discovered Tasaday of Mindanao, in which aggressive interactions are minimal. In a word, the evidence from comparative studies of animal behavior cannot be used to justify extreme forms of aggression, bloody drama or violent competitive sports practiced by man.

This brings us to the topic which, in my experience, causes the most difficulty in discussions of human sociobiology: the relative importance of genetic vs. environmental factors in the shaping of behavioral traits. I am aware that the very notion of genes controlling behavior in human beings is scandalous to some scholars. They are quick to project the following political scenario: Genetic determinism will lead to support for authoritarian status quo and continued social injustice. Seldom is the equally plausible scenario considered: Environmentalism will lead to support for authoritarian mind control and worse injustice. Both sequences are highly unlikely, unless politicians or ideologically committed scientists are allowed to dictate the uses of science. Then anything goes.

Genetic Determination

That aside, concern over the implications of sociobiology usually proves to be due to a simple misunderstanding about the nature of heredity. Let me try to set the matter straight as briefly but fairly as possible. *What the genes prescribe is not necessarily a particular behavior but the capacity to develop certain behaviors and, more than that, the tendency to develop them in various specified environments.* Suppose that we could enumerate all conceivable behavior belonging to one category—say, all the possible kinds of aggressive responses—and for convenience label them by letters. In this imaginary example, there might be exactly twenty-three such responses which we designate A through W. Human beings do not and cannot manifest all the behaviors; perhaps all societies in the world taken together employ A through P. Furthermore, they do not develop each of these with equal facility; there is a strong tendency under

most possible conditions of child rearing for behaviors A through G to appear, and consequently H through P are encountered in very few cultures. It is this *pattern* of possibilities and probabilities that is inherited.

To make such a statement wholly meaningful, we must go on to compare human beings with other species. We note that hamadryas baboons can perhaps develop only F through J, with a strong bias toward F and G, while one kind of termite can show only A and another kind of termite only B. Which behavior a particular human being displays depends on the experience received within his own culture, but the total array of human possibilities, as opposed to baboon or termite possibilities, is inherited. It is the evolution of this pattern which sociobiology attempts to analyze.

We can be more specific about human patterns. It is possible to make a reasonable inference about the most primitive and general human social traits by combining two procedures. First, note is made of the most widespread qualities of hunter-gatherer societies. Although the behavior of the people is complex and intelligent, the way of life to which their cultures are adapted is primitive. The human species evolved with such an elementary economy for hundreds of thousands of years; thus, its innate pattern of social responses can be expected to have been principally shaped by this way of life.

The second procedure is to compare the most widespread hunter-gatherer qualities with similar behavior displayed by the species of langurs, colobus, macaques, baboons, chimpanzees, gibbons and other Old World monkeys and apes that, together, comprise man's closest living relatives.

The Hunter-Gatherer

Where the same pattern of traits occurs in man—and in most or all of the primates—we conclude that it has been subject to relatively little evolution. Its possession by hunter-gatherers indicates (but does not prove) that the pattern was also possessed by man's immediate ancestors; the pattern also belongs to the class of behaviors least prone to change even in economically more advanced societies. On the other hand, when the behavior varies a great deal among the primate species, it is less likely to be resistant to change.

The list of basic human patterns that emerges from this screening technique is intriguing:

- The number of intimate group members is variable but normally 100 or less;
- some amount of aggressive and territorial behavior is basic, but its intensity is graduated and its particular forms cannot be predicted from one culture to another with precision;

- adult males are more aggressive and are dominant over females;
- the societies are to a large extent organized around prolonged maternal care and extended relationships between mothers and children; and
- play, including at least mild forms of contest and mock-aggression, is keenly pursued and probably essential to normal development.

We must then add the qualities that are so distinctively, ineluctably human that they can be safely classified as genetically based: the overwhelming drive of individuals to develop some form of a true, semantic language; the rigid avoidance of incest by taboo; and the weaker but still strong tendency for sexually bonded women and men to divide their labor into specialized tasks.

In hunter-gatherer societies, men hunt and women stay at home. This strong bias persists in most agricultural and industrial societies and, on that ground alone, appears to have a genetic origin. No solid evidence exists as to when the division of labor appeared in man's ancestors or how resistant to change it might be during the continuing revolution for women's rights. My own guess is that the genetic bias is intense enough to cause a substantial division of labor even in the most free and most egalitarian of future societies.

As shown by research recently summarized in the book *The Psychology of Sex Differences*, by Eleanor Emmons Maccoby and Carol Nagy Jacklin, boys consistently show more mathematical and less verbal ability than girls on the average, and they are more aggressive from the first hours of social play at age two to manhood. Thus, even with identical education and equal access to all professions, men are likely to continue to play a disproportionate role in political life, business and science. But that is only a guess and, even if correct, could not be used to argue for anything less than sex-blind admission to and free personal choice in these areas.


The Aggressive Female

Certainly, there are no a priori grounds for concluding that the males of a predatory species must be a specialized hunting class. In chimpanzees, males are the hunters; which may be suggestive in view of the fact that these apes are by a wide margin our closest living relatives. But, in lions, the females are the providers, typically working in groups with their cubs in tow. The stronger and largely parasitic males hold back from the chase, but rush in to claim first share of the meat when the kill has been made. Still another pattern is followed by wolves and African wild dogs: Adults of both sexes, which are very aggressive, cooperate in the hunt.

The moment has arrived to stress that there is a dangerous trap in


sociobiology, one which can be avoided only by constant vigilance. The trap is the naturalistic fallacy of ethics, which uncritically concludes that what is, should be. The "what is" in human nature is to a large extent the heritage of a Pleistocene hunter-gatherer existence. When any genetic bias is demonstrated, it cannot be used to justify a continuing practice in present and future societies. Since most of us live in a radically new environment of our own making, the pursuit of such a practice would be bad biology; and like all bad biology, it would invite disaster. For example, the tendency under certain conditions to conduct warfare against competing groups might well be in our genes, having been advantageous to our Neolithic ancestors, but it could lead to global suicide now. To rear as many healthy children as possible was long the road to security; yet with the population of the world brimming over, it is now the way to environmental disaster.

Our primitive old genes will therefore have to carry the load of much more cultural change in the future. To an extent not yet known, we trust—we insist—that human nature can adapt to more encompassing forms of altruism and social justice. Genetic biases can be trespassed, passions averted or redirected, and ethics altered; and the human genius for making contracts can continue to be applied to achieve healthier and freer societies. Yet the mind is not infinitely malleable. Human sociobiology should be pursued and its findings weighed as the best means we have of tracing the evolutionary history of the mind. In the difficult journey ahead, during which our ultimate guide must be our deepest and, at present, least understood feelings, surely we cannot afford an ignorance of history.



COUNTRY-MUSIC: THE NEW "AMERICAN" SOUND

By Daryl D. Dayton




Jazz was the first "new American sound" to intrigue listeners all over the world—country-music is the second. Mr. Dayton traces this music from its innocent, amateur beginnings to its present highly polished and professional products—its themes, performers, instruments, works.

Daryl Dayton is a pianist and musicologist who has lectured extensively on American music throughout the world.

For many years, audiences around the world have considered jazz to be the only truly indigenous "American" music. Today, however, a new "American" sound—the sound of country-music—is challenging the long-held international supremacy of jazz, expanding the world-wide appreciation of American popular music.

Originally heard only locally in those rural southern areas that gave it birth, in the 1970s country-music almost overnight became America's "national" music. First capturing the enthusiasm of listeners in the inland areas of the Middle West and South, country-music has moved swiftly via recordings, radio, stage and television, to conquer such Eastern strongholds of musical sophistication and culture as New York, Boston, Philadelphia, and Washington. Today, it is reaching out to attract an international audience, generating enthusiasm in such widely-separated parts of the world as Japan, Australia, Czechoslovakia, Venezuela, India, South Africa and Great Britain. In fact, this "new" American music threatens to surpass in acceptance overseas, not only jazz, but also rock, soul, and all other forms of American popular music.

Many persons have tried with little success to define country-music. Even the "stars" in the field cannot agree on a definition.




Waylon Jennings: 1975 Country Music Award Winner

Guitarist Chet Atkins, whose name is enshrined in country-music's Hall of Fame in Nashville, Tennessee, declares that "Country-music is completely lacking in pretense. Its strength lies in its honesty and sincerity." Waylon Jennings, 1975 Country-Music Award winner, affirms, "Country-music is real . . . It's about people, their ups and downs, people singing the blues about their good times and their bad." But Josephine Walker, executive director of the Country Music Association (Nashville), recalls: "When our association was first organized (1958), we set up a committee to try to define country-music, but the committee declared that it was impossible, and finally gave up!"

Origins

Although both jazz and country-music originated in the rural areas of southern United States, they grew out of distinctly separate and singularly different social and musical backgrounds. Jazz, deeply-rooted in the drumming, dancing and singing of African tribal musicians, coalesced into its American form (around 1900) only after those powerful African rhythmic and melodic impulses (imported to the southeastern shores of the New World in slave ships in the eighteenth century) had assimilated Western harmonic practices, Western instruments, the Christian religion and the English language.

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Guitar Pickin' *Jerry Reed*

Country-music, on the other hand, has existed ever since the United States became a nation. While the "sound" of jazz is the sound of trumpets and trombones, saxophones and clarinets, drums and cymbals, the "sound" of country-music is the sound of banjos and guitars, fiddles and harmonicas, dulcimers and autoharps. Its rhythms are the rhythms of the Saturday-night barn dance, the sliding and double-stopping of the country blue-grass fiddler, and the guitar pickin' of such celebrated country-music singers as "Doc" Watson, Jerry Reed or Johnny Cash.

Country-music is, of course, traditionally rural, a musical reflection of the American who lives close to the soil. Many of the country artists came originally

Loretta Lynn: a wealthy "coal-miner's daughter"



from humble backgrounds, and their songs convey the homely philosophy and "backwoods" atmosphere of their childhood environment. Red Lane, from Bogaloosa, Louisiana, remembers, "If you've ever picked a boll of cotton, you know how it feels. Not just how the cotton boll feels, but how the people feel, and what it's like to be down on your luck." And when Loretta Lynn, America's favorite country-music singer, and winner of many country-music awards, sings "I was born a coal-miner's daughter/In a cabin on a hill in Butcher Holler (Kentucky) . . .," she literally means what she says. To her thousands of admirers, Loretta recalls with affection her childhood in the mountainside home where the men of the family eked out a living digging coal by night and scraping crops out of the stony unyielding soil by day. Country-music used to be called "poor man's music." No more. Loretta, like many other country artists with record sales running into millions of copies is today a wealthy "coal-miner's daughter."

Reasons for Popularity

The upsurge in the popularity of country-music beginning in the 1930s is a socio-musicological phenomenon of extraordinary significance. It raises several questions.

Why has this music that has existed for generations suddenly emerged in the 1970s from the cultural backwaters of rural America, to step on to the world music stage?

Have social or political forces propelled this music across international boundaries?

Or are there technical and musical elements in this basically simple, straightforward music that endow it with universal appeal?

One obvious explanation for the wide acceptance of country-music is, of course, the speed of international communication—radio, films, television, satellites, air travel—that today is annihilating distance and space, merging and cross-blending cultures of many disparate civilizations.

A second explanation is, undoubtedly, the availability of the phonograph recording. All forms of American popular music today (rock, jazz, soul, country) are conceived in terms of the recording, and the musicians depend heavily for their survival on the promotion, sale, and distribution of the vinyl disc. Sales by the more than eight hundred recording companies in the United States are estimated in the thousands of millions of dollars, nearly half of this astronomical amount being spent for country-music.

These technical and economic factors may offer creditable reasons for the widespread popularity of country-music in the United States. But they do not explain why, in Japan, for example, the "Tennessee Waltz" is the all-time top hit tune in the "pop" field; nor the

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existence in England of a well-established thriving Country Music Association; nor why in Czechoslovakia, more than two thousand youthful guitarists, fiddlers and banjo players patiently listen to recordings of country-music, diligently practicing (mostly without access to the printed music) this "American" sound, seeking faithfully to recreate it as though it were their own.

Nostalgia

In a sense, the popularity of country-music may be an outward manifestation of a wave of nostalgia which is currently sweeping the United States. This desire to recapture the past, to retreat to the simpler life of earlier times, is observed in many other areas of American life and culture as well as in music. In the process of trying to recreate olden times, often by adopting the fashions in dress and the hairstyles of earlier days, Americans have also discovered the special music—country-music—that was popular in those (presumably) happier days. Country-music may seem also to reaffirm the faith in the dignity and worth of the common man on which America was founded 200 years ago. Quite possibly, people in other countries are discovering the same democratic faith beneath the surface gaiety of country-music.

The home of this earthy American music is in Nashville, Tennessee. Once a quiet southern city where the principal occupations were such serious-minded businesses as insurance, printing and shoe manufacturing, the "Athens of the South" (Nashville's classic-minded citizens in 1921 erected in the center of the city a full-scale replica of the Greek Parthenon!), is today one of the major music capitals of the world.

It all started in 1925 when the local radio station (WSM) broadcast the first "Barn Dance." Listeners were so receptive that WSM announced that instead of carrying the National Broadcasting Company's regular programs of nineteenth century European-oriented grand opera (conducted by the illustrious Walter Damrosch in New York), it would, henceforth, present only the Nashville style of opera—"Grand Ole Opry"—meaning of course,

Dolly Parton and Porter Wagoner: the Grand Old Opry goes on and on



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country-music in all its forms. The name stuck, and in 1941 result of the growing audiences, WSM moved the "Grand Ole into larger quarters, to a redbrick, store-front church originally in 1891. This new home was named Ryman Auditorium after riverboat captain, H.W. Ryman, who "got religion" one night in Nashville, threw all of his whiskey into the river, and contributed \$25,000 to construct a temple. In this aptly-named "Mother Church of Country Music," the "Grand Ole Opry" went on and on.

Growth

In 1975, in celebration of fifty years of success, during which the Grand Ole Opry was carried every Saturday night on radio and television, every corner of the United States, WSM and the Country-Music Association dedicated a luxurious new "Opry House" in order to accommodate the thousands of faithful devotees to worship at the shrine of country-music.

More than 300 record manufacturers now have their homes in Nashville. This once sleepy little city on the Cumberland River (capitol of the state of Tennessee since 1843), today produces more phonograph recordings than any other city in the United States except New York. Nashville directories also list scores of record agencies, booking agents, artist's managers, motion-picture producers, television firms, record distributors, photography design firms, artwork firms, and, of course, hundreds of country musicians.

Before country-music, "popular" music in the United States meant a novelty tune from New York's Tin Pan Alley, a lyric from a Broadway musical comedy, or a "theme song" from a Hollywood screen extravaganza. The term itself—country-music—often carried condescending or derogatory connotations. Country-music was considered by the sophisticated city-dweller and by the cultured intellectual to be crude and vulgar, aesthetically lacking in taste and technique. University and college students who came from rural areas repudiated their musical heritage, disassociating themselves from this colloquial music at every opportunity. A composer such as the now internationally-celebrated American, Charles Ives (1874-1954), who dared to incorporate such vernacular music in his "serious" compositions, was scorned by his colleagues and dubbed banal, eccentric and unplayable by performers, rejected by the public. In fact, the current extraordinary success and appreciation for the music of Charles Ives can be attributed in large part to the parallel post World War II rise in popularity of the once uncultured "country-music."

Even today there are frequent attempts to downgrade or ridicule country-music. Recently a film entitled *Nashville* has had remarkable success portraying some of the least attractive features

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country-music. It shows only the gaudy and surface aspects of this immensely popular music. It reveals little of the vitality and variety to be found in the country-music style.

Jimmie Rodgers

The rise of country-music from regional to national prominence can be traced to that period in the late 1920s when radio and recordings began to focus attention on the solo performer, to arouse interest in his personality, to reveal his private life. One of the earliest of these radio country-music "heroes" was Jimmie Rodgers (1897-1933), the first also to be elected to the Country-Music Hall of Fame (1961). The bronze plaque erected in his posthumous honor calls Rodgers "The Singing Brakeman" and eulogizes him with the words: "His songs told the great stories of the singing rails, the powerful steam locomotives, and the wonderful railroad people he loved so well."

To appreciate the reference to railroad songs, one should realize how strong is the fascination which the railroad holds for most Americans. Even today, when trains have almost disappeared from the American countryside, such songs as "Orange Blossom Special," "Wreck of the Old 97," or "The Train's Done Left Me" remain standard numbers in the country-music repertoire, and never fail to conjure up nostalgic memories whenever they are performed.

Frequently referred to as "the father of modern country-music," within six years (1927-1933) Rodgers initiated that remarkable con-

Jimmie Rodgers: his songs told the stories of the singing rails



version of country-music from its little-known hillbilly origins toward the commercial star-oriented direction which today, more than forty years after his untimely death in New York from tuberculosis, is rapidly achieving world renown. Rodgers recorded more than one hundred country songs depicting every aspect of rural life and temper. He also developed a form entirely new to the commercial field, the "blue yodel," a blend of southern "white" blues and Swiss-style mountain yodelling, a style which persisted for over two decades after his death. The legend of Jimmie Rodgers is now firmly established in the annals of country-music. His recordings

continue in great demand, and enthusiasm for his music remains as strong today as though he were appearing nightly on the country-music circuit.

Professionalization

In the decade following Rodgers' death, the style and emphasis shifted from an unpretentious rural folk-music, performed mainly by self-taught, poorly paid country amateurs, into a highly polished, professional entertainment form. Rodgers' spectacular success in the field of recordings and radio stimulated hundreds of other country musicians to attempt to gain fame and fortune through emulation of the "Blue Yodeler." Country musicians now began to think of the vast unseen audience which would open the doors to a rich and promising future. There were scores of other musicians—fiddlers, guitarists, mandolinists, singers—contemporaries of Rodgers whose careers contributed to the establishment of the authentic country-music tradition. In this rubric were such individuals as Uncle Dave Macon, Fiddlin' John Carson and Linda Parker, and various groups with such colloquial names as Arthur Tanner and His Cornhuskers. Now appeared a large number of family groups—especially the renowned Carter Family. While the decade of the 1930s saw the worst financial depression in American history, country-music recording continued to sell well.

Cowboy Songs

Among numerous prophetic developments in the 1930s was the rise in enthusiasm for Western music and for its most colorful representative, the American cowboy. The cowboy has always been an object of romantic adulation both in the United States and overseas. But now (inspired in large part by the cowboy songs of Jimmie Rodgers), country-music performers began to capitalize on this new theme, and to don cowboy-style dress—ten-gallon hats, high-heeled riding boots, colorful scarves, leather jackets—even though many of them had never ridden a horse!

This Western "fashion" produced a wholly new category of country-music performer such as Tex Ritter, Roy Rogers, and especially Gene Autry who, in 1934, as the "Nation's Number One Singing Cowboy," began a long and successful career in Hollywood. The screen was another shaping force in the popularity of the country-music product. Group names in the 1930s such as Girls of the Golden West, Oklahoma Cowboys, Riders of the Purple Sage, find their 1976 counterparts in Bill Boyd's Cowboy Ramblers and New Riders of the Purple Sage. This cowboy image was projected through enduring songs: "The Old Chisholm Trail," "Cowboy's Dream," and "Pistol-Packin' Mama."

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As country-music was changing, so were the economic and social conditions of the South that had nurtured it. Rural electrification made possible the electric guitar, a device which nearly every guitarist (Ernest Tubb was the first) seized upon. Eventually the other instruments used in popular music were electrified and, of course, the stage microphone became ubiquitous. Few bands today perform without elaborate electronic equipment. In addition to the electric guitar, many bands also include the large string bass ("bass fiddle"), standard equipment for every blue-grass group.

In the Wake of World War II

The second World War (1941-1945), and the years immediately afterward, contributed to the elevation of country-music into national prominence. During the war a massive shift in populations took place between the North and the South. Northerners migrated in huge numbers to work in southern munition factories, airplane plants and military installations, where many of them heard country-music "live" for the first time. When they returned to their homes in the North after the war, their enthusiasm for this music created a new public. Southern workers who traveled North in search of defense work brought with them their instruments, and their playing further developed the national taste for country-music. Through the military servicemen, country-music was carried to many areas of the United States, and ultimately to other parts of the world.

The close of the war also saw the close of what is sometimes called the "Golden Age" of hillbilly music. Although "purist" groups and loyal devotees of country-music would strive to carry on the "old-time" tradition of country fiddling and singing (as they still do today), there was no returning to that earlier simpler life. The years following the war witnessed a period of national prosperity, marked in country-music by stress on personal appearance of stars. Responding to commercial pressures, country-music became big business. As the national appreciation for country-music increased, so did the vast network of managers, booking agents, song-writers, talent scouts, periodicals, newspaper critics, and all of the rest of the commercial apparatus that today is vital to success in the fiercely competitive entertainment world.

A complete list of the musicians who were successful in the growth of country-music as big business would run to the hundreds. Deserving special mention is Bill Monroe, who must be credited with introducing the term—"blue-grass"—and who was a prime inspiration in developing the large audience for this form of country-music.



Hank Williams: the most successful

Many of the songs of the 1950s are still popular. One of them "Tennessee Waltz," remains the all-time top hit-tune in American popular music history.

The best-known and most successful of these post-war country music entertainers was Hank Williams, whose legendary success won for him a posthumous niche in the Country Hall of Fame. In many ways, Williams' untimely death in 1953 at the age of twenty-nine symbolized the end of the post-war boom. Not until the 1970s would country-music enjoy such material and financial prosperity.

Rock and Roll

For in less than a year, a new musical form appeared on the popular music scene that drove both jazz and country-music into a temporary decline. This powerful new musical force, rock-and-roll, was essentially a hybrid, a fusion of rhythm-and-blues together with elements of country-music, both products of the rural South. The emergence in 1954 (the term was first used in a radio broadcast from Cleveland, a rhythm and blues tune called "My Baby Rocks Me Like A Steady Roll"), changed the concept, form and content of virtually all American popular music. Not until the late 1960s did jazz, v

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long Afro-American tradition, succeed in making peace with this raucous, ear-splitting new genre by adopting many of the electronic and theatric elements of rock. Country-music, however, although strongly influenced by the new techniques, was able to adapt more quickly to many of the features of rock music without losing its basic identity.

Many country-music stars who survived the popular music upheavals of the 1960s remain active today. Such classics as Johnny Cash, Ernie Ford and Jerry Lee Lewis—to name but a few—are solid country-music names. To these we must add the names of many younger musicians such as Ronnie Milsap, Olivia Newton-John, Melba Montgomery and Jimmie Davis, and that multiple country-award-winner, John Denver. Several of the successful younger crop of country musicians are “chips off the old block”—Hank Williams, Jr., Jimmie Rodgers Snow, Roy Acuff, Jr.—artists carrying on the country-music traditions established by their fathers.

In little more than forty years, country-music has evolved from an obscure rural folk-music into an internationally acceptable popular style revealing an extraordinary capacity to assimilate, to adapt and to change.

It would be idle speculation to attempt to predict the future of country-music. Its success has tempted many entertainers in other popular music areas such as Bob Dylan, Jackson Browne, Maria Muldaur and Joni Mitchell to crossover, to cultivate some of the winning features of country-music, producing a number of hybrids such as country-rock, country-pop, country-blues and country-jazz.

To define country-music, therefore, becomes more difficult daily

Johnny Cash: a classic




Maria Muldaur: a recent convert



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as this music adapts to new styles, reaches out into new areas, embraces innovative sounds. The most satisfactory definition of this truly "American" music can best be obtained by hearing such contemporary examples as John Denver's "Back Home Again," Dolly Parton's "Love is Like a Butterfly," Glen Campbell's "Rhinestone Cowboy," by listening to the musical groups, The Eagles, or Asleep at The Wheel, or The Nitty-Gritty Dirt Band; or by attending one of the more than sixty blue-grass festivals held annually in various parts of Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee.

Just as jazz has continued to evolve through many stages since the early days of the voodoo rituals in the Place Congo, so country-music will continue to respond to the changes in American life—and to perpetuate the "American" sound.




ECONOMISTS AND THE GROWTH DEBATE

By Wilfred Beckerman

Economic growth has fallen into disrepute in some quarters in the last few years, for two separate reasons, says Professor Beckerman. The first reason is that growth is thought to be too materialistic, too consumption-oriented; the second, that it is believed to be bound to collide with the limits of the earth's environment. Not so, he argues: objectively viewed, economic growth can be seen as enhancing the total welfare of society, both in the present and the long run. What is necessary is not to *curtail* growth, but to rationally *direct* it by clearcut social policy decisions. This article is abridged from Professor Beckerman's recent book, *Three Cheers for the Affluent Society*, published by St. Martin's Press.

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The goal of economic growth has been increasingly questioned during the last few years, at least in the advanced countries. The anti-growth movement has collected together some very strange bedfellows, ranging from aristocratic conservationists worried about their salmon streams and grouse moors to extreme left-wing youth eager to condemn the soul-destroying consequences of capitalist greed and materialism.

There have been two main themes behind the widespread view that economic growth must be brought to a halt, or at least deliberately slowed down. The first is that growth does not make us any happier; indeed the "costs" of economic growth include a wholesale deterioration in the quality of life that makes us less happy. The other is that growth cannot continue much longer. Unless we end it in a deliberate and controlled manner, it will simply be halted by a confrontation with environmental limits.

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There is some overlap between these two themes. But the two basic anti-growth camps can be treated separately, for they are essentially reaching different conclusions, even if they share some assumptions.

Lord Lionel Robbins accurately described the first of the anti-growth themes when he said, "Growth itself is something which is intrinsically undesirable; and to recommend anything on the ground that it will promote growth is simply to reveal an essentially philistine character, an indifference to all that makes life anxious and ugly in the present age and an insensitiveness to truly civilized values." This faction of the anti-growth movement insists that economic growth has involved an excessive concern with *material* output, particularly of a "vulgar" kind, that often represents the gratification of "needs" created artificially by the advertising media in a "consumer society." They argue that the growth "rat race" destroys not merely the visual amenities of towns and country, but also our ability to communicate with our fellow men, our sense of aesthetic and moral values, and even our pride in our work.

The Case to Be Proven

To be convincing, those who attack economic growth because of its detrimental effect on the quality of life need to demonstrate that this detriment *necessarily* comes with economic growth, *and* that the detriment is being pushed to the point where, even after taking into account the benefits of economic growth, human welfare is reduced. The logical need for these two steps in the argument is rarely perceived, and never sustained. In fact, the undesirable effects on the quality of life have not merely failed to increase to the point where total welfare declines but, instead, have probably been *reduced* in many instances; they are likely to be reduced much further if the economic growth is maintained.

Of course there is cause for valid concern with many aspects of modern economies and society. It is impossible for the unregulated free market mechanism to prevent certain harmful economic activities (of which pollution is an example), or the production of certain dangerous or socially undesirable substances, nor can it unfailingly ensure the adequate provision of various public goods and services. Many of the unpleasant features of modern economies arise from what are known as "neighborhood" effects of certain activities (such as the fallout of smoke from a factory chimney on surrounding areas), or simply because society has certain views concerning the desirable pattern of consumption or the need to protect the public from dangers against which it will be unable to protect itself. Those who campaign against such genuine failures of the market mechanism provide a valuable public service.

It is particularly unfortunate, therefore, that such valid criticisms of the existing pattern of output are frequently used by others as if these criticisms supported an anti-growth position. This merely confuses the issue. It is one thing to criticize the way in which society at any moment of time distributes resources between, say, the environment or public health or transport facilities, and, say, consumer durables, and quite another thing to criticize the way that society distributes its resources over time—which is what the growth problem is really about. That part of the anti-growth movement that bases its case on the existence of pollution, or the proliferation of undesirable products, or the neglect of the public sector, confuses the issue of how best to allocate resources at any moment in time with the issues of how fast economies should grow over time. To attack pollution, or dangerous drugs or automobiles, or the inadequacy of public transport is not to attack growth. Hence this article is not a defense of the existing pattern of resource use in modern society; it is a defense of growth.

The distinction between the materialists who are in favor of growth and the men of sensitivity who see the sordid realities of modern economic growth is often accompanied by the notion that economists—with a few notable exceptions like E.J. Mishan, John Kenneth Galbraith or Kenneth Boulding—are all in the materialist camp and regard economic growth as the ultimate goal of society. Even the Canadian economist Arthur Cordell has written that “for many years economic growth has been treated as an end in itself. Somewhere along the line economists forgot that increased GNP (Gross National Product) is a means.”

Defining Welfare

But the fact is that few economists would support maximum economic growth as an objective. Maximum economic growth *per se* is simply a silly objective, as any economist would know. Maximum economic growth has *never* been a sensible objective for society. Maximum “welfare” is, presumably, a fairly acceptable starting point for what would be a sensible objective, but people will differ widely as to what constitutes welfare.

Most economists would postulate that, subject to various well-known qualifications, *economic* welfare is a part of total welfare. Hence, subject to those qualifications, more economic welfare will contribute to more total welfare. Furthermore, economic welfare can be regarded as having two dimensions; the size of the economic cake, and the way it is distributed. The economist conceives of economic welfare as society’s total level of consumption and the manner in which it is shared out among people. Note the emphasis on consumption: not investment, or exports or the balance of pay-

ments, or anything else—just consumption. For in the end, it is what we get out of the economic system in the way of goods and services that contributes directly to our economic welfare. This doesn't mean that all output should be devoted to present consumption and none used for investment or for research. A rational man is concerned with consumption over some relevant period of time, such as his lifetime. To this end he will often sacrifice some present consumption in order to have more consumption in the future.

The same applies to society. It may be perfectly rational for society to sacrifice some present consumption in order to enjoy a higher standard of living in the future. But it would be irrational to incur an unlimited sacrifice of current standards of living for this purpose. After all, it would be absurd to cut current consumption by, say, 80 percent, to reduce food supplies to subsistence levels, to allow people only the minimum essential clothing and heating, to send the children to work in the mines, and introduce compulsory twelve-hour work days in order to achieve the maximum possible investment rate simply to maximize the growth rate. For this clearly does not maximize *consumption* over the time span relevant for society's decisions. The loss of welfare from such a cut in *current* consumption would far exceed any conceivable increase in welfare in later years obtained by the higher level of investment today. In other words, such an excessive diversion of resources from current consumption to future consumption would not achieve what is the sensible objective of society, namely to maximize consumption over a given period of time, allowing for the extent to which the loss of consumption at present and the extra consumption in the future represent, respectively, subtractions from and additions to welfare.

Time Considerations

This allowance must take account of the fact that one dollar of extra consumption in twenty years' time may not have the same value to society as one dollar of consumption today. To take an extreme case, for purposes of illustration, it would be folly for a starving man to sacrifice one loaf of bread now in order to have ten loaves next year; he would be dead by then. Even in less extreme cases the same principle holds. For example, a young married man with a family and heavy mortgage payments on his house, who is still at the early stages of his lifetime earning capacity, might not want to put a lot of money aside in order to have an even higher income when his children have grown up and off his hands, and the mortgage is paid off. Much will depend, therefore, on the level of consumption one enjoys at present, and the level one expects to enjoy in the future, and the uncertainty that has to be attached to the prospect of future rewards in return for abstinence now.

The essential point is that it is *consumption* over some relevant time period which should be maximized, not the growth rate of national product. But to obtain the highest level of consumption over whatever future time period is regarded as relevant to decisions today requires a certain level of investment in order to keep consumption rising.

Let's assume that an investment possibility is put to us—say, a marvelous new energy source that can be researched and developed over a period of time, and which, at the end of that time, will make possible fantastically higher consumption levels. But during the period of research and development current consumption would have to be held at very low levels, because the major portion of the total output will have to be put into investment. Let's assume too that the research and development are such that it builds on itself and makes it possible with each succeeding year to generate even more output that can be put into further research and development. Assume that the GNP during this period can be projected to go up 5 percent the first year, 10 percent (of the base year) the second year, and so forth. If current consumption is held at the same absolute levels, the proportion of GNP that is consumption will dwindle, while the proportion that is investment will rise.

Suppose in weighing this investment we contrast it with an alternative: we are told we can reject the investment idea, and that GNP will still grow, though only at 4 percent each year. However, half of that growth can be in consumption, we are advised, while the other half is in a more modest investment.

Given these two possible choices, the critical question then becomes: How much time would it take for the investment possibility to pay off in massively increased consumption? If, for example, the answer were a hundred years, we'd probably elect to reject the investment—even though the investment brought with it a huge growth rate of the GNP.

Hence, what economists advise society to go for is not *maximum* growth of total output but *optimum* growth—i.e., that growth of total output (consumption plus investment) at which the part that is devoted to investment in order to obtain the growth is matched by the extra future consumption that this faster growth will permit. This depends partly on society's relative valuation of present as compared with future consumption, which must be a subjective matter. It must depend also on a purely technical, factual consideration, namely how much of the total output that could be used for current consumption actually has to be devoted to investment instead in order to allow more consumption later on. Even our struggling young man might be prepared to put aside some of his income for investment, if he were offered a really attractive proposition.

Economists and "Materialism"

It should also be emphasized that in defining the economic objective in these terms, economists do not limit the definition of consumption to include only material goods. It is a basic proposition of the economics of welfare that goods per se do not directly contribute to social welfare at all, but do so only indirectly insofar as they add to the welfare of individuals. Of course, views may differ as to the relative importance to attach to the welfare of different members of the community, or to the time period in which they obtain satisfaction from the goods and services they consume, as well as about the way different goods and services and other factors affecting the conditions of life will actually affect their welfare. But the key point is that economists do not need to be solemnly informed by those who regard themselves as being of superior moral fiber that "things are for Man, not Man for things." This has been a basic axiom of economic theory for a long time, regarded by economists as being so obvious, and hence trivial, that it did not need to be triumphantly proclaimed from the rooftops as if it were the latest breakthrough in moral philosophy.

Indeed, it is strange that many of those who stress that "things are for Man, not Man for things"—which is interpreted as an argument against the proliferation of material goods—are often the same people who are very agitated about the way that we are using up the Earth's resources (or so they believe). They often maintain that the resources of the Earth constitute part of Man's heritage. But if things are for Man, why shouldn't Man use up every scrap of copper or every drop of oil if it happened to maximize his welfare? After all, there seems to be very little moral virtue in preserving the copper species from extinction. Whether or not using up resources at any given rate *does* maximize human welfare is, of course, another matter. But it is a technical matter, not a moral issue.

It is equally untrue that economists are interested only in those things that can be measured in terms of money. It is true that the part of economics which is concerned with describing how economies do actually operate is limited largely to those activities that have a monetary value. But this is because any applied science must be confined to what is measurable. It is not because the theory of economic behavior—which is concerned with the way people can best choose between conflicting claims—is necessarily confined to activities that can be expressed in terms of money.

Obviously, if one is interested in real comparisons of the cost and benefits of alternative uses of resources, such as whether output should be used for consumption today rather than tomorrow, or whether it should be used to produce more food, clothing and so on, rather than a better environment, it is necessary to value the

choices in some comparable units. It just happens that money is a convenient unit. In principle, the analysis would be just as valid if everything could be compared in terms of Beethoven quartets. The notion that economists are somehow narrow, base, and commercial-minded materialists because they tend to be concerned with monetary values, whereas conservationists and ecologists are motivated by high-minded, virtuous, noble and spiritual considerations, is a travesty of the truth.

The Growth Issue Clarified

It is also untrue that economists have some special professional preference concerning the way output should be used at any moment of time—e.g., how much should be devoted to protecting the environment. This, too, is simply another dimension of choice, and the principles involved are basically the same as with the growth issue. Nor should the growth issue be confused with general questions about the most desirable allocation of resources at any moment of time. For example, many people believe that traffic congestion or pollution provide arguments against economic growth, but in reality they only provide arguments that resources may not be allocated, at any given time, in the most desirable matter.

Similarly, John Kenneth Galbraith, who ought to know better, associates the case against growth with the lack of public amenities (such as better public transport) and environmental nuisances such as the noise of jet planes. Others think that growth must be stopped or slowed down on account of the pollution that can be seen around us or read about in the newspapers. But this has nothing to do with growth; it is a question of the best pattern of consumption at any moment of time. Zero growth would not prevent this sort of resource misallocation—private cars would not disappear to be replaced by adequate and prosperous public rail and road services. If anything, slower growth will merely make it more difficult for governments to achieve the desired switch in the way our national products are used.

The Cost of Growth

In order to produce growth, resources must be used for investment, so they cannot be used for today's consumption. To the economist, therefore, *the costs of growth consist of the current consumption foregone*. The best growth rate, therefore, is the one at which the additional sacrifice of current consumption is matched by the addition to future consumption that can be obtained by the extra investment (given society's preference as between present and future consumption). Until recently it was fashionable to maintain that the free market economy failed to invest enough, so that the

free market growth rate would be below the socially desirable growth rate. The fashionable “radical” view was that society was growing too slowly, and hence failed to make proper provision for future generations. Nowadays, the mood has swung to the opposite extreme, and it is more fashionable to maintain that growth rates are too *high* and that unless they are cut, future generations will suffer from pollution, congestion, and an inevitable deprivation of raw material reserves.

However, the symmetry between the two opposing doctrines does not go very far. The earlier view that growth was too slow did at least rest on a coherent analysis of the way the costs of investment to private firms may exceed their real costs to society, and hence prevent investment being pushed to the socially desirable point. According to this view, therefore, current consumption was too high (since not enough of total output was devoted to investment) so that future consumption would be too low. The opposite view that growth is too fast, however, does not rest on any such clear theoretical basis. The external costs of production—such as pollution—which are quoted in support of this view are not costs of *investment*, they are costs of production in general. This implies an undesirable pattern of production at a given point of time. It has no implications at all for the growth rate, since it does not necessarily imply excessive investment and hence excessive growth. It may well imply inadequate investment. But it probably implies a wrong pattern of “consumption” (widely defined to include the environment).

Of course, we have too much congestion in the cities, too many cars on the roads, too much pollution and too much output of goods that cause pollution. These defects in the pattern of consumption and production exist in the unregulated economy because of their associated “external diseconomies”—the smoke from a factory chimney producing steel that is used in hundreds of products damages neighbors and imposes costs on them that are not reflected in the costs of production of the firm that owns the factory. Most of these excessive environmental “externalities”—or spillover effects—arise because most people do not have easily enforceable “property rights” in the environment. Nobody “owns” the clear air or clean water that is, in effect, used up when it is polluted. But the fact that resources are misallocated on account of failure to correct for such externalities does not necessarily mean that the growth rate of total output is wrong. To prove that the growth rate is excessive, it is necessary to show that the resource misallocation takes the form of excessive investment.

The choices that face society, whether they are choices between the environment and other ingredients of human welfare or choices between more consumption (including a better environment) today

and more tomorrow, depend on two things. First, society's relative preferences between the alternatives and, second, the amount of one that has to be given up in order to have more of the other. The latter is a technical matter, but the former is a matter of value judgment; preferences or tastes. The economist does not pretend to be an authority on these social preferences, and does not seek to impose any special preferences of his own.

Defining Choices

Hence, there is no such thing as "the economist's" view as to how far society should prefer present to future consumption. Nor is there any special economist's view as to society's preferences between say, an extra dollar spent on public services, or maternity homes, or schools, or TV sets, or anything else. Economists do not claim to be the keepers of society's conscience in matters of relative tastes and preferences. They only claim to provide a guide as to *how* rational choice should be made given these preferences and certain technical constraints.

Consider, for example, a case where the value of the fish in a stretch of water is estimated at \$5000. Suppose it is argued that the present generation has no right to pollute the area in question, even if the cost of avoiding the pollution were greater than this. But where do we stop? Suppose the value is only \$5; or only 5 cents? Would it still be argued that the fish should be preserved? If so, this would imply turning over the whole national product to the preservation of fish; for there must be an infinite number of cases where the value (or potential value in a thousand years' time) of some reduction in current pollution would be some positive number, if only a few cents. Now presumably nobody would go as far as this. But here's the rub: Where does one stop? Or, to be more precise, what are the precise criteria for deciding where to stop? Economics sets out clear and explicit criteria; you stop when the value to society of the improved environment is less than the value to society of the other things it will have to sacrifice in order to achieve the improved environment. Conservationists and others who maintain that, in adopting such a position, the economist is imposing his own "materialistic" preferences, should either provide alternative criteria or demonstrate that the above criteria are wrongly applied. So far they have done neither.

The whole point is that "all-or-nothing" solutions rarely make sense. Where objectives conflict, some criteria have to be worked out for deciding on the optimum compromise between them. Only in the Garden of Eden are there no constraints on human choice. Economics shows what these criteria must be in general and what facts are relevant in trying to apply these criteria in particular cases.

Growth, the Environment and Equality

We have mentioned two basic economic objectives: maximizing the size of the cake and achieving the desired share out of the cake. This is extremely important in the context of the environmental problem. For, as already indicated, some of the pressures to allocate more resources to the environment imply taking more away from certain members of the community than might be justified in terms of the welfare of society taken as a whole. Furthermore, although it is probably true that the poorer groups in society are more likely to be the victims of a bad environment than are the richer groups, who can more readily move away from noisy or polluted localities, the poor are still likely to attach relatively more importance to increased material consumption or better housing or better working conditions in factories than the rich. And, at the same time, insofar as the costs of greater environmental protection are passed on in higher prices, income distribution might become more unequal. The income distribution aspects of environmental protection are, clearly, bound up with the problem of how much of current output should be devoted to the environment.

To some extent even the growth problem, too, raises income distribution considerations. For the way that consumption is distributed over time implies a distribution of consumption between different generations of people. If we decide to have less consumption now in order to achieve future improvement of the environment (or other components of consumption), we are, to some extent, deciding to redistribute consumption away from present generations in favor of future generations. It should not be assumed, without question, that this is a more egalitarian distribution. Future generations may be much richer anyway. And there is little doubt that a large proportion of the world's population alive today is very poor by any standard. Hence, it would be more egalitarian to advocate higher consumption today, and hence less investment and growth, on the grounds that we should not attach much weight to providing even higher standards of living for future generations, rather than to argue—as do some anti-growth proponents—that we should have slower growth in the *interest* of future generations.

On the other hand, it may well be that faster growth is a necessary condition for making the distribution of incomes more nearly equal. Clearly, it is easier to raise the relative position of the poorer members of a community when this does not actually involve an absolute cut in the standard of living of the more affluent members of society. The more the incomes of the latter can be maintained, or kept rising, the easier it will be to reduce their *share* in total income. This is one of the reasons why, in spite of certain obvious disadvantages of growth for the middle classes, it would not be in their true interests

to have zero growth, since the pressures for rising living standards by the less affluent would still persist, and the only way these pressures could be satisfied in a zero growth context would be via cuts in the living standards of the more affluent.

Need for Public Action

The growth problem and the environment problem are serious problems of social choice.

It cannot be assumed that the environment will look after itself in the absence of appropriate government policies. The characteristic feature of the environment is that, for most practical purposes, nobody owns it. Hence, it is used and misused by individuals, firms, and, for that matter, public bodies as well, without any automatic restraint in the form of obligation to compensate the owners for its use. To some extent the situation has been remedied in the past, particularly in Britain, by controls of one kind or another. But now that the environment is becoming an increasingly important ingredient in the welfare of the public, an ad hoc system of controls—such as that which is being introduced in the United States—that is not clearly founded on any criteria of rational choice can no longer be allowed to suffice. Much more attention must now be given to the elaboration of rational criteria for environmental policy and to the collection of the data needed to apply them. Furthermore, any policies to influence resource allocation will affect income distribution. In a democratic society, therefore, it is essential that environmental policies should not be influenced solely by the more powerful and articulate—though possibly minority—interests for whom other needs, such as food, clothing, housing and working conditions, are now less important. The implementation of environmental policies raises important issues concerning the decision-making machinery to be used.

Another reason for public intervention in environmental matters is the “public good” character of many of the measures needed in order to preserve and clean up the environment. That is to say, some of the environmental services needed are similar to traditional public services, such as the provision of basic hygiene facilities, the control of infectious diseases, the institutions of law and order, and so on. The market mechanism cannot be expected to supply the socially desirable amount of such services, so the state has to fill the gap. However, the gap will not be filled in the absence of well-informed and responsible public pressures.

BOOK REVIEWS

A VICTIM OF POLITICAL TERROR

By Edmund Fuller

Mr. Fuller is a teacher and author of several books on modern fiction. He is the daily book critic of *The Wall Street Journal*, from which his review is reprinted.

Surviving the Long Night: An Autobiographical Account of a Political Kidnapping. By Sir Geoffrey Jackson. New York: Vanguard. 226 pp.

There are more than enough chronicles of our time calculated to cast down, thus we may rejoice at one that offers a remarkable lift to our spirits. It is *Surviving the Long Night: An Autobiographical Account of a Political Kidnapping*, by Sir Geoffrey Jackson. The power of this narrative comes from the rare qualities of its author, an authentic man for all seasons.

Sir Geoffrey, a career diplomat, was British Ambassador to Uruguay when, in Montevideo, on the 8th of January, 1971, he was kidnapped by the urban guerrillas known as Tupamaros. He endured a harrowing captivity for 244 days, sometimes achieving an extraordinary relationship with his always hooded captors. His survival, physically and spiritually, is a notable example of that grace under pressure so admired by Ernest Hemingway. Also, the book makes striking comparative reading with Graham Greene's novel, *The Honorary Consul* (1973),

about an analogous but fictitious kidnapping.

Ambassador Jackson had foreseen the event so clearly that, in late 1970, he flew to London to advise his superiors of the probabilities. He faced the prospects also with his wife and grown son—family devotion being one of his main resources when the anticipated happened.

Warnings

There had been a series of sinister events in Latin America. In Guatemala, Count von Spreti, the German Ambassador, was abducted and murdered. In Brazil, the U.S., German, and Swiss ambassadors had been kidnapped and exchanged for political prisoners.

On the very morning that Sir Geoffrey returned to Montevideo from London, Gordon Jones, a second secretary of the U.S. Embassy, was kidnapped but made a resourceful escape. The same day, Dan Mitrione, a U.S. police official serving as a technical aide to the Uruguayan government, was kidnapped and, a week or so later, murdered. Dr. Claude Fry, an elderly soil technician, was seized and long imprisoned.

Then came the morning when Sir Geoffrey's car was blocked on a crowded street. He was seized by armed, masked men, driven off in his own car and then transferred to

a van. He was pistol-whipped and his wrists were bound behind him by a steel wire "butterfly," the improvised Tupamaro handcuffs, so cruelly tightened that one of his wrists remained paralyzed for three months. He was kept in a damp, underground, pig-wired cage for the first two months. Flooding and other complications finally led to his transfer to another "People's Prison" even more cramped but drier.

In both places he was under constant guard by shifts of hooded guerrillas, men and women, of drastically varying natures, ranging from the occasionally frightening psychopath to some of courtesy and innate decency. Often he confounded these young Marxist-Leninists by his ability to parry their stock rhetoric and turn the logic of their own premises against them, not in idle debate but in his firm demand for rights and concessions in his treatment, and in adroitly responding to long, repeated interrogations.

Like uncowed political or war prisoners of all time, he understood the necessity to formulate a concise plan of "conduct and attitudes." He would not allow himself to sink below his own standards as a gentleman, a representative of his government, a man of cultivation, keen intellect and, as the test proved, of iron inner strength. A devout Roman Catholic, he preserved his spiritual calm in prayer and reading the Bible, which was among the books he was able to obtain. In his mid-fifties, Sir Geoffrey had attained that "ripeness" stressed by Shakespeare, another of his mainstays.

Discipline of Mind

His jailers were astonished at his "coolness," his self-disciplines, including such limited physical regimens as running in place. Deliberately shielded from awareness of night or day, he managed to keep his own calendar by a kind of dead reckoning which, at the close of eight months, turned out to be only a day and a half "out of true." He fed his spirit on the stores of literature in several languages with which his mind was stocked, living, in Thornton Wilder's phrase, in the noble weather of his own mind.

Determined to make sure that "in the midst of madness and fury, it was I who remained calm and sane," he managed to preserve even the grace of humor and guarded himself against hypersensitivity.

There is no purpose in imagining deliberate cruelty when either it does not exist or, if it does, is inherent in the situation rather than arbitrarily superimposed on it. Only occasionally in my captivity did I meet personal cruelty with the unmistakable reek of malice or sadism identifiable with it.

His kidnapping seemed largely a public-relation coup; his captors arranged two interviews with him, by different journalists, released with pictures to the world press for propaganda effect.

One day, "I found myself at the viewing rather than the participating end when another human being was thrust, dumped like some kind of a package, appalled, horrified yet unvanquished, into this abominable environment." With this Uruguay-

an, Ricardo Ferres, he formed a friendship.

Politics and Friendship


With his own depth of historical understanding, he managed a compassion for the youthful idealists and ideologues who were his captors, knowing better than they what awaited them. He saw

only two prospects for the rank-and-file Tupamaro. The first would be to achieve personal "room at the top" via a classic power-struggle, which the senior Tupamaros seemed to me already to contemplate. The second would be their early liquidation, as having served their purpose, which to their idealism, however lethal in its immediate term, was evidently inconceivable. I listened to them with sadness, asking myself at what point does martyrdom degenerate into vulgar cannon-fodder. And who, in this dreadful place, was the true prisoner?

He kept the political abyss be-

tween them distinct from human consideration—an achievement that touched many of his captors. One young couple, when their guard stint was ended, "stretched their hands through the pig-wire and asked to take mine. 'You will walk with us all our lives, Ambassador,' were the girl's words. I return them with all my heart, to her and her young man, wherever they may be."

He ponders the revolutionary psychology. "It is as well always to keep in mind that behind all the ideological protestations of the new Revolution lies the ultimate and unchanging sanction of raw force." In his reflections on his prison reading, he hints that he contemplates further writing about "the strange and irrefutable responses of the human spirit to captivity and solitude." One awaits it eagerly. Meanwhile, it is elevating and heartening to dwell awhile with Sir Geoffrey Jackson in the paradoxical confinement of his cage and the boundless freedom of his spirit.



A STRONG MAN'S TRAGEDY

By Eugene D. Genovese

The reviewer is a professor of history at the University of Rochester; his most recent book, *Roll Jordan Roll: the World the Slaves Made*, published in 1974, received a National Book Award. This review is excerpted from the *National Review*.

Booker T. Washington: The Making of a Black Leader—1856-1901. By Louis R. Harlan. Oxford University Press. 379 pp.

Booker T. Washington was a bad man. He compromised with those strong enough to kill him and trample his people. He countenanced racial segregation in a period when he had no choice. He built a political machine that functioned like a political machine instead of a knitting circle. He rewarded his friends and ruthlessly punished his enemies and, what is worse, got away with it. His whole life, in fact, consisted of a perverse recitation of liberal no-nos. This litany has been familiar in recent years, so we ought not to be surprised at its reappearance even in Louis R. Harlan's new and superior biography.

Booker T. Washington's life reads like a black Horatio Alger rags to riches success story. Born a slave in Virginia, he worked day and night to get an education, earn a living and make a man out of himself. Largely through his own effort but also with

help from some friendly white people, he attended Virginia's Hampton Institute and caught the eye of its head, General Samuel Chapman Armstrong. With Armstrong's backing, he went on to the leadership of Alabama's new Tuskegee Institute, which he had to build virtually from scratch and which he patterned on Hampton.

Black Paternalism

The rest of the story is familiar: He championed vocational training for blacks; argued that blacks would win acceptance into white America by making themselves economically indispensable; fought to instill a Puritan work ethic into a people who had been raised into a radically different culture; won the admiration and support of powerful Northern as well as Southern big businessmen and politicians; counseled black acquiescence in white domination of the South; built a formidable national machine of his own with white money, and used it to control the black press and to crush militants who dissented from his strategy; and, in a word, put a black imprimatur on a grim racial settlement.

Washington's economic program has aptly been characterized by Professor Harlan as "peasant conservatism—small property accumulation, education of a practical sort,

recognition of the dignity of toil, and 'doing the common everyday things of life uncommonly without a murmur.'" In 1895, Washington electrified the South and soared to national prominence with his famous speech to the Atlanta Exposition. "Cast down your buckets where you are," he urged Southern blacks. You have nowhere to go. Stay put and dig in. Make your labor so valuable that the white South must offer you respect and conditions for advancement as a matter of its own survival. Toward this end he openly accepted social segregation and political quiescence.

He did not take this course happily. As Harlan shows, he surreptitiously financed court challenges to segregation and did what he could to keep the vote in the hands of at least literate and economically solid blacks. But his star had risen during a period of intense racist reaction, replete with lynchings, disenfranchisement, and savage repression on every level. Deserted by Northern Republicans, without allies or resources, his people were at their nadir. Washington maneuvered to save what could be saved—which was not much. He bargained away what had already been lost anyway. It is difficult to see what else he could have done.

An Unworkable Economic Strategy

Washington's tragedy, as his brilliant critic W.E.B. Du Bois saw, was that the economic strategy on which he pinned his hopes had no prospects. By the time he advanced it, the national economy and the new system of large-scale corporate or-



Booker T. Washington (1856-1915)

ganization had proceeded so far that, at best, the blacks could hope only to establish a secure place for themselves at the bottom of the social scale. In fact, they could not even do that much. Unlike European immigrants, who successfully battled against discrimination and hardship in order to win acceptance in the social and economic order, the blacks had actually experienced considerable deterioration in their condition as a result of unparalleled racist attack. They had, for example, established themselves in a variety of trades in the North as well as the South during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries only to find themselves driven out, not by economic competition, but by terror and violence.

After the fall of the Confederacy blacks found it extremely difficult to buy land or enter skilled trades, no matter how hard they had worked to accumulate money or train themselves. Whites would not sell them land or hire them for skilled work:

the homes of the skilled and propertied blacks were burned and looted; and they were murdered with impunity. To expect them to regain their lost positions in the teeth of the postwar reaction was to follow a will o' the wisp. The fight, as Dr. Du Bois saw, could not be waged by individuals in the great tradition of early American self-reliance; it had to be waged by the black community as a whole, and to do so would require political organization and intellectual leadership as well as individual economic effort.

Harlan deals roughly with Washington for his myopia, for his reliance on the patronage of white big businessmen, his autocratic domination of the black press and organizations, and for his own patronage-distributing machine. But again, what choice did he have? His Northern black critics performed an invaluable service in opening fire against him, for in so doing they helped prevent his compromises from becoming principles and his defensive strategy from becoming a way of life. But nowhere in the relative safety of the North, much less in the South, were they able to mobilize the black masses and adopt a successful alternative strategy. It is one thing for Harlan to point out that Washington's strategy came at a high price and that blacks are still paying for it. It is quite another for him to write as if Washington had another course open to him. If he did, Harlan ought to have told us what it was and how it could have been consolidated in Alabama—or anywhere else for that matter.

Leadership in the Worst of Times

To render this criticism plausible Harlan must return to another favorite theme of liberal criticism: Rich and powerful whites, not blacks, created Washington's position of leadership. But this criticism, however valid on the surface, begs the question. Why did not an authentic black leadership rise against him? However that question may be answered, one thing remains clear. The black masses, battered by violence, demoralized by the abandonment of their white allies and the dashing of their post-Emancipation hopes for equality, without an existing political leadership, simply lacked the resources to develop a leadership that could survive in the face of white hostility. But if so, then Washington, as a transitional leader, did all he or any other black leader could have done. He held his people together, defended their honor, and bided his time. Unheroic. But necessary.

Harlan rebukes Washington for pinning "his faith not in equality and democracy but in leadership and discipline." He does not tell us how the struggle of a downtrodden people for any kind of equality and democracy would be possible without leadership and discipline. The criticism sounds all the more strange since blacks today so readily admit that the absence of leadership and discipline — of a strong center capable of creating a cohesive political movement — constitutes their greatest weakness in the battle for equality. Harlan's discomfort with Washington's paternalistic iron rule of both the Tuskegee Institute and

his national political apparatus misses the point. Slavery had been the ultimate paternalistic system, and blacks as well as whites had been molded by it. Washington's methods reflected a profound knowledge of his people and their condition. Harlan seems to think that Washington ought to have introduced "democracy" into his political plantations, but had he done so, neither he nor his work would likely have survived a year, especially in view of the white racist colossus he

had to spend every day of his life trying to outmaneuver.

Harlan's criticisms are nonetheless important, for they outline the debilitating long-term consequences of the narrowly economic strategy of racial accommodationism. They constitute criticism of the legacy rather than of the man himself. Booker T. Washington accomplished as much as he or anyone in his place could have. If, in so doing, he ended in tragedy, that strategy was also his people's—and ours.



AMERICAN VISIONARY

By Kenneth Evett

Kenneth Evett is chairman of the department of art, College of Architecture, Art and Planning, Cornell University. His review is reprinted from *The New Republic*.

Whistler. By Stanley Weintraub. New York: Weybright & Talley. 498 pp.

The give-and-take between native-born American artists and the civilization of Europe is one of the fascinating features of our cultural history. Transatlantic contacts that began with Pocahontas and Benjamin West continue to this day, and they have been both traumatic and fruitful. American creative pilgrims of the nineteenth century, conditioned by their geographic remoteness and provincial isolation, brought to their voyage of rediscovery a unique mixture of innocence, curiosity, humility, young-country confidence and book-learned familiarity. Most of them took what they could from the experience, which no doubt changed them for life, and eventually returned to continue their careers on native grounds. However a few talented dropouts like the writer Henry James and the painters Mary Cassatt and James McNeill Whistler settled in Europe for good and as expatriate outsiders made their way on the great stage of European cul-

tural life. How these colonials from the wilds of the New World reacted to that milieu, how their American roots sustained or hampered them, and how they managed to move into the thick of advanced contemporary continental creative activity are all questions particular to the circumstance. Of this expatriate contingent, Whistler was one of the most gifted, cantankerous, influential and consistently American.

Stanley Weintraub's biography is a thorough and impartial account, rich in original source material, letters, writings and reported quotations of the artist and his contemporaries that provide valuable insights and fresh revelations of Whistler's epoch, his views of art,

Self-portrait
James McNeill Whistler (1834-1903)



and the ups and downs of his vivid career.

Destined from the outset to an existence of movement and contrary forces, Whistler was born in Lowell, Massachusetts, offspring of a devoutly puritanical mother with Southern antecedents and a military engineer father who, as a prototype of the globe-ranging technologically proficient Yankee, was invited by Czar Nicholas I to supervise the building of the Moscow-St. Petersburg railroad. Young Whistler was transplanted to Russia at age four. There he lived in princely style, had a French tutor, took drawing lessons at the Imperial Academy, visited Paris, and studied in England before returning to America. Subsequently he lived on a farm near Pomfret, Connecticut, enrolled at West Point, was kicked out, had a brief irksome job making images for the Coast Survey Office in Washington, where he learned the technique of etching, cheerfully lost his job, and finally persuaded his family to send him to Paris to study art. He left the United States in 1855 and never returned.

The Unorthodox American

In Paris, his head filled with Murger's visions of *la vie de Bohème*, he engaged in alternately lazy and intense study, had liaisons with several French girls, made friends with Fantin-Latour, Legros and du Maurier, discovered the prints of Hokusai, was a sometime disciple of Courbet, enjoyed the youthful pleasures of attacking the art establishment of the day and, by the time he was twenty-four, had made a

place for himself, along with Manet and Degas, as a significant member of the vanguard of the time. However, he left that company for the less competitive, comparatively provincial environment of London, which remained home base for the rest of his life, though he traveled considerably in Europe, sometimes settled in Venice or Paris, and once set forth on a quixotic semi-military adventure to Valparaiso.

In England he battled it out on his own unorthodox esthetic and personal terms, supporting himself and his unstable menage of sequential red-haired model mistresses, illegitimate offspring, servants and later on a wife, by portrait commissions and the sale of etchings and pastels. He knew and frequently fought with most of the notable British creative lights of the time, including Swinburne (who later called Whistler "a little viper"), Oscar Wilde (with whom he gratuitously traded both private and publicity-calculated insults), Carlyle. When he displayed his most radical visionary work, "Nocturne in Black and Gold: the Falling Rocket" at the Grosvenor Gallery, John Ruskin wrote, "I have seen and heard much of Cockney impudence before now, but never expected to hear a coxcomb ask two hundred pounds for flinging a pot of paint in the public face." This historically wrong-headed pronouncement not only became one of the classic errors of conservative criticism (later to be used as justification in reverse for all manner of excesses); it also provoked Whistler to sue the author for libel. The trial, with its potential

danger of repressive censorship for both parties, was a Kafkaesque, comic-opera mix-up of legal maneuvers and subjective art criticism passing as testimony.

In his defense Whistler tossed off a number of witty sarcasms and made a few radical remarks: "I was making an arrangement of tones." "It was an arrangement of line, form, and color first." He wrote in a newspaper article:

Art should be independent of all clap-trap—should stand alone, and appeal to the artistic sense of eyes or ear, without confounding this with emotions entirely foreign to it, as devotion, pity, love, patriotism and the like. All these have no concern with it; and that is why I insist on calling my works "arrangements" and "harmonies."


A Penny for the Old Guy

The jury was probably unaware of the importance of these heresies and decided in Whistler's favor, awarding him one mere farthing for his pains—a sum scarcely adequate to cover his enormous legal expenses. Temporarily he lost face and commissions, went bankrupt, fought back and became the notorious gadfly (or butterfly) wit and tolerated eccentric for the philistine "islanders" of Victorian London. Only later in life did he achieve the international recognition he craved and deserved. For a time he was a cult figure for the French symbolists and influenced a number of painters, poets and musicians, including Debussy, Lautrec, Mallarmé and Proust. He died at sixty-nine, was buried on an appropriately muted grey rainy day.

Throughout his life Whistler carried a particular psychic baggage of American puritanism, provincial cockiness, West Point illusions of gentlemanly military machismo, and a trumped-up vision of himself as a disinherited Southern cavalier, with the race prejudice against blacks and Jews that he assumed went with the role. But he was a creature of many roles and perverse contradictions. A small, wiry man, about the same size as Mozart, he had a similar capacity for high spirits and creative self-assurance. His foppish affectation of dress bordered on the effeminate, but his bellicosity ("my nature needs enemies") was far from ladylike. He could be charming to both men and women, had a host of friends and followers, but banished them to outer darkness if they crossed him or threatened his ego. He made of himself an artistic creation, a quintessential nineteenth-century aristocratically independent master-painter, and he had the talent to support the role.

Greys, Blacks and Whites

In one of those happy conjunctions of artist, time and place, Whistler connected with the most vital esthetic ideas of his day. Courbet's realism taught him to observe his immediate environment and led him to those images in nature that suited his special vision (though he later called Courbet's influence "disgusting"). The nineteenth century French preoccupation with the art of Japan made him aware of abstract problems of tonal balance, weights and arbitrary placement.



Arrangement in Black, (Portrait of Frederick R. Leyland)

The emancipated mark-making and free brushwork that he learned from his observation of paintings by Velázquez and Manet gave him range for his own highly energetic and personal gestures. And of course the liberating color discoveries of the impressionists were of use to him. Although he had periods of creative impotence, was

prone to endless rubbing out, redoing and destroying, was frequently spoken of as an artist who had failed to realize his promise, Whistler did manage to produce a body of work that influenced the course of Western art. His "art for art's sake" posture, his defense of the nonreferential values of art, and the formal refinements of his work all paved the way for the flowering of abstract art. In the reductive simplicity of certain "Venetian" etchings, the rectangular frontality of his compositions, the emphasis on graduations of value, and in his "Arrangement in Black" (portrait of Frederick R. Leyland) it is easy to find the sources that ultimately led to the grisly black and grey works of Reinhardt and Rothko. But whereas those strivings for puritanic silence represent the abstract aspect of Whistler's work carried to the point of masochistic nihilism, what makes him fresh again today is his open response to the tones and moods of nature, his trained capacity to recreate visual experiences from memory, and the empathetic vitality of his drawing. Even though he frequently lamented that he had never learned to draw, and indeed his drawing is occasionally thin and flimsy, he did have a wonderfully spirited physical touch. And when that lively force is joined with his sensitivity to nuances and his adroit and audacious sense of order, his work takes on an exuberant authority that ranks him with the best painters of the nineteenth century.

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
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SUMMER 1977

THE AMERICAN MAN

ON MANAGERS AND MANAGEMENT

Peter F. Drucker

THE INNOVATIVE ORGANIZATION

David C. McClelland and David H. Byrne

THE NEED FOR POWER

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BOOK REVIEWS

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ON MANAGERS AND MANAGEMENT

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A NOTE TO THE READER

Unlike lawyers, doctors or engineers, managers constitute a professional class without a formal body of doctrine or science. They are, as Henry Mintzberg points out in his article, masters of the *ad hoc*, the quick decision made under pressure and based on an odd assortment of information, ranging from gossip to computer printouts. True, we have seen in recent years the mushrooming of schools of business and public administration whose purpose is to organize a credible mass of knowledge that will throw light on, and add wisdom to, the manager's role. The outsider who dips into the literature of management, however, finds much of it diffuse, portentous, and laced with jargon.

So there is a temptation to dismiss the claims of management as self-aggrandizing, perhaps even a bit comic. But this would be a grievous mistake. For managers are the people who, more than any other group or class, run our world. They make more of the business decisions than owner-capitalists; they direct the public industries and services in countries of every ideological hue; and they occupy the crucial positions in every government bureau.

We may not accept the mystique that endows managers with a command of arcane skills. But management deserves our most scrupulous study because it determines, to a large degree, how well our economies, our private institutions, and our governments are conducted. The articles in our special section were chosen for their absence of jargon, their vigor of argument, and their illuminating detail. They raise serious and debatable questions about the manager's actual job, his motivation, his capacity to innovate, and the possibilities of improving his performance.

We will return to the subject of management in future issues, and we invite letters from our readers as contributions to the ongoing discussion.

N.G.

Special Section.

On Managers and Management

THE INNOVATIVE ORGANIZATION

By Peter F. Drucker

Tributes to "innovation" are ritual in most discussions of management. Here Peter F. Drucker argues that innovation in business or in public life is too often confused with improvement of existing activities. Rather, he says, starting something entirely new is a uniquely difficult, complex, but exhilarating process, with its own special rules and dangers. It is also indispensable to modern life, the alternative being stagnation.

Dr. Drucker is professor of social sciences at Claremont Graduate School in California and a leading management consultant for business and government in the United States and abroad. His books include *Managing for Results*, *The Age of Discontinuity* and, most recently, *Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices* (published by Harper & Row), from which this article is adapted.



The "need to innovate" is emphasized in every book on management. But beyond this the books, as a rule, pay little attention to what management must do to stimulate innovation and to make it effective. Most discussions stress, almost exclusively, the administrative function of management, that is, the task of keeping going and of improving what is already known and what is already being done. Little thought or space is normally devoted to the entrepreneurial function of creating effectively and purposefully the new and the different.

In this neglect of the management of innovation, the books only mirror business reality. Every management stresses the need to innovate. But few, in the large as well as the small businesses, organize innovation as a distinct and major task.

There were good reasons in the past for the focus on the administrative function to the neglect of innovation. When management first became a concern, in the early years of this century, the great need was to learn how to structure and run the large-scale organizations which were suddenly coming into being. Innovation, insofar as

The American Review

it received attention, was seen as a separate job, a job done by the individual, by the "inventor." Or it was seen as a predominantly technical job, that of research. Moreover there was not too much scope for innovation in the years from 1920 to 1950 when most of the basic work of management was being done. For contrary to common belief, these were not years of rapid change, either in technology or in society.

Now, however, we may be entering a period of rapid change more comparable in its basic features to the closing decades of the nineteenth century than to the immediate past with which we are familiar. In the late nineteenth century, as we need to remind ourselves, a new major invention leading almost immediately to the emergence of a new major industry surfaced every few months on the average. This period began in 1856, the year that saw both Siemens's dynamo and Perkins' aniline dye. It ended with the development of the electronic tube in 1911. In between came typewriter and automobile, electric light bulb, man-made fibers, tractors, streetcars, synthetic drugs, telephone, radio, and airplane—to mention only a few. In between, in other words, came the modern world.

By contrast, no truly new major industry was started after 1914 until the late 1950s, when computers first became operational.

Social Change

Just as the late nineteenth century was a period of tremendous innovative activity in industrial technology, so also was it in social and economic institutions. The Local Government reform in Great Britain which began in the middle of the nineteenth century created new institutions, new relationships; above all, it established new tasks for government. Building the modern welfare state began shortly thereafter in Bismarck's Germany. At about the same time—the 1880's—the United States made a major contribution to the arts and practice of government: the regulatory commission. Every one of the New Deal reforms of the 1930s had been discussed, worked out, and in many cases put in practice on the local or state level twenty years earlier, that is, in the Progressive Era just before World War I.

The American university as we know it today was the innovative creation of half a dozen brilliant university presidents between 1860 and 1900. The modern hospital was essentially designed between 1900 and 1920. Armed services took their present shape in the two major conflicts of the mid-nineteenth century, the American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. Since then, the development has been linear—larger armies, more firepower, more armor, but fundamentally the same strategies and tactics and indeed even the same stress on "hardware technology," that is, its physical com-

ponents. Even such radical technical innovations as the tank and the airplane were largely integrated into traditional command structures and traditional military doctrines.

Now the need for social and political innovation is becoming urgent again. The modern metropolis needs new governmental forms. The relationship between man and his environment has to be thought through and restructured. No modern government governs effectively anymore. The crisis of the world is, above all, an institutional crisis demanding institutional innovation.

Challenge to Business

The business enterprise, its structure and organization, the way in which it integrates knowledge into work and work into performance—and the way in which it integrates enterprise with society and government—these are also areas of major innovative need and innovative opportunity. Surely there is need in the social and economic sphere for another period of innovative activity such as we last lived through in the second half of the nineteenth century.

In sharp contrast to the nineteenth century, however, innovation from now on will have to be built into existing organizations. Large businesses—and equally large public-service institutions—will have to become increasingly capable of organizing themselves for innovations as well as for administration. Since innovation creates new wealth or new potential of action rather than new knowledge, this means that the bulk of innovative efforts will have to come from the places that control the manpower and the money needed for development and marketing—that is, from existing businesses and existing public-service institutions.

This does not mean that the small business, or even the lone entrepreneur, will not continue to play an important role. Nothing is further from the truth than the hoary myth of the Populists that the small man is being squeezed out of the marketplace by the giants. The innovative growth companies of the last twenty-five years all started as small businesses. And by and large the small businesses have done far better than the giants.

An established company which in an age demanding innovation is not capable of innovation is doomed to decline and extinction. And a management which in such a period does not know how to manage innovation is incompetent and unequal to its task.

The Dynamics of Innovation

The measure of any innovation is its impact on the environment. Innovation in a business enterprise must therefore always be market-focused. Innovation that is product-focused is likely to produce “miracles of technology” but disappointing rewards.

The outstanding innovators among the world's pharmaceutical companies define their goal as new drugs that will make a significant difference to medical practice and to patient health. They do not define innovation in terms of research, but in terms of the practice of medicine. Similarly, Bell Laboratories always starts out with the question, "What will make a difference to telephone *service*?"

Not surprisingly, however, it is precisely the most market-focused innovator who has come up with some of the most important technical or scientific advances. Bell Laboratories, for instance, created the transistor, produced the basic mathematics of information theory, and is responsible for some of the fundamental discoveries underlying the computer. To start out with the consumer's or client's need for a significant change is often the most direct way to define new science, new knowledge, and new technology.

“
A concept is stronger than a fact.

Charlotte P. Gilman
”

One guide to an area ripe for innovation is the basic *economic* vulnerability of a process, a technology, or an industry. Wherever an industry enjoys rising market demand without being able to turn that demand into profit, one can, in most cases, safely predict that a major innovation (in process, product, distributive channel, or customer expectations) will produce high rewards.

Examples abound. One is the paper industry, which, all the world over, has enjoyed rapidly expanding consumer demand—on the order of 5 to 10 percent a year, year in and year out—without being able apparently to earn a decent return on its capital. There is the steel industry, which is in a very similar position. But there is also life insurance, which is one of the few “products” a customer is ready to buy—one of the few products, by the way, in which the interests of producer and consumer are completely identical—and which yet has to be sold through “hard-sell” methods and against apparently very high buyer resistance.

Responding to Change

Similarly, innovative opportunity exists where there is glaring disparity between various levels of an economy or of a market.

The major growth industry in Latin America in the 1960s, for instance, was not manufacturing. It was retail distribution. Huge masses of people flocked into the cities, moving from a subsistence economy into a money economy. Individually they were, of course,

mostly very poor. But collectively they represented large new purchasing power. Yet the distribution system in most Latin American countries remained in the pre-urban mold—small shops, undercapitalized, undermanaged, poorly stocked, and yet with very slow turnover. Wherever an entrepreneur moved in to offer modern distribution—Sears, Roebuck was the first to recognize the opportunity—success was instantaneous.

Another area of innovative opportunity is the exploitation of the consequences of events that have already happened but have not yet had their economic impacts. Demographic developments, i.e., changes in population, are among the most important. They are also the most nearly certain. Changes in knowledge are less certain—the lead time is difficult to predict. But they too offer opportunities. Then, most important, but least certain, are changes in awareness, changes in vision, changes in people's expectations.

Finally, of course, there are the innovations that are not part of the pattern, the innovations that are unexpected and that change the world rather than exploit it. They are the innovations in which an entrepreneur sets out to make something happen. They are the truly important innovations. They are the innovations of a Henry Ford, who envisioned something that did not exist at the time, namely a mass market, and then set about to make it happen.

These innovations lie outside of the probability distribution—or, at least, they place so far toward the extreme as to be grossly improbable. They are also clearly the most risky ones. For every one such innovation that succeeds, there must be ninety-nine that fail, ninety-nine of which nothing is ever heard. So, while they must be watched for, they cannot be the object of systematic activity within the business enterprise. They cannot be managed.

Innovative Strategy

An ongoing business assumes that present product lines and services, present markets and present distribution channels, present technologies and processes will continue. Thus the first objective of a strategy for the ongoing business is to optimize what already exists or is being established.

In contrast, an innovative strategy assumes that whatever exists is aging and will soon have to be changed or replaced. The governing device of a strategy for the ongoing business might therefore be said to be: "Better and More." For the innovative strategy the device has to be: "New and Different."

The foundation of innovative strategy is planning and systematic sloughing off the old, the dying, the obsolete. Innovating organizations spend neither time nor resources on defending yesterday. Systematic abandonment of yesterday alone can free the resources, and

especially the scarcest resource of them all, capable people, for work on the new. Thus the failure of the General Electric Company to establish itself as a computer producer is explained in large part by its unwillingness or inability to make available managers and professionals of the high quality and proven performance capacity needed. To be sure, GE assigned many good people to its computer group. But few of them were allowed to stay there long. No sooner were they gone from their original post in a research lab or a large division than the cry went up, "we cannot do without them," and back they went to their old assignments of improving what was already known and what was already done.

“

You can never plan the future by the past.

Edmund Burke

”

Second in a strategy of innovation is the clear recognition that innovation efforts must aim high. It is just as difficult, as a rule, to make a minor modification to an existing product as it is to innovate a new one. In either case, the mortality rate of innovations is—and should be—high. Innovative strategy therefore aims at creating a new business rather than a product within an already established line. It aims at creating new performance capacity rather than improvement. The goal of innovating efforts is to make a significant difference. What is significantly different is not a technical decision. It is not the quality of science that makes the difference. It is not how expensive an undertaking it is or how hard it is to bring it about. The significant difference lies in the impact on the market place and the consumer public.

An innovation does not proceed in a nice linear progression. For a good long time, sometimes for years, there is only effort and no results. The first results are then usually meager. Indeed, the first products are rarely what the customer will eventually buy. The first markets are rarely the major markets.

Even more difficult to predict than the eventual success of the genuinely new is the speed with which it will establish itself. There are the computer, the antibiotics, the Xerox machine—all innovations that swept the market. But for every successful innovation that brings results faster than anyone anticipates, there are five others—in the end often equally successful—which for long years seem to make only frustratingly slow headway. The outstanding example may be the steam-driven ship. By 1835 its superiority was clearly established; but it did not replace the sailing ship until fifty

years later. Indeed, the "golden age of sail" in which the great clippers reached perfection began only after the steamship had been fully developed. For almost half a century, in other words, the steamship continued to be "tomorrow" and never seemed to become "today."

But then, after a long, frustrating period of gestation, the successful innovation rises meteorically. It becomes within a few short years a new major industry or a new major product line and market. But until it has reached that point it cannot be predicted when it will take off, nor indeed whether it ever will.

Measurements and Budgets

Innovation strategy requires different measurements and a different use of budgets and budgetary controls from those appropriate to an ongoing business.

To impose on innovating efforts the measurements, and especially the accounting conventions that fit ongoing businesses, is misdirection. It cripples the innovative effort the way putting a one-hundred-pound pack on his back would cripple a six-year-old going on a hike. And it also fails to give true control. Finally, it may become a threat when the innovation becomes successful. For then it needs controls that are appropriate to rapid growth, that is, controls which show what efforts and investments are needed to exploit success and prevent overextension.

In the innovative effort the first and most serious question is "Is it the right opportunity?" And if the answer is yes, one asks, "What is the maximum of good people and key resources which can productively be put to work *at this stage*?"

A separate measurement system for innovative effort makes it possible to appraise the three factors that determine innovative strategy: the ultimate opportunity, the risk of failure, and the effort and expenditure needed. Otherwise, efforts will be continued or will even be stepped up where the opportunity is quite limited while the risk of nonsuccess is great.

Innovative strategy, therefore, requires a high degree of discipline on the part of the innovator. He has to operate without the crutch of the conventional budget and accounting measures which feed back fairly fast and reasonably reliable information from current results to efforts and investments. The temptation is to keep on pouring people and money into innovative efforts without any results. It is therefore important in managing innovation to think through what one expects, and when. Inevitably, these expectations are changed by events. But unless there are intermediate results along the way, the innovation is not being managed.

When Du Pont engaged, in the late 1920s, in the polymer research

that eventually led to nylon more than ten years later, no one was willing or able to predict whether mastery of polymer technology would lead to synthetic rubber, to textile fibers, to synthetic leathers, or to new lubricants. (In the end, of course, it led to all of them.) It was not until fairly close to the end of the work that it became clear that synthetic fibers would be the first major commercial product. But from the beginning Du Pont, together with Dr. Wallace H. Carrothers, the research scientist in charge, systematically laid out a road map of what kind of findings and results could be expected and when. This map was changed every two or three years as results came in. But it was always redrawn again for the next stages along the road. And only when Carrothers came up with polymer fibers, which then made large-scale development work possible, did Du Pont commit itself to massive investment. Until then, the total cost was essentially the cost of supporting Carrothers and a few assistants.

A strategy for innovation has to be based on clear acceptance of the risk of failure—and of the perhaps more dangerous risk of “near-success.” It is as important to decide when to abandon an innovative effort as it is to know which one to start. It is therefore particularly important in managing innovation to think through and to write out one’s expectations. And then, once the innovation has become a product, a process, or a business, one compares one’s expectations to reality. If reality is significantly below expectations, one does not pour in more men or more money. One rather asks, “Should we not go out of this, and how?”

The Innovative Attitude

In the traditional managerial organization, top management is the final judge. This means, in effect, that management’s most important power is the veto power, and its most important role is to say “no” to proposals and ideas that are not completely thought through and worked out. In the innovative organization, the first and most important job of management is the opposite: it is to convert impractical, half-baked, and wild ideas into concrete innovative reality. In the innovation organization top management sees it as its job to listen to ideas and to take them seriously. New ideas are always “impractical,” and it takes a great many silly ideas to spawn one viable one. Indeed in the early stages there is no way of distinguishing the silly idea from the stroke of genius. Both look equally impossible or equally brilliant.

Top management in the innovative organization, therefore, not only “encourages” ideas, as all managements are told to do. It asks continuously, “What would this idea have to be like to be practical, realistic, effective?” It organizes itself to think through rapidly even

the wildest and apparently silliest idea for something new to the point where its feasibility can be appraised.

This, however, presupposes restructuring relations between top management and the human group within the enterprise. The traditional organization, of course, remains. Indeed, on the organization chart there may be little to distinguish the innovative organization from the most rigidly bureaucratic one. And an innovative organization need not be "permissive" or "democratic" at all. But in innovative companies senior executives typically make it their business to meet with the younger men throughout the organization in sessions without an "agenda." Rather, the seniors sit down with the younger men and ask, "What opportunities do *you* see?"

The Structure for Innovation

The search for innovation needs to be organized separately and outside of the ongoing managerial business. Innovative organizations realize that one cannot simultaneously create the new and take care of what one already has. They therefore put the new into separate organizational components concerned with the creation of the new.

The oldest example is probably the development department at E.I. du Pont de Nemours in Wilmington, founded in the early 1920s. This unit is concerned exclusively with the making of tomorrow. It is not a research department—Du Pont has a separate, big research lab. The job of the development department is to develop new business; production, finance, and marketing are as much its concern as chemical technology, products, and processes.

During its massive reorganization in 1952, the General Electric Company took a different path, trying to continue innovation with ongoing business. This did not work, because the general managers had neither the time nor the motivation to render obsolete the products they were managing. Only after ten years or so did GE draw the proper conclusions from its frustrations and begin to organize major innovation separately from existing product departments.

Experience in public-service institutions also indicates that innovative efforts can best be organized separately and outside of existing managerial organization.

The greater innovative capacity of the American university as compared to the universities of continental Europe has often been remarked upon. The main reason is clearly not that American academicians are less resistant to change. It is the ease with which the American university can set up a new department, a new faculty, or even an entirely new school to do new things. The European university, by contrast, tends to be compelled by law and tradi-

tion to set up a new activity *within* an already existing department or faculty. This not only creates immediately a "war of the ancients against the moderns" in which the new is fought as a threat by the established disciplines. It also deprives the new, as a rule, of the resources needed to innovate successfully. The ablest of the young scholars, for instance, will be under great pressure to stick to the "safe" traditional fields which control the opportunities for promotion.

For significant innovation to move fast in the European academic setting usually requires "break-away institutions." The great age of English physics and chemistry in the late seventeenth century was ushered in by setting up the Royal Academy outside the established university system. More than two hundred years later, a similar break-away institution, the London School of Economics, created the opportunity for genuine innovation in teaching—and learning—in the economic and social fields. In France Napoleon systematically set up the *grandes écoles* such as the Ecole Polytechnique and the Ecole Normale outside the university system as vehicles for innovation in learning and research, e.g., to make effective the then brand-new idea that teachers needed training and could actually be trained. And one of the main reasons why the Germans, in the decade before World War I, set up separate scientific research institutes in physics and other fields was to gain freedom to develop new disciplines and new approaches in old disciplines, that is, to gain freedom for innovation.

The innovative organization, the organization that resists stagnation rather than change, is a major challenge to management, private and public. That such organizations are possible, we can assert with confidence; there are enough of them around. But how to make such organizations general, how to make them productive for society, economy and individual alike, is still largely an unsolved task. There is every indication that the period ahead will be one of rapid change in technology, society, economy, and institutions. There is every indication, therefore, that the innovative organization will have to be developed into a central institution for the last quarter of the twentieth century.



THE NEED FOR POWER

By David C. McClelland and David H. Burnham

Some years back, *Dialogue* published a widely discussed article by Professor McClelland entitled "The Impulse to Modernization," which argued that those societies that moved most rapidly toward economic development shared a widespread "need for achievement." Here he and Mr. Burnham suggest that the best managers of business (or public organizations) are motivated less by a need for achievement than by a need for power, a concern for influencing people.

David C. McClelland is professor of psychology at Harvard University and internationally known for his pioneering research in the area of social motivation. His books include *The Achieving Society*, *Personality*, and, most recently, *Power: The Inner Experience*. David H. Burnham is an economist who heads a behavioral science consulting firm in Boston. Their article is excerpted from *Harvard Business Review*.



David C. McClelland



David H. Burnham

What makes or motivates a good manager? The question is so enormous in scope that anyone trying to answer it has difficulty knowing where to begin. Some people might say that a good manager is one who is successful; the key to success is often assumed to be what psychologists call "the need for achievement," the desire to do something better or more efficiently than it has been done before.

But what has achievement motivation got to do with good management? There is no reason on theoretical grounds why a person who has a strong need to be more efficient should make a good

manager. While it sounds as if everyone ought to have the need to achieve, in fact, as psychologists define and measure achievement motivation, it leads people to behave in very special ways that do not necessarily lead to good management.

For one thing, because they focus on personal improvement, on doing things better by themselves, achievement-motivated people want to do most things themselves. For another, they want concrete short-term results on their performance so that they can tell how well they are doing. Yet a manager, particularly one of or in a large, complex organization, cannot perform all the tasks necessary for success by himself or herself. He must manage others so that they will do things for the organization. And he must recognize that the evaluation of his subordinate's performance may be a lot vaguer and more delayed than it would be if he were doing everything himself.

To measure the motivations of managers, good and bad, we studied a number of individual managers from different large U.S. corporations. The general conclusion of these studies is that the top manager of a company must possess a higher need for power, that is, a concern for influencing people, than for personal achievement. However, this need must be disciplined and controlled so that it is directed toward the benefit of the institution as a whole and not toward the manager's personal aggrandizement. Moreover, the top manager's need for power ought to be greater than his need for being liked by people.

Measuring Managerial Effectiveness

First off, what does it mean when we say that a good manager has a greater need for "power" than for "achievement"? To get a more concrete idea, let us consider the case of Ken Briggs, a sales manager in a large U.S. corporation. Seven years ago, Briggs was promoted to a managerial position at corporate headquarters, where he had responsibility for salesmen who serviced his company's largest accounts. In filling out a questionnaire, Briggs showed that he correctly perceived what his job required of him, namely, that he should influence others' success more than achieve new goals himself or socialize with his subordinates. However, when asked to write a story depicting a managerial situation, Briggs unwittingly revealed that he did not share those concerns. Indeed, he discovered that his need for achievement was very high and his need for power was very low. His high need to achieve was no surprise—after all, he had been a very successful salesman—but obviously his motivation to influence others was much less than his job required.

Then came the real shocker. Briggs' subordinates confirmed what his stories revealed: he was a poor manager, having little positive impact on those who worked for him. His subordinates felt that they

had little responsibility delegated to them, that he never rewarded but only criticized them, and that the office was not well organized, but confused and chaotic. He had responded to his lack of influence on his staff by setting very high standards and by trying to do most things himself, which was close to impossible; his own activity and lack of delegation consequently left his staff demoralized. Briggs' experience is typical of those who have a strong need to achieve but low power motivation. They may become very successful salesmen and, as a consequence, may be promoted into managerial jobs for which they, ironically, are unsuited.

Developing Good Morale

If achievement motivation does not make a good manager, what motive does? In trying to determine who the better managers were in Ken Briggs' company, we did not want to rely on the opinions of their superiors. For a variety of reasons, superiors' judgments of their subordinates' actual performance may be inaccurate. We decided that a good index of a manager's effectiveness would be the climate he or she creates in the office, reflected in the morale of subordinates.

Almost by definition, a good manager is one who, among other things, helps subordinates feel strong and responsible, who rewards them properly for good performance, and who sees that things are organized in such a way that subordinates feel they know what they should be doing. Above all, managers should foster among subordinates a strong sense of team spirit, of pride in working as part of a particular team. If a manager creates and encourages this spirit, his subordinates certainly should perform better.

“
Drive thy business, or it will drive thee.

Benjamin Franklin
”

In examining the motive scores of over fifty managers of both high and low morale units in all sections of the same large company, we found that most of the managers—over 70 percent—were high in power motivation compared with men in general. (Remember that as we use the term “power motivation,” it refers not to dictatorial behavior, but to a desire to have impact, to be strong and influential.) The better managers, as judged by the morale of those working for them, tended to score even higher in power motivation. But the most important determining factor of high morale turned out not to be

how their power motivation compared to their need to achieve, but whether it was higher than their need to be liked.

Why should this be so? Sociologists have long argued that, for a bureaucracy to function effectively, those who manage it must be universalistic in applying rules. That is, if they make exceptions for the particular needs of individuals, the whole system will break down. The manager with a high need for being liked is precisely the one who wants to stay on good terms with everybody, and, therefore, is the one most likely to make exceptions in terms of particular needs. This kind of person creates poor morale because he or she does not understand that other people in the office will tend to regard exceptions to the rules as unfair to themselves.

Socialized Power

But so far our findings are a little alarming. Do they suggest that the good manager is one who cares for power and is not at all concerned about the needs of other people? Not quite, for the good manager has other characteristics which must still be taken into account.

Above all, the good manager's power motivation is not oriented toward personal aggrandizement but toward the institution which he or she serves. In an earlier research study, we found that the signs of controlled action or inhibition that appear when a person exercises his or her imagination in writing stories tell a great deal about the kind of power that person needs. We discovered that, if a high power motive score is balanced by high inhibition, stories about power tend to be altruistic. That is, the heroes in the story exercise power on behalf of someone else. This is the "socialized" face of power as distinguished from the concern for personal power, which is characteristic of individuals whose stories are loaded with power imagery but which show no sign of inhibition or self-control. In our earlier study, we found ample evidence that these latter individuals exercise their power impulsively. They are more rude to other people, they drink too much, they try to exploit others sexually, and they collect symbols of personal prestige such as fancy cars or big offices.

Individuals high in power motivation but also in self-control, on the other hand, are more institution-minded; they tend to get elected to more offices, to control their drinking, and to want to serve others. Not surprisingly, we found that the better managers in the corporation also tend to score high on both power and inhibition.

Profile of a Good Manager

To recapitulate: the better managers we studied are high in power motivation, low in the need to be liked, and high in inhibition. They care about institutional power and use it to stimulate their em-

ployees to be more productive. Now let us compare them with "affiliative" managers—those in whom the need to be liked is higher than the need for power—and with the personal power managers—those in whom the need for power is higher than for affiliation but whose inhibition score is low.

We found that affiliative managers make so many *ad hominem* and *ad hoc* decisions that they almost totally abandon orderly procedures. Their disregard for procedure leaves employees feeling weak, irresponsible and without a sense of what might happen next, of where they stand in relation to their manager, or even of what they ought to be doing.

The managers who are motivated primarily by a need for personal power are somewhat more effective. They are able to create a greater sense of responsibility in their divisions and, above all, a greater team spirit. They can be thought of as managerial equivalents of successful tank commanders such as General Patton, whose own daring inspired admiration in his troops. But these men still rank lower in the amount of organizational clarity they create, as compared to the high power, low affiliation, high inhibition managers, whom we shall term "institutional."

Managers motivated by personal power alone are not disciplined enough to be good institution builders, and often their subordinates are loyal to them as individuals rather than to the institution they both serve. When a personal power manager leaves, disorganization often follows. His subordinates' strong group spirit, which the manager has personally inspired, deflates. The subordinates do not know what to do for themselves.

Of the managerial types, the "institutional" manager is the most successful in creating an effective work climate. His subordinates feel that they have more responsibility. Also, this kind of manager creates high morale because he produces the greatest sense of organizational clarity and team spirit. If such a manager leaves, he or she can be more readily replaced by another manager, because the employees have been encouraged to be loyal to the institution rather than to a particular person.

Managerial Styles

Since it seems undeniable that either kind of power orientation creates better morale in subordinates than a "people" orientation, we must consider that a concern for power is essential to good management. Our findings seem to fly in the face of a long and influential tradition of organizational psychology, which insists that authoritarian management is what is wrong with most American businesses. Let us say frankly that we think the bogeyman of authoritarianism has in fact been wrongly used to downplay the impor-

tance of power in management. After all, management is an influence game. Some proponents of "democratic" management seem to have forgotten this fact, urging managers to be primarily concerned with people's human needs rather than with helping them to get things done.

But a good deal of the apparent conflict between our findings and those of other behavioral scientists in this area arises from the fact that we are talking about *motives*, and behaviorists are often talking about *actions*. What we are saying is that managers must be interested in playing the influence game in a controlled way. That does not necessarily mean that they are or should be authoritarian in action. On the contrary, it appears that power-motivated managers make their subordinates feel strong rather than weak. The true authoritarian in action would have the reverse effect, making people feel weak and powerless.

Thus another important ingredient in the profile of a manager is his or her managerial style. In the illustrative company, 63 percent of the better managers (those whose subordinates had higher morale) scored higher on the democratic or coaching styles of management as compared with only 22 percent of the poorer managers, a statistically significant difference. By contrast, the latter scored higher on authoritarian or coercive management styles. Since the better managers were also higher in power motivation, it seems that, in action, they express their power motivation in a democratic way, which is more likely to be effective.

The Institutional Manager

A concern for helping others was characteristic of men with the institution-building motivational pattern. In further examining institution builders' thought and actions, we found they have four major characteristics:

- They are more organization-minded; that is, they tend to join more organizations and to feel responsible for building up these organizations. Furthermore, they believe strongly in the importance of centralized authority.
- They report that they like to work. This finding is particularly interesting, because our research on achievement motivation has led many commentators to argue that achievement motivation promotes the "Protestant work ethic." Almost the precise opposite is true. People who have a high need to achieve like to get out of work by becoming more efficient. They would like to see the same result obtained in less time or with less effort. But managers who have a need for institutional power actually seem to like the discipline of work. It satisfies their need for getting things done in an orderly way.

- They seem quite willing to sacrifice some of their own self-interest for the welfare of the organization they serve. For example, they are more willing to make contributions to charities.
- They have a keen sense of justice. It is almost as if they feel that if a person works hard and sacrifices for the good of the organization, he should and will get a just reward for his effort.

Checks and Balances

Men and nations with this motive profile are empire builders; they tend to create high morale and to expand the organizations they head. But there is also danger in this motive profile; empire building can lead to authoritarianism in companies and imperialism in countries. The same motive pattern which produces good power management can also lead a company or a country to try to dominate others, ostensibly in the interests of organizational expansion.

“

Power flows to the man who knows how.

Elbert Hubbard

Power is poison.

Henry Adams

”

Thus it is not surprising that big business has had to be regulated from time to time by federal agencies. And it is most likely that international agencies will perform the same regulative function for empire-building countries.

For an individual, the regulative function is performed by two characteristics that are part of the profile of the very best managers—a greater emotional maturity, where there is little egotism, and a democratic, coaching managerial style. If an institutional power motivation is checked by maturity, it does not lead to an aggressive, egotistic expansiveness.

For countries, this checking means that they can control their destinies beyond their borders without being aggressive and hostile. For individuals, it means that they can control their subordinates and influence others around them without resorting to coercion or to an authoritarian management style. Truly disinterested statesmanship has a vital role to play at the top power levels of both countries and companies.

A MANAGER BY ANY OTHER NAME

By Antony Jay

The idea of creativeness in business management or public administration is not entirely respectable, writes the author. It is associated with long hair and the arts, not with serious or profit-conscious enterprises. But Mr. Jay insists, with wit and example, that a good manager not only can be, but must be, creative, effecting change through free leaps of the imaginative intelligence.

A former writer of television documentaries, Antony Jay is currently chairman of Video Arts, Ltd., a London-based producer of training films for industry. He is the author of several books, including *Management and Machiavelli: An Inquiry into the Politics of Corporate Life* (published by Holt, Rhinehart and Winston), from which this article is taken.



It is too late to change it now, but “manager” is an insulting and belittling word. It carries a sense of someone put in by the owner to keep the thing going while he is not there. “Director” has a ring of opulence, even “worker” has an unpretentious dignity, but “manager” sounds dangerously like a euphemism for foreman. He is neither a thinker nor a doer, he is just a manager. I suppose it dates back to a time when he really was just a manager: The mill owner or mine owner wanted a simple and unvarying process to be continued indefinitely in more places than he could supervise personally, so he hired someone who could manage in his absence, someone drawn from the social class of the workers to discharge the more disagreeable tasks of the employer.

Of course words can outgrow their base origins; but sometimes those who are designated by them use them as a refuge and perpetuate the slightly pejorative connotation. “Administrator” has been a good case of this: Officials in the civil service and the big corporations have hidden behind it for many years, and used “administration” as a mystique to justify drawing a leadership-size salary without exercising a function of leadership. Now there seems to be a danger that managers are hiding behind the word “management” in order to fend off the idea of creativeness. It is, of course, undoubtedly true that the word creativeness is also gaining an

undesirable connotation. Long-haired, clever, irresponsible; people the manager has to manage tactfully, because they are difficult to organize, temperamental, and yet in some way necessary, even indispensable. They are a sort of colony of licensed eccentrics: "I'll get the creative boys to kick it around," "This is what the creative chaps have come up with," "He's a very good guy really, but ...well, you know what these creative people are." The manager finds it thoroughly unsatisfactory that the future of the whole business should rest, as it apparently does, on such an unpredictable and volatile foundation. He, however, has the title of manager. No taint of creativeness about that; and it is a good word to fend off any suggestion that perhaps he ought to be creative himself.

Two Kinds of Change

He, of course, unlike the administrator, would not resist the title of leader: group leader, team leader, project leader, are perfectly acceptable terms. It may frighten "administrators," but a lot of managers accept the idea of being a boss quite happily. And yet leadership, especially at the highest levels, is becoming more and more concerned with change. The days are over when a firm could continue profitably for three generations casting toilet tanks, baths, and manhole covers from the same three hallowed molds. Change has become the dominant concern of top management, and growth plans are geared to projected changes in wealth, technology, demand patterns, birth rate, habit, taste, population distribution, power supply, raw material production, and other such considerations. As these factors change, so the firm's activities must change to meet them.

“
The laws of behavior yield to the energy of the individual.
Ralph Waldo Emerson
”

But change can be of only two kinds—imitative or creative. You can change the way other people have changed already, or you can change in a new way. You can follow, or you can lead: You can wait until you find out how other firms have coped with or exploited the projected changes, and then copy them, or you can think up original ideas that they have not hit on. And if you do that, you are being creative in the fullest sense. Change is not a sideline in the business of leadership, it is integral to the whole idea: to describe a man who left things exactly as he found them as a "great leader" would be a contradiction in terms. A leader may change the map of Europe, or

the breakfast habits of a nation, or the capital structure of an engineering corporation; but changing things is central to leadership, and changing them before anyone else is creativeness.

It is strange and quite illogical that creativeness should, in the public mind, be linked to long hair and dirty fingernails instead of grey flannel suits and pinstripe trousers. It is not a rare human attribute like telepathy or double-jointed knees; it is quite a normal quality (like intelligence or manual skill) which most children possess in some degree, as any teacher of five-year-olds will tell you. If most teachers of eighteen-year-olds would question it, that is a reflection on our method of education, not on children. A great many managers are in fact creative people, but people are liable to balk at the idea because they do not look like painters or poets. Nor do most good painters and poets, for that matter, but there is a pre-Raphaelite stereotype which creative people are expected to conform to. Arthur Koestler in *The Act of Creation* explains creativeness as the result of bisociation, of putting together two unconnected facts or ideas to form a single new idea. Of course it is an ingredient of great art, if handled by a great artist. The two unconnected ideas of one army beating another and placing their banner where the enemy's once stood, and the pallor of death draining the blood from the face of a dying girl, are united creatively by Shakespeare into Romeo's apostrophe to Juliet:

Thou art not conquered; beauty's ensign yet
Is crimson in thy lips and in thy cheeks,
And death's pale flag is not advanced there.

Equally, this bisociation can lead to a discovery, as when Newton saw an apple fall in an orchard when pondering the anomalies in the orbits of planets, and hit on gravitational theory and the attraction of masses. Or it can lead to an invention—Koestler quotes the case of Gutenberg puzzling over ways of reproducing the written word while watching the grapes being pressed, and suddenly seeing the printing press as the answer.

Television and Lawnmowers

All these are spectacular examples of creativeness, and few of the creative ideas of managers are likely to win such enduring fame. But in a small way creative ideas are being produced all the time. Take the simple problem of the cinema parking lot: A reasonable charge is seventy-five cents per car, but the management wants to encourage patrons by charging them only fifty cents. How can you tell which motorists are bona fide patrons? Follow them all in? Ask them, but don't believe the shifty ones? The answer devised by a creative manager was to charge everyone seventy-five cents and give them a

ticket which was a voucher for the first twenty-five cents of the cost of their seat for that performance. It may not rank with Shakespeare and Newton, but it is no less creative for that.

The universal nature of creativeness became particularly clear to me when I left television and worked on a project which demanded close study of an engineering factory. Television has the reputation of being full of creative people, and engineering has not. And yet after a week or two it suddenly dawned on me that a television program and an engineering product went through a virtually identical process and demanded almost exactly the same qualities from the people responsible for them. The design engineer is told in broad terms what is wanted: a simple light motor mower for the smaller lawn, costing between \$75 and \$90, and selling at a rate of about two hundred a week. So is the television writer or producer: a thirty-minute twice-weekly thriller serial for the 6:30-7:00 P.M. spot for an audience of 10-15 percent on a budget of \$12,000 a week.

“
Man is made to create, from the poet to the potter.
Benjamin Disraeli
”

The engineer and scriptwriter both go away, read a bit, talk the subject around, perhaps check back on a few points, and finally come up with a document. If the document looks promising, the engineer is told to go and make a lab model, and the producer and scriptwriter to do a pilot program. If these are successful, they both pose the same problem: It is all very well to prove that these clever fellows, given lots of time and facilities and strong incentive, can produce just one program-model which works—but can the boys in the television studio and the operatives on the factory floor produce them to the same quality at a steady rate within the agreed budget? So the factory goes into production development and the television company commissions an initial series of six, during which time certain snags are sorted out and changes are made which make conveyor belt production easier.

Of course there were wide differences in the backgrounds and knowledge and skills of the people involved, but the creative demands are just the same; yet somehow people who are verbally creative are licensed to be “creative people” while those who are mathematically and mechanically creative are not. And of course just as some managers hide behind the word “manager” to evade the responsibility of creativeness, some creative people hide behind the word “creativeness” as an excuse for overspending their budgets,

not delivering on time and never being available when wanted. But it is by no means necessarily the best of them who do this, and in my experience efficiency is as much a part of the best creative people as creativeness is of the best managers. Those who flaunt their creativeness to conceal their laziness ought to have their poetic licenses revoked.

Making Decisions

The most important acts of creativeness, however, in the case of both the lawn mower and the television program, were the ones which were taken before the engineer and the scriptwriter began: the idea that there was a need for this product and a profit to be made by supplying it. If that idea was wrong, then however good the subsequent creative ideas the product will fail. And the man responsible for that idea is the manager—the creative manager. This is not to say that he has to have all the ideas himself, or even most of them. But to deal in an area where so much depends on creativeness he must keep his own creative faculties alert.

Even the act of deciding between proposed alternatives is creative. It does not have to be: There are creative and uncreative ways of making decisions. A simple case is the picture editor who wants a picture of Times Square to illustrate a feature article or news story. When forty pictures are brought up from the picture library, the uncreative mind selects the most suitable. The creative mind, however, first of all visualizes its own mental picture of the sort of feeling and atmosphere and information the picture should convey, and then looks through the forty library pictures to see if one of them is right. It may be that several are; but it may be that none are, in which case he will reject the lot and dispatch a staff photographer or send out to the agencies.

“ “
I would swap a whole cartload of precedents any time for one brand new idea.

Luther Burbank
” ”

Or take the dry cleaning firm ordering a fleet of delivery vans. Because they carry evening dresses on hangers, they need a minimum interior clearance of five feet. The uncreative mind examines a range of such vans and picks the one that is best for the job: But the creative mind has a picture of what it wants, and that does not include the expensive width and engine size that go with that size interior clearance. It wants a small, light, narrow delivery

wagon, but five feet high, and it gets the vehicle manufacturer to build a simple raised roof on to its cheapest van for a net saving of several thousand dollars capital outlay, and rather more in fuel, maintenance, garaging, tax, and depreciation.

Solving the Wrong Problem

It is in the consideration of proposals put up by others that managers most often have to exercise creativeness. The uncreative manager examines a proposal on its own terms—he may question the solution proposed, but not the over-all problem to which it offers a solution. The creative manager thinks creatively about the nature of the problem before reading the document, and formulates one or two elements which any solution must embody. He may then find that although the proposed solution is reasonable and internally consistent, a part of the problem has been ducked or overlooked. The uncreative mind can spot wrong answers, but it takes a creative mind to spot wrong questions, or to think up a few more unstated alternatives.

Few managers would deny the need for this sort of judgment, this sort of attitude, but if you accused them of being creative they would suspect you were equating them with a temperamental copywriter or an effeminate art director. And yet historians talk quite naturally about creative statesmen—it is the term that historian A.J.P. Taylor applies to Winston Churchill and Lloyd George. Perhaps if we can look upon creativeness not as a mutational freak but a normal ingredient of a balanced personality we may one day be able to call a manager creative without offense—perhaps even as a compliment.



THE MANAGER'S JOB: FOLKLORE AND FACT

By Henry Mintzberg



Managers are far from being the reflective, disciplined, almost Olympian figures, thoroughly informed by scientific "management information systems," portrayed in some textbooks and in some managerial daydreams. On the contrary, says Professor Mintzberg, recent studies show managers hipdeep in the details of daily operation, gathering their own information ad hoc, making quick, often hasty, decisions. If they are to improve their performance significantly, he concludes, they will have to discard the illusory folklore and recognize the many and complex roles they actually play.

Professor Mintzberg teaches management at McGill University in Montreal, Canada. His article is excerpted from *Harvard Business Review*.

Some of the material is condensed from his book *The Nature of Managerial Work*, published by Harper & Row. This article has stimulated more requests for reprints than any others published by the *Review*.

If you ask a manager what he does, he will most likely tell you that he plans, organizes, coordinates, and controls. The fact is that these four words, which have dominated management vocabulary since the French industrialist Henri Fayol first introduced them in 1916, tell us little about what managers actually do. At best, they indicate some vague objectives managers have when they work.

My intention in this article is simple: to break the reader away from Fayol's words and introduce him to a more supportable, and what I believe to be a more useful, description of managerial work. This description derives from my review and synthesis of the available research on how various managers have spent their time in the United States, Canada, Sweden, and Great Britain.

In some studies, managers were observed intensively; in a number of others, they kept detailed diaries of their activities; in a few studies, their records were analyzed. All kinds of managers were studied—foremen, factory supervisors, staff managers, field sales managers, hospital administrators, presidents of companies and nations, and even street gang leaders. My own study of five American chief executive officers focused on the mail each received and on the verbal contacts each made during a week of intensive observation.

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A synthesis of these findings paints an interesting picture, one as different from Fayol's classical view as a cubist abstract is from a Renaissance painting. More concretely, I found that three major myths about the manager's job did not bear up under careful scrutiny of the facts.

A Reflective Planner?

Folklore: The manager is a reflective, systematic planner. The evidence on this issue is overwhelming, but not a shred of it supports this statement.

Fact: Study after study has shown that managers work at an unrelenting pace, that their activities are characterized by brevity, variety, and discontinuity, and that they are strongly oriented to action and dislike reflective activities. Consider this evidence:

- Half the activities engaged in by the five chief executives of my study lasted less than nine minutes, and only 10 percent exceeded one hour. The work pace for both chief executives and foremen was unrelenting. The chief executives met a steady stream of callers and mail from the moment they arrived in the morning until they left in the evening. Coffee breaks and lunches were inevitably work-related, and ever-present subordinates seemed to usurp any free moment.

- No study has found important patterns in the way managers schedule their time. They seem to jump from issue to issue, continually responding to the needs of the moment, the pressures of the job. Is this the planner that the classical view describes? Hardly. The fact is that the job of managing simply does not breed reflective planners; the manager is a responder to stimuli, an individual who is conditioned by his job to prefer live to delayed action.

No Regular Duties?

Folklore: The effective manager has no regular duties to perform. Managers are constantly being told to spend more time planning and delegating, and less time seeing customers and engaging in negotiations. These are not, after all, the true tasks of the manager. To use the popular analogy, the good manager, like the good conductor, carefully orchestrates everything in advance, then sits back to enjoy the fruits of his labor, responding occasionally to an unforeseeable exception. But here again the pleasant abstraction just does not seem to hold up.

Fact: In addition to handling "exceptions," managerial work involves performing a number of regular duties, including ritual and ceremony, negotiations, and processing of "soft" (informally acquired, unofficial) information that links the organization with its environment. Consider some evidence from the research studies:

- A study of the work of the presidents of small companies found that they engaged in routine activities because their companies could not afford staff specialists and were so thin on operating personnel that a single absence often required the president to substitute.

- One study of field sales managers and another of chief executives suggest that it is a natural part of both jobs to see important customers, assuming the managers wish to keep those customers.

- Someone, only half in jest, once described the manager as that person who sees visitors so that everyone else can get his work done. In my study, I found that certain ceremonial duties—meeting visiting dignitaries, giving out gold watches, presiding at Christmas dinners—were an intrinsic part of the chief executive's job.

- Studies of managers' information flow suggest that managers play a key role in securing "soft" external information (much of it available only to them because of their status) and in passing it along to their subordinates.

How a Manager Acquires Information

Folklore: The senior manager needs aggregated information, which a formal management information system (today, usually computerized) best provides. Not too long ago, the words *total information system* were everywhere in the management literature. In keeping with the classical view of the manager as that individual perched on the apex of a regulated, hierarchical system, the literature's manager was to receive all his important information from an information bank.

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Executive ability is deciding quickly and getting somebody else to do the work.

John Garland Pollard

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But it has become increasingly evident that managers are simply not using these systematized, computerized records often—the enthusiasm has waned. A look at how managers actually process information makes the reason quite clear. Managers have five media at their command: documents (including computer printouts), telephone calls, scheduled and unscheduled meetings, and observational tours.

Fact: Managers strongly favor the verbal media—namely telephone calls and meetings. The evidence comes from every single study of managerial work. Consider the following:

- In two British studies, managers spent an average of 66 percent and 80 percent of their time in verbal (oral) communication. In my study of five American chief executives, the figure was 78 percent.

- On the other hand, these five chief executives treated mail processing as a burden to be dispensed with.

- An analysis of the mail the executives received reveals an interesting picture—only 13 percent was of specific and immediate use. So now we have another piece in the puzzle: not much of the mail provides live, current information—the action of a competitor, the mood of a government legislator, or the rating of last night's television show. Yet this is the information that drove the managers, interrupting their meetings and rescheduling their workdays.

Managers seem to cherish "soft" information, especially gossip, hearsay, and speculation. Why? The reason is its timeliness; today's gossip may be tomorrow's fact. The manager who is not accessible for the telephone call informing him that his biggest customer was seen golfing with his main competitor may read about a dramatic drop in sales in the next quarterly report. But then it's too late.

The manager's emphasis on the verbal media raises two important points:

First, verbal information is stored in the brains of people. Only when people write this information down can it be stored in the files of the organization—whether in metal cabinets or on magnetic tape—and managers apparently do not write down much of what they hear. Thus the strategic data bank of the organization is not in the memory of its computers but in the minds of its managers.

Second, the manager's extensive use of verbal media helps to explain why he is reluctant to delegate tasks. It is not as if he can hand a dossier over to someone; he must take the time to "dump memory"—to tell that someone all he knows about the subject. But this could take so long that the manager may find it easier to do the task himself. Thus the manager is damned by his own information system to a "dilemma of delegation"—to do too much himself or to delegate to his subordinates with inadequate briefing.

What the Manager Really Does

We can see that the manager's job is enormously complicated and difficult. The manager is overburdened with obligations; yet he cannot easily delegate his tasks. As a result, he is driven to overwork and is forced to do many tasks superficially. Brevity, fragmentation, and verbal communication characterize his work. Yet these are the very characteristics of managerial work that have impeded scientific attempts to improve it.

Today, the pressures of the manager's job are becoming worse. Where before he needed only to respond to owners and directors, now

he finds that subordinates with democratic norms continually reduce his freedom to issue unexplained orders, and a growing number of outside influences (consumer groups, government agencies, and so on) expect his attention. And the manager has had nowhere to turn for help. The first step in providing the manager with some help is to find out what his job really is.

“
A leader is best when people barely know that he exists.

Witter Bynner
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Let us try to put some of the pieces of this puzzle together. Earlier, I defined a manager as a person in charge of an organization or one of its sub-units. Besides chief executive officers, this definition includes vice presidents, bishops, foremen, hockey coaches, and prime ministers. Can all of these people have anything in common? Indeed they can. For an important starting point, all are vested with formal authority over an organizational unit. From formal authority comes status, which leads to various interpersonal relations, and from these comes access to information. Information, in turn, enables the manager to make decisions and strategies for his unit.

The manager's job can be described in terms of various “roles,” or organized sets of behaviors identified with a position. In my view, formal authority gives rise to three *interpersonal* roles, which in turn give rise to three *informational* roles; these two sets of roles enable the manager to play four *decisional* roles.

Interpersonal Roles

Three of the manager's roles arise directly from his formal authority and involve basic interpersonal relationships.

First is the *figurehead* role. By virtue of his position as head of an organizational unit, every manager must perform some duties of a ceremonial nature. The president greets the touring dignitaries, the foreman attends the wedding of a lathe operator, and the sales manager takes an important customer to lunch.

The manager's second role is that of *leader*, who is responsible for the work of the people in his unit. Some of his actions involve leadership directly—for example, in most organizations the manager is normally responsible for hiring and training his own staff. In addition, there is the indirect exercise of the leader role. Every manager must motivate and encourage his employees, somehow reconciling their individual needs with the goals of the organization. The influence of the manager is most clearly seen in the leader role. Formal

authority vests him with great potential power; leadership determines in large part how much of it he will realize.

Finally, in his *liaison* role, the manager makes contacts outside his vertical chain of command. It is the finding of virtually every study of managerial work that managers spend as much time with peers and other people outside their units as they do with their own subordinates—and, surprisingly, very little time with their own superiors.

For instance, Rosemary Stewart's study of 160 British middle and top managers revealed that they spent 47 percent of their time with peers, 41 percent of their time with people outside their unit, and only 12 percent of their time with their superiors. Other studies showed a similar distribution of time. The manager cultivates such contacts largely to find information. In effect, the *liaison* role is devoted to building up the manager's own external information—informal, private, verbal, but, nevertheless, effective.

Informational Roles

By virtue of his interpersonal contacts, both with his subordinates and with his network of contacts, the manager emerges as the nerve center of his organizational unit. He may not know everything, but he typically knows more than any member of his staff.

Because he is their leader, the manager has formal and easy access to every member of his staff. Hence, he tends to know more about his own unit than anyone else does. In addition, his *liaison* contacts expose the manager to external information to which his subordinates often lack access. Many of these contacts are with other managers of equal status, who are themselves nerve centers in their own organization. In this way, the manager develops a powerful data base of information, the transmission of which is a key part of his job.

- As *monitor*, the manager perpetually scans his environment for information, interrogates his *liaison* contacts and his subordinates, and receives unsolicited information, much of it as a result of the network of personal contacts he has developed. Remember that a good part of the information the manager collects in his *monitor* role arrives in verbal form, often as gossip, hearsay and speculation. By virtue of his contacts, the manager has a natural advantage in collecting this soft information for his organization.

- He must share and distribute much of this information. Information he gleans from outside personal contacts may be needed within his organization. In his *disseminator* role, the manager passes some of his privileged information directly to his subordinates, who would otherwise have no access to it.

- In his *spokesman* role, the manager sends some of his informa-

tion to people outside his unit—a president makes a speech to lobby for an organization cause, or a foreman suggests a product modification to a supplier. In addition, as part of his role as spokesman, every manager must inform and satisfy the influential people who control his organizational unit. For the foreman, this may simply involve keeping the plant manager informed about the flow of work through the shop. For the president of a large corporation, however, a great deal more is demanded: Directors and shareholders must be advised about financial performance; consumer groups must be assured that the organization is fulfilling its social responsibilities; and government officials must be satisfied that the organization is abiding by the law.

Decisional Roles

Information is not, of course, an end in itself; it is the basic source for decision making. One thing is clear in the study of managerial work: the manager plays the major role in his unit's decision-making system. As its formal authority, only he can commit the unit to important new courses of action; and as its formal nerve center, only he has full and current information to make the set of decisions that determines the unit's strategy. Four roles describe the manager as decision-maker.

- As *entrepreneur*, the manager seeks to improve his unit, to adapt it to changing conditions in the environment. He is constantly on the lookout for new ideas. When a good one appears, he initiates a development project that he may supervise himself or delegate to an employee.

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The question “Who ought to be boss?” is like asking “Who ought to be the tenor in the quartet?” Obviously, the man who can sing tenor.

Henry Ford

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He maintains a rough inventory of the development projects that he himself supervises—projects that are at various stages of development, some active and some in limbo. Like a juggler, he keeps a number of projects in the air; periodically, one comes down, is given a new burst of energy, and is sent back into orbit. At various intervals, he puts new projects on-stream and discards old ones.

- The *disturbance handler* role depicts the manager involuntarily responding to pressures. Here change is beyond the manager's control. He must act because the pressures of the situation are too

severe to be ignored: a strike looms, a major customer has gone bankrupt, or a supplier reneges on his contract. Disturbances arise not only because poor managers ignore situations until they reach crisis proportions, but also because good managers cannot possibly anticipate all the consequences of the actions they take.

- A third decisional role is that of *resource allocator*. To the manager falls the responsibility of deciding who will get what in his organizational unit and how work is to be divided. (Perhaps the most important resource the manager allocates is his own time.) The manager also authorizes the important decisions of his unit before they are implemented. By retaining this power, the manager can ensure that decisions are interrelated; all must pass through a single brain. To fragment this power is to encourage discontinuous decision making and a disjointed strategy.

- The final decisional role is that of *negotiator*. Studies of managerial work at all levels indicate that managers spend considerable time in negotiations: the president of the football team is called in to work out a contract with the holdout superstar; the corporation president leads his company's contingent to negotiate a new strike issue; the foreman argues a grievance problem to its conclusion with the shop steward. As Leonard Sayles puts it in *Managerial Behavior*, negotiations are a "way of life" for the manager, since only he has the authority to commit organizational resources in "real time," and only he has the nerve-center information that important negotiations require.

The Integrated Job


It should be clear by now that the roles I have been describing are not easily separable. In the terminology of the psychologist, they form a gestalt, an integrated whole. No role can be pulled out of the framework and the job be left intact. For example, a manager without liaison contacts lacks external information. As a result, he can neither disseminate the information his employees need nor make decisions that adequately reflect external conditions. (In fact, this is a problem for the new person in a managerial position, since he cannot make effective decisions until he has built up his network of contacts.) In almost all cases the interpersonal, informational, and decisional roles remain inseparable.

What are the messages for management in this description? I believe, first and foremost, that this description of managerial work should prove more important to managers than any prescription they might derive from it. That is to say, the manager's effectiveness is significantly influenced by his insight into his own work. His performance depends on how well he understands and responds to the pressures and dilemmas of the job. Thus managers who can be

introspective about their work are likely to be effective at their jobs.

If there is a single theme that runs through this article, it is that the pressures of his job drive the manager to be superficial in his action—to overload himself with work, encourage interruption, respond quickly to every stimulus, seek the tangible and avoid the abstract, make decisions in small increments, and do everything abruptly. The challenge to the manager is to deal consciously with the pressures of superficiality by giving serious attention to the issues that require it, by stepping back from his tangible bits of information in order to see a broad picture, and by making use of analytical inputs. Although effective managers have to be adept at responding quickly to numerous and varying problems, the danger in managerial work is that they will respond to every issue equally (and that means abruptly) and that they will never work the tangible bits and pieces of informational input into a comprehensive picture of their world. A sophisticated manager will avail himself of the models of the specialists. Economists describe the functioning of markets, operations researchers simulate financial flow processes, and behavioral scientists explain the needs and goals of people. The best of these models can be searched out and learned.

No job is more vital to our society than that of the manager. It is the manager who determines whether our social institutions serve us well or whether they squander our talents and resources. It is time to strip away the folklore about managerial work, and time to study it realistically so that we can begin the difficult task of making significant improvements in its performance.



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MANAGEMENT AND THE "POST-INDUSTRIAL" SOCIETY

By Theodore Levitt



In more and more advanced economies services are replacing manufacturing as the dominant sector. Some observers predict a decline in living standards, on the assumption that service industries are inefficient by their very nature, depending as they do more on people than on technology. Professor Levitt dissents from this gloomy appraisal. The success of the industrial age, he argues, owes more to inventive management than to invented technology. And he cites some striking examples of the application of managerial arts to the service sector as evidence that economic progress is possible in the "post-industrial" age.

Theodore Levitt is professor of business administration at Harvard University and the author of several books, among them *Marketing for Business Growth* and *The Third Sector: New Tactics for a Responsive Society*. His article is excerpted from *The Public Interest*.

The world's industrial nations are now hearing a new cry of doom. As we shift from an industrial society centered on the production of goods to a post-industrial society dominated by the demand for services, say the new Jeremiahs, costs will rise, efficiency will decline, and living standards will ultimately decline as well.

Advanced goods-producing nations, they warn, become goods-satiated and service-hungry. As affluence waxes, the demand for goods wanes—a third family car seems less urgently needed than the second; after one refrigerator, another is a marginal convenience. On the other hand, the demand for travel, education, entertainment, eating out, health care, and other services accelerates both absolutely and relatively. More work shifts from the production worker to the lower-level service worker and the upper-level "knowledge worker," whose activities have only limited access to the kinds of industrial and science-based technologies that so profoundly increased productivity in manufacturing and farming in the last hundred years. Hence costs and prices rise more rapidly, and a structural imbalance creeps into the economy. As we want relatively

more of the things (increasingly services) that cost relatively more to produce, the less well-off we shall become. Thus the anomaly of our age: Economic progress impoverishes itself.

The most sophisticated version of this gloomy prognosis is contained in Daniel Bell's *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society*, which elaborately describes the nature and consequences of this shift from a production to a service economy. Bell's account seems, on its face, plausible enough. He sees the economy seriously troubled by the low production rates of service industries as compared with manufacturing, and concludes that this "structural...problem...can be overcome only by somehow finding methods to increase productivity in the service sector."

Is it possible to make the service economy in the 20th century as productive as manufacturing became in the 19th century? Most people seem to believe there is no answer to this problem. Fortunately there is one. The supposed consequences of the supposedly unique structure of the "post-industrial" society are far less real or worrisome than advertised. Nobody really disagrees about the need for more productivity in the service sector. And in fact, we are getting it, we know why, and we know how to get more.

What is crucially missing in most assessments concerning the possibility of increasing service-sector productivity is any serious consideration of exactly what accounts for the great productivity of the goods-producing industries. In my view, *the most important element in the success of the industrial age is not technology but "management."*

The Role of Management

Increasingly, management is acknowledged to be the unique and central characteristic of the industrial revolution, by those who really know the inner workings of modern industry. Management is *the* primary engine of progress, as progress is generally defined. The crucial importance of management has been eclipsed by the historians' almost obsessively childlike fascination with the technological artifacts of 19th-century industry and the flamboyant entrepreneurs of that era.

The significance of management in the creation and development of the industrial age can perhaps best be understood by noting how long it took for the available technology actually to create that age. Technologically speaking, the industrial age began in Milan around 1335, with the gear-driven time clock. It contained all the mechanical hardware and engineering know-how we associate with the machinery of the industrial revolution in the 19th century. But it took Eli Whitney, in New Haven (Connecticut) in 1798, to wrest the available technology from the dead hands of isolated medieval

craftsmen and put it into the more productive hands of organized unskilled labor. Whitney's contribution was less technological than managerial. To assemble interchangeable musket parts, he created large-scale factories where there had been one-man shops; he organized, directed, and controlled groups of workers to do with existing technologies what had previously been done singly and alone.

It took over 400 years to go from the clock to the musket factory, and Whitney's contribution was precisely the work of what we call today the "manager." He was also an entrepreneur, but that part of his activity has almost totally obscured a more arduous and encompassing aspect—his role as a serious organizer and manager.

Management consists of the rational assessment of a situation and the careful selection of goals; the systematic development of strategies to achieve those goals; the marshalling of the required resources; the rational design, organization, direction, and control of the activities required to attain the selected purposes; and, finally, the motivating and rewarding of people to do the work. Whitney's idea of interchangeable parts for manufacturing muskets might be said—in the profundity of hindsight—to have led "inescapably" to the creation of the mass-production factory. But it was hardly obvious then—nor was it, in fact, a century later.

Henry Ford's Assembly Line

Henry Ford's singular contribution was not that he invented the assembly line. He didn't—he merely rediscovered it while witnessing the operation of the Sears, Roebuck mail-order warehouse in Chicago, where roving clerks assembled orders by picking items off the shelves. Ford's unique insight was that the potential buyer's real problem was the ability to afford a car, and he set out to solve that problem by finding a way to make cars more cheaply. The solution derived largely from Ford's daring approach to the engineering of the automobile, making it an assembled rather than a constructed machine. If he had not redesigned the automobile as an assembly of parts, it could not have been manufactured on an assembly line. And the shift from independent craftsmen working alone to unskilled multitudes working together—under highly ordered and closely supervised conditions—helped control quality, productivity, and costs. Ford's achievement was thus not technological but managerial, the application of reason to function which characterizes superior management.

It is well to appreciate what the absence of good management can mean in our daily lives. For example, it is a fact now unanimously acknowledged by those who understand that, after the Arab oil embargo in November 1973, it took only one week of intensive around-the-clock work by the managers of the oil industry to rear-

range completely the entire sourcing, shipping, pipelining, and delivery of the world's oil and petroleum products to get things back on a new, functioning track.

Using Technology

I now return to my earlier question: Is it possible to make the new service economy as rationally efficient as the older manufacturing economy? To speak of the goods-producing sector as more "productive" or more efficient than the service-producing sector is to enlist a few facts into an excessively encompassing generalization. Between 1899 and 1953, the average annual productivity increase in the United States railroads was 2.6 percent; in local transit, 2.5 percent; in telephone service, 2.0 percent. Each of these service industries did better during this half century than industries manufacturing foods, beverages, apparel, lumber products, leather products, primary metals, nonelectric machinery, and furniture. Though service productivity has generally lagged behind goods productivity, what distinguishes the better-performing service industries is the enormous help they get from technology. For example, the capital invested in the telephone and telegraph industries has risen dramatically each decade from 1879 until today.

Thus the great technological flowering of the industrial sector has also helped the service sector, and in some cases has resulted in productivity expansion much more dramatic in the latter than in the former. There is no reason to believe that things will or must be different in the "post-industrial" society. Recent developments are, in fact, quite promising.

The industrialization of service is still in its infancy. Perhaps the most important aspect of this process is hidden. While computers, credit cards, electric hair dryers, electric hand tools, typewriters, and the like have already produced substantial productivity gains, the involvement of an entirely different facet of industrialization is even more promising—the use of manufacturing rationality, what we now call management, in the service sector. The power tools, jigs, machines, electronic controls, turbines, chemical processors, and all the knowledge that created them do not in themselves explain the productivity of manufacturing. More important is how all these are managed. Only recently has this kind of management systematically entered into the service industries.

What makes scientific knowledge, inventions, and machines productive is not their mere existence, but how they are used—how they are directed, organized, and managed in a complex manufacturing setting. Some examples will illustrate how management, which is itself a technology—though a "soft" technology, it is nonetheless a conscious routine of establishing purposes, goals, and priorities, and

Management and the "Post-Industrial" Society

a rational system for getting results—is being “rediscovered” and employed to vastly raise the productivity of the service sector.

“Fast Food” Efficiency

Take the case of food. Most Americans buy most of their food in the supermarket—a part of the retailing branch of the service sector. It represents an enormous advance in productivity over the corner grocery store, where a single clerk filled an order one item at a time while the customer waited. The supermarket substitutes fast and efficient self-service for the slow, inefficient, and often erratic clerk. The customer is a cooperating agent in the production process—and this is also the case with laundromats, cafeterias, and more traditionally, schools and churches, where study and prayer by the “customers” of education and religion help produce the products themselves.

The supermarket is obviously more efficient than its predecessor. Interestingly, it is modeled on the automotive assembly line. The final product (in this case, the parcel of purchased goods) is assembled from the product inventory of the store, just as a car is assembled from the parts inventory of the factory. Though the customer does most of the production work, customer satisfaction is higher. The supermarket is a triumph of entrepreneurship and management over immemorial custom.

“ That “producer’s economy” . . . which first creates articles and then attempts to create a demand for them . . . has flooded the country with breakfast foods, shaving soaps, poets, and professors of philosophy.

George Santayana

” On the other hand, take the case of food that is eaten out. Consider the thriving nationwide chain of McDonald’s hamburger outlets. Few of today’s successful new commercial ventures have antecedents that are more humble and less glamorous. McDonald’s is a supreme example of the application of manufacturing and industrial systems in a service industry. From 1961 to 1974, McDonald’s annual sales rose from \$54 million to \$729 million.

Most important in explaining the chain’s success are the customer-satisfying consequences of the carefully controlled execution of each outlet’s central function—the rapid delivery of a uniform, high-quality mix of low-priced prepared foods in an environment of cleanliness, order, and cheerful courtesy. The sys-

tematic substitution of equipment for people, the carefully planned positioning and use of technology, and the meticulous management and use of labor enable McDonald's to attract and hold patronage to a degree no predecessor imitator has managed to duplicate.

Consider the remarkable ingenuity of the system, which is worth examining in some detail. To start with the obvious: Raw hamburger patties are carefully premeasured and prepackaged in a capital-intensive central commissary, thus leaving neither the franchisee nor his employees any discretion as to size, quality, or consistency. This kind of carefully controlled attention is given to all McDonald's products and activities. Each outlet's storage and preparation space and related facilities are expressly designed for, and limited to, a predetermined mix of products. There is no space for any food, beverage, or service that was not designed into the system at the outset. There is not even a sandwich knife or a decent place to keep it. Thus the owner has no discretion regarding what he can sell—not because of contractual limitations, but because of facilities limitations. And the employees have virtually no discretion regarding how to prepare and serve products. McDonald's restaurants are factories in the field—designed and equipped to do only what the planners intended, nothing more or less.

Applied Rationality

Discretion is the enemy of order, of standardization, and in this case, of quality. An automobile assembly line worker who has discretion and latitude might possibly produce a more personalized car, but it would certainly be less reliable. The elaborate care taken in designing the automobile, making its components, and structuring and controlling the assembly line is what produces quality cars at low prices—with extraordinary functional reliability, considering that the average new assembly line produces more than one completely ready-to-drive car every single minute of its operation. McDonald's operates precisely the same way. Like Henry Ford's Model T, McDonald's owes much of its success to the conscious design of an industrial system productive enough to offer abundance and quality at bargain-basement, customer-attracting prices. That was its original goal and that has been its spectacular achievement. It was no accident.

Precisely the same sort of applied rationality has been used to improve the distribution and service of industrial products. In 1961, the Building Controls and Components Group of Honeywell, Inc.—the largest producer of heating and air-conditioning thermostats and control devices in the United States—did a major part of its business in replacement controls. These were sold through heating and air-conditioning distributors, who then supplied plumbers and

other installation and repair specialists. At that time, Honeywell's product line consisted of nearly 18,000 separate catalog parts and pieces. The company had nearly 5,000 distributor accounts, none of which could economically carry a full line of these items. Honeywell therefore maintained nearly a hundred fully-stocked field warehouses that offered immediate delivery to distributors. The costs of carrying these inventories were enormous, but were considered a normal expense of doing business.

Then Honeywell made a daring move—it announced that it would close all warehouses, and all parts would have to be stocked by the distributors. The original equipment, however, had been redesigned in the meantime to use 300 standard, interchangeable parts—interchangeable for most Honeywell controls, and also for many of its major competitors. Moreover, each package was clearly imprinted to show exactly which products made by Honeywell or its competitors the contents were compatible with.

By closing its own warehouses, Honeywell obviously shifted the costs of carrying inventory to its distributors. But instead of imposing new burdens on them, the new interchangeable products enabled distributors to carry substantially lower inventories, particularly by cutting down the need for stocking the replacement parts for competitors' products, which the distributors could nonetheless continue to service. Thus they were able to offer their customers faster service at lower costs. Repairs, moreover, could be done more easily and more cheaply.

Success Through Management

Honeywell's share of the replacement-market almost doubled, its original-equipment business rose by nearly 50 percent, and its inventory costs were cut to zero. Whereas previously nearly 90 percent of Honeywell's replacement sales were scattered among 4,000 distributors, within 10 years after the introduction of the new policy, the same proportion—but of a doubled volume—was concentrated among only about 900 vastly more effective distributors.

What was considered an inescapably labor-intensive problem was solved by the scrupulous application of managerial methods. The basic management decision to focus with imagination on the service problems and needs of the company's distributors and their customers was the starting point. Service became faster, easier, and cheaper not because of good administration of an existing structure, but because of superb management which changed that structure.

These examples of the industrialization of service through the application of managerial rationality are neither trivial nor exceptional. They illustrate possibilities that have, for the service sector today, the same irrepressible potential (even inevitability) that was

once characteristic of pin-making, which Adam Smith used as an example in 1776 to illustrate the division of labor—and all that it implied for manufacturing.

Productive Prototypes

To improve the quality and efficiency of service takes the kind of technocratic thinking that in other fields has replaced the high cost and erratic elegance of the artisan with the low cost and predictable munificence of the manufacturer. This is now rapidly happening. There are today over 1,400 Mr. Minit shoe-repair shops in continental Europe that, through a total redesign of shoe-repair equipment and operations layout, resole a pair of shoes at phenomenally low prices in less than five minutes—without dust or noise—while the customer waits in quiet comfort inside the department store or specialty store where these operations are generally located. The Damon Corporation operates 125 pathological clinics throughout the United States that—with the help of modern machines, 125 salaried physicians and 1,400 medical technologists—perform a wide range of diagnostic tests that formerly required patients to visit several doctors and clinics, at costs in time and money several times greater.

But the industrialization of health care is not limited to diagnostics. During World War II, the Kaiser Foundation established the nation's first "health maintenance organization" (HMO), providing low, prepaid, out-patient medical services at clinics manned by almost every conceivable kind of medical specialist—highly paid, salaried employees freed from all the troublesome administrative details of ordinary practice. They work only in their specialties, and are occupied full time during regularly scheduled 40-hour work weeks. There are now hundreds of such HMO's—mostly operated as profit-making firms. Large prepaid membership rolls—sometimes including the entire work force of a factory—facilitate economies of scale and sound management, which in turn produce a full range of high-convenience, top-quality medical services at rock-bottom costs.

As for hospitalization, industrialization has also had an impact through specialization. In 1970, the nation's first "ambulatory surgical facility" (ASF) was established in Phoenix, Arizona. There are now over 100 such facilities in the United States. The typical ASF is capable of performing some 125 low-risk operations on healthy, low-risk patients. The patient comes in, undergoes tests and surgery, rests, and goes home—all in one day.

Lawyers have access to computerized legal search systems, e.g., real estate titles, birth and death certificates. In greater popularity are the new so-called "boutique" law services that specialize in providing conventional searches, and only that—they do not practice law. Significantly, this is the same kind of specialization that is

practiced by Sears, Roebuck when it fills a mail order, or by the American Express Company, with its wide line of packaged travel tours, produced and managed by others—a supermarket of tours fully explained in a regularly published book, in clear, technicolor detail.

Knowledge, the most transferable of all resources, seems finally on the verge of making its greatest contribution to our living standards, not so much by the invention of things for the service sector to use, as by the application of rational calculation, systems, and routines, and by the use of management in their direction and control. The "post-industrial" society already has some productive prototypes, and McDonald's is not the only one.

The Limits of Service Efficiency

But some things are less easily managed than others. The demand for many service activities—food service, banking, retailing, amusement places, and the like—often fluctuates widely at particular hours of the day and among days of the week. During nonpeak times there is usually idle capacity. If demand were spaced out, it might substantially raise productivity; however, that cannot be easily managed. Entertainment places and some restaurants try to manage it by differential pricing—such as reduced prices for mid-week night movies.

Moreover, many people are in service because it offers more opportunities for self-employment—professional occupations like law and medicine, retailing, repair. Self-employment is over twice as common in service as in the rest of the economy. Where self-employment is the main motivation, managerial efficiency tends to be neglected. The owner is less likely to make capital-intensive or management-intensive improvements than the professional manager with a different set of motivations.

Victor Fuchs' studies show that within the same service sectors, worker productivity is higher in firms with employees than in firms where the proprietor (and possibly his family) do all the work. In part, the difference is the result of economies of scale—bigger firms are less likely to be proprietor-operated. In part, it reflects the superiority of the professionally managed enterprise. Since there will always be those who would rather earn less than work for others, the superior productivity of competitors will never destroy all those who are less efficient. Small corner grocery stores, small repair shops, and small accounting offices survive, even though their self-employed owners often work for incomes piteously exploitative on a per-hour basis, and generally small also on an absolute basis. This is seldom possible in manufacturing.

Service-sector productivity will therefore, on the average, remain lower than goods-producing productivity, even when service becomes more industrialized. But it is not the hopeless structural case it is widely believed to be.

The technology of management is less easily accessible to some service activities than to others. To that extent, the attempt to expand productivity in the service sector will be more difficult and less rewarding in many cases than in most of the goods-producing sector. The work of the surgeon may be facilitated by better equipment and organization in the operating room, but he can hardly do two appendectomies in the time it has always taken him to do one. The government interviewer at the unemployment compensation office is not likely to have access to the productivity-improving technologies that created the applicant before him.

Possibilities for Progress

On the other hand, there may be more possibilities than meet the casual eye. It is noteworthy, for example, that a large proportion of the continually increasing number of applications for credit cards and small loans are "processed" not by time-consuming personal interviews or application reviews, but by simple, fast (not even computerized), one-page credit-scoring forms. The score coefficients that measure credit-worthiness on these applications are developed through statistically sophisticated analysis. Significantly, this rapid scoring system was the development not of banks, finance companies, department stores, petroleum companies, or the American Express Company—all of which now use it—but of rank outsiders, trained in systems analysis, who recognized an opportunity and created a service company to enhance the productivity of other service companies.

Despite Daniel Bell's argument in *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society*, the rise of science-based industries and the importance of the knowledge worker have no basically unique significance or effects. What is significant is that in the more advanced societies, abundance and affluence create increased demands for things less easily produced under the conditions of mass-production efficiency. The recent increased demand for handcrafted artifacts—from "folk" jewelry to "antique" executive desks—tells us that even in the goods-producing industries mass-production efficiency does not exhaust all the public's oscillating wants.


Increasingly more of what is wanted, however, are services. As in the case of beauty shops, credit cards, hamburgers, repairs of thermostats, medicine, or law, it is reasonable to assume that when markets expand, the managerial imagination will apply its own kind of special knowledge to raise productivity.

Management and the "Post-Industrial" Society

Whatever else may have changed, the "post-industrial" society will continue to incorporate expanding bursts of industrialization. Industrialization is more than inventions, machines, and amassed technology. Among the growing proportion of "knowledge workers" are not just engineers, scientists, and technicians, but more importantly, managers. Bell's "joining of science to invention, principally through the organization of research and development efforts" still depends, heavily and inescapably, on the practical labors of honest "tinkerers"—and above all on the work of managers who identify problems and opportunities, define goals, select means, marshal resources, motivate, energize, direct, measure, control, and reward the performance of people.

All that management did in the past to make technology and abundance possible in the goods-producing industries, and all it is now doing to help convert scientific knowledge into the practical output of technological systems—all of this is now in ascendance in the non-goods-producing industries. Something of what can be achieved has already been described. More is surely on the way.

Management is a crucial element of society. If society is indeed going to be "post-industrial," the recent emergence of the managerial arts in the service sectors of society suggests the likelihood that these sectors will enjoy the same improved productivity in the years ahead that the industrial sectors did in years past. The predicted apocalypse of structural imbalances that will halt progress is a misperception of the future. It neglects or fails to account for precisely what, in the end, makes economic progress possible—the practice of management.



THE LIBERAL IMAGINATION

BY Steven Marcus

The late Lionel Trilling achieved prominence in the intellectual world of New York, his native city, as a literary critic whose philosophical writings examined contemporary culture from the perspectives of psychoanalysis, history, and the social sciences. Professor Marcus traces the development of Trilling's provocative ideas over forty years: on the modern self; on commitment and autonomy—real or fictitious; and (toward the end of his life), on the limitations of art, which he had once envisioned as an almost limitless force for self-fulfillment in the moral life of humanity.

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When Lionel Trilling died at the age of seventy in November 1975 a figure of great importance was removed from the world of literature and ideas. It isn't often that intellectual distinction of such magnitude occurs in a scholar or critic of literature. There is even something restrictive and slightly misleading in referring to Trilling as a scholar and literary critic. Though he was both, he was also clearly much more. Nevertheless, he had started out in what seemed to be the conventional way. His first book, published in 1939, was an intellectual biography of Matthew Arnold. He followed this in 1943 with a critical study of E.M. Forster. Both of these books received the large measure of praise that was their due.

It was not until 1950, however, that Trilling began to acquire the wider recognition he would subsequently enjoy. In that year he published his first collection of essays, *The Liberal Imagination*. This volume contained discussions of such writers as Sherwood Anderson, Wordsworth, Henry James, Mark Twain, Kipling and F. Scott Fitzgerald, and such topics as psychoanalysis and literature, the little magazine in America, and manners, morals and the novel. Diverse and wide-ranging as these concerns may have been, the

essays were in fact remarkably connected and unified. They embodied a profound criticism of liberalism in both its cultural and political forms by one who understood himself to be a liberal.

An Awareness of Complexity

Trilling used that word here in a slightly Aesopian sense and with a variety of meanings that shifted according to their context. His essential understanding of his subject, however, can be gathered from this passage that comes at the end of the Preface to *The Liberal Imagination*:

It is one of the tendencies of liberalism to simplify, and this tendency is natural in view of the effort which liberalism makes to organize the elements of life in a rational way. And when we approach liberalism in a critical spirit, we shall fail in critical completeness if we do not take into account the value and necessity of its organizational impulse. But at the same time we must understand that organization means delegation, and agencies, and bureaus, and technicians, and that the ideas that can survive delegation, that can be passed on to agencies and bureaus and technicians, incline to be ideas of a certain kind and of a certain simplicity: they give up something of their largeness and modulation and complexity in order to survive.

The job of criticism would seem to be, then, to recall liberalism to its first essential imagination of variousness and possibility, which implies the awareness of complexity and difficulty. To the carrying out of the job of criticizing the liberal imagination, literature has a unique relevance, not merely because so much of modern literature has explicitly directed itself upon politics, but more importantly because literature is the human activity that takes the fullest and most precise amount of variousness, possibility, complexity, and difficulty.

This is, to be sure, a splendid declaration, one that Trilling himself set great store by. By regarding the excesses and deformations of liberalism as moving toward the extreme end of a continuum, Trilling established a capacious context for criticizing it. Nevertheless, as fine as that passage is, we shall see that Trilling did not continue to adhere to every statement it contains.

But *The Liberal Imagination* was much more than a book of essays with an intermittently overt political interest. To those of us who read it at the time, it was unmistakable that a major figure in modern literary criticism had put in his appearance. Trilling at once took his place beside F.R. Leavis and Edmund Wilson as one of the three or four dominating and decisive presences in twentieth century critical discourse—that discourse in which literature, culture, history, ideas and values freely and richly mingle. Yet the point of such a comparison almost always turned out to be a demonstration

of how different each was from the others, how distinct were their virtues of mind and intellect, how unique a combination of forces was incorporated in each of them.

Leavis was distinctively English, a central figure at Cambridge, founder of a school of criticism, with disciples and enemies, a passionate moralist, a grand polemicist, a true believer in the redemptive powers of literature. Wilson was both distinctively native American and cosmopolitan, already in 1950 a grand old man of letters in the grand old patrician tradition, immensely learned in many languages, purveyor and apostle of modernism to the educated world.

New York Intellectual

Trilling was something else again. He was in the first place urbane in the strict sense of the word—he was a man of the city, of the metropolis. That city was New York, and the sector of urban culture that Trilling emerged from and partly embodied was the subculture of the New York Jewish intellectuals. That subculture was distinguished by the intensity of its commitment to ideas, its radical secularism and its involvement in the ideological consciousness of modern political life. Trilling united these qualities with those that he acquired during his years of academic and scholarly training at Columbia University.

This combination produced a figure that seemed new and at the time was rather unlikely: an American academic who was also

a genuine intellectual in the non-academic sense; a professor of English who could really think, whose writing—elegant and elaborate as it often was—moved to the movement of ideas. And these ideas, one felt, were important. They were generated in the discussion of literature, but they went beyond that discussion and touched consciously upon matters of larger consequence for both the reader and the culture in which the reader was situated.

One felt as well that the essays in *The Liberal Imagination* were helping to generate a new kind of discourse; in them the traditional disparities between English and American ways of discussing both

Lionel Trilling



literature and society were being transcended. The specific means of this transcendence had largely to do with the intensity and luminosity of Trilling's mind, with its rigor and flexibility, and with his being able to bring relevantly to bear upon the discussion of literature bodies of thought and theory that had their origins in extra-literary realms—such as history, psychoanalysis and the social sciences. This was certainly not the discourse of the New Criticism—with its narrow focus upon isolated texts—which was then becoming a dominant force in academic life. If it reminded one of anything, it was the prose of the great nineteenth century critics and essayists. Yet it was a clearly modern idiom, and it proposed to bring to the discussion of literature a seriousness and cogency that such discussion merits but only rarely finds.

As the 1950s moved on, Trilling's essays began self-consciously to focus upon a number of major themes. These themes, one now can see, constituted the central preoccupations of his intellectual career from the outset. He was concerned, as he wrote in the Preface to *The Opposing Self* (1955), his second major collection of essays, with the idea of the modern self as it has been expressed in the literature of the last century and a half, and at the same time he was equally concerned with a particular characteristic of that self, "its intense and adverse imagination of the culture in which it has its being."

These concerns were articulated with characteristic balance, coherence and dialectical subtlety. On the one hand, the great writers of the modern world, such as Dickens, Dostoevsky, Joyce and Kafka, conceived of "modern culture as a kind of prison," a place in which the modern self finds fulfillment through the experience of "alienation," a contradictory and painful state which is at the same time a "device of self-realization." On the other hand, as opposed to the pain and despair of the life of society, civilization and culture, modern writers tended to project "the experience of art . . . into the actuality and totality of life as the ideal form of the moral life."

Influence of Freud

It was this set of complex and unstable oppositions that Trilling habitually returned to explore. What he found was always surprising and sometimes alarming. For example, in discussing Flaubert's "despair of culture"—meaning, largely, bourgeois culture—Trilling asks what remains for Flaubert when "culture is rejected and transcended." The answer, "given with a notable firmness and simplicity," he continues, "is that something of highest value does remain—it is the self affirmed in self-denial: life is nothing if not sacrificial."

That last graceful and powerful formulation was subscribed to by Trilling himself, as it had been by the individual who, after Arnold,

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exerted the second most important influence upon the development of Trilling's mind. I am speaking, of course, of the influence of Freud. That influence was deep, pervasive and radical. Trilling looked to Freud and particularly to Freud's "emphasis on biology" as "actually a liberating idea." It was liberating because

it proposes to us that culture is not all-powerful . . . We reflect that somewhere in the child, somewhere in the adult, there is a hard, irreducible biological *reason* that culture cannot reach and that reserves the right, which sooner or later it will exercise, to judge the culture and resist and revise it.

This was one kind of reason and one kind of resistance that Trilling unwaveringly continued to affirm.

Yet the importance of Freud for Trilling was also of a more than intellectual kind. The figure of Freud was for him something very close to a moral ideal, or to an ideal of personal character and conduct. Freud's fierceness, boldness, honesty and independence, his sense of tragedy and stoical resistance all served or figured as models for him, models that he reaffirmed in his own person and tried to fulfill in his own existence. Indeed he believed that Freud's dealing with the notions of instinctual renunciation and with the inevitable price that has to be paid for civilization and culture were exemplary. For him they were one of the supreme expressions of the self affirmed in self-denial, of the idea that life is nothing if not sacrificial.

The Challenge of the 60s

As the years passed, such notions, contemporary renderings of classical humanist aspirations and ideals, tended to be increasingly beset. As the sixties rose up to assert the values of irrationalism and a new hedonism, such notions were openly, and on a wide scale, declared to be discredited. Trilling prepared himself to meet these challenges in his own way. He undertook amid the pressure of the times to examine yet once more "the adversary intention, the actually subversive intention, that characterizes modern writing." The original intention of such modernist writing had been "to liberate the individual from the tyranny of his culture in the environmental sense and to permit him to stand beyond it in an autonomy of perception and judgment." Trilling never faltered in his steady commitment to the ideal of autonomy, but what he now thought he saw taking shape was a factitious or pseudoautonomy, the adoption of the adversary program on a relatively massified scale.

As he looked back from the mid-sixties over forty-odd years of cultural life, he noted that in the interval "there has grown up a populous group whose numbers take for granted the idea of the adversary culture." He found that the adversary project of mod-

ernism had become institutionalized, and its adherents now formed a virtual class within the bourgeoisie that was supposed to be its enemy. Because it had become established and so to speak "successful," Trilling rightly wondered how the ideal of autonomy would fare under such conditions of sufferance and prosperity. His view remained skeptical, for he observed that the modernist and adversary culture had now begun to share "something of the character of the larger culture to which it was—to which it still is—adversary."

The Adversary Culture

He did not stop there but went on to confront an even graver difficulty. This difficulty has to do with the dominant part that is played by art in the adversary culture. As he considered this problematical subject, Trilling found himself approaching

a view which will seem disastrous to many readers and which, indeed, rather surprises me. This is the view that art does not always tell the truth or the best kind of truth and does not always point out the right way, that it can even generate falsehood and habituate us to it, and that, on frequent occasions, it might well be subject, in the interests of autonomy, to the scrutiny of the rational intellect. The history of this faculty scarcely assures us that it is exempt from the influences of the cultures in which it has sought its development, but at the present juncture its informing purpose of standing beyond any culture, even an adversary one, may be of use.

These arguments were made in the Preface to *Beyond Culture*, Trilling's third large collection of essays; when that volume was published in 1965 there were indeed some readers who responded as if Trilling had committed a cultural and moral disaster. These arguments do in fact represent a departure from—or at least a significant modification of—some of the beliefs put forward in *The Liberal Imagination*. That work, one may recall, opened with the ringing assertion that "literature is the human activity that takes the fullest and most precise account of variousness, possibility, complexity and difficulty."

To a New Generation

The Liberal Imagination had been directed to a generation of readers whose determining experiences had been the political-ideological crises of the left in the 1930s and 40s; this generation had in considerable measure committed itself to a simplified and constricted notion of rationality. For these readers, Trilling had contended, the experience of literature, had they been open to it, would have acted with salutary force; for literature was no less than a criticism of life, in particular of the life of inadequate rationality to

which so many had given themselves. *Beyond Culture* was addressed to the grown-up and growing-up children of those readers. The inadequacies and deformations of intellectual life were now running in the other or opposite direction. Hence the polemical line of discourse that Trilling now took up was essentially aimed at the excesses of irrationalism and self-abandonment that the "success" of the adversary culture had made popular and even *chic*.

But Trilling himself had changed as well. Earlier he had been a partisan, however qualified, of the modern. By the mid-1960s the qualifications increasingly tended to outweigh the original partisanship. Yet in some other part of himself Trilling had not changed at all. There had always been something in him that responded positively to the proposal made by Plato in *The Republic* to banish poets from the ideal society. Not that Trilling would have endorsed any such banishment himself. What he was responding to was Plato's recognition of the power of art, a power to exert influence on attitudes and behavior. It was a power, he was fond of remarking, that modern dictatorships understood only too well.

Trilling himself responded to this power with exceptional literalness. Part of his greatness as a critic was that he regarded the dramatic proposals made by literature as solicitations directed toward the reader. He ascribed to art a purposefulness that was more than esthetic. He detected in the formal gestures of literature intentions that, were they taken seriously by the reader, would lead to new behavior, to changes in life, to consequences of every kind.

He did not in effect think of literature and artistic representations as primarily symbolic actions or as theoretical and contemplative flights of the imagination—although he was not, to be sure, innocent of such conceptions and of how they can be persuasively applied and/or manipulated. He experienced the radical negativity of some of the most characteristic modernist art and thought, such as Beckett's writings and certain forms of existential philosophy, with uneasiness, ambivalence and finally, I think, with downright dislike—although, once more, he fully appreciated the undeniable power of that negativity.

The Rational Affirmed

Here again he took his stand with Freud. *Civilization and Its Discontents* was the text by Freud that Trilling read and taught the most and prized most highly. In that work, Freud raised the question "of whether or not we want to *accept* civilization . . . with all its contradictions," and with all its pains and torments. For Trilling, Freud asked that question with unique force and answered it with equally telling saliency. Trilling's formulation of that answer—the style in which he paraphrases Freud's unblinking acceptance of

civilization—is as much Trilling as it is Freud. “We do well to accept it,” he writes in summary, “although we also do well to cast a cold eye on the fate that makes it our better part to accept it.”

In reaffirming the idea of rational intellect, which he also called “the idea of mind,” Trilling realized that he was not supporting anything that could currently be conceived of as glamorous or even attractive. “Mind today,” he wrote, “must inevitably seem a poor gray thing,” and he was under no illusion that it could regain the power and mystique that it had once enjoyed in our culture. In putting forward an ideal and a set of values that even in his own eyes seemed bleak, exigent and yet minimal, Trilling was behaving with characteristic courage. He once wrote that Freud and Nietzsche “thought that life was justified by our heroic response to its challenge.” To my mind Trilling’s spiritual heroism was in large part bound up with his exigency and his minimalism—his ability to affirm, without illusion, qualities and virtues that his own group, his own culture, his own audience had largely given up on as being at once excessive in their demands upon us and insufficient in the gratifications they return.

During the political and cultural storms of the sixties Trilling continued to sustain himself in these attitudes. As he considered some of the more bizarre lunacies of the New Left or wilder manifestations of the counter-culture, he thought he saw in these rapidly fluctuating formations genuine threats to the cultural order that he affirmed, albeit minimally and with a cold, skeptical eye. He tended on the whole to see tragedy in such developments, while others tended to see farce. Others often responded to these phenomena with the usual distancing defenses of literary criticism and placed them in contexts that were literary, symbolic and theatrical. Trilling for the most part did not. To him, these were real events, created by real people, in the real world.

Trilling’s great virtue as a critic of literature and culture was that he never ceased to attend to the social and cultural circumstances out of which art and literature arise and that they serve in part to constitute. His legacy to us, I believe, is the seriousness and directness with which he addressed himself to the verbal and written productions that came to him from the world “out there.” It was almost as if, in the face of everything modernity had taught us, he continued with old-fashioned perversity to assert that society really exists and that each one of us is an important part of it.

Sincerity and Authenticity

As the cultural turbulences began to abate, Trilling gathered his forces together for yet one further inquiry into the grimness of the current historical situation. The outcome of this investigation, and

his final volume, was a small masterpiece. *Sincerity and Authenticity* (1972) ranges across the culture of the last four centuries of Western history—and deals with such writers as Shakespeare, Molière, Diderot, Goethe, Rousseau, Schiller, Hegel, Conrad and Sartre, among many others—but its subject remains the fate of the modern self, the historical vicissitudes that our individuality and personhood have undergone. That is the book's subject, but its argument—in any conventional sense—is almost impossible to summarize.

What Trilling had come to realize afresh is that the modern Western self, that proud creation of our historical culture, was beleaguered and endangered. It was threatened on the one hand by its old cultural enemies, such as repression, deprivation and alienation; it had to continue to struggle against such forces in order to attain what Trilling referred to as the personal sense of "authentic being," that sense in which an individual modern person recognizes the state of his own positive self-realization. But the modern self was threatened as well by some of its putative new cultural friends, those who would lead us away from repression and deprivation and deliver us, reborn, to a new disalienated condition of authentic existence. Prominent among these are the recent prophets and savants of madness, like R.W. Laing and Norman Brown, who have proclaimed to us that madness is an adequate, appropriate and even healthy personal response to a sick, corrupt and exploitative society. It was to such pronouncements that Trilling turned at the end of the book, whose final passage runs as follows:

Yet the doctrine that madness is health, that madness is liberation and authenticity, receives a happy welcome from a consequential part of the educated public. And when we have given due weight to the likelihood that those who respond positively to the doctrine don't have it in mind to go mad, let alone insane—it is characteristic of the intellectual life of our culture that it fosters a form of assent which does not involve actual credence—we must yet take it to be significant of our circumstance that many among us find it gratifying to entertain the thought that alienation is to be overcome only by the completeness of alienation, and that alienation completed is not a deprivation or deficiency but a potency. Perhaps exactly because the thought is assented to so facilely, so without what used to be called seriousness, it might seem that no expression of disaffection from the social existence was ever so desperate as this eagerness to say that authenticity of personal being is achieved through an ultimate isolateness and through the power that this is presumed to bring. The falsities of an alienated social reality are rejected in favor of an upward psychopathic mobility to the point of divinity, each one of us a Christ—but with none of the inconveniences of undertaking to intercedè, of being a sacrifice, of reasoning with rabbis, of making

sermons, of having disciples, of going to weddings and to funerals, of beginning something and at a certain point remarking that it is finished.

The densities of judgment in that prose—its identification, for example, of “a form of assent which does not involve actual credence”—modulate into the ironic bite of “an upward psychopathic mobility” and then turn once again into that remarkable and moving conclusion in which Trilling is able to evoke with utter conviction and finality what the authentic life of the authentic Christ entailed. Confronted with such a prose and such a text we see literary criticism becoming something larger, richer and more alive with meaning than it almost ever is. We see, in short, a secondary text—something which began as a commentary on another text—in the very act of turning itself into a primary one, into a work of literature.

Historian of the Moral Life

He was our historian of the moral life of modernity, our philosopher of culture. He had adopted for himself what he described as Freud’s “patrician posture of simultaneous acceptance of and detachment from life in civilization.” In him, literary criticism became an enactment of the autonomy that he esteemed as the high goal and destination of personal existence. His writing embodied and dramatized the self-conscious and self-defining individuality that was at the same time its principal subject. He regarded this individuality as being today everywhere coerced, stunted, distorted and constrained; and he sought to sustain in us his readers an awareness of the value of this unique historical artifact. He came to conceive of the modern self as an endangered species, and he thought that however burdensome and troubling that individuality might be for each of us, it was certainly worth conserving.

In his essay on Jane Austen’s *Emma* Trilling wrote: “There is no reality about which the modern person is more uncertain and more anxious than the reality of himself. For each of us, as for Emma, it is a sad, characteristic hope to become better acquainted with oneself.” As one reads Trilling’s essays, one becomes aware that in him the project of literary critical analysis is at the same time a project of conscious self-examination. Trilling’s native pedagogic impulse expressed itself in its clear implicit invitation to the reader to undertake on his own part a similar project of self-scrutinization—to read Trilling’s essays was in fact one step in such an activity.

He was our teacher, and I believe that future generations of readers will continue to learn from him as well. They will read his writings and discover that they too have become better acquainted with themselves. The faculty of rational intellect, the idea of mind, that

he had once described as a poor gray thing was not so gray after all. In some of the writers whom he most admired—in Hazlitt, Arnold, Tocqueville, Mill, and George Orwell, to name but a few—that faculty, rigorously and pertinaciously exercised, had led to its own self-transcendence and to its transformation into literature. In the writings of Lionel Trilling we can observe these same processes at work. Those writings are now a permanent part of our culture's heritage.

FOR PATT, WHISPERING TO A BURRO

By David Wagoner

David Wagoner has published eight books of poetry, and an equal number of novels. All his work, a discerning critic has noted, is distinguished by a "curious, sardonic, and often authentically wild comic imagination." His most admired novel is *Where Is My Wandering Boy Tonight?* This poem is reprinted from the *Hudson Review*.

One arm around his neck, she whispers
Into his unpromising, uncompromising ear
What I may never discover:
In the middle of a field, she tells him
What they have always remembered,
Something as nameless as the calmest day
Ever to drift through fences,
Something they lost once
In the swelter of hard mountains,
In the blizzards drifting
Over the gold-burdened rivers,
Something they may never find
Again but will always search for:
Not magic words spell-breaking or -binding
But the first spell itself, the enduring
Dream between her lips and his ear,
As round-eyed, as constant,
As sure as they stand together.

THE "WHITE WRITING" OF MARK TOBEY

By John Russell

The late Mark Tobey was a slow starter who worked outside—and in advance of—the mainstream of American art for most of his long life. His innovative paintings anticipated Jackson Pollock's abstract expressionism. A noted critic calls our attention to Tobey's coloristic as well as his calligraphic genius.

John Russell, art critic for *The New York Times*, is the author of *The Meanings of Modern Art* (Museum of Modern Art, 1974), and, in co-authorship with Suzi Gablik, of *Pop Art Redefined* (Praeger, 1969). This article originally appeared in *The Smithsonian* magazine.



Mark Tobey stood out, before his death in April 1976, as one of the last of the authentic, unreconstructed nineteenth-century Americans. Everything about him made that point: the old-fashioned fine looks, the formula-free habits of speech, the actor-manager's command of gesture with which he would stand at a street corner as if searching for the passage of blank verse that would most effectively bring the traffic to a halt.

Yet when all that is said, how many contradictions remain! This quintessential American, with his rare feeling for the patterns of American speech, had long lived abroad, latterly in a city where he understood barely a word that was spoken around him. In everyday life, as in his work, he was much concerned with mystical states of mind; but if he chose to speak out in conversation, he sounded as blunt as a dockyard worker. He lived in a big, square-built fortress-like house in the old quarter of Basel, Switzerland, and felt as much at home there as he once was in Shanghai—or in the vanished England of 40 years ago.

Tobey cannot be typed. In terms of American painting, Tobey was one of the great survivors: He saw the modernist New York Armory Show in 1913, and took his ideal of female beauty from 19th century Charles Dana Gibson. But he was also unexpectedly, repeatedly and unarguably up-to-date; time and again a Tobey of many years ago will turn out to bear closely on the current concerns of painting.

Tobey's most characteristic style is essentially calligraphic—a gossamer network or skein of lines, which many among his following refer to as "white writing." But it never does to think that we have

the measure of Tobey; in the paintings of his last few years, for example, there are pictures with a new slashing boldness about their handwriting, as in the wildly angular and dissonant lines of *Coming and Going*.

Tobey was as resourceful a colorist as any contemporary artist. But his fundamental instrument remained the line. Tobey's line had a motor energy all its own; no sooner did it seem to offer us a recognizable form or a known shape, than it moved on—defying us to halt it. "It's a type of painting," Tobey said, "in which you are not allowed to rest on anything; either you're bounced off it, or you have to keep moving with it."

Perhaps the best brief estimate of Tobey's innovative power was made as early as 1944 by art critic Clement Greenberg, when he described the effect of Tobey's white writing:

The calligraphic, tightly meshed interlacing of white lines which build up to a vertical, rectangular mass reaching almost to the edges of the frame; these cause the picture surface to vibrate in depth—or, better, toward the spectator. Yet this seems little out of which to compose an easel painting. The compensation lies in the intensity, subtlety and directness with which Tobey registers and transmits emotion usually considered too tenuous to be made the matter of any other art than music.

Like most artists of international stature, Tobey was no stranger to awards and honors. In 1958 he won first prize for painting at the Venice Biennale and, afterward, he had numerous retrospectives, notably in New York, Paris and London, and in 1974 a comprehensive "Tribute to Mark Tobey," at the Smithsonian's National Collection of Fine Arts in Washington, D.C.

After he had lived for years in the northwest city of Seattle, Washington, people thought of him as a mid-Pacific man. He was believed, that is to say, to have a special relationship with the Orient and with Oriental art. And it is perfectly true that Chinese calligraphy, Japanese poets, Zen Buddhism and the meditative lifestyle of the East meant a great deal to him. But when he made a big decoration for the Seattle Opera House in the 1960s, it

Mark Tobey



The "White Writing" of Mark Tobey

turned out to be truffled with local references and made up of a heterogeneous mix of pure painting, fragments of monotypes, printed matter of many kinds, postage stamps and a magazine photograph of Queen Elizabeth II on a horse. Seen from a distance, these constituents lose their identity and lead a new life as a "Tobey." A similar melange—with labels and postage stamps—appears in *Hidden Spheres*.

An Inner Consistency

Where others trimmed their personalities to suit their environments, Tobey had always kept his intact; and he had his reward in the inner consistency which binds his work together. Nothing about him was irrelevant, least of all the place where he was born and reared.

Mark Tobey was born in Centerville, Wisconsin, in 1890, and from 1894 to 1906 he lived with his parents in the little town of Trempealeau, Wisconsin. Trempealeau stands on the Mississippi, a short way north of La Crosse, on a particularly noble sweep of the river.

Trempealeau is midmost America, and Mark Tobey's father was a midmost American, of the kind who can turn his hand to many things—farming, carpentering, house-building. Young Mark lived "the life of a barefoot boy," nimble and self-reliant in his relations with nature. He was by turns swimmer, skater, fisherman, botanist, and he saw his future—again by turns—in terms of the Congregational Church, taxidermy, storekeeping, biology and zoology. His parents kept him on a light rein in such matters and there seemed no hurry for him to make up his mind.

All that was changed when, in 1909, his father became too ill to work and it fell to Mark Tobey to find some way to make a living, fast. The family moved to Chicago, and from that time on Tobey became a student of the metropolitan scene. He didn't always like what he saw—in fact, he liked it less and less—but he kept something of that primal amazement with which he greeted the fact that there really were many people in the world, and that so many of them had come together in one place. For many years, learning and living took all his energies. Some of the learning was unsuccessful; there was never much likelihood that he would succeed as a mechanical draftsman, a shipping clerk or a blueprint boy, although he accepted them all as interim occupations.

What he did have, and what then commanded a ready market, was a gift for setting down the look of other people on paper, and for doing it with just that grain of wit, or of poetry, which makes for memorable looking. He could still do it, in his later years; but in the early years of this century, he did it to order, and editors soon knew him as a man who could be relied upon. By 1911 he was doing

well enough to set up in New York as a straightforward portrait draftsman.

It wasn't quite *Tobey*, even so. In graduating from commercial, or near-commercial, art to something more exalted, he was part of a living American tradition—at one with William Glackens, Everett Shinn, John Sloan and George Leks. But he took much longer than they did to get around to it. In terms of time and location, and in terms of his ultimate ambition, Mark Tobey was one of those late and slow developers who have counted for so much in modern art (Mark Rothko, Barnett Newman and Jean Dubuffet are other examples). He had to get everything right, and without reneging on what he had been before. It was as if he knew, by instinct, that he would be about forty before he found his whole self in his art.

He was active throughout the 1920s in all kinds of ways: traveling to England, France, Spain, Greece, Turkey and what is now Israel, teaching art, studying the Baha'i World Faith (of which he had been an adherent since 1918), selling his caricatures, working incessantly with whatever materials lay at hand. Yet the artist, the quintessential Tobey, was somewhere else.

What was that quintessential Tobey about? Well, as early as 1920 he had experienced what he called "a violent desire to break and disintegrate forms, and to use light structures rather than dark." He had an intimation that "minute forms or patterns" would play a great part in his art. So, too, would what he called "dimensionless dimension": a quality which he had noted in the work of the great English visionary painter, J.M.W. Turner. He knew from his studies of Oriental calligraphy that it is possible for a painter to *think* with the brush; and, in some ways as yet undefined, he wanted to rethink the traditional categories of space and form and time, as they applied in art.

It was a big program, and it called for the total integration of Tobey's experience. Every aspect of his nature had to play its part, from the otherworldly to the sardonic, and from the solitary to the metropolitan. The whole world and the whole of human life were somehow to be got into the picture.

Search for the Infinite

What Tobey wanted of his art was something that would be infinite in both the literal and the metaphorical sense. It would have no beginning and no end, no focus and no dimension. He knew, with the scientists, that "there is no such thing as empty space. It's all loaded with life," and he wanted to share with others his own awareness of space: "a kind of living thing. . . like a sixth sense."

Tobey finally broke through to this in paintings based for the most part on the experience of city life. City life presents, ready-made, a




Coming and Going (1970) recalls jazz improvisation in its energy and embroidery.



(Above) *Hidden Spheres* (1967) has a richly textured surface which partly obscures collage elements, such as paint labels and postage stamps. (Above right) *Broadway* (1936) portrays big-city life at night, ablaze with lights and teeming with traffic. Its contour lines prefigure Tobey's abstract "white writing" of later years, visible in the huge, densely detailed canvas (right), *Sagittarius Red* (1963).

spectacle of the utmost vivacity and complexity. Tobey's own painting of cities are portraits of pullulation. In *Broadway*, one of his best early examples of this new, fulfilled painting style, Tobey retained only enough circumstantial detail to remind us that the picture derived from the direct observation of life. Not until some years later, in the early paintings of Jean Dubuffet, was there anything like this in European art. In life, the nearest thing to the experience of a Tobey painting is the experience of a ticker-tape parade, when the whole space before us is crisscrossed with fugitive shapes which form and reform themselves continually. When Tobey saw color photographs of astronaut John Glenn's triumphal progress along New York's Fifth Avenue, he said, "I never saw so many Tobey's!"

Eventually, he trusted to the movement of his hand to produce an allover, abstract structure which worked by itself, with no direct





Edge of August (1953) suggests the color transition between summer and fall.

The "White Writing" of Mark Tobey

reference to the world before us. But even then there was a continuing concern with the look of things, the difference being that that concern expressed itself directly. *Edge of August*, for instance, could suggest a microscopic world of dancing particles or, perhaps, a telescopic view of a solar flare.

In Greenberg's essay, the date matters as much as the discernment. In the year 1944 only a very few people understood what later came to be called action painting (or abstract expressionism). Greenberg wrote on a later occasion that whereas Tobey's white-writing pictures were shown in New York in 1944, Jackson Pollock did not make his own first all-over paintings till the late summer of 1946. In other words, Tobey was first with the kind of defocused painting in which motor energy spreads itself across the whole area of the canvas with no concession to conventional ideas of composition. But it was never Tobey's ambition to be "first" with anything.

Tobey had chosen a way of life which put him physically and geographically in the margins of art history. Where American painting is concerned, the running has been made over the last 30 years by artists who lived primarily in New York City, where an elaborate machinery of scrutiny and appraisal went to work upon them. Tobey, by contrast, lived in faraway places and was believed to paint only small pictures of a vaguely uplifting sort. In point of fact, his *Sagittarius Red* of 1963 is more than 12 feet (4 meters) wide, big even by the standards of abstract expressionism.

He had many gifts—not least for poetry, and for the composition of short piano pieces. There is no *one* Tobey whom we can simplify and two-dimensionalize. The world which he sets before us in his late paintings is one in which nothing has been lost or forgotten from his experience; it is also one in which nothing is stated directly. The paintings stand for energy, continuous change and instantaneous readaptation. It was a great moment for all of us when Tobey the moralist joined hands with Tobey the magician.

POLITICS: THEORY AND PRACTICE

By Maurice Cranston

Every generation seems to feel the obligation of posing for itself the large philosophical question of first, what constitutes good government and next, of how to achieve it. Ours is no exception, says an eminent political scientist. Dr. Cranston examines a recent attempt to view the contemporary politics of the New Left

through the lucid prism of the classical political theory of Aristotle and his successors. His review is abridged from *Art International*.

Professor of political science at the London School of Economics, Maurice Cranston is the author of many books, the latest being *The Mask of Politics*.

The *Common Sense of Politics* may seem a paradoxical title for Professor Mortimer Adler's new book. For it offers the reader a conception of politics which is very much that of a philosopher, and its argument is addressed to something decidedly more sophisticated and intellectual than is "common sense." Adler sets out, first, to defend politics against those who think that the life of man would be better in a world without politics; and secondly, to adumbrate, if not fully to articulate, a progressive, democratic, socialistic system of political ideals.

It was not unusual in the eighteenth century for writers to assume that any appeal to clear and distinct ideas was bound to recruit the support of common sense, on the grounds that every man was rational; but, alas, this congenial belief has proved with subsequent experience more difficult to entertain, except by minds of a resolutely optimistic turn. Adler, however, is one such optimist. He is, so to say, an Aristotle without Aristotle's conservative doubts and fears; a man of confidence as well as rationality, and also one who writes with an irresistible charm.

The part of the book which is most effectively and convincingly argued is that which is concerned with the defense of politics as such. Adler begins with Aristotle's dictum that man is a political animal, and he sets out to consider what this means. It means, for one thing, that man is *not* a social animal. Man is not equipped, like ants and bees, with instincts which prompt him always to act in a manner conducive to the interests of the group or tribe or species. Some of a man's impulses prompt him to collaborate with his neighbors; others lead to rivalry and conflict. Hence men have to settle rules and agree to arrangements for the life they lead in company with other men. This is what makes man a political as distinct from a social animal.

© by Maurice Cranston

Adler's defense of politics is in part a refutation of the idea, now curiously fashionable in radical circles, that government is unnecessary. Even Marx himself, as Adler reminds us, had an anarchist vision of the state withering away when the classless society was fully matured; but for purposes of practical politics Marx was a total *étatiste* (as witness the program of *The Communist Manifesto*). What is remarkable about the Noam Chomskys, the R.D. Laings, the Paul Goodmans and the other ideologists of the recent "new left" is their belief that government is *already* unnecessary. Their claim is that it is only because historic man has been so brain-washed and denaturalized by past and present culture-patterns (all based on exploitation) that man appears to need rules. Recover the natural man, according to these theorists, and human societies could flourish without authorities and law. Adler demonstrates the folly of this reasoning; he also shows that, for all its modishness, it is only a jazzed-up version of the most dated 19th-century anarchism, dated because it rests on a very Victorian conception of human societies as wholly natural entities.

A short summary can do no justice to the subtlety of Adler's analysis of human societies; but the point he underlines is that while nature makes society necessary for man, nature does not solve the problems which that necessity introduces. Indeed there are some natural instincts which themselves constitute a large part of the problem. One is man's natural tendency to aggression. Adler writes:

If men were totally devoid of aggressive tendencies, if they were in all things pacific and always motivated by impulses of benevolent love toward all their fellow-men, the maintenance of civil peace, the preservation of individual freedom from coercion and intimidation, and security of life and limb would not need the operation of such institutions as the criminal law and the police force; nor would the sanctions of constitutional government be needed to protect men from being dominated by one individual or group of individuals whose appetite for power makes them seek despotic dominion over all the rest. One of the fundamental principles of politics...is the proposition that society cannot exist without government and without the exercise of coercive force by government.

The Need for Government

Against the violence of natural aggression, the force of human institutions is the only protection. This much, at any rate, is manifestly evident to common sense. And the "new left" can sustain its position only by recourse to a bizarre psychology which asserts that human aggression is *not* a natural phenomenon: a psychology which

is logically driven, in the theories of Foucault, Laing and Cooper, to declare that "unreason is as good as reason." Adler, in refuting such extravagance, has no need to employ the technical resources of philosophy. But only philosophy can undertake the task which Adler sets himself, of determining what kind of government can best satisfy those needs which man's nature and predicament between them generate. This he often speaks of, in the language of the Aristotelian tradition, as the "good life." Man must have government, and if he does not have good government he will have bad government; so the philosopher is asked: how are we to recognize good government?

Three Types of Freedom

Our approach to this problem through which Adler conducts us, turns out, not unexpectedly from an author who has written the most substantial treatise in the present century on the subject of freedom, to consist of an enquiry into different types of liberty. First, there is liberty understood simply as an autonomy. This is the conception favored both by the authoritarian Thomas Hobbes and the anarchistic "new left." Liberty is here conceived as being unimpeded by any person or institution in doing what you want to do. Adler speaks of this type of freedom as "unlimited autonomy," and he contrasts it with two other types of freedom. One of these he calls "limited freedom"—that is a freedom limited both by the exigencies of justice and by the authority (itself limited) of a *de jure* government of which the individual is a consenting constituent. This conception of limited freedom, which has its most noted exponent in the philosopher Locke, Adler calls "individual civil liberty." Adler further distinguishes a third type of freedom which he calls "political liberty," and which augments the Lockean civil liberty with active participating citizenship.

It is a crucial part of Adler's argument to show that the Hobbist-anarchist conception of unlimited liberty is bad: not bad in itself, perhaps, but bad in its predictable effects. For, as Adler puts it,

It follows that if unlimited liberty were to be exercised *without the restraints of justice*, some individuals might enjoy unlimited freedom to the maximum, but in doing so they would encroach upon, limit or reduce the freedom of others to do exactly as they pleased. In other words, unlimited freedom—freedom unrestrained by justice—*cannot be maximized for all*.

This, in brief, is Adler's indictment of absolute freedom as a bad conception of freedom: a freedom that cannot be universalized, and cannot therefore satisfy the criteria of justice and morality. It remains to be emphasized that in speaking of a freedom *restrained* by

justice, Adler is thinking primarily of the restraints which a man puts on his own conduct in obedience to the moral law: and in this sense there is no abrogation of autonomy, for the just man obeys only himself. But since there are widespread tendencies for men to act unjustly, this (limited or Lockean) freedom has to be upheld by human institutions which act, so to speak, externally on the individual.

Political Liberty

The third conception of freedom that Adler distinguishes, a conception classical in its provenance but none the less first in the author's own preferences, is the positive freedom of the active citizen, the freedom of the man who plays a dynamic role in formulating the rules under which he lives. The difference between Adler's "limited civic liberty," which is limited only by just law, and Adler's "political liberty" is that the latter goes together with a voice in deciding what the just law is. Adler, in other words, believes that democracy adds to civil liberty a new dimension which he calls the political. And he points out that this more perfect liberty is just as dependent as is civil liberty "upon the institution of a just state with just government." The anarchist ideal of the "new left," by contrast, is an understanding of freedom which never got beyond the Hobbesian conception of the "Silence of the law."

Adler believes that the law is a good thing, not merely a necessary thing. For the good life of man, as he puts it, is not something that each individual can experience in solitude. To know the good life a man must enjoy the partnership and the cooperation of many other people, besides the friendship and the love of a few. This is not possible unless tranquility and order prevail in the relations between neighbors. And since men "cannot engage effectively in the pursuit of happiness" unless "the authority and authorized force of government" replace lawless autonomy of individuals, the state must be regarded as a blessing: the state is good.

The reader of Adler's pages will not be tempted; as were so many careless readers of Hegel, to pass from the assertion that the state as such is good to the conclusion that all existing governments, regimes, or rules ought to have our approval. For Adler moves briskly from his analysis of what a state should be to a consideration of what governments are and have been; and he does not fail to notice that most societies have lived under despotisms of one kind or another.

However, Adler the historian is no less controversial than Adler the philosopher. He speaks of three revolutionary transformations that have, he believes, characterized the history of government in the Western world. The first, a revolution effected by the ancient Greeks, introduced constitutional government in place of despotism.

The second, a revolution introduced by the Americans in the eighteenth century, introduced democracy in addition to constitutional government. The third, a revolution effected by the Russians in 1917, added socialist egalitarianism to the democratic and constitutional innovations of the two earlier revolutions. Although Adler uses the word "socialist" in a rather peculiar way, he concludes that the state in its republican, democratic and socialist form, realizes its best and highest nature.

Socialism and Freedom

This is the part of Adler's argument which I myself find most difficult to follow. For while constitutional government is undoubtedly a revolutionary transformation of despotism, democracy (such as we have known it) has come about almost invariably by piecemeal modification of the constitutional structure, and not by any violent break. As for the socialist revolution of Russia in 1917, and other revolutions which have copied it, the effect has *never* been an improvement of a constitutional democratic system, but simply a reversion to despotism. Francis Bacon, the true founder of revolutionary socialism, recognized as early as the beginning of the seventeenth century that the regime of philanthropic intellectuals which he wished to introduce required the end of the rule of law: an enlightened despotism must be a total despotism. Bacon's disciple Lenin saw this as clearly as he did: there was no question for Lenin of adding to the innovation of early constitutional and democratic revolutions; the dictatorship of the proletariat would abolish all such "liberal shams."

What then is the "socialist" revolution that Adler would have us welcome as something to enlarge the possibility of men enjoying active freedom? It turns out that what he really favors is a system he names "universal capitalism," that is, a society in which every man is an owner as well as a citizen. He thinks that "bourgeois capitalism" is bad because it enables rich men to exploit poor men; and that "state capitalism" (or communism) is bad because it produces a new class of bureaucrats to dominate ordinary people. He suggests that a mixed economy is tolerable, even desirable if the ideal form of capitalism—in which every citizen is a capitalist —"should turn out not to be feasible." So it seems that the only kind of socialism Adler actually favors is something milder than the mildest Fabianism: and why the Russian revolution should be given any credit for putting it on the map remains a mystery.

THE CASE FOR TECHNOLOGY

By Samuel C. Florman



A pragmatic scientist replies to those contemporary critics who insist that technology is the root of all evils, and humanity must return to a simpler, less materialistic, more "natural" life. Life was not really better in the "innocent" past, he says—and human beings have a right to want to improve their lot.

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A generation ago most people believed, without doubt or qualification, in the beneficial effects of technological progress. Books were written hailing the coming of an age in which machines would do all the onerous work, and life would become increasingly utopian. Today there is a growing belief that technology has escaped from human control and is making our lives intolerable. Thus we dart from one myth to another. Hostility to technology has become such a familiar staple that rarely do we stop to consider how this new doctrine has gained its hold upon us. Critical scrutiny of this strange and dangerous phenomenon is very much overdue.

The Founding Fathers

The founding father of the contemporary anti-technological movement is Jacques Ellul, a theological philosopher, whose book, *The Technological Society*, was published in France in 1954, and in the United States ten years later. When it appeared in the United States, the late mystic-poet Thomas Merton called it "one of the most important books of this mid-century."

Ellul's thesis is that "technique" has become a Frankenstein monster that cannot be controlled. By technique he means not just the use of machines, but all deliberate and rational behavior, all efficiency and organization. Man created technique in prehistoric times out of sheer necessity, but then the *bourgeoisie* developed it in order to make money, and the masses were converted because of

their interest in comfort. The search for efficiency has become an end in itself, dominating men and destroying the quality of his life.

The second prominent figure to unfurl the banner of anti-technology was Lewis Mumford. His conversion was particularly significant since for many years he had been known and respected as the leading historian of technology. His massive *Myth of the Machine* appeared in 1967 (Part I: *Technics and Human Development*) and in 1970 (Part II: *The Pentagon of Power*).

The next important convert was René Dubos, a respected research biologist and author. In *So Human an Animal*, published in 1968, Dubos started with the biologist's view that man is an animal whose basic nature was formed during the course of his evolution, both physical and social. This basic nature, molded in forests and fields, is not suited to life in a technological world, Dubos argued. Man's ability to adapt to almost any environment has been his downfall, and little by little he has accommodated himself to the physical and psychic horrors of modern life. Man must choose a different path, said Dubos, or he is doomed. This concern for the individual, living human being fleshed out the abstract theories of Ellul and the historical analyses of Mumford. *So Human an Animal* was awarded the Pulitzer Prize, and became an important article of faith in the anti-technology crusade.

In 1970 everybody was talking about Charles A. Reich's *Greening of America*. Reich, a law professor at Yale, spoke out on behalf of the youthful counterculture and its dedication to a liberating consciousness-raising. Theodore Roszak's *Where the Wasteland Ends* appeared in 1972 and carried Reich's theme further, into the realm of primitive spiritualism. Roszak, like Reich, is a college professor. His work brought to a logical climax the anti-technological movement started by Ellul.

Technology as a Thing

The anti-technologists are notable for the way in which they refer to "technology" as a thing, or a force, as if it had an existence of its own. In this way they take their cue from Ellul. "Technique has become autonomous," he writes. "It has fashioned an omnivorous world which obeys its own laws." This is not just a figure of speech; it is meant as a serious definition.

The anti-technologists then proceed to depict the average person as a helpless slave, driven by the technological force to perform work he detests. He is also driven by forces no less malevolent to *consume* things he does not want.

At the same time that they identify an anonymous technology itself as the source of these evils, the anti-technologists place the blame on a particular group of individuals: the Establishment.

Strong, selfish men, making use of technology for their own benefit, supposedly force the masses of men to work and to consume under conditions that can only be described as subhuman. The leaders of the Establishment are assisted in their nefarious work by a staff of deputies: the technologists. Sometimes, the technologists themselves become the Establishment—called technocrats—using their esoteric knowledge to dominate their bewildered fellows. This state of affairs, say the anti-technologists, tends not only to debase the quality of life, but to perpetuate itself in a form of technocratic totalitarianism.

Another atrocity of which technology is accused is that of cutting man off from the natural world in which he evolved. This could have disastrous results. As Mumford sees it, “man himself will become...denatured, that is to say, dehumanized.” Dubos and Reich compare modern man to a wild animal spending its life in a city zoo. Dubos refers to the attempts of city dwellers to make some small contact with nature as “the pathetic weekend in the country.”

Not only weekend outings, but all of modern man's leisure activities are viewed by the anti-technologists with pity and contempt: television (Ellul), spectator sports (Mumford), the automobile ride (Dubos), even the old-fashioned ice-cream parlor (Reich), hot dogs, soft drinks, and photography (Roszak).

These, then, are the main themes that run through the works of the anti-technologists:

- Technology is a “thing” or a force that has escaped from human control and is spoiling our lives.
- Technology forces man to do work that is tedious and degrading.
- Technology forces man to consume things that he does not really desire.
- Technology cripples man by cutting him off from the natural world in which he evolved.
- Technology provides man with technical diversions that destroy his “existential” sense of his own being.

Lost Harmonies

The anti-technologists contrast our modern technocracy with three cultures that they consider preferable: the primitive tribe, the peasant community, and medieval society.

Ellul notes approvingly that primitive man “worked as little as possible and was content with a restricted consumption of goods....The time given to the use of techniques was short, compared with the leisure time devoted to sleep, conversation, games, or, best of all, to meditation.”

Mumford contends that “the poorest peasant...is foot-free and mobile.” According to Reich, in medieval times, “when a very differ-

ent consciousness prevailed, neither technology nor the market was permitted to dominate other social values."

Though recognizing that we cannot return to earlier times, the anti-technologists would have us attempt to recapture the satisfactions of these vanished cultures. To do this, what is required is nothing less than *a change in the nature of man*.

Although the anti-technologists are concerned mainly with the harmful *effects* of technology, they reserve some of their disdain for the *activity* itself, and for the men who make it their life's work. To them, engineers and scientists are half-men whose analysis and manipulation of the world deprives them of the emotional experiences that are the essence of the good life.

Is Technology Out of Control?

If the anti-technological argument is allowed to stand, the engineer is hard pressed to justify his existence. More important, the implications for society, should anti-technology prevail, are most disquieting. For, at the very core of anti-technology, hidden under a veneer of aesthetic sensibility and ethical concern, lies a yearning for a totalitarian society.

The first anti-technological dogma I dispute is that technology is something that has escaped from human control. Sometimes anxiety and frustration at the workings of technology do make us feel that way. But sober thought reveals that technology is not an independent force, but merely one of the types of activity people engage in... because they choose to do so. The choice may sometimes be foolish or unconsidered. It may be forced upon some members of society by others. But this is far different from the concept that technology *itself* misleads or enslaves the populace.

Philosopher Daniel Callahan has stated the case with calm clarity:

Man is by nature a technological animal; to be human is to be technological... We should recognize that when we speak of technology, that is another way of speaking about man himself in one of his manifestations.

In the face of the complex problems with which we live, it may seem ingenuous to say that men invent and manufacture things because they want to, or because others want them to and reward them accordingly. Technological activities have had *consequences*, not only physical but also intellectual, psychological, and cultural. Thus, it can be argued, technology is *deterministic*. It causes other things to happen. Someone invents the automobile, for example, and it changes the way people think as well as the way they act. It changes their living patterns, their values, and their expectations in ways that were not anticipated. Some of the changes are

undesired—traffic jams, accidents, and pollution. Therefore, technological advance seems to be independent of human direction.

But our automobile culture has grown because people have always wanted to do the things that automobiles now enable them to do: to move quickly and independently from one place to another. Technologists were “commissioned” to invent the automobile. Some people have come to despise it, but at the present time they are very much in the minority. As people become disgruntled with the problems of mass ownership of the automobile, they are beginning to pass new laws controlling its use—and also to “commission” technologists to devise different types of vehicles for individual and mass transport.

Work and Consumption

Is it ingenuous, again, to say that people work, not to feed some monstrous technological machine, but, as they have since time immemorial, to feed themselves? We all have ambivalent feelings toward work—engineers as well as anti-technologists. We try to avoid it, and yet we seem to require it for our emotional well-being. This ambivalence is as old as civilization. A few wealthy people are bored because they do not have to work, and a lot of ordinary people grumble because they do have to.

The anti-technologists romanticize the work of earlier times to make it seem more appealing than work in a technological age. But their idyllic descriptions of peasant life do not ring true. Agricultural work, for all its appeal to the intellectual in his armchair, makes brutal demands. Factory and office work is no bed of roses, either. But, given a choice, most people prefer to escape from the drudgery of the farm.

Does technological society force people to consume things they do not want? The consumers who buy cars and electric can openers could, if they chose, buy oboes and oil paints, sailboats and hiking boots, chess sets and Mozart records. If people are vulgar, foolish, and selfish in their choice of purchases, is it not the worst sort of “cop-out,” or evasion, to blame this on “the economy,” “society,” or “the suave technocracy”? Indeed, would not a man prefer being called vulgar to being told he has no will with which to make choices of his own?

Exploitation by the Elite?

The next tenet of anti-technology is that a technocratic elite is taking over control of society. The charge that certain people are taking advantage of other people is not contrary to common sense. But is it logical to claim that exploitation *increases* as a result of the growth of technology?

This claim is absolutely without foundation. When camel caravans traveled across the deserts, there were a few merchant entrepreneurs and many disenfranchised camel drivers. From earliest historical times, peasants have been abused and exploited by the nobility. Bankers, merchants, landowners, kings and assorted plunderers have enjoyed life at the expense of the masses in practically every large social group in history. Perhaps in small tribes there was less exploitation than that which developed in large and complex cultures—and surely technology played a role in the transition from tribalism to agriculture. But since that dim, distant time, it simply is not true that advances in technology have been helpful to the Establishment in increasing its power over the masses.

In fact, the evidence is all the other way. In technologically advanced societies, there is more freedom for the average person than there was in earlier ages. In our own time, people have been apprehensive that new technological achievements *might* make it possible for governments to tyrannize their citizens. But, in spite of the newest electronic gadgetry, governments are scarcely able to prevent the anti-social actions of criminals—much less control every act of the ordinary citizen. Hijacking, technically ingenious robberies, computer-aided embezzlements, all are evidence that the outlaw is able to turn technology to his own advantage, often more adroitly than the government. The rebellious individual is more than holding his own.

Exploitation continues. That is a fact of life. But it has not increased in extent or intensity because of technology—and the technologists are wrong to say so. Those who were slaves are now free. Those who were disenfranchised can now vote. Rigid class structures are giving way to mobility.

Center of Power

It is ironic for technologists in the Establishment to hear themselves called “high priests” and “technocratic elite” at the very time that we are complaining of a lack of prestige and power. Talk to any scientist or engineer, look into any professional journal, and you will learn quickly enough that the centers of power lie elsewhere. Technologists are needed, to be sure, just as scribes were needed at one time, or blacksmiths, or millers, or builders of fortresses. Some engineers have moved into positions of responsibility in industry and government, but their numbers are small compared to leaders trained in the law, accounting, and business. Real power rests, not with the technologists, or with any special professional group for that matter, but with the wealthy, the clever, the daring—and with their friends—just as it always has.

Nor do the technologists lord it over their fellows from a “citadel of

expertise." My teen-age sons read articles in *Scientific American* on computers, quasars, and laser beams. A typical plumber or gas station attendant who owns a second-hand car knows more about society's technical systems and the "august mystery of science" than any dozen Establishment people such as bank presidents and political bosses. I pick up a book entitled *How Things Work*, intended for children of primary school age. It contains straightforward discussions of electricity and magnetism, internal combustion engines and rockets. With the help of simple diagrams, it explains the workings of carburetors, thermostats, transistors, and dozens of other devices. Where is all the mystery of technology? With the growth of public concern about ecology and conservation, the general public is becoming more conversant with technological subjects, rather than less so.

Ah, Wilderness!

Is technology cutting man off from his natural habitat with catastrophic consequences? If we are less in touch with nature than we were, the reason does not lie exclusively with technology. Technology could be used to put people in very close touch with nature, if that is what they want. Wealthy people could have comfortable abodes in the wilderness, could live among birds in the highest jungle tree tops, or even commune with fish in the ocean depths. But they seem to prefer New York penthouse apartments and villas on the crowded hills above Cannes. Poorer people could stay on their farms in the plains or in their small towns, if they were willing to live the spare and simple life. But many of them seem to tire of the loneliness and the hard physical labor that go with rusticity, and succumb to the allure of the cities.

I can see no evidence that frequent contact with nature is *essential* to human well-being, as the anti-technologists assert. Perhaps the human species owes much of its complexity to the diversity of the natural environment. But why must man continue to commune with the landscapes from which he evolved?

Millions of families have lived happy years in nondescript high-rise apartments, and millions of people have spent pleasant working lifetimes in modern office buildings. These people are no more dehumanized by their environment than are a group of native women doing their laundry on the bank of a river.

Must one be in the wilds to be in touch with nature? Will not a garden in the backyard suffice? How about a collection of plants in the living room? Oriental artists have shown us how the beauty of all creation is implicit in a single blossom, or in the arrangements of a few stones. The assertion that men are emotionally crippled by being

isolated from the wilds does not take into account the many ways in which "nature" can be experienced.

It is particularly important to anti-technology that popular hobbies and pastimes be discredited, for leisure is one of the benefits generally assumed to follow in the wake of technological advances. The theme of modern man at leisure spurs the anti-technologists to derision. "As for the mass of urban workers," says Mumford, "they must have viewed their dismal lot, *if they were conscious at all (my italics)*, with a feeling of galling disappointment."

It is legitimate, of course, to speculate on the extent to which people's lives are dominated by debasing illusions. Ibsen's *Wild Duck* and Eugene O'Neill's *Iceman Cometh* are two dramatic works that deal with the theme of how our lives are made tolerable by self-deceit, and with the problem of what happens when simple people are abruptly confronted with "truth." But the anti-technologists are not creative artists speculating about the eternal problems of being human. They are polemicists determined to prove that life today is worse than it used to be.

The Good and the Bad

When real people are actually asked about their lives, Irene Loviss noted in a Harvard University program on technology and society, "they believe that technology is both good and bad, and for most of them . . . the good outweighs the bad." In medical studies assessing the adverse impact on health of changes in a person's life it has been found that timeless events such as marriage, divorce, and death in the family are far more significant than anything having to do with the rule of technology in the world.

I leaf through *The Family of Man*, a book reproducing the photographic exhibition assembled in 1955 by Edward Steichen. I see 503 pictures from sixty-eight countries, representing man in every cultural state from primitive to industrial. I see lovers embracing, mothers with infants, children at play, people eating, dancing, working, grieving, consoling. Everything really important seems eternally the same—in cities and in jungles, in slums and on farms.

The harmony that the anti-technologists see in primitive life, anthropologists find only in certain tribes. Other tribes display the very anxiety and hostility that anti-technologists blame on technology—as why should tribesmen not, being almost totally vulnerable to every passing hazard of nature, beast, disease, and human enemy? Was the peasant "foot-free," "sustained by physical work," "with a capacity for a 'non-material existence' "? Or was he brutal and brutalized, materialistic and suspicious, stoning errant women and hiding gold in his mattress? And the Middle Ages, that dimly remembered time of "moral judgment," "equilibrium," and

"common aspirations"—was it not also a time of pestilence, brigandage, and public tortures? Callous brutality, unrelievable pain, ever-present threat of untimely death are the realities with which our ancestors lived.

I do not assert that, because we live longer and in greater physical comfort than our forebears, life today is better than it ever was. It is this sort of banality that has driven so many intellectuals into the arms of the anti-technology movement. Nobody is satisfied that we are living in the best of all possible worlds.

Part of the problem is the same as it has always been. Men are imperfect, and nature is often unkind, so that unhappiness, uncertainty and pain are perpetually present. Absorbed as we are in our present problems, we forget how replete history is with wars, feuds, plagues, fires, massacres, tortures, slavery, the wasting of cities, and the destruction of libraries. As for ecology, all over the earth men have made pastures out of forests, and then deserts out of pastures. In every generation prophets, poets, and politicians have considered their contemporary situation uniquely distressing, and looked for someone—or something—to blame. The anti-technologists follow in this tradition.

The Impulse to Experiment

True, we do have some problems that are unique in degree if not in kind, and in our society a vague, generalized discontent is more widespread than it was just a generation ago. *Something* is wrong, but what?

Part of the answer is self-evident. Contemporary man is not content because he *wants* more than he can ever have. The story of Faust embodies a profound truth. The *Homo sapiens*, through the evolutionary process, has developed a unique combination of curiosity, creativity, and daring. These traits have been responsible for his success, while also confronting him with many serious problems. Once he is exposed to a new possibility, man cannot resist sampling it. If the elders hold back, youth will break away. If conservatives preach caution, radicals will arise. The new attraction might be glass beads for American Indian braves or spices for Renaissance princes; it might be the idea of heavenly salvation for marauding Vikings, or the concept of equality for Russian serfs.

Man learned early that changes in his way of life could have unforeseen and adverse consequences. Preach a religion of love, and you may start a revolution. New technologies are part of man's elemental impulse to experiment. This impulse does lead man to invent, but of equal importance—and hazard—it leads him to explore, to create, new arts, new religions, new ideas.

Man has always been afraid of his urge to do more and know more.

His earliest myths attest to this fear: Adam and Eve, the Tower of Babel, Prometheus, Pandora, Icarus. But he is constitutionally unable to restrain himself.

Our contemporary problem is distressingly obvious. We have too many people wanting too many things. This is not caused by technology; it is a consequence of the type of creature man is. There are a few people turning back, like the young men and women moving to the counterculture communes, and many people who have not gotten started because of crushing poverty and ignorance. But the vast majority of people in the world want to move forward, whatever the consequences. They are wary of revolution and anarchy. They are increasingly disturbed by crowding and pollution. Many of them recognize that "progress" is not necessarily taking them from worse to better. But whatever their caution and misgivings, they are pressing on with awesome determination.

Democratic Desires

It is common knowledge that millions of underprivileged families want adequate food and housing. What is less commonly remarked is that after they have adequate food and housing, they will want to be served at a fine restaurant and to have a weekend cottage by the sea. The illiterate want to learn how to read. Then they want education, and then more education, and then they want their sons and daughters to become doctors and lawyers.

The anti-technologists are frightened to see so many people wanting so much; they counsel halt and retreat. They tell the people that Satan (technology) is leading them astray, but the people have heard that story before. They will not stand still for vague promises of a psychic contentment that is to follow in the wake of voluntary temperance. Desperately the anti-technologists try to sell their vision of the ideal society, a sort of Viennese operetta scene, with the good and gentle populace dancing around the Maypole.

Schopenhauer warned us a century ago about the *will* divided against itself. Will presses forward relentlessly in each living creature, heedless of the inevitable conflict with itself. Will, or life-force, or human nature—call it whatever you like—is what is at the root of our problems. Technology is merely one expression of this force.

If the situation is not quite as appalling as the anti-technologists make it out to be, certainly the annoyance and fear they feel does have some basis in fact. But since the cause of the problem is not technology, which can be restrained, but the pressure of human desire, which cannot be restrained, we can only continue to muddle along as best we can.

The anti-technologists do not see things so pragmatically. In their apocalyptic view, technology has brought us to the brink of disaster,

and only an abrupt change of course can save us. Their desire to change human nature follows logically from their fear of the accelerating demands of the multitudes. Their literature is filled with praise of freedom. But it is a strangely restricted freedom—the freedom to pray or sing or dance or weave, for example, but not to visit Disneyland; the freedom to plant barley or corn, but not to use a bulldozer. It is the half-freedom, the false freedom, of the benevolent despot.

The anti-technologists are not preaching totalitarianism. They are good and gentle men, humanists at heart. But their cry for “something like a spontaneous religious conversion” (Mumford), “a common faith” (Dubos), “Consciousness III . . . an attempt to gain transcendence” (Reich), “the visionary commonwealth” (Roszak) is a cry for a new “movement,” and each new mass movement carries within itself the seeds of a new totalitarianism. Despots arise when certain conditions exist: widespread disillusionment with the existing society, identification of a scapegoat, and the dissemination by glib prophets of new visions of salvation.

Heresy and Tyranny

The anti-technologists explicitly disavow any aggressive revolutionary activity. They announce the need for radical change in our way of life, but for themselves and their followers they propose a quiet disengagement. What if large numbers of good people did begin to withdraw? That would only serve to make it easier for a demagogue to come to power. If a single tyrant did not come forward, then all the petty tyrants—the most selfish and aggressive ones—would speedily take over. It is foolhardy to assume that human nature will change spontaneously, to think that lions will lie down with lambs, when all the evidence of history as well as the experience of our daily lives tells us that it will not happen.


To the everlasting credit of man, he recognized early the imperfection of his character and set about finding ways of coping with it so as to be able to live harmoniously in large groups. For a long time spiritual and moral imperatives were declared by a succession of high-minded prophets. But then the philosophers of the Enlightenment, having observed that one man's faith always seemed to be another man's heresy, and that evangelism inevitably led to crusades, wars, and inquisitions, declared that formal religious and philosophical movements must be prevented from playing a dominant role in the organization of the state. What a unique and noble idea that was! The American founding fathers, sons of the Enlightenment, believed that certain basic rights should be accorded to each citizen, but after that the course of civilization was to be left to the vagaries of human impulse, as expressed in the bit-

tersweet phrase, "the pursuit of happiness."

We call ourselves pragmatists. Our pragmatic democracy may be doomed to fail. The increasing demands of the masses may overwhelm us, despite all our resilience and ingenuity. In such an event, we will have no choice but to change. However, we must not deceive ourselves into thinking that we can undergo such a change, or maintain a different, authoritarian way of life, without the most bloody upheavals and repressions.

We are all frightened and unsure of ourselves, in need of good counsel. But where we require clear thinking and courage, the anti-technologists offer us fantasies and despair. Where we need an increase in mutual respect, they exhibit hatred for the powerful and contempt for the weak. The times demand more citizen activism, but they recommend an aloof disengagement.

The anti-technologists do have many inspiring things to say: about nature, work, art, spirituality. Their ecological concerns are praiseworthy, and their cries of alarm have served some useful purpose. But, frightened and dismayed by the unfolding of the human drama in our time, yearning for simple solutions where there can be none, and refusing to acknowledge that the true source of our problem is the irrespressible human will, they have deluded themselves with the doctrine of anti-technology. It is a hollow doctrine, whose increasing popularity adds self-deception to all the other dangers we already face.



IN DEFENSE OF THE ENVIRONMENT

By René Dubos

Are the concerns of the environmentalist truly in opposition to those of the technologist? Speaking as an objective scientist, Dr. Dubos denies any such dichotomy. He details specific changes in technological development that have resulted from a new public awareness of the importance of ecological considerations.

Professor emeritus at Rockefeller University in New York City since 1971, René Dubos has pioneered in the fields of antibiotics and the effects of environmental influences. His most recent books include *Beast or Angel? Choices That Make Us Human* (Scribners, 1974) and *A God Within* (Scribners, 1972). This article is reprinted from *The American Scholar*.



Is there any hope for civilization? Can the world survive? During the past few decades, more and more people have answered these questions with a resounding *No*. Pervasive pessimism is not a new phenomenon, of course. During all periods of history, there have been people who believed that their time was out of joint, that all coherence was gone. Contemporary pessimism, however, goes far beyond this traditional worry about the state of affairs. Its new aspect is the assumption that our descendants will be even worse off than we are because the world will have become too complex for comprehension by the human brain. I am not interested in this assumption, because it was just as true in the past as it is today. On the other hand, there is no need for scientific study to predict what will happen if the present growth rates of world population, industrialization, and pollution are maintained for a few more decades.

The earth will be overcrowded and its resources depleted. Pollution will ruin the environment, upset the climate, dim our vision, and rot our lungs. The gap in living standards between rich and poor countries will widen and lead the angry, hungry people of the world to acts of desperation, including the use of nuclear weapons as blackmail. Economic affluence also has its drawbacks. It commonly spoils human relationships and creates forms of environmental degradation that increasingly damage the physical and biological quality of the globe as a whole, for the simple reason that most pollutants spread far beyond their points of emission.

If the present trends of exponential growth continue, the future will look dismal indeed for humankind and for the earth; but what a big *if* this is. Except on the graphs of mathematicians and computer scientists, growth curves never remain exponential for many years—not even in the case of rabbit populations. In nature, the excessive growth of any population almost automatically brings into play opposing forces that eventually make the system self-correcting; ecological equilibrium is the outcome of such homeostatic processes. In human affairs, the spontaneous self-correcting mechanisms of nature are supplemented by deliberate social interventions. Human beings are not likely to remain passive when they become aware of trends they do not like. Admittedly, their interventions are not always wise, but they inevitably change the course of events, and make a mockery of any attempt to predict the future from extrapolation of existing trends. Wherever human beings are concerned, trend is not destiny.

Limits to Growth

During the early euphoric phase of the industrial revolution, it was almost universally believed that the result of industrial growth would be the betterment of human life, and that the earth was spacious enough and rich enough in resources to accommodate unlimited growth of the human species and of its ambitions. For a while, it was almost taken for granted that the year 2000 would be the dawn of a technological Utopia; but the public mood is beginning to change. It has become painfully obvious that the world's population cannot safely exceed a level much higher than the present one, and that many dangers inevitably follow the undisciplined growth of industry. The awareness that there were inescapable limits to quantitative growth rapidly spread from a few specialists to the general public, generating an explosion of concern for what came to be called, vaguely, the quality of human life and of the environment. The official expression of this concern was the United Nations' Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment in 1972, which was soon followed by the creation of international and national agencies focused on aspects of environmental problems.

The various programs for environmental control are so new that most of them are still in a clumsy, formative stage and provide easy grounds for criticism. According to some critics, these programs have not been sufficiently vigorous to be really effective. According to other critics, they are objectionable because they interfere with industrial progress—a phrase commonly used to mean continuing the quantitative development of industry along lines known to be economically profitable whatever their environmental drawbacks and their long-range ecological dangers.

One of the easiest and cheapest ways to appear socially sophisticated these days is to dismiss the advocates of environmental control as eco-freaks or as "anti-technologists." Since I have been mentioned as one of the five most influential "anti-technologists" of our time (to my great surprise, as I have repeatedly argued that much of civilization depends upon the development of new, imaginative technologies), I shall briefly outline here some aspects of the campaign for environmental control in modern industrial societies. I shall point to some of the constructive results of this campaign that are contributing even now to the emergence of a new technological philosophy in which industrial growth is made subservient to human and ecological considerations.

In Step with Man

In 1933, the city of Chicago held a World's Fair focused on the contributions of scientific technology to human welfare. The organizers of the fair believed, as was then the general view, that progress could be identified with industrial growth. They naively expressed their faith in the guidebook prepared for the occasion: "Science finds, industry applies, man *conforms* . . . Individuals, groups, entire races of men *fall into step* . . . with science and industry" (italics mine). These statements are of historical importance because they provide a point of comparison from which to judge the change of attitude that has occurred during the past four decades. The advocates for a better human environment start from an attitude concerning the relationship between technology and humankind that is exactly opposite to that expressed in the guidebook to the 1933 World's Fair. In their opinion, technology can continue to move forward and to be lastingly successful only to the extent that it conforms to human needs and aspirations, not vice versa. A measure of their success is that they have created a psychological atmosphere in which it would now be socially unacceptable, and indeed shocking, to state that humankind must fall into step with industry and conform to technological imperatives.

An essential necessity for the humanization of the technological enterprise is to recognize the dangers inherent in any kind of excessive growth, and especially of undisciplined industrial growth. Fortunately the prospects are rather hopeful in this regard, thanks to the social attitude that is progressively emerging from the concern for a better human environment.

Until our time, disasters caught the world by surprise, and it was therefore difficult, if not impossible, to control their manifestations. In contrast, modern societies are beginning to develop methods for anticipating future upheavals, whether of natural or man-made origin. The long-range effects to be expected from social or tech-

nological innovations are now discussed long before the event, especially if there is any likelihood that these effects might be dangerous. One of the beneficial results of the campaign for a better environment has been to foster studies that will help to prevent, or at least minimize and rapidly correct, the environmental damage caused by industry. Clumsy and difficult to administer as it is, the legislation that makes it necessary to file a statement of "environmental impact" before undertaking any large-scale project is a first step in a direction that will certainly be followed in the future.

It is admittedly difficult, perhaps impossible, to determine completely in advance the "environmental impact" of human interventions into natural and social systems; but it is certain nevertheless that much of the damage that was done in the past could have been prevented if environmental awareness had been as widespread as it is now becoming. A few examples will suffice to illustrate the wide range of changes that have taken place in technological development as a result of environmental awareness.

Social Needs vs. Technological Growth

Industrial growth has long been considered desirable, because of its contribution to health and happiness, for the creation of wealth, or simply for its own sake. Until recent times, progress was indeed identified with such quantitative growth. In contrast, modern societies have begun to question the desirability of certain innovations that are technologically feasible and economically profitable, but that have undesirable social aspects. The shelving of the American supersonic transport is a case in point, and so is the delay in the development of various nuclear technologies for the production of energy—such as the breeder reactor. The evaluation of potential long-range dangers for human beings and for the environment is becoming one of the crucial factors in the formulation of technological policies.

The partial banning of pesticides exemplifies a situation in which a technology that had first been accepted with enthusiasm was brought under strict control once its dangers had been recognized. Even more striking is the case of the fluorocarbons used in spray containers. There are some indications that these substances may be directly harmful to human beings, and also indirectly harmful through possible effects on the ozone layer of the atmosphere. Although the information concerning the magnitude of these effects is still uncertain, and although there is as yet no legislation controlling the uses of fluorocarbons, the sale of spray cans has greatly decreased, and several industrial firms are putting other kinds of spray pumps on the market.

These examples, and many others that could be cited, are evidence

of a rather new attitude in the modern world: the willingness to abandon policies and practices that are technologically possible and economically profitable but socially objectionable. The symbolic importance of such reversals is that they are caused, not by political upheavals or scientific breakthroughs, but by public awareness of environmental consequences.

The social attitude toward innovations can undergo rapid changes even while these innovations are still in the stage of scientific or cultural development. Witness the heated controversies and progressive evolution of views about genetic engineering and behavioral control, despite the paucity of evidence that effective techniques will soon—if ever—be developed for the manipulation of genes or of behavior on a wide scale.

Perhaps most interesting in the long run are indications of reversals of attitudes concerning the role of human beings in technological society. Up to now, one of the explicit ideals of technological civilization has been to substitute machines for human beings wherever possible. At first, this policy had the advantage of increasing industrial productivity; then, progressively, machines proved more efficient than human beings in most industrial operations. It is now becoming apparent, however, that the unreasonable use of Western technology often creates conditions that are inimical to the expression of human resourcefulness and creativity. Mahatma Gandhi's saying that the future of India is not in mass production but in production by the masses may have meaning for the Western world as well. The human tragedies resulting from unemployment may lead industrial societies to rediscover that, except for the dull-est, most repetitive, and painful tasks, human beings are better than machines—and certainly more creative.

Right to a Healthy Environment

One of the characteristics of our time evident in practically all fields of human endeavor is the rapidity with which steps can be taken to impose a new orientation on social and technological trends, once public opinion has been alerted to their potential consequences. It is worthy of note that the direction of trends at any given time is more influenced by grass-roots movements than by official directives. Such trends are less a result of conventional education than of the widespread awareness generated by concerned citizen groups and by the news media.

Phrases such as "limits to growth" and "anti-technological movement" lose much of their disturbing and somewhat frightening connotations when read in the light of the changes that are now occurring in social attitudes. It is obvious of course that all forms of growth have limits from the *quantitative* point of view; it is certain

also that protests will continue against *certain* types of technology. These limits and protests, however, correspond to a desire for *qualitative* change rather than to a rejection of development. The forms in which growth takes place are continuously undergoing evolution, just as do all the manifestations of life.

One of the most remarkable achievements of the campaigns conducted by those who have been castigated as eco-freaks or anti-technologists is that the opportunity to live in a good environment is coming to be regarded as one of our "unalienable" rights, along with the rights to freedom, to education, and to some form of medical care. A good environment, furthermore, means not only conditions that are favorable to the maintenance of physical health, but also certain emotional and aesthetic qualities of the surroundings. These criteria, which are very different from those that governed industrial growth in the past, are likely to generate new forms of growth in which the quality of life will take precedence over the quantity of goods produced.

Such a change of attitude will certainly lead to the downgrading of certain technologies and resources, and will foster the development of others that are of little importance today. Belching smokestacks were regarded as a sign of prosperity during the first phase of the industrial revolution; they are now read as evidence of poor technological management and of social irresponsibility. There are no visible limits to the kind of growth associated with qualitative changes, because social evolution is endlessly inventive of new resources and new technologies that can be developed to achieve the goals imagined by the new mentality.

Doom or Transcendence

While I have emphasized those aspects of modern societies that give reason for hope in the future, I am aware of other aspects that create a sense of alarm—for example, the distressing human tendency to pursue innovations as far as possible, indeed to the point of absurdity. Awareness of long-range consequences does not imply that modern societies will always be willing to change their course early enough to avoid the deleterious effects inherent in most rampant technologies.

There is also the danger that in some situations the societies' responses will not be rapid enough to warn of dangers in time, and to prevent crucial processes from overshooting and ending in catastrophes. In fact, catastrophic declines following overshoot are not peculiar to industrial societies. The ancient civilizations of the Near East, and later those of the Maya and the Khmer people, probably came to an end through some process of environmental degradation caused by overshoot. Fortunately, what is known concerning the

phenomenal resiliency of biological and social systems now makes it easier to deal with this problem, and therefore not to be overpowered by the myth of inevitability.

There are two kinds of prophets of doom. On the one hand, there are the pessimists, who feel that humankind is on a course of self-destruction; on the other hand, there are those, falsely called optimists, who affirm that technological Utopia will soon be reached if we continue moving along the industrial road we have been traveling during the past century.


The pessimists serve a useful social function. By publicizing the dangers of our present practices, they sensitize the general public to the likelihood of catastrophes, and thus create an awareness that makes it possible to reverse dangerous trends. In contrast, the tunnel-vision optimists are the unimaginative architects of disaster. By visualizing the future as a mere extrapolation of present trends, with more and more of the same, only bigger and faster, they encourage society to follow a suicidal course.

In my opinion, the difficulties of our time, or of any time, are not reasons for discouragement. History shows that crises usually foster renewal and herald new phases of creativeness, different from the past. The most interesting characteristic of human beings is that they can transcend social as well as biological determinism. Animals are almost completely prisoners of biological evolution, but human beings are blessed with the freedom and inventiveness of social evolution. They can retrace their steps and start on a new course whenever they see danger ahead; they can integrate the raw materials of the earth, with the knowledge derived from past experience and from new learning, in a continuous evolutionary process of creation.



EQUALITY, OPPORTUNITY, AND THE "GOOD JOB"

By Bradley R. Schiller



Is the United States still the "land of opportunity" that enticed millions of immigrants to its shores? Can one still rise "from rags to riches"? A number of radical critics in recent years have answered "No" and have cited statistics to support their claim. Professor Schiller has reexamined the statistics and finds that they suggest a much more complex picture of the state of economic mobility in America today.

Bradley R. Schiller is assistant professor of economics at the University of Maryland, and the author of *The Economics of Poverty and Discrimination*, among other books. His article is abridged from *The Public Interest*.

The distribution of income in the United States has been remarkably immune to major changes in economic conditions and public policy. Even the cataclysm of the Great Depression of the 1930s caused only a modest change in the relative shares of the rich and poor. In 1947, the richest 20 percent of all families received 43 percent of total income, while the poorest 20 percent received only 5 percent; in 1974, the income pie was distributed much the same way, with the richest getting 41 percent of the total income and the poorest getting only 5.4 percent. These statistics seem especially disturbing since, during the period from 1947 to 1974, the United States experienced a tremendous growth of government programs designed to redistribute both incomes and opportunities.

The apparent rigidity of income distribution is a serious challenge to American concepts of equality and opportunity. In particular, the available evidence seems to lend credence to a double indictment, formulated by the "radical" Left: that the American economy is characterized by a highly stratified structure of status and opportunity, and that the vast expansion of "liberal" government programs since 1946 (or even 1936) has only served to solidify and rationalize that structure.

Before accepting the above indictment, however, we should consider alternative interpretations of the evidence. It is possible, in fact, that the observed rigidity of the distribution of income is en-

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tirely consistent with widespread opportunities for *individuals* to alter their own economic status. Indeed, the observed stability of the income shares received by the rich or the poor (or any other income group) really doesn't tell us anything about the extent of income mobility experienced by *individuals*—the essential test of economic opportunity. The radical critics tend to assume that the richest 20 percent in 1974 are the same individuals (or their families) that were among the richest 20 percent in 1947. Such an assumption allows one to conclude from the available evidence that our American society is rigidly stratified.

But there is another possible explanation: Individuals could be highly mobile *across* income classes. This suggests a "musical chairs" arrangement in which the chairs themselves remain stationary, while individual players move from chair to chair. If this image was accurate, then the fact that the chairs were always in the same place could not be construed as proof of rigid opportunity stratification. And the fact that some individuals frequently end up in the same chair as when they started is not nearly so important as the fact that everyone moves around while the music is playing. What must be determined is whether individuals do, in fact, move between different points of the income distribution.

Measuring Mobility

We must distinguish two potential sources of such movement. In the first place, individuals typically enjoy steady increases in wages and salaries as they grow older, as a consequence of both seniority and experience. Thus, most people move at least part way up the income distribution ladder by simple virtue of the fact that they grow older. Although this kind of mobility is not completely irrelevant to the issue of opportunity stratification, it is not very meaningful.

But individuals may also move *between* income classes as a result of the kinds of jobs they hold, the effort they put into their jobs, the kinds of talent they demonstrate, or simply the amount of good luck they experience. That is to say, it is possible for individuals of approximately the same age to experience very different rates of income growth, leading to widespread movement across points of the income distribution. Such mobility is a much better index of opportunity stratification. It is probably also the case that individuals tend to measure their own success or failure in such terms—i.e., that they gauge their status not in relation to all other individuals, but only in comparison to others of approximately the same age (and, possibly, sex and race).

The critical question, then, is whether individuals of approximately the same age exchange relative income positions with the

passage of time. Are the same individuals always "richer" or "poorer" than their contemporaries, regardless of how hard they work or how much time elapses? Or could the people who are rich in one year be poor in another? In order to answer these questions, we need to be in a position to observe how individuals' incomes change from year to year.

It is possible to observe how individuals' *earnings* vary from year to year, since most Americans' wages and salaries are subject to social security taxes, and are thus reported regularly. Social security records provide the opportunity not only to observe how the earnings of an individual change from year to year, but also to compare such changes to those experienced by everyone else. These records tell us, with rough accuracy, who is "rich" or "poor" in any given year, and how far individuals move from one level of earnings to another. In view of the fact that annual earnings are the largest component of total income, as well as the largest source of variability in family incomes, such information goes a long way toward our objective of gauging the extent of opportunity stratification in the American economy.

High and Low Earners

The evidence I have reviewed focuses on 74,227 male workers who earned at least \$1,000 in 1957 and were still working in 1971. What I sought to determine was whether the "high" earners of 1957 were still the "high" earners in 1971, or whether they had exchanged relative positions with other workers. The definition of "high" and "low" earnings was based on the distribution of earnings unique to each age group in each year. For example, a thirty-two-year-old worker earning \$16,000 in 1957 was among the top 5 percent of workers in his age group, and thus qualified as a "high" earner. However, suppose that the same worker was earning \$14,000 in 1971: he was still relatively well off in that year, but had slipped from the top of the earnings distribution (the top 5 percent) to a percentage substantially lower (15 percent). This loss of relative position is attributable, of course, to the fact that other workers in his age group earned more money, and faster, during the same period.

For the sake of convenience, a worker was said to be "mobile" if he moved at least 5 percentage points up or down the earnings distribution ladder for his age group. Using this criterion, I found that 71 percent of all the workers were in fact mobile, suggesting a tremendous amount of fluidity in the socio-economic structure.

Mobility was not the only concern, however. Although it was clearly a widespread phenomenon, it was possible that such mobility could be narrowly constrained—i.e., that people moved up and down the distribution of earnings ladder but by only small distances. This

was not the case, though, as further examination of the data reveals. Indeed, the *average* move was 21 percentiles up or down the earnings distribution ladder—or over one fifth of the way from one end of the distribution scale to the other. Hence, mobility of relative status not only was a common experience, but also involved very large movements.

From Rags to Riches?

Although the average distance of movement was impressive, we should also note that very few people made it all the way from one end of the distribution scale to the other in the short span of time (fourteen years) we are observing. Only 1.7 percent of the workers who were at the lowest end of the distribution in 1957 made the climb to the highest end by 1971. Likewise, few (1.5 percent) of those who began at the top of the income distribution in 1957 fell to its lowest points by 1971: There were as few riches-to-rags stories as rags-to-riches stories. But the absence of such extreme moves should not obscure the extensive mobility that took place throughout the distribution.

Further evidence on this point is provided by statistics which indicate the extent of mobility experienced by workers from different income classes. The most noteworthy observation was that high rates of mobility were experienced by *every* income class. The second phenomenon to note was the lower rates of mobility experienced by the lowest, and particularly the highest, earners. For example, nearly half (48 percent) of the highest earners in 1957 managed to hold on to their lofty positions in 1971, while over one third of the lowest earners of 1957 were unable to move up the earnings distribution scale over the subsequent fourteen years. These higher rates of immobility at the opposite ends of the distribution are clearly a basis for public concern. How are the "rich" able to hold their relative position so securely? Why are "poor" people significantly less mobile than others?

Although such concerns should not be dismissed, it should be noted that these higher rates of immobility are "high" only by comparison: The fact that half of those who started at the top ended up further down the distribution, while nearly two thirds of those who began at the bottom later moved up, constitutes irrefutable evidence of extensive fluidity in the socio-economic structure. And the even higher rates of status mobility experienced by the vast majority of workers in the middle ranges of the distribution offer further evidence.

Although the available data on earnings suggest that income mobility characterizes the American economy, it might be asked whether these general patterns of mobility are shared equally

by all groups of workers. It seems particularly appropriate to ask whether black workers have shared equally in the patterns of mobility. That question is rendered even more interesting by the fact that the years in question (1957-71) encompassed a period of tremendous judicial and legislative activity on behalf of equal opportunity. Hence, it might be anticipated not only that black workers experienced more mobility than white workers during this period, but also that they moved, on the average, to higher positions of the earnings distribution.

Racial Patterns

Unfortunately, however, the available evidence did not support these expectations. Although the same percentage of black workers as white workers (71 percent) were "mobile," blacks tended to move smaller distances across the earnings distribution (18 percentage points versus 21 percentage points). This is particularly worrisome since black workers tended to start out at lower relative positions.

Black workers who began in the low end of the distribution scale in 1957 were much less mobile than white workers of the same status in 1957. On the other hand, blacks who were at the top of the income distribution in 1957 were extremely likely to fall to lower status positions, in contrast to white workers starting from the same point. Taken together, these observations suggest quite simply that black workers stayed at the bottom and found it precariously difficult to cling to the higher rungs of the earnings distribution.

There is, however, some evidence from other studies that blacks who entered the labor market after 1957 fared much better, especially if they had a university education, which a rapidly increasing proportion of them did. Thus the income in black families where husband and wife were under 35 years old in 1971 reached 82 percent of similarly situated white families; and where both husband and wife worked, this rose to 90 percent. These figures represent a promising contrast to the situation in 1948, when median income for nonwhite families was only 53 percent of that for white families. Another group that tended to close the gap were the 37 percent of black workers who achieved trade union membership—a ratio of unionization greater than the 25 percent of white workers.

The Verdict on Mobility

Our observations lead to two conclusions. First, the American economy is characterized by a very high degree of individual income mobility. Specifically, individuals move significant distances up and down the earnings distribution, implying tremendous mobility of relative economic status. Opportunity is measured not only by the share of total income received by the richest 20 percent

Equality, Opportunity, and the "Good Job"

(or any other group) but by the chances for individuals to move from lower status positions to the top 20 percent (or anywhere else). And on this basis the suggestion that the American economy is rigidly stratified must be rejected. The inequalities observed at any particular time are reduced over time as individuals exchange relative economic positions.

There are important exceptions to this generalization, however—the most important of which concerns blacks (and presumably some other minorities as well). Black workers in the labor force in 1957 were much less likely to move up the earnings distribution and more likely to fall once they did reach the top of distribution.

Second, there is a pattern of reduced mobility at the top and bottom, an observation which further qualifies the general conclusion about pervasive opportunity. People at the top clearly have an easier time maintaining their status than others, while people at the bottom have a relatively difficult time moving up.

The Causes of Mobility

With important qualifications, the general conclusion to be drawn is that income mobility is a fact of life in the American economy. It might be asked, though, how all this mobility comes about. How does a worker from the low end of the distribution actually get to the higher earnings position? Recall that all the relevant comparisons are based on the relative earnings of men who are approximately the same age. Thus, the number of years an individual has worked—the quantity of experience—cannot explain this mobility. Instead, it is the quality of experience that really counts. What this means is that the experience of individual workers varies according to several factors: the type of jobs they have had; the kinds of employers (firms and industries) they have chosen; the number of different jobs and employers they have had; and the amount of training they have undertaken.

Economists have been paying increased attention to this last element of experience—the amount of training undertaken after a worker becomes employed. Such training may take place in formal vocational schools, but is more likely to take place on the job. Workers *learn* skills on the job, and the quality and quantity of on-the-job training can materially change a worker's income potential. In general, it would be expected that those who undertake more training experience higher rates of promotion, thus rising higher in the earnings distribution. Conversely, those who undertake little on-the-job training will experience slower rates of earnings growth and thus lose relative status.

On-the-job training thus provides a more coherent explanation of earnings mobility than other elements of work experience. It is

difficult to say, for example, why the *number* of different jobs one has had should raise or lower one's relative status unless we are willing to suggest that skill development is somehow related to job-jumping. Likewise, the most important feature of an employer—either a firm or an industry—may be the number and quality of skill development opportunities it provides.

The "Good Job"

Although the general impact of training can be described, it is not altogether clear what determines the availability of on-the-job training opportunities, or how workers avail themselves of such opportunities. In many instances a formally structured training course is established by the employer and made available to all employees, or to a select group of them. Programs in management development are one example of such on-the-job training opportunities, and successful "graduates" typically experience unusually high rates of earnings growth. More frequently, on-the-job training is provided in a decidedly informal structure, with skills being passed on from worker to worker. In this context, the amount of training offered is dependent on the size of the firm and the amount of interaction between workers of different skills, while the amount of training undertaken is largely an expression of individual motivation and ambition, and the capacity to learn.

If these suggestions about the nature and impact of on-the-job training are valid, they have important implications for our perspectives on equality and opportunity. To begin with, our concept of a "good job" might be defined more appropriately in terms of opportunities for on-the-job training than in the traditional, but static, terms of wages, hours, or other amenities. More generally, we might begin to see the availability of such "good jobs" as the critical mechanism for assuring equal opportunity.

U.S. AND WORLD FILM: A TWO-WAY EXCHANGE

By Stanley Kauffmann

The popularity and influence of American films in other countries have often been noted. Charlie Chaplin's pathetic figure immediately springs to mind—as well as Mickey Mouse. What is not so well known is the success of foreign films shown in America. A knowledgeable student of cinema traces the history of the interaction between films by American directors and those produced by their French, Italian, German, Swedish, Norwegian, Indian, and Japanese counterparts. Mr. Kauffmann analyzes the forces that produced a cultural cross-fertilization in films, from which moviegoers everywhere have benefited.



Stanley Kauffmann is currently the film and theater critic of *The New Republic*. Many of his articles have been reprinted in *Dialogue*, most recently "Notes on Theatre and Film." This article is abridged from his book *Living Images* (Harper & Row). His latest book is *Persons of the Drama*.

More and more, as I look at the history of film, one factor becomes especially significant: the tension, the interchange, the argument between American and foreign films. This relation has existed from the very beginning of the art.

Almost from the start, the American product had tremendous influence abroad. International relations in film were at once a matter of influence and counterinfluence. In the first decade of film, before 1910, foreign films in the United States meant mostly French and Italian films, and their photography was held to be superior to American work, their pantomime more subtle, their cultural ambitions more elevated. Toward the end of that decade the French were making potted versions of famous plays, called Films d'Art, usually with famous actors of the Comédie Française, and were sending them here, where they were taken as evidence of film's potentialities at a time when most American films were still about banal melodramatic or comic subjects.

Around 1910 the Italians began to make five- to ten-reel films while Americans still rarely ventured beyond two reels. Such Italian,

spectacles as *The Fall of Troy*, *Cabiria*, the first *Quo Vadis?*, the first *Ben Hur*, were all great successes in America before World War I, and their success caused an epochal split in American production and exhibition. There were those who felt that American one-and-two-reel production was paying quite nicely, and the goose should be allowed to go on laying those small but numerous golden eggs. But there were also those who felt that more complex stories, longer films, higher admission prices, and more elegant places for exhibition were indicated. The second group was quickly proved right and soon dominated the U.S. film industry.

American Pantomime

By this time, however, a reverse flow, the popularity of American films abroad, had become very strong. In 1912 one critic offered an odd explanation:

The European school is based more upon bodily movements than upon the mobility of the face . . . Facial expression is the keynote of American pantomime. It has made American pictures popular all over the world.

If this peculiar thesis needed amplification, it soon got it. In early 1914 Charles Chaplin appeared—his body *and* his face—and, with a

Charles Chaplin, *THE KID*

"Facial expression is the keynote of American pantomime"



speed that has never been surpassed, soared to world-wide fame. A point that is often overlooked: he made this global reputation while World War I was going on. Military convoys must have carried as many Chaplin films as war supplies and soldiers.

Less well remembered now is the then-famous French comedian who surely influenced Chaplin, Max Linder, who made a reverse reputation in the United States during the war and was invited here to America to make films. He stayed two years, 1917 and 1918, and returned later in 1921-22. Linder's American films were not box-office hits; still it was his French films that had got him his American contracts.

At about the same time such American directors as D.W.

Griffith and Thomas Ince were heavily influencing French directors like Louis Delluc and his friends. Griffith was one of the only two directors who ever influenced the Danish director Carl Dreyer. American films were even pouring into Japan, to fill the gap left by the stifling of European production during the war.

Long before 1920 American films had cornered the world market. By that time, more than 90 percent of the films shown in foreign countries were American. By about 1920 a rough, debatable, but persistent generalization had come into being: America made entertainment films, Europe made art films.

Entertainment vs. Art

That generalization has become increasingly suspect as it has become increasingly plain that good entertainment films cannot be made by the ungifted; further, that some men of alpine talent have spent their whole careers in entertainment films. But for compact purposes here, the terms "entertainment" and "art" can serve to distinguish between those films, however well made and aesthetically rewarding, whose original purpose was to pass the time; and those films, however poorly made and aesthetically pretentious, whose original purpose was the illumination of experience and the extension of consciousness. In this view, the generalization about American and European films has some validity—less than was assumed for decades, still some validity.

Every film-making country makes entertainment films; they are the major portion of every nation's industry. But no country's entertainment films have had the international success of American films. Some historians have speculated that the swift success of American entertainment films around the world came from the fact that the United States is a heterogeneous country without old class stratifications; that the United States thus had a quick affinity with popular works in a new theatrical medium, an affinity more immediate than in countries where the theater was historically associated with the upper classes of society, an affinity closer to the international common man. This theory, hardly watertight, is just sound enough to be stimulating, particularly when one looks at the contrast with older countries with relatively homogeneous cultures. Their entertainment films had a parochialism, resulting from that homogeneity, that often made them unexportable. For instance, take Sweden. Very few Swedish entertainment films were seen outside Scandinavia.

But I choose Sweden because that's the country where the art film, the serious film, is said to have begun; and that, too, was the result of homogeneity, of class tradition. Unlike the United States, Sweden had a substantial homogeneous cultural heritage, and the



Robert Wiene, *THE CABINET OF DR. CALIGARI*
"The high quality of European imports in the early 1920s"

cultivated people of Sweden wanted at least a small portion of their national film output to respond to that heritage. That serious minority of Swedish films—that serious minority of all foreign films—were what usually reached the United States; so Americans got the impression that other countries made nothing but serious films. This misconception, together with a blindness to the intrinsic merits of the best entertainment films made in America, led to the generalization quoted above.

Two extrinsic factors helped the less “national” and more “popular” American film to global success: World War I, which (as mentioned) hampered European production, and the superior international organization of American distribution facilities.

Reasons for U.S. Success

Naturally, however, this success came ultimately from the films themselves. We can distinguish at least two principal esthetic components in this success: one, at the lowest-common-denominator level, is the simplicity of Victorian melodrama in plot, in values, in character: Mary Pickford, Lillian Gish, Richard Barthelmess were essentially figures from a local stock company, archetypally magnificent and magnified. The second component, at the highest esthetic level, was the superb quality of American comedy. Along with Chaplin, the Englishman who made his career in America, there were the

U.S. and World Film: A Two-Way Exchange

equal genius Buster Keaton and the near peer of both, Harold Lloyd, the Keystone Kops, and many others.

A third, almost mythical factor figured in this global success, I believe: the factor of America itself. American films were exporting within themselves the very size of America: the reach of the horizon, the bustle and immensity of the cities, the spirit—true or not—of infinite possibility. Federico Fellini once told me that he often dreamed about New York when he was a boy in Rimini. Many Europeans have told me that I, a New Yorker, cannot appreciate the effect that American films had on them in their, as they thought, constricted provincial early years. The very geography of America, the Rocky Mountains and metropolitan skyline; the very distances that one could ride a horse or drive a car or ascend in the social scale; the chance for air and the prospect of fortune—all these things, quite apart from individual talents and individual pictures, helped American films to the world eminence that they gained quickly and have never lost.

But, as with all history, closer examination brings contradiction and complexity. In the midst of the American deluge of the world, German films began to be imported into the United States and to

Rudolph Valentino in *FOUR HORSEMEN OF THE APOCALYPSE*
"Exotic sex appeal and a continental flavor"



have considerable influence. The quality of such films as Ernst Lubitsch's *Passion*, Robert Wiene's *The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari*, and F.W. Murnau's *The Last Laugh* made some American critics domestically discontented and made some American studios jealous. Their success led American producers to a simple counteraction: not so much to fulfill "a debt of inspiration" as to buy the competition. The studio chiefs made shopping trips to Europe in the early 1920s and returned with prizes like the directors Lubitsch, Paul Leni, Dmitri Buchowetzki, Murnau, from Germany, and Victor Seastrom and Mauritz Stiller from Sweden: along with actors from both countries—Emil Jannings, Pola Negri, Lars Hanson, and Greta Garbo. These people increased very sharply in American film a "continental" flavor that had already been implanted by, for example, Maurice Tourneur, the French director who worked in Hollywood from 1914 to 1926, by Erich von Stroheim, the Austrian-born director-actor whose film career began here but whose hallmarks of style were middle-European, and by Rudolph Valentino, whose sex appeal was exotic.

European Imports

It is easy to mark the work that these imported artists did in Hollywood. What is less easy but almost equally significant is to mark the effect that directors such as Lubitsch and Murnau had on native directors. Very few sophisticated comedies made after Lubitsch's arrival would have been done exactly as they were done if he had not become American-based; and the influence of the German expressionists, particularly in lighting, can still be seen—even on our television screens.

At the same time, however, American influence was considerable in the most important political event of the 1920s: the building of the Soviet revolution. Surely no single item of influence in film history is more vivid than the effect of D.W. Griffith and other Americans on the preeminent Soviet directors, Sergei Eisenstein and V.I. Pudovkin, whose work helped to consolidate the Soviet Union at home and to win it acclaim abroad. Why did these Soviet directors turn to American directors instead of to more sophisticated Europeans? Eisenstein tells us:

What enthralled us was not only these films, it was their possibilities It was the boundless temperament and tempo of these amazing (and amazingly useless!) works from an unknown country that led us to muse on the possibilities of a profound, intelligent, class-directed use of this wonderful tool.

So the Soviet Union drew on American films, while American films drew on the more subtle and involuted Germans and Swedes and

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Sergei Eisenstein, *POTEMKIN*

"Soviet directors were influenced by U.S. film-makers like D.W. Griffith"

others. Another way of putting it is that the Russians wanted only grammar, in which to express their concepts; the United States, which had the grammar, wanted concepts, although not Russian ones.

But when we look at European countries other than Russia, the matter gets more complex. True: in the 1920s many Americans wanted Hollywood to be more like Europe. On the other hand, through this period European countries other than Russia wanted more than American grammar, they wanted American approaches.

The flooding of Europe by the United States—a movement that went east across the Atlantic at the same time that European artists were being shipped west—grew so great that by December 1927 the American critic Harry Alan Potamkin wrote a worried article called "The Plight of the European Movie," whose opening sentence was "Europe has America on the brain."

Potamkin called the roll of European countries and checked them vis-a-vis American influence. England (contradictorily) was too resentful of that influence, he said, particularly in view of the low state of English films. But Germany, whose films he admired, was being debased by close business ties between German studios and Hollywood power and by the talent raids mentioned above. Likewise Sweden. Italy, whose industry after World War I was even flabbier than England's, "almost invariably" showed American films in its theaters. There was one European exception.

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One country has met the onslaught of America and met it with grace and self-preservation. France, which recognized the merit of the American film long before America did, promises, despite little progress, to develop a distinguished film art....

Potamkin's prediction was extraordinarily sound. As René Clair and Marcel Carné and Julien Duvivier and Jean Renoir developed, the French film became the dominant foreign influence in the United States during the 1930s.

Rise of French Influence

The anomaly in this French influence is that it came after the advent of sound, when language might have been supposed to be a barrier. But French sound films were quite successful in the United States, notably Clair's *Sous les Toits de Paris*, which ran for six months in New York. Said Herman G. Weinberg in early 1933, "Clair's influence on Hollywood has been probably greater than that of any other European director" since Murnau and E.A. Dupont. German films, particularly operettas, continued to have success and influence in America in the sound age until the rise of Hitler; but French work, through the decade until the start of World War II, because of its talent and honesty and touching sense of approaching doom, was the leader among imports.

Other countries, too, kept sending films, and the figures are rather surprising. For instance, in 1936, *The New York Times* reviewed 548 films, 314 of which were American, 33 British, and 201 in foreign languages. (Of course only a few of the last group got really widespread release in America.)

The second large wave of immigration to this country, after the 1920s shopping trip, was caused by Hitler. At first came such figures as the directors Fritz Lang, Billy Wilder, Max Ophüls, Otto Preminger, and Douglas Sirk, the cinematographer Rudolph Maté, the composer Friedrich Hollander, the producers Erich Pommer and Sam Spiegel. As the German occupation spread, we got the directors Clair, Renoir, and Duvivier, the cinematog-

Rene Clair, *A NOUS LA LIBERTE*
"Before World War II, such talented French films led U.S. imports"





Michael Curtiz, *CASABLANCA*
"Hollywood's osmosis of the French temper of the 1930s"

rapher Boris Kaufman, the actors Jean Gabin and Michele Morgan. But during the 1930s European production kept rolling and, in France, reached new heights. Welford Beaton, writing of *Carnival in Flanders* in 1937, said: "Across the Atlantic they recognize there is such a thing as an art of the screen and allow consideration of it to influence production."

This (recurrent) statement is much too glib because it ignores the large amount of poor foreign work—almost as high a proportion as in America—and because of the generally high level of execution of Hollywood films. But the more subtle point that the statement overlooks is that the influence of foreign styles and talents on American film had never been stronger. This could be seen in the work of such a seemingly homespun director as Frank Capra and later was seen in the work of Orson Welles, Samuel Fuller, Nicholas Ray, and Joseph Losey. It could also be seen in the originating point of view of some American films: for example, *Casablanca* (1942) can be called a Jean Gabin picture transplanted, Hollywood's osmosis of the French temper of 1930s, replacing Gabin with Humphrey Bogart.

After World War II

Immediately after the end of World War II, the imports were coming chiefly from Britain; but before 1950, Italy, whose films had been insignificant here since 1914, found its cinematic feet again, more solidly than ever; and in reaction to twenty-five years of fascist film



Vittorio De Sica, *TWO WOMEN*

"After World War II, Italian neo-realism was very visible on American screens"

fabrication produced the school of neo-realism—more properly, neo-naturalism—headed by Luchino Visconti, Roberto Rossellini, and Vittorio De Sica. Soon Italy was very visible on American screens; soon after, France was too, particularly in the work of Jean Cocteau.

The exchange pattern that emerged in the late 1940s remained fairly constant for about ten years. American films reclaimed their universal power to grip, to inhabit dreams, to win affection, to inspire near-worship. As for imports, the only completely new element was the appearance in the United States of Japanese films, led by the success of Akira Kurosawa's *Rashomon* at the Venice Festival in 1951. Very few Japanese films had been shown widely in the United States even prior to World War II; now they had at least a great effect on critics and film makers. Aside from evidences of Kurosawa's style in American film, the overt effect can be seen in such American remakes of Kurosawa films as *The Outrage* from *Rashomon* and *The Magnificent Seven* from *The Seven Samurai*. What makes the influence of Kurosawa especially pertinent is that he himself has acknowledged the early influence on him of such Americans as Howard Hawks and George Stevens, and has said that his three favorite directors are John Ford, William Wyler, and Frank Capra.

I must note, in passing, that the remaking of foreign films in American settings is not a recent phenomenon. Only a few past examples: the Soviet film *Road to Life* by Nikolai Ekk (1931) was remade by William Wellman as *Wild Boys of the Road* (1933); Lang's



Akira Kurosawa, *RED BEARD*

"An example of mutual influence between Japanese and American films"

M (1931) was remade by Losey (1951); Carné's *Le Jour Se Lève* (1939) was remade by Anatole Litvak as *The Long Night* (1947).

In the Fifties and Sixties

Then, at the end of the 1950s and through the first half of the 1960s there arrived the strongest foreign influences in our film history, because of the conjunctive emergence of extraordinary talents in Europe: in Sweden Ingmar Bergman, in Italy the two post-neo-realists Michelangelo Antonioni and Fellini, in France the group of directors labeled the New Wave. All of these directors have testified to American influences on them, but those French directors particularly are clear examples of the international syncretism we are examining. Most of them were young, most of them had grown up through the Second World War and the German occupation and had been deprived of films, certainly of American ones. Soon after the liberation they fell upon a feast of films in general and of American ones in particular—not only the new issues but the backlog of seven or eight years that they had missed, indeed the whole history of American film which had been inaccessible to them. Films became in an operative sense their university and their cosmos, and most especially American films. Through the stimulation and prisms of American film they turned to and treated their own lives and times. Out of a host of possible examples, just one: Jean-Luc Godard dedicated his first feature *Breathless* (1959) to Monogram Pictures, the most B of American B studios making low-budget films.

These foreign directors, French and otherwise, nurtured by

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Ingmar Bergman, *THE VIRGIN SPRING*

"The emergence of extraordinary talents in Europe"

America, had a tremendous effect on America in the 1960s. The first year of that decade, 1960. These are some of the films that arrived in that brief period: Godard's *Breathless*, François Truffaut's *The 400 Blows*, Alain Resnais's *Hiroshima, Mon Amour*, Philippe De Broca's *The Love Game*, Antonioni's *L'Avventura*, Fellini's *La Dolce Vita*, De Sica's *Two Women*, Bernard Wicki's *Bridge*, Satyajit Ray's *The World of Apu*, Kurosawa's *Ikiru*, Bergman's *The Virgin Spring*. Within two years came Brecht's *Pickpocket*, Ermanno Olmi's *Il Posto* (*The Sound of Trumpets*), Pier Paolo Pasolini's *Pier Paolo Pasolini's Divorce Italian Style*, Karel Reisz's *Saturday Night and Sunday Morning*, Lindsay Anderson's *This Sporting Life*.

Satyajit Ray, *THE WORLD OF APU*

"Influenced by American film-makers, such directors in turn shook up American traditions and styles"



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Claude Chabrol's *Landru*. The paradox is that most of these directors have acknowledged their debt to the traditions and styles of Americans—Bergman and Ray and Germi and Anderson and Fellini and Truffaut have specified John Ford—but their effect on the United States was to shake traditions and styles. The changes here occurred in virtually every aspect: from a fundamental concept of the function of film, to cinematic syntax, to ideas of narrative, to views of character, to the frontiers of subject and theme.

Rediscovery of U.S. Films

The immense eruption of film enthusiasm in that decade, the rhapsodies of news magazines, the torrent of film books that swelled through the decade, the fantastic increase in the number of film courses in colleges and universities, including film majors and doctoral programs—all these were stimulated by, if not derived from, the force of these numerous extraordinary foreign films, arriving at a particularly apt cultural moment for American youth. Concurrently the interest in foreign pictures was accompanied, intensified, by a crescent interest here in American films of the past. While young people were responding to Godard and Bergman, they were also discovering the seminal pictures from which those men had learned so much. These two factors, the foreign influx and the domestic interest heightened by it, made the 1960s the most significant decade in American film history: in terms of changes in American film-making methods and manners, and changes in audience knowledge, discrimination, and hope. Films were being seen by fewer people than in the 1930s and 1940s, but those who now saw them cared more and felt differently about them.


Since the end of the 1960s the situation has changed in several respects. The single most striking change is that the flood of good and occasionally fine films from abroad has dwindled to a trickle. Why did the flood falter? Several reasons can be suggested, one of them—appropriately enough in a chronicle of interchange—involving the United States.

Rise of Independents

Ever since the end of World War II it has been patent that the traditional method of American film production—seven or eight giant plants, each one producing between fifty and eighty pictures a year—was doomed. The increase in television production and viewing, the divorce between studio ownership and theater ownership decreed by law, the soaring expense of film making, the vagaries of public taste as against the public's almost sheeplike obedience in much of the past, have finally killed the assembly line. Film production, still numerically substantial, has become independent. Inde-

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pendent production means that, for each project, a producer not only needs to acquire script and director and actors and studio facilities and distribution, he also has to acquire an audience—possibly a different audience for each film, or at least not a relatively dependable general audience as in the past.



Dennis Hopper, *EASY RIDER*

"Young fresh talents reflect the influence of foreign films"

One important result of this fragmented production, which is at least partly occasioned by a fragmented audience, is that it has allowed more young people, more new people of differing ages, to work in films than ever before in this country. Producers and financiers have taken chances that they might not otherwise have taken. For a while, a short while, this resulted mainly in so-called youth pictures, like *Easy Rider* and its imitations; in the large, it has simply meant that fresh talents have had a chance to work. So in the past few years we have seen the talent of such directors as Barbara Loden in *Wanda*, Peter Fonda in *The Hired Hand*, John G. Avildsen in *Save the Tiger*, Daryl Duke in *Payday*, Frank D. Gilroy in *Desperate Characters*, Bob Rafelson in *Five Easy Pieces*, Francis Ford Coppola in *The Conversation*, Terrence Malick in *Badlands*, and Sam Peckinpah in *The Wild Bunch*. There are others. Some of these directors have not yet made one wholly satisfactory picture, but all of them have shown distinctive gifts and all of them clearly share one characteristic: all of them reflect the influence of foreign films made during the 1960s.

When Lubitsch and Clair and Murnau were influencing Hollywood, it was a question of adapting what was learned from those

men to the relatively precise and constricting demands of the studio: because the studio knew quite well, over the long run, what the audience wanted. But neither the studio nor the audience exists as before; so the influence of those foreign directors of the 1960s can now be used here for the making of "personal" pictures, films much closer to art as roughly defined earlier, in a distinction from entertainment that is itself rough. The best pictures from abroad represent the originating vision of one man and a large measure of his control. Both of these conditions are very unlike the overwhelming preponderance of American production in the past. The American present makes the future look possibly different.

At the Turning Point?

So we stand, or anyway may be standing, at an important point in cultural history. In this long and tensile relation between foreign and American films, the influence of America's films on foreign production has been principally through the force of individual talents expressed through genres and schools. The force of foreign films on American productions has of course also been through individual talents but as expressed in individual, realized works—not the evidence discernible in a body of consciously compromised entertainment films, but the evidence of completely realized, uncompromised works of art. The search in America for new audiences apparently permits the production of at least a small proportion of personal films. And many of the stylistic qualities in those personal films come from abroad. All one would want is the possibility of such a tradition in this country. American film makers and film audiences have opened up possibilities for themselves. And the new, foreign-influenced American film may in time stimulate and influence production abroad!—as American films have so often done in the past. The current uncertainties in the American film scene guarantee nothing, but they do offer possibilities. I hope that the next decade of American film will be as adventurous and aspiring and unordained as it certainly could be.

MOTHER OF EXILES

By Harold Rosenberg

Harold Rosenberg is the art critic of *The New Yorker*, and has contributed essays on literature, politics, and art to many intellectual journals in the United States and Europe. His review is reprinted from *The New York Times Book Review*.

The Statue of Liberty. By Marvin Trachtenberg. New York: The Viking Press. 224 pp.

The Statue of Liberty is ninety years old. Since its unveiling in October 1886, it has aroused more intense emotions in more people than any other work of art in America, perhaps any other work anywhere. Most of this feeling was concentrated in the first third of Liberty's existence, the decades when millions of immigrants sailed past her into the gateway of the New World. From slums, villages and ghettos, from poverty, ignorance and tyranny, the "huddled masses" of Europe found themselves saluted at the end of their journey across the sea by the upraised arm of Liberty—"Welcome to Freedom!"

Symbol of America

The closing of the period of mass immigration estranged the Statue from its role of inspiring greeter of newcomers. According to Marvin Trachtenberg's extraordinarily

thorough account, the Statue of Liberty is today at the summit of its prestige as the outstanding symbol of America as a whole, but it has also come to be an object of commercial and political exploitation, a version of a Miss America beauty contest winner, and even of derision. Apparently, monuments have lost their capacity to be lasting embodiments of concepts—though in the light of the sculptures by Alexander Calder and Henry Moore, I find it difficult to agree that "modernism appears to exclude authentic monument making." What Trachtenberg has in mind is that a monument is not merely a work of art set in a public place—such as a Claes Oldenburg lipstick—but a work that is a reminder of some idea or event that people hold in common. To rule out the Oldenburgs, perhaps some sense of the august ought also to be presupposed.

The important point is that a monument and a work of art are not necessarily identical, nor do their virtues reside in the same qualities. Trachtenberg is inclined to disparage the Statue, the creation of Frédéric Auguste Bartholdi, as a sculpture: "Bartholdi's work for the most part," he writes, "bears little discernible stamp of formal originality, and resembles the output of a hundred other sculptors—and monument-makers—of his time."

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Indeed, a colossal statue, such as Liberty, may by its very size violate valid concepts of scale. As art, Liberty is the creation of mediocre 19th century academicism, but that's only the beginning of what there is to say about it as a work of art.

The inside of the Statue, for example, is far more interesting in terms of art today than the figure itself. Describing the mathematically determined iron skeleton and the flowing linear patterns on the reverse side of the copper skin that covers it, Trachtenberg concludes that the effect is that of a kind of "accidental Art Nouveau." On another level, the Statue partakes of a Pop Art gimmick or toy, in that visitors look out from its row of windows as through the eyes of a giant, thus, "*becoming* the colossus." Then, too, the face of Liberty is said to resemble that of the sculptor's mother.

In sum, Bartholdi's conventional art work of the last century has more in common with creations that generate myths than with museum pieces that exemplify achievements in form. Today, Liberty invites comparison not with, say, Auguste Rodin but with vanguard projects, such as Christo's Valley Curtain or Smithson's Spiral Jetty. In 1971 Christo Javacheff stretched and hung an orange drapery across a one-quarter mile canyon near Rifle, Colorado. It consisted of 200,000 square feet of nylon fabric, 110,000 pounds of steel cable, and 800 tons of concrete. Robert Smithson's jetty, completed in 1970, extends into the Great Salt Lake, in Utah. Made up of rock, earth, water, algae and salt crystals, its coil length is 1500 feet.

In these projects, organizational and physical processes of production and the use and transformation of the site take precedence over the esthetics of the finished object.

One of the virtues of Trachtenberg's study is his grasp of the importance of beyond-art elements in the realization of the Statue. "Conventional aesthetic considerations apart," he observes,

Bartholdi's executive competence and formal ingenuity can hardly fail to impress. His strong feeling for site and scale, image and symbol was, of course, rooted in the French tradition of planned monumental sites When we descend to the most concrete of all Liberty's aspects—her structure and fabrication—it is only to emerge with the strongest admiration for the skill and perseverance of Bartholdi and his colleagues.

Statue of Liberty in New York's harbor



Propaganda Art

Historically and conceptually, as well as esthetically, the Statue in New York Harbor has much more to do with France than with New York or the United States. Trachtenberg's exhaustive research lays bare the political, social and building-project background of the French gift to America. Primarily, "Liberty Enlightening the World," as the sculpture was originally entitled, was a piece of propaganda art designed to strengthen Republicanism in France after the fall of the Second Empire and the demolition of the Paris Commune. The light of Liberty (the Statue was conceived also as a lighthouse) was intended to direct its rays across the ocean to sustain the cause of political freedom. In the imagination of Bartholdi and his patrons, "the figure loomed so large and bright it could be seen across the Atlantic"—apparently, one of the less objectionable ways of meddling in the internal affairs of a friendly nation.

In tracing the evolution of the Statue from its first maquette in 1870 to its unveiling, Trachtenberg has been obliged to investigate the political currents of 19th-century France; the biography and temperament of Bartholdi; the history of colossi in the ancient and modern world; the effects of new technology on mechanical and engineering

methods; the story of how the money was raised in the United States to pay for the base of the monument; the transportation of the statue to New York; and what it has come to mean in our day. In its beginnings, Liberty incorporated a burgeoning cluster of symbols related to illumination, ranging from the Olympic torch runner to Christ as "the light of the world" and the Age of Enlightenment. Trachtenberg pursues each of these as it was embodied in art and entered into, or was dropped from, Bartholdi's design.

Mixed with the symbolism of the torch was the history of female figures of liberty, including the central personage in Delacroix's celebrated "Liberty Guiding the People," and of colossi. Then there were such fortuitous circumstances as the placement of the statue in the Port of New York at the moment when the floodgates of immigration were opened. The symbols of Liberty were reshuffled into a new emblem; instead of casting its glance back toward Europe, it looked over its shoulder toward the West and toward events to be wrought by naturalized aliens in American history. If the significance of the Statue of Liberty has in our day again been altered, it remains constant in the memory through its association with America's grandeur as "Mother of Exiles."

ORCHIDOMANIA

By John Hope Franklin

John Hope Franklin, a long-time orchid grower, is Professor of American History at the University of Chicago, president of Phi Beta Kappa, and past president of the American Studies Association. He is the author of *From Slavery to Freedom: A History of Negro Americans*, whose fourth edition was published in 1974. His most recent work, *A Southern Odyssey-Travelers in the Anti-Bellum North*, was published in 1975. This review is reprinted from *The American Scholar*.

Orchids: Flowers of Romance and Mystery. By Jack Kramer. New York: Harry N. Abrams, Inc. 309 pp.

It would be a gross error in judgment and taste to classify this extraordinarily handsome book as one more coffee table adornment. It is certainly that, but it is much more. Its author, Jack Kramer, who has written many books on orchids and other flowers and who has collected and cultivated these flowers for many years, would scarcely have been content to put together a work merely to catch one's eye. To be sure, it is not a book on how to grow orchids. Instead it is a comprehensive introduction to the history, the provenience, the uses, the drama, color, form, and even the sex life of this hauntingly beautiful family that numbers more than thirty thousand species growing wild all over the world.

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While Kramer does not assume that the reader knows a great deal about orchids, he is careful to place his discussion on a level that will appeal to the intelligent, inquisitive person—one who will immediately recognize the subject as worthy of sensitive, even sophisticated treatment. He is particularly concerned with the place of orchids in the ancient cultures of the Orient, how they came to the attention of the peoples of the West, and what impact their discovery had on the peoples of Europe and America. The flowers that were called *lan hua* by Confucius were cultivated by the Chinese and Japanese in the eighteenth century, and were as highly regarded by them as they had been by the sage of the ancient Orient. And when the Europeans discovered orchids in that same century and brought them home, their enthusiasm for such species as the *Oncidium altissimum* and the *Epidendrum ciliare* matched that of the Orientals. Eventually, through trial and error as well as through scientific observation and experiment, the orchids of the tropics were grown and propagated in the temperate and colder climates of Europe and America, where countless new species were soon discovered.

By the middle of the nineteenth century "orchidomania," the craze for orchids, had swept over Europe and was spreading to the Americas.

The stimulus was owing in part to the cultivation of spectacular species and hybrids, such as some South American cattleyas that sold for as much as \$600 in the Stevens auction rooms at Covent Garden. It was also owing to the interest of wealthy patrons who built elaborate greenhouses and engaged highly successful growers like Conrad Loddiges and James Veitch to produce the finest flowers possible without regard to the cost. An important consideration, moreover, was the increased respectability of orchid culture provided by scientists such as John Lindley, whose *The Genera and Species of Orchidaceous Plants* began to appear in 1830, and Charles Darwin, who in 1862 published *On the Various Contrivances by Which British and Foreign Orchids Are Fertilized by Insects*.

Reaching the Common Man

Orchid culture could not remain the exclusive domain of the wealthy any more than conveniences or even luxuries could be cornered by people of large means or inherited privilege. The time would come, in the middle of the twentieth century, when orchidomania would reach the common man. Low-budget greenhouses and window greenhouses placed orchid culture under glass within the reach of thousands who previously had to content themselves with occasional visits to the public conservatory. In the United States today there are more than eighteen thousand members of the American Orchid Society, and there are more than two hundred and fifty

local orchid societies. It is possible that these figures represent only a fraction of those who are actively engaged in growing orchids.

As knowledge of orchids has increased and spread, some of the mistaken ideas about them have begun to disappear, although the flowers themselves remain romantic and mysterious. Kramer reminds us that they are not only among the most numerous but also among the hardiest of plants. Any longtime association with them will convince one that delicacy may describe their colors but not their capacity to withstand mistreatment or even abuse. He also reminds us that few of them have the traditional orchid color and that the dominant colorings are yellow and brown. The cattleya or cymbidium that one purchases from the florist has no odor, because it has been severed from the plant for days, but about 80 percent of all orchids have some kind of fragrance. They have many uses, from the limited use of their roots for tea and broth to the almost universal use of *Vanilla planifolia* for flavoring cakes and ice cream.

This book has many rewarding features, not the least of which is the delightful foreword by Anthony West, who calls orchids "the most extraordinary of flowers," which almost always "have a suggestion of otherworldliness about them." Another is the text by Jack Kramer, which is as felicitous as it is informed. And then there are the plates—227 of them, 92 in color—that give some idea of the range of the family *Orchidaceae*.

A NEW VILLAGE VERNACULAR

By Moshe Safdie

Moshe Safdie is the architect who achieved world fame when he built the "Habitat" complex for the 1967 World's Fair in Montreal. He is the author of *Beyond Habitat* (1970) and *For Everyone A Garden* (1974). His review is abridged from *The New York Review of Books*.

Architecture for the Poor. By Hassan Fathy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 233 pp.

When I leafed through this book by the Egyptian architect Hassan Fathy, I was first struck by the illustrations showing domed houses in quaint streets and squares, an arcaded white mosque and market place, arches, vaults, domes, trellises, and massive masonry walls. I saw a beautiful village that seemed to be a superb example of the "indigenous vernacular architecture" built for hundreds of years along the plains of the Mediterranean in North Africa or the Middle East. But when I started to read the captions, I was not sure whether what I was looking at was ten years old or five hundred. The text refers to "the new village of Gournah," and some of the accompanying photographs suggested that I might be looking at recent buildings. Could this really be an entirely new environment, a single project built from one plan? I soon discovered that Hassan Fathy had designed and built this village in the late 1940s as a prototypical mud

brick housing project offering a solution for rural housing in Egypt.

Fathy's book is important and deserves attention not only for what it tells of his experience in building New Gournah, but also for his ideas on urban and rural building generally. His problem in 1946 was to house some of the poorest people of one of the world's poorest countries in a pleasant village in the upper Nile basin. To judge what he did, we should bear in mind the methods of building he might have used: concrete poured in place; pre-fabricated concrete panels; concrete boxes; steel or wood or plastic construction; and mud brick. We should also consider the materials available, the limited skills of the local labor and its abundant supply as compared with the scarcity of money. When we do this, there seems no doubt that Fathy's scheme was a wise one.

He reintroduced ancient, indigenous methods, using mud bricks, relying on the vault, the arch, and the dome as the most logical forms of mud brick construction; he used traditional groupings of houses around squares, and juxtaposed the houses to the mosque and the village square. Creating a new village by reintroducing the oldest traditions and methods seemed to be the only economically and environmentally acceptable solution, acceptable, that is, for the late 1940s, in a country where industrialization and agriculture were decades, if not centuries,

behind the more developed countries and where human labor was cheap. It is architecture for the poor, constructed by the poor for themselves.

But poor peasants of today may be city dwellers tomorrow and bourgeois the next. Will Fathy's ideas be valid as their lives change? Fathy believes that builders must go back to the primary means of construction, to the materials available in the earth itself, to the labor of the prospective inhabitants. But he also tells us of the insecurity and lack of cooperation among the inhabitants of New Gournia and of the many setbacks caused by this antagonism (an account that reminded me of my own experience in building Habitat).

Bureaucrats and Technology

Fathy tells us in the final chapters that in many ways New Gournia has failed. It was never finished. The local people did not move in. The government stopped supporting the program and bureaucrats plotted against him, which he feels ruined his plans for the village. I accept explanations, yet I also believe that New Gournia has been a success at least as a model suggesting new possibilities. But in assessing the success or failure of the new village of Gournia, one must distinguish between the intrigues of officials and the lack of cooperation of people who felt threatened by the problems raised by Fathy's solution.

When peasants constructed their own houses and villages over a period of many years, there were no problems of meeting schedules or delivering materials. A house was built

in small increments: a few bricks one day, a small room added the next. But Fathy tried to adapt this gradual process to the swift construction of an entire village. He found himself stymied by the lack of sufficient material and equipment, the need to train laborers and keep them continuously occupied. In other words, Fathy found himself confronted by the basic problems of modern production and technology. True, it is not a question of high technology when one cannot ship a pump from Cairo to a building site, or get enough straw delivered for making thousands of bricks; but these are still the kinds of problems of scheduling and coordination that characterize modern production.

To some extent the failure of New Gournia arose from conflicts between the requirements of organizing production on a fairly large scale and building methods which didn't lend themselves to that sort of organization. Fathy's account also shows how bureaucrats can be expected to stifle new ideas, whether one is working in a developed or in an underdeveloped country.

Fathy argues that traditional local architecture in Mediterranean countries has through the ages produced an environment that responds to the needs of its builders. He shows how such architecture is adapted to local climate, to economics, to available material, to the local style of life, and how it provides a human environment where scale, identity, and privacy are respected. I entirely agree. When I traveled to similar Mediterranean villages and towns, I was convinced

that the vernacular is truly the architecture of humanism.

In my book *Beyond Habitat* I wrote that in studying architecture we come to think of ancient Athens as a collection of Parthenons, whereas most of Athens then resembled the Aegean hill towns we see today. Fathy explains the success of such towns by emphasizing the links between the forms of building and the process used to make them, between the tools used to build and the village environment that is created. For him indigenous building is that which people build for themselves, and the architect should represent and serve the people with whom he is building.

A Human Scale

But it is important also to emphasize that vernacular building is not merely a collection of wisely conceived structures, but represents a system of building, a system by which villages grow according to a consistent human scale. If we can understand more precisely how the environment of Mediterranean villages was created, we might learn something about the modern city. Fathy argues that "in architecture the quality of rightness must be felt intuitively," and he feels that much modern architecture lacks the human qualities that we find in the traditional village.

But in emphasizing intuition, Fathy does not carry the analysis of the villages as far as he might. For example, Christopher Alexander, who teaches at the University of California at Berkeley and is the author of *Notes on the Synthesis of*

Form, believes that the "patterns" or "structures" of certain aspects of the environment can be distilled into general rules of building, making explicit the patterns that are implicit in traditional vernacular construction. The articulation of such patterns, Alexander believes, will result from an analysis of the components of the successful environments we find in the villages and city neighborhoods we admire.

I believe, with Alexander, that we must seek out the rules that make the traditional peasant villages so successful; that we must expand and elaborate them into a system of design as effective as the peasants'. The emphasis then would not be on artistry, charm, and beauty, but on order, system, rule, and those organic forms that underlie what we find humanly useful and pleasant.

More specifically, we must consider the value of mud brick construction as a solution to the problem of architecture for the poor. Fathy asks: "What have the Nubian peasants got that our architects haven't? First, they have a technique—that of vaulting in mud brick." True, but to what extent can such methods be adapted to the construction of rural and urban housing today? In view of the potentials of technology, the growing cost and preciousness of human labor, and the dying out of traditional skills and crafts, can we still depend so exclusively on the brick-making peasants? How can we apply the lessons of the vernacular to modern building, if we bear in mind the problem of growing populations, the differences between hand-crafting and the

stamping machine, between the strength of the human arm and that of a fifty-ton crane, between adobe and assembly line construction, between a village for 500 families and a city that expands by 1,999 families a day?

Answer for the City

Fathy is aware that urban housing is one the world's most urgent problems. While it is true that most people in Africa, Asia, and Latin America are poor peasants, it is also true that huge peasant migrations to the cities are taking place. But Fathy seems to believe that traditional methods, local craftsmanship and organic materials, all available without modern technology, are the answer, both in the city and the countryside; the village of Gournā, built with mud brick, is a prototype for thousands of villages springing up in the underdeveloped world.

Indeed, I consider Fathy's villages among the most attractive and human environments that have been built in recent times. His architecture responds to the essence of the vernacular process, which creates environments with variety, richness of texture, privacy, and identity; where form is rooted in process and material. But we must

bring this to bear on contemporary problems, and we must ask the difficult questions: How can we preserve this human scale in a more crowded environment with a faster rate of construction? Can hand-made craft methods deliver as much as is needed fast enough? How do we deal with the difference between a village that is built over a period of 500 years and a town for 50,000 people built in three? Or with problems of hierarchy, identity, and human scale as we go from a village of 500 families to a city of 3 million?

Fathy, as I have said, seems to agree that urbanization is bound to take place in Egypt, India, Pakistan, and Peru as it has in the West. The real issue then, is whether, using modern technology, the assembly line and stamping machine, we can create an architecture as human as New Gournā's, in which the individual participates in the building of his environment as the peasant did in the past. Fathy's work in New Gournā shows him to be sensitive to the qualities of a truly human environment. I hope that he will be able to adapt his concepts to the realities of an increasingly technological world—helping all of us who share his views to create a contemporary vernacular.

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
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

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
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AUTUMN 1977

THE AMERICAN BELLETRIST

FOREIGN POLICY IN A NUCLEAR AGE

Jerome Jaffe

IS U.S. POLICY "IMPERIALIST"?

Alister Buchanan

AMERICA IN ROMANOV'S WORLD

James E. Douglass

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
NUCLEAR DEFERENCE

Bayless Manning

IDEOLOGY AND FOREIGN POLICY

Irving Howe

THE NOTE OF WONDER IN U.S. WRITING

Richard Kostelanetz

DISSECTING THE 20TH CENTURY

Lester Brown

SLOWING URBAN GROWTH

Stephen G. Brush

THEORY AND FACTS IN SCIENCE

SOCIAL JUSTICE: THREE VIEWS

J. P. DeMarco and S. R. Richmond

Raymond D. Gastil

Irving Kristol

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A NOTE TO THE READER

In an earlier age, foreign policy was limited mainly to relations with geographically close nations or with dependent colonies. There were, of course, brutal wars, but the weaponry was primitive by today's standards. And there were clashes of naked economic interest, but these interests were fairly simple and circumscribed. For the new American republic there was the added element of geographical isolation, which allowed George Washington to warn against "permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world."

This option is no longer available to the United States, or to the older nations, or to the dozens of new nations that have emerged onto the world scene since 1945. We have, all of us, entered into an age of inescapable and complex interdependence. Economic and political developments in one area of the globe can immediately and crucially affect countries thousands of miles away. Nuclear weapons—and even more, the possibility of their proliferation—threaten people everywhere, indiscriminately.

The contributors to our special section recognize the dangers of this new interdependence, but also see it as an incentive toward greater cooperation. The threat of nuclear warfare has made the superpowers more responsible and cautious, and has brought about an unprecedented progress in arms control which, if it is sustained, may free substantial resources for aid to developing countries. A variety of regional and international arrangements place restraints on impulsive national actions, and tend to encourage negotiation in place of confrontation.

But along with such hopeful trends, our contributors recognize the persistence of conflicting interests and ideologies. They foresee no prospect for world government, no easy solutions to the discords and ambiguities of international relations. What they offer is the realistic consolation that, for all countries, intelligent self-interest—not to speak of mutual survival—points toward peaceful accommodation rather than military conflict.

N.G.

Foreign Policy in a Nuclear Age

IS U.S. FOREIGN POLICY "IMPERIALIST"?

By Jerome Slater

During the past decade, radical critics have viewed America's role in world affairs—and especially its relation to the Third World—as "imperialist" in the traditional pattern of nineteenth century European colonialism. The author, while advocating a more generous aid policy toward developing nations, finds the radical arguments unsupported by the political and economic realities of recent history.

Jerome Slater is professor of political science at the State University of New York at Buffalo. He is the author of several books and many articles concerned with U.S. foreign policy, especially in relation to Latin America. His article is excerpted from *Political Science Quarterly* for Spring 1976.



Since the early 1960s, leftist critics have seen the American role as imperialistic rather than defensive: a deliberate and generally successful effort at world domination under the pretext of "containment." The central goal of this domination is usually described in economic terms—maintaining access on favorable terms to overseas raw material, markets, and investment outlets for U.S. private capital. Using its vast economic power, the thesis continues, the United States works to keep the rest of the world conservative, capitalist and docile.

An alternate view of American postwar foreign policy prefers the characterization of "imperial"—a term more descriptive than hostile. U.S. policies are seen as concerned with stabilizing world order in a period when other international institutions are not capable of maintaining peace and performing other critical functions. Any great power in the present world system, argues French political commentator Raymond Aron, naturally and inevitably expands its

interests and commitments. And such an expansion can at times be morally and politically desirable, as Aron finds the American role in Europe during the postwar period to be.

But both the "imperialist" and the "imperial" designations imply that the United States has *great* power, not merely unequal power; both imply the capacity to dominate or control other states, not merely to influence them; both imply an empire, not merely a sphere of influence. Are these assumptions correct? Has the actual impact of U.S. power on the rest of the world been sufficiently expansive to justify describing it as either "imperialistic" or "imperial"?

Dependence Theory

In the last decade or so, the theory of "dependence" has become the dominant theme in radical writings. In their more sophisticated versions, dependence theories hold that Third World countries have become inextricably integrated in the world capitalist system, dominated in turn by United States capitalism, as producers of raw materials and consumers of manufactured products. Because they are weak and economically undiversified, however, Third World countries are relegated to the "periphery" of the system, kept underdeveloped or impoverished by the low prices they receive for their exports, the high prices they must pay for their imports, and the onerous conditions which they are forced to accept in order to have access to foreign capital through either loans or investment. Although dependence may be partially a consequence of the deliberate exercise of power, it is more fundamentally a function of the capitalist structure. As long as world capitalism continues in its present form, the Third World cannot escape underdevelopment, for its "surplus production" will continue to be in effect appropriated for the benefit of the advanced capitalist societies. Under capitalism, then, underdevelopment is not a transitional stage to development but a permanent condition: "economic development and underdevelopment are the opposite faces of the same coin," in the words of radical Mexican economist Andre Gunder Frank.

Why do more Third World countries not rebel against this structural exploitation? Because, according to the dependence theorists, although Third World *people* as a whole suffer, the local political, business, and military *elites* benefit: their power, status, and wealth are directly linked to the preservation of the existing "system," i.e., investment and production by local subsidiaries of the giant multinational corporations; military assistance programs; CIA advice, support, and financing; and so on. Without this alliance between the elites of the center and the periphery, the entire structure of indirect capitalist control over the Third World would be impossible. Put differently, it is this mutually symbiotic alliance that is the func-

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tional equivalent of the direct military, political, and bureaucratic control structures of the older, colonialist versions of imperialism.

Let us examine this theory or argument, looking first at the question of whether the United States economically exploits the Third World. It is important to emphasize here that if we wish to distinguish "exploitation" from mere "inequality," surely a useful distinction to maintain, the asymmetries of advantage (a) must be *very* great, not merely somewhat unequal, and (b) must stem from the deliberate use of power by the stronger party.

Economic Exploitation?

We can now proceed directly to examine the charge that the United States, as the leading contemporary neoimperialist power, economically exploits the Third World. According to classic economic theory, free trade in an open international market is of mutual and equal benefit to rich and poor nations alike, because of the familiar principles of comparative advantage based on specialization and division of labor. However, in the real world international trade may not be truly open and based strictly on supply and demand, and the benefits may be unequally distributed. Until quite recently, it was widely accepted, even by non-Marxist and nonradical economists, that in fact the terms of trade were weighted against the Third World countries as a result of the deliberately or unconsciously exercised political and financial power of the industrialized world. For it was generally thought that, at least since 1940, the prices of raw materials and other commodities exported by the Third World had steadily fallen relative to the price of manufactured goods which they had no choice but to import from the industrialized world. In actual operation the international "free trade" system, it was usually conceded, had the same disadvantages as the domestic "free enterprise" system: where not all participants have equal and economic power, the rich do disproportionately better than the poor, or even, in more extreme formulations, the poor are actually further impoverished. The open-door policy or economic liberalism became, as a recent study put it, simply "the ideology of a continuing American hegemony."

In the last few years, however, the accuracy of this assessment has been called into question, as it has applied to the recent past, as well as to the present and the foreseeable future. A recent study, for example, concluded that (even excluding oil from the calculation) in the last twenty-five years the prices of raw materials exported by poor countries had risen at about the same rates as the prices of imported manufactures. Steven Krasner has gone even further, arguing that the Third World countries have been the relative *beneficiaries* of restrictive schemes imposed by the consuming

states or their multinational corporations: "For most primary commodities, the actual prices are higher than those that would prevail in a free market. In terms of neoclassical concepts of value, consuming states have been exploited by producing areas." As for the present and foreseeable future, there is a growing consensus that as a result of the increasing scarceness of certain key raw materials and the ability of producing states to form successful cartels, not only in oil but also in other commodities (copper, tin, bauxite, and apparently more on the way), the terms of trade will increasingly shift in favor of the Third World, or at least that part of the Third World fortunate enough to control major commodities or raw materials.

Foreign Investment and Multinationals

Does the direct corporate investment of advanced countries in the Third World constitute exploitation, in either the absolute or relative senses of the word? According to radical critics, foreign-owned subsidiaries of multinational corporations "decapitalize" the underdeveloped countries by taking out more in profits than they put in through investment; further block local growth and industrialization by buying up smaller local firms or driving them out of business through cutthroat competition; create sudden unemployment by ruthlessly closing local subsidiaries whenever worldwide profit maximization so dictates; remove key sectors of the economy from local control; create a domestic bourgeoisie whose self-interests are tied to foreign industry rather than indigenous growth; disrupt local cultural patterns and institutions and substitute in their place the crass materialism of the West; and, in general, integrate the economies, social structure and political institutions of Third World countries into permanently subordinate peripheral positions in the world capitalist structure.

“
Until nations are generous they will never be wise.

Washington Irving
”

Other students of foreign investment see the matter quite differently. Foreign investment is said to clearly bring with it many positive benefits. Foreign companies have the capital and the skills initially lacking in underdeveloped countries to explore for, develop, produce, and market raw materials that would otherwise lie dormant for decades. In the course of doing so, they build transportation networks; employ large numbers of local people, usually at wage rates much above host country norms; build housing, schools, and hospitals; and through taxation contribute much needed foreign cur-

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rency. In the manufacturing area, multinational corporations provide the managerial skills, the infusion of advanced technology, and the access to world markets that the developed countries lack.

To be sure, the multinational corporations usually make profits, sometimes very high profits, but they also take risks—the political risks of nationalization, the economic risks of failure—and without the promise of high profits they simply would not invest at all. And it is wrong to conclude that a new economic loss—exploitation—has necessarily occurred at the point in which the outflow of profits exceeds the inflow of new capital investment. For the notion of “decapitalization” ignores the value of the economic infrastructure left in place and the transfer of technology, labor, and marketing skills which have or at least should have led to continuing, self-sustaining development.

Still, there are undoubtedly costs, as the critics have pointed out: the elimination of local competitors and the squeezing out of infant industries, the domination of key sectors of local economies by foreigners, and the consequent difficulties of instituting national planning and economic controls when a substantial proportion of the economy is immune from such measures, the political and psychological resentments. Probably the balance of cost and advantage cannot be determined in general, but only on a case-by-case basis, depending on the indigenous context and the precise terms of the agreements negotiated between foreign investors and the host governments.

What certainly is clear is that although there is considerable nationalistic rhetoric about the evils of foreign investment, most Third World countries continue to actively seek it. Nor can it be argued, as the dependence theorists do, that this simply reflects an alliance between local reactionaries and foreign exploiters, for in recent years even the most radical, nationalistic states (such as Cuba, Algeria, Peru, and even to some extent China) have sought increased foreign investment. To be sure, they have insisted on terms that do not unduly compromise national independence, but the fact that they can successfully do so certainly suggests a rather more evenly distributed balance of power between the multinational corporations and the Third World countries than the literature on “exploitation” implies.

Is Foreign Aid Harmful?

Finally, even foreign aid is seen by many radicals as nothing more than another instrument of control and exploitation of the Third World by the capitalist countries, particularly the United States. Here the argument is that economically the aid eventually comes to be a net burden on Third World economies: repayments on past loans

mount higher and higher, until they exceed new inflows of assistance. Politically, it is argued, aid serves mainly to support reactionary dictatorships and local oligarchies, who block real social change and balanced economic growth, and who serve as agents of United States imperial control in the Third World.

There is no doubt that for a number of Third World countries the annual inflow of new capital assistance is less than the outflow in the form of interest on past debts. But it is clearly fallacious to conclude that this *necessarily* demonstrates that aid is harmful, for if the previous aid has been used productively, it will have generated new sources of wealth out of which interest on previous debt can be repaid. And it cannot be doubted that a number of countries have in fact achieved self-sustained growth in good part because of the infusion of major amounts of foreign aid; examples are Western Europe following the Marshall Plan, Turkey, Taiwan, Brazil, and South Korea. If efficiently used, aid promotes overall economic growth and thus cannot be considered exploitative; economic growth, however, by no means assures democracy, social change, or even equitable distribution of the fruits of growth—these are matters determined by indigenous policies and practices only slightly or not at all subject to outside influence.

Problems of Growth

We may now sum up. Taken as a whole, have the economic ties between the United States and the Third World been economically exploitative? It is obvious that the United States has enormous economic power; that this power has consequences for other, weaker states; that the consequences are sometimes though hardly invariably detrimental; and that while these detrimental consequences may frequently be the unintended result of sheer power, they are sometimes undeniably the result of deliberate, self-seeking policies on the part of the government. If by exploitation one means absolute deprivation, though, it is clear that the United States has not economically exploited the Third World. Indeed the underdeveloped world as a whole has grown at a rate of 2 percent per annum per capita since 1945, and over 5 percent per annum per capita since 1960, rates which are historically very high, higher for example than the growth rates of the United States or the European countries during any comparable length of time prior to World War I. To a substantial degree, this relatively high growth rate is attributable to the sharp increase of foreign aid, investment, and trade between the developing countries and the advanced industrial ones, primarily (at least until fairly recently) the United States.

Has there nonetheless been exploitation in the sense of *relative*

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deprivation? For most of the postwar period, it is true, the rich got richer faster than the poor got "richer," and thus the gap between them was growing (although it is likely that this trend has ended in the last few years). The most persuasive evidence, though, is that the growth rates of the rich had little or nothing to do with their "exploitation" of the Third World: the rich got richer because of an increase of both domestic productivity and of trade and investment among themselves, while the poor did not develop at higher rates because of their essentially indigenous problems: one-crop economies, high population rates, political instability, etc.

To be sure, there can be absolutely no doubt that the rich countries, particularly the United States, *could* and (according to my values) *should* have done more, much more, to help the Third World countries develop. Take the case of foreign aid as an illustration. Radicals have pointed out the variety of ways in which foreign aid is at least in part structured to promote access for private investment, subsidize American shipowners, promote American export industries, and so on. The total effect of the various restrictions on the uses to which recipients may put bilateral United States assistance clearly lowers the real value of that assistance, but equally clearly those restrictions do not eliminate the benefits of aid, although the benefits are not as great as they would be if the amounts were larger and unconstrained by restrictions designed to assist American industries. What the Third World needs from the United States and the rest of the developed countries is not less but more aid, trade, and private investment, though undoubtedly on better terms than in the past.

Political Control?

None of this analysis denies, of course, that economic power carries with it political leverage. But is this political leverage sufficient to give it political control over the Third World? The evidence from events in the real world, particularly during but not limited to the past few years, hardly suggests that this is the case.

If economic power carried with it considerable political control, one would expect that *at a minimum* such control would be sufficient for the imperial power to protect its major economic interests, particularly in areas of the world where its economic power is greatest. That is, the United States could exert sufficient political control to at least preserve the position of its major multinational corporations in Latin America. And yet over the past decade there has been a wave of nationalization of United States corporations around the world in general—e.g., in Ceylon, Egypt, Indonesia, Algeria, Libya—but *particularly* in Latin America. Thus, Peru nationalized the International Petroleum Corporation, among many other U.S.-owned mul-

tinational; Bolivia expropriated the Gulf Oil Corporation; the Allende regime in Chile expropriated without compensation the Anaconda Companies; and Venezuela has fully nationalized most foreign (mainly U.S.) oil corporations. In addition, Argentina and Brazil have tightened controls over U.S. enterprises. The United States government has not had the political leverage to prevent these actions against its corporations and, with only several partial exceptions, has all but ceased to try.

It is now increasingly recognized that as the host countries gain in knowledge, confidence, and experience, and as European and Japanese multinational corporations seek to compete with American business for access to the Third World, the bargaining relationship between multinational corporations and indigenous governments is rapidly shifting in favor of the latter. The "dependence" pattern, under which local elites collaborate with foreign investors against their own national interests, is rapidly disappearing and was probably always exaggerated anyway. Without local allies, more direct action on the part of the "metropolitan" countries would be required; yet, armed force on behalf of private interests is practically out of the question in this day and age. Economic pressures can be relatively easily resisted by proud nationalist regimes and only worsen the situation for the multinational corporations. In the past few years it is clear that most corporations have come to grips with the new realities, seeking to adapt to rising nationalism as best they can, with no recourse to threats of economic retaliation or to governmental assistance.

Even short of outright nationalization, the terms of both trade and investment between the Third World and the advanced industrial world are rapidly shifting. The rise of OPEC (the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) in the Middle East is the most dramatic example, of course: in the 1920s host oil-producing countries received in taxation only about 10-15 percent of oil corporation profits on production; by the mid-1970s the general figure was over 80 percent and that of a far larger pie. Other raw materials producers are now seeking to form price cartels in emulation of OPEC, and while it is doubtful that any will achieve quite the fantastic success of the oil producers, the fact is that collaborative action to restrict production has led to dramatic price rises for Third World producers of bauxite, tin, copper, and other raw materials. Once again, the U.S. government has been powerless to prevent these developments, even though they inflict varying degrees of damage not only on the United States-based multinational corporations but on the economy as a whole, and there are increasing indications that adaptation rather than coercive resistance will be the general American response.

Is U.S. Foreign Policy "Imperialist"?

An American "Empire"?

Obviously no one would wish to deny that the United States has enormous economic, political, and military power, and that this power must have a significant impact on other states, both intended and unintended. The question, however, is whether this power is so great as to warrant calling it either "imperialist" or "imperial." Even if these terms or the notion of a United States "empire," are meant to be understood metaphorically rather than literally, we still must decide whether the metaphors are insightful and enlightening rather than misleading.

“In foreign relations, as in all other relations, a policy has been formed only when commitments and power have been brought into balance.

Walter Lippmann

Benjamin Cohen's definition of imperialism seems reasonably appropriate: "any relationship of effective domination or control, political or economic, direct or indirect, of one nation over another." Such a definition clearly implies that *great* power is involved, not merely inequalities of power, and that the relationship is nearly wholly one-sided. However, it is possible to distinguish three different dimensions of power: *control*, defined as the invariable capacity to achieve objectives even in the face of opposition; *domination*, implying great power but falling somewhat short of outright control; and *influence*, meaning the capacity to *affect*, to a greater or lesser degree, the policies and behavior of other states. The term "imperialism" and all its usual variants should be limited to cases in which the power of one state over another is sufficient to establish control or at least a high degree of domination; it has no place where the relationship is simply one of influence, even of asymmetrical influence. Given the invariable connotation of the term "imperialism," the scope and degree of control must approximate the kind of control exercised by nineteenth-century European powers over their colonies.

Where in the world, even in the Third World, does the United States actually enjoy *control*? In Asia? In Africa? In the Middle East? A moment's reflection, without further argument, should suffice to reveal the very suggestion as being without foundation. Perhaps in Latin America, then? In which Latin American countries does the United States exercise control or domination: Argentina, Peru, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico? Hardly, for the United

States has clearly been opposed to many significant policies and actions of those states and has been unable to affect them. What about Brazil and Chile since Allende, where the general drift of affairs is apparently pleasing to Washington? The bulk of the evidence as well as plain common sense suggests that indigenous forces in such large and complex societies were surely far more important than any U.S. actions or pressures. What, then, about the Caribbean area? Here, indubitably, the United States has considerable leverage, though not control and only doubtfully even domination, except for some extreme cases, such as Cuba before Castro and the Dominican Republic in the 1960s. Certainly countries like Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua *are* economically dependent on the United States and make it a practice to support American foreign policies; on the other hand, even leaving aside the rather dramatic Cuban case, other Caribbean countries (such as Panama, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago) have charted a clearly independent economic and political course.

Limited Influence

We may boldly but confidently conclude that the United States today does not "control" *any* country *anywhere*, and in only a slightly more qualified manner we may also reject the notion of United States "domination." That the United States has varying degrees of *influence* in the Third World is of course undeniable, but it is a declining influence, and limited in scope and effectiveness to only certain matters. The United States has hardly been successful in stemming the rise of nationalism and radicalism, or of attacks on its interests and policies around the world. How does the United States today typically react to the nationalization of property, to dramatic increases of the prices of critical raw materials, to demands that it remove its military bases, to anti-American riots? On increasingly rare occasions with suspension of economic *assistance* to the offending state, more typically with diplomatic protest, and, increasingly, simply with silence. "Imperialism" should be made of sterner stuff—and certainly it used to be.

Thanks to its growing wealth, the rapidly increasing availability of external aid, trade, and investment from sources other than the United States (Japan, Western Europe, the Soviet Union); and the increased domestic and external constraints on American use of military force, the Third World today is less vulnerable to power of any kind than at any time since World War II. The relationship cannot be plausibly described as "imperialist" or "imperial" at all, and only doubtfully and decreasingly as "dependent." It would be more accurate to see the relationship between the United States and the Third World in terms of mutual dependence, mutual power, and

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mutual vulnerability. To be sure, there are still considerable asymmetries of power—the United States has more *potential* power than the Third World, but it has become increasingly costly for it to actually employ that power. Still, so long as inequalities remain, we may expect the attacks on United States "imperialism" to continue, however inaccurate and misleading they in fact are, both because the shibboleth of "imperialism" provides a convenient myth to deflect attention from the indigenous problems of Third World countries and because inequality per se—rather than domination or control from without—has become the real focus of resentment in many developing nations of the advanced industrial societies.



AMERICA IN TOMORROW'S WORLD

By Alastair Buchan

What can we expect the relationship of the United States and the Soviet Union to be in the coming decade and a half? What roles will be played by China, by the increasingly assertive developing nations, by the European Community and Japan? In the following article, abridged from *Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs*, a noted authority assesses the problems and opportunities that American foreign policy faces in the years ahead.

Alastair Buchan, who died in February 1976, was professor of international relations at Oxford University. Before that, as director of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, he played a seminal role in defense planning by the NATO countries. His books include *Change without War*, *The End of the Postwar Era* (both published in 1974), and *Power and Equilibrium in the 1970s*.

What do we mean by the international system? Clearly it is not simply a calculus of the relative power of states and of their interaction upon each other; it is not simply a matter of diplomatic or interstate relationships, especially in the days of great multinational corporations and of mass communication; this is only one aspect of it. The international system is also a matter of the internal strength or weaknesses of different societies. And by reason of this it is also a matter of what states and societies conceive to be their vital interests.

I cannot predict what the international system of the year 2000 will resemble, what the attitudes and preoccupations of a generation that is still unborn will be, or what the American priorities will be. Although I think it likely that America will still be the most powerful state, I propose to set my sights at a more modest elevation and discuss the visible horizon, say the next fifteen years.

The international system in which we dwell today is dominated as far as issues of security are concerned by two superpowers coexisting by reason of a complex system of strategic deterrence. The division of Europe into an East-West confrontation was likely, but it was made inevitable by mutual Anglo-American and Soviet misperceptions of each other's needs and fears. The regeneration of Europe and Japan was partly the consequence of highly intelligent acts of American politico-economic statesmanship (e.g., the Marshall Plan). The rapid calling into existence of a large number of new weak states was also partly, though not entirely, a consequence of traditional

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American hostility towards colonialism. More important, it was also the consequence of a prideful belief, arising from the confidence of an earlier generation of Americans in their own society, that the United States could successfully enter into a relationship with areas and societies of which she then knew little, in South or Southeast Asia, or the Islamic world. Yet this very sense of the universality of American interests over the whole globe that contributed to the Cold War in Europe and led to the Vietnam debacle in Asia, led also to a multilateral trade and payments system which has produced the greatest rise in well-being and prosperity in human history, and which has stood up remarkably well so far in a period of serious recession.

Despite the fact that the United States largely brought the present international system into being, it has now much more the character of a large state than of the center of the universe—at least the noncommunist universe—which it had for perhaps the twenty-five years after 1941. Because we have emerged into a more multilateral world order, in which previously dependent nations act with increasing independence; because the European Community is beginning to acquire somewhat different—though not irreconcilable—interests from the United States; because there is a whole new order of business with the developing world, it is well to avoid broad generalizations and to look specifically at the most important American relationships with the external world.

The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Relationship

The right place to start is obviously with the central power relationship that exists between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is a striking fact that of the 105 treaties and agreements that have been signed since the United States and the Soviet Union entered into diplomatic relations in 1933, 58 were concluded between 1969 and the spring of 1975. It is a comforting fact that there is a degree of consultation and mutual comprehension between Washington and Moscow that significantly diminishes the risk of another Cuban missile crisis.

The strategic balance has now reached a point of complexity where it is not clear whether further negotiations can do more than set margins to the arms race, rather than markedly reduce the level of the balance. Technological innovations that in the late 1950s and early 1960s worked in favor of a stable superpower relationship (e.g., hardened missiles or Polaris submarines) now also work against it. Thus we see multiple warheads and improved accuracies that engender mutual fears of a disarming attack.

Since what has been achieved is simply detente (that is, a reduction of tensions) and since both superpowers have different

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aspirations that, in Henry Kissinger's words, "do not spring from misunderstanding, or personalities, or transitory factors" but are rooted in history and nourished by conflicting values, their competition for influence within the international system is only muted, not resolved.

Such detente as has been attained has been through a process of purely political negotiations, and has almost no social content and only a modest economic one, unlike the Entente Cordiale or the European-American relationship in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Detente has been a consequence of inter-governmental agreement and as such could be reversed by successor regimes.

The Prospects for Detente

The maintenance of superpower detente will not be easy over the next decade, which is not to say it is impossible. One difficulty arises from uncertainty about the nature of the American political temper, about what will be the balance between and within the parties, and where the balance between Congressional and Executive power will come to rest. Political introversion could give rise to a passive conception of detente, one that simply accepts the achievements of the past and has no dynamism. Uncertainty about possible changes in the leadership of the Soviet Union and what they will mean, and what the influence of the military will be, creates additional difficulties.

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International arbitration may be defined as the substitution of many burning questions for a smouldering one.

Ambrose Bierce

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When the American "containment" policy was fashioned in the late 1940s, it was conceived as being necessary only for a limited time span, until the Soviet Union recognized the limitations of revolutionary or nationalist policies and turned to other preoccupations, and until centers of power other than the United States regained their strength and the international system reverted to its normal plural state. Some of the objectives of the containment policy have been attained. Insofar as ideological hostility has been a source of conflict between the Soviet Union and the capitalist world, it has been partly overlaid by practical considerations of security or welfare politics.

This is not true of the rivalry between the two great Communist

powers. As a result, the United States no longer shoulders the burden alone; and, ironically, in the area where the containment policy was criticized as being inapplicable, namely, in the Far East and Asia, much of the political task of containing Soviet power is exercised not only by the United States but by China, so that the former is, or need only be, one party in a multiple balance. But the Soviet Union has also become a very powerful military state of traditional kind with a global reach, like France in the eighteenth century or Britain in the nineteenth.

China and Tripolar Balance

This leads one naturally to a consideration of the American relationship to the Sino-Soviet conflict, where there is deep and perhaps growing hostility. It is not a Western interest to exacerbate the conflict, as some people thought ten years ago. To do so would create appalling problems for Japan, which depends on trade with both the Soviet Union and China. Worse still, it would heighten Soviet xenophobia that is so easily aroused, and induce that same sense of being trapped between an adversary on either flank that Franco-Russian diplomacy induced in Germany in the twenty years before the First World War. In fact, an amelioration of Sino-Soviet relations is in the general interest, for it would make for a less competitive attitude to problems in the Third World.

Since we cannot at present have a five-power balance, which is the basic model of stability, because Japan and Western Europe are not political actors of equivalent weight to the other three, the United States has to make a choice as to whether it is Peking or Moscow with which it has the more constructive agenda of negotiation. There is no question that it is with the Soviet Union, by reason of the potential dangers to the strategic nuclear balance to which I have already referred and by reason of the Soviet influence upon the secondary area of conflict, the Middle East. A second SALT agreement is needed to establish strategic stability, and to move on to the reduction of strategic forces which the growing demands from other sources on federal expenditure clearly make a central political interest of the United States.

The Japanese-American alliance is unlikely to greatly change. If one thinks back to the adversary relationship of the first half of the century, or to the broken, desolate islands of a quarter-century ago, and thinks forward to the dramatic surge of Japanese consumer exports in the later 1960s, the fact that the alliance has held together so well is a real triumph of statecraft for both Tokyo and Washington. One point may be worth making: The Japanese have thought very hard in secret about the problems of acquiring nuclear weapons and all the implications of doing so. I think for "tomorrow" they have

rejected the idea; whether they have rejected it for good depends partly on what American policy and attitudes are likely to be in fifteen or twenty years' time, and partly on whether the two great Communist powers can move towards a cold peace and some basis of mutual tolerance. I can imagine Japan becoming seriously alarmed either if there were a precipitate withdrawal of American concern with the maintenance of a stable balance in Asia, or if Sino-Soviet hostility were to flare into open conflict, reminding the Japanese people of the inherent vulnerability that geography imposes on them.

The European Community

I would be remiss if, as a European, I did not go into some detail on the future of European-American relations. Both Europeans and Americans have come through a period of considerable disillusionment with illusions that, candidly, we created for ourselves. Clearly, there was a need after World War II to find a political and social Western anchor for a renascent Germany in a Europe which had become split into two hostile systems in the early years of the Cold War. As a consequence, there was not only considerable European but also considerable American enthusiasm for the foundation of the European Economic Community in 1958—American enthusiasm, despite the fact that such a Community was likely also to become a powerful trading rival of the United States.

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There was never a good war or a bad peace.

Benjamin Franklin

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Then throughout the Kennedy and Johnson presidencies we had perforce to live with the phenomenon of De Gaulle, whose prime objective was to restore the morale and prestige of France, and to prove that the international system was not wholly dominated by the superpowers. Unfortunately, in the process of doing so, De Gaulle seriously arrested the development of the Community and its institutions. His departure revived hopes on both sides of the Atlantic that the Community would march forward again, not merely as a coherent economy but also as a political entity that would incidentally relieve America's burdens.

The history of the Community over the past five or six years is a very complex one, made more difficult by its enlargement from Six to Nine to include one major industrial and two small, primarily agricultural, states. More than that, it began to try to develop more

active central European institutions of decision-making just at a time when more and more functional areas of activity—monetary relationships for one thing, energy problems for another—were becoming global in character and impossible to handle on a European scale. The consequence is that the Community has had to lower its sights.

However, it would be a mistake to think that the Community is a failure or in a process of decay. It is true that the ambitious objective of acquiring the characteristics of a powerful single actor in world politics by the end of this decade is now seen as likely to take much longer to achieve. Also, the idea of creating a superstate with a population larger than that of the United States has proved unrealistic. Still, the Community is acquiring quite rapidly the characteristics of an effective political entente. Thus it has been more effective than the United States in handling trade relations with those parts of the developing world in which its member states have had long experience and whose economic interests are complementary to their own. Hence the various trade agreements with India, Israel, North Africa, and the large group of equatorial African states whose economic ties with the Community were codified in the Lomé convention of 1975.

Rise of Regionalism

I would like to conclude with two more general points about the United States and its relation to the international system. The first concerns the developing world. When the United States first entered world politics as its most influential member, in the years of World War II, it was inspired by a sense of the universality of its interests.

This general stance took juridical form in the United Nations Charter, of which America was the principal architect. And when the antithetical character of the two principal political societies, the United States and the Soviet Union, made the UN an instrument of limited usefulness, American energy and initiative was directed towards the creation of regional collective security and defense alliances, in Europe, around the Pacific littoral, in Southeast Asia, and in the Middle East.

In the meantime other forms of regionalism have come into being without the inspiration of either superpower: the European Community, the Organization for African Unity (OAU), the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the Association of South East Asian Nations, various regional groupings beneath the general umbrella of the Organization of American States. The British Commonwealth, which now comprises over thirty countries, still has an important functional utility in relations between its less developed and highly developed members, as does France in its

association with the Francophone states of Africa. There is, therefore, a choice to be confronted in American policy. Is the United States still a power of universal interests? I think today's answer is not very different from yesterday's, though Vietnam made clear that there are severe limits in American capabilities.

But the techniques may be different. Is it more profitable to pursue and preserve these interests by interstate relations with every one of the 130 countries in the world, or by dealing with these new groupings when they are effective, thus placing greater responsibilities on their shoulders? Just as political tension in Southern Europe can probably be handled more effectively by the European Community, is not the OAU likely to be able to mediate more effectively in Africa, and to inhibit Soviet adventurism there, than any Western body? Will not the members of OPEC mature to the responsibilities that their newfound wealth requires, if the industrialized nations accept the reality of their strength and try to elicit their cooperation as new members of the club of the rich rather than threatening them with confrontation?

A Defense against International Anarchy

Finally, there is the important question of the role that the United States will play in the reform and extension of international institutions. The Anglo-American tradition in dealing with the state system of the twentieth century has not been to rely on traditional state-to-state relations alone, but where possible on international management of problems that could be identified as common to mankind as a whole. Thus both in the Covenant of the League and in the Charter of the United Nations we tried to subject the problems of war and aggression to a process of international management. That proved unrealistic, partly because of conflicts between the great powers, partly because warfare began to acquire completely new dimensions. So in part we had to return to the traditional method of restraining conflict, namely, balancing military power—with all its difficulties and risks.


But the United Nations remains an important forum for managing the crises that lead to war, as we have seen in many instances over the last decade. In addition, its specialized agencies have become increasingly important centers for the management and reconciliation of various forms of national activity which impinge on other nations: the International Atomic Energy Agency, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, the World Health Organization, the new Environmental Protection Organization and others. These agencies have become more difficult to operate in, especially for a big power with diverse internal pressure groups like the United States, by reason of the rapid growth in the number of sovereign

America in Tomorrow's World

states. The agencies require men of great patience and considerable authority as national representatives; their deliberations are often polemical and their decision-making processes slow. I hope that we may eventually see them reformed by a greater use of the regional principle to which I have referred.

In the meantime, it would be a tragedy if the United States with its strong innovative traditions in the field of international law were to lose interest in such international organizations, for they represent one of our best defenses against a return to international anarchy. Instead I hope that in tomorrow's world the immense talents of the United States for legal and political improvisation can be applied to many new issues of international management that now confront us—the law of the sea, the activities of multinational companies, the rationalization of raw material prices, energy, the distribution of food supplies—as well as to the central political machinery of the UN itself.

I have often been critical of particular American policies and decisions. I think the coming generation of Americans may have to think very hard about the whole machinery of executive government and its relation not only to Congress but to the people. In a world in which the United States has lost its margin for error there will clearly have to be a much more careful definition of American interests. But nothing has happened to diminish my own confidence in the creative ability of Americans to meet new international challenges and responsibilities.



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

By James E. Dougherty



Does the possession of nuclear weapons by ideologically hostile states make war more likely or less so? The author examines the psychological factors that enter into foreign policy decision-making and finds that the threat of mutual nuclear annihilation has led governments to conduct themselves with unprecedented restraint and uncommon rationality.

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More than thirty years have passed since the first production and use of atomic bombs. Much has been written and spoken about the impact of nuclear weapons on the human psyche. The existence of such weapons has been cited as a factor which makes governments more cautious in their foreign policies, or else makes them more reckless, which either increases the danger of war by heightening fears and tensions or decreases the danger of war by greatly multiplying its anticipated costs.

Some people argue that the accumulation of nuclear weapons stockpiles has, because of its implicit absurdity and irrationality, compelled political decision-makers to think honestly about the problem of war for the first time in the history of the world and to substitute the deterrence system for the war system. Others contend that the growth of nuclear weapons arsenals has brought mankind to the precipice of self-extinction; that the superpowers are foolish to base their security upon the morbid and contradictory premises of "mutual overkill"; and that the danger is heightened by

a tendency to seek escape from anxiety either by unconscious denial of the threat or by an effort to blot its implications from consciousness by rationalizing them away. ("They will never be used.")

Our scientifically acquired knowledge about the relationship between the existence of nuclear weapons and the operation of psychological factors in international relations is, unfortunately, rather scant. To go one step further, it is necessary to repeat the warning—often uttered by social psychologists themselves—against efforts to reduce political decision-making, whether at the international, national, or other levels, to purely psychological explanations. Psychological factors are of considerable importance in

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In politics, what begins in fear usually ends in folly.

S.T. Coleridge

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human behavior, both individual and social, but they constitute only a part of the whole picture.

There is a dearth of empirical evidence which might enable us to answer the crucial question: "Will the existence of huge stockpiles of nuclear warheads serve to deter a nuclear war that would destroy human life and civilization, as we know it, over large segments of the earth?" Quite naturally, we would like the empirical evidence in this field to remain as scarce as possible. We would rather live for an indefinitely long time with the gnawing uncertainties of an unprovable affirmative hypothesis than have the negative demonstrated with finality.

The Efficacy of Fear

It is commonplace to say that the fear of nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and nuclear war is widespread and abiding among the peoples of the world. The question is whether such fear is and will remain politically efficacious, so that the power of the atom can be used for beneficent, rather than destructive, purposes. Granted that the assessments of the precise dangers confronting us may differ widely, to what extent do the fears (both rational and irrational) of policy-making elites and political masses produce actual effects upon the behavior of governments (which are, after all, the only entities in control of nuclear weapons or capable of acquiring them—thus far)?

The difficulty of giving a simple answer to such a complex question may be illustrated by citing a few isolated examples. Threat appeals that focused upon the dangers of radioactive fallout were effective in

motivating segments of the American public to object to nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere and in eliciting the support of Administration officials and members of Congress for the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963. In West Germany, the publication of the results of NATO military exercises, in which the use of tactical nuclear weapons to repel a possible massive land attack is simulated, usually arouses popular concern and produces a spate of critical press comment for a short time. But it produces relatively little change in the policy of a government which believes in the effectiveness of NATO's nuclear deterrent strategy and perceives no practical alternative at the present time. Japan, the only country ever to feel the physical impact of nuclear weapons in wartime, has long manifested a significant (though fluctuating) psycho-political aversion to things nuclear. Whenever a submarine thought to be carrying nuclear missiles or equipment puts in at a Japanese port, a protest demonstration can be expected. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party recognizes the sensitivity of Japanese public opinion on this score, but steers a delicate course between supporting U.S. defense policy (on which Japan's national security currently depends) and keeping open Japan's defense options for the future in case the American guarantee loses credibility (by holding off ratification of the Nonproliferation Treaty).

From these few illustrations, we can see that psychological factors affect the political attitudes of publics (or segments thereof) and of governmental decision-makers in different ways in democratic countries. (In non-democratic countries, of course, there is less interaction between "people" and "government," and the attitudes of the former have less influence upon the decisions of the latter.) Today, it is generally agreed that the decision-making elements in all the governments which avowedly possess substantial nuclear military capabilities take the value of deterrence for granted. It is the validity of this conviction which warrants our consideration from the standpoint of psychological knowledge.

The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence

The theory of nuclear deterrence, as expounded by contemporary strategic analysts, presupposes a high degree of "common sense" on the part of national political decision-makers. At this point, psychologists warn us that, in the lives and decisions of individuals, irrational, unconscious factors frequently prevail over rational, conscious factors. But sociologists who have been influenced by Max Weber rejoin by pointing to the inherently stabilizing rationality which is built into the political-administrative bureaucratic structures of modern states, in which the emotional preferences of individuals are subordinated to and neutralized by a complex network of

institutionalized procedures that inhibit or screen out rash and erratic decisional behavior. The scientific, technological, and military personnel who plan, manage, and staff the nuclear deterrent capability may be obliged to worry about the worst case in which deterrence fails—in other words, to “think about the unthinkable” for the purpose of keeping it that way. However, this takes place within the larger context of international political decision-making that rests upon the assumption that “rationality” will continue to prevail in the capitals of the world—“rationality” here taken as involving some proportionate relationship between long-range value goals and immediate instrumental policies, between ends and means, between the objectives pursued and the costs to be paid.

The concept of deterrence is more than a military-strategic concept. It also belongs to the realm of psychology, since it involves an effort to influence the behavior of others through dissuasion—i.e., through the threat of inflicting an unacceptable amount of punishment in retaliation for a certain highly undesirable form of behavior, such as military aggression. Psychologists ask whether the threat of punishment alone (without being combined with a system of rewards) will serve to change the underlying motives of the other party and induce behavioral change, or whether such a threat will, by arousing anxiety and hostility, merely serve to produce a more intransigent opposition in the one against whom it is applied.

The Rationality of Political Decision-Making

Strategic and political practitioners who accept the workability of nuclear deterrence in a world of strategic “parity” or “equilibrium” (in military-technological terms) assume that the political leadership of the superpowers will never perceive any “rational” political goal that would justify any action likely to lead to “mutual assured destruction.” To express this in the framework of Maslow’s humanistic psychology, we might say that the whole group of political decision-makers responsible for the well-being of their societies becomes “a safety-seeking mechanism” all of whose elements function as “primarily safety-seeking tools.” “Practically everything,” writes Maslow, “looks less important than safety and protection.” One is entitled to hope that to guarantee against nuclear war has become the most important and persistent goal of rational decision-makers in Washington, Moscow, and Peking—even for no nobler reason than that, in the age of the nuclear-tipped missile, the personal survival of political decision-makers and their families will, upon the outbreak of nuclear war, be just as much in jeopardy as that of any front-line soldier in a previous war.

We have some reason to assume, then, that the rationality of bureaucratic decision-making (whether in the U.S. National Sec-

urity Council or in the Soviet and Chinese Politburos) will remain continuously dominant over the forces of intermittent irrationality that can badly warp the judgment of individuals. We may also assume that the implicit threats of catastrophe will be supplemented by increasing efforts toward arms limitation, conflict control, and the rewards of peaceful economic, scientific, educational, and political cooperation. On these assumptions, we can expect that the nuclear threat will be effective in dissuasion and will never be consciously invoked for coercive purposes.

This is not to say that the present international military-strategic situation contains no cause for worry. It does. Human rationality can break down under some circumstances; technical accidents can happen; men might misinterpret warning signals and act precipitously; conflicts thought controllable at the outset might escalate to the level of a nuclear confrontation; as nuclear weapons technology is diffused, a third party might be tempted to "catalyze" a nuclear exchange between the superpowers.

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Atomic energy... may intimidate the human race into bringing order into its international affairs, which, without the pressure of fear it would not do.

Albert Einstein

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
But when we analyze the problems of disarmament and arms control, we should not lightly dismiss the significance of the paradoxical contribution which nuclear weapons have made to the international system. On the one hand, the military atom presents a frightful specter to people everywhere; even when its possible use is rejected by the rational mind, it leaves a growing anxiety in man. Yet the same military atom has, on the other hand, made the major powers more cautious than ever in those relationships that might give rise to a military encounter, even one with conventional forces alone. And by extension to the alliance blocs of the major powers, the condition of nuclear deterrence is being gradually extended to provide security against attack for larger numbers of states, including many that possess no nuclear weapons.

In the absence of a world peacekeeper, the atom holds governments in awe of its power. Those who plan to disarm the nations should be extremely careful in setting out to defuse a mechanism which has produced at least a precarious peace by compelling governments to conduct themselves with unprecedented restraint and uncommon rationality. Peace has been maintained despite an in-

The Psychology of Nuclear Deterrence

tense ideological-political conflict over the basis on which human society is to be organized in the future.

The risks of disaster confronting humankind will endure, no matter what we do—regardless of whether we pursue deterrence or disarmament, or a mixture of both. But on the basis of their behavior over the past thirty years, we have reason to hope that political decision-makers in the nuclear powers are capable of making intelligent and responsible choices even amidst the emotional strains of crisis—especially if they have acted prudently in advance of crisis to minimize the chances of the unintended happening. There is some evidence that governments are becoming more determined to render the possibility of mutual annihilation improbable—which is as much as we can hope for in a world that holds few certainties.



IDEOLOGY AND FOREIGN POLICY

By Bayless Manning



Ideology—a system of basic political and economic values—inevitably plays a role in any nation's foreign policy. But the author sees a growing consensus among the major powers that their mutual survival and economic interdependence require less ideological confrontation, more reliance on multilateral negotiation. For the United States, he believes, the role of ideology should consist primarily of its example as a country that values individual freedom.

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by special permission from *Foreign Affairs*, January 1976. It is based on one of four lectures, all of which have been published by the Claremont Press under the title, *The Conduct of Foreign Policy in the Nation's Third Century*.

A commonly heard comment about American foreign policy these days is that the nation has lost its earlier sense of national goals and ideological objectives and that we should, as a nation, settle upon a new consensus as to our global moral objectives. This is a difficult subject, and, in my view, much of the discussion of it is made up of half-perceptions and half-truths.

In the first place, it is clearly true that there is less consensus today among Americans on foreign policy issues than was the case from about 1940 until about 1965. This is in no way surprising. The goals of World War II were simple and clear: the utter extermination of Hitlerian nazism and its Japanese counterpart. At the end of World War II, the United States developed a grand global vision grounded in traditional American liberal economics, free trade, anticolonialism and parliamentarianism. That vision inspired American leadership in the construction of the major world institutions that came into being at the end of World War II—the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the United Nations.

Very shortly, however, as the outlines of the cold war crystallized,

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the dominant drive of U.S. foreign policy increasingly became anticommunism and global Soviet containment. A secondary theme was the desire to help develop a united, democratic Europe that would forever preclude another European-centered world war. And a third motif was decolonization and, somewhat less wholeheartedly, assistance in the untried experiment of bringing modern economic development to the unindustrialized world.

The Nazis are now gone. The restoration of Europe and Japan has long since been completed. The colonial empires have been wholly dismantled. The global institutions built at the end of World War II are now demonstrably inadequate to the problems of today. The cold war (at least in its original form) is now history. The comparative moral, political and economic power of the United States has been measurably reduced. The trauma of Vietnam has intervened, bringing with it for a time a major schism in U.S. public opinion. Basic changes have also taken place in domestic social attitudes. Politically and psychologically, we Americans are in a time of regeneration, in part stunned by the Vietnam debacle and in part fumbling in a dim recognition that world conditions have changed and that old problems have given way to new ones.

A Stable Consensus

On the other hand, despite these developments, the decline of consensus should not be overstated. Public consensus continues to support the central elements of U.S. foreign policy. For example, the nation's resolution to defend itself against attack remains unimpaired. Similarly, a direct Soviet military assault on Western Europe, Japan or Canada would be met with American military retaliation. No conceivable U.S. foreign policy program would contain as a component the territorial expansion of the United States. The United States will, like all other countries, devote a substantial portion of its international energies to enhance the economic interests of the American people, but the nation will at the same time continue to respond sympathetically to the humanitarian needs of others. The nation's ideological preference remains in favor of parliamentarianism and free market economics. European unity still enlists U.S. support.

With the Vietnam issue behind us, the major changes that distinguish U.S. policy today from the continuity of yesterday are seen on reflection to be essentially two: a lowering of the intensity of our cold-war fears and our Communist containment policy, and a heightening of our recognition that it will not be feasible to remake the world in our own image.

Indeed, on further reflection, it becomes apparent that our main problem in shaping our foreign policy in the last decade was not that

we lost our consensus, but that we too long retained a consensus as to our perception of reality into a new era in which the reality itself had radically changed.

The Role of Ideology

In the nineteenth century it had not yet become fashionable to consider that every nation's foreign policy should have an ideological component. Although the United States stood far in the vanguard of representative democracy and individual liberty, the nation did not feel obliged to seek to export its governmental forms or ideals. The primary objectives of U.S. policy were to stay out of European politics, to extend U.S. trade, and to keep the seas open for American ships. We carried out those policies very well.

The twentieth century, however, has seen the emergence of titanic international struggles among a variety of competing secular ideologies. "Isms," great and small, fight for control of men's minds and institutions of power. Future historians of foreign affairs will see our era as made up of a mix of two classical elements (balance-of-power struggles and competition for national economic return) and one new element that is remarkably akin to older wars of religion—an ideological struggle over the "right" principles that "ought" to govern patterns of economic distribution among men in society and define the proper relationship between the individual and the collectivity, the state.

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It is often easier to fight for one's principles than to live up to them.

Adlai Stevenson

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The ideological stance of the United States is clear enough. Indeed it is remarkably so, and it has been extraordinarily stable. The nation has a preference for a relatively free-market economy where feasible, and a preference for the individualistic libertarian tenets set out in the Constitution in 1789, as expanded in the years since to bring more domestic groups into full political participation. A major question for debate today is whether and to what extent these ideological preferences should be given weight in determining the nation's posture on foreign policy issues.

Critics who contend for a "higher ideological content" in our foreign policy usually point out, quite correctly, that the nation performs at its best when welded together in a common ideological endeavor. They recall the enthusiasm in World War I for making the

world safe for democracy. They point to the public ideological commitment of World War II and the generation following, and detect a messianic streak in the American people—a latent propensity to go forth to save the world. When that psychological resource is tapped, there is almost nothing the United States cannot accomplish; when that resource is not invoked, goes the argument, the American public loses interest in international affairs, tends to withdraw, and U.S. foreign policy wilts. As these analysts see it, therefore, for the United States to have a strong and effective foreign policy over a period of time, our leaders must serve up, and the public must, after debate, accept some large-scale targeted goal.

Four Policy Issues

Further, it is evident that tomorrow's international agenda will repeatedly put to us in one form or another at least four basic questions that contain an unavoidable ethical or ideological component.

- What will be the American attitude regarding the poor two-thirds of the world?
- What will be the American attitude regarding persons in other countries whose individual political rights are being suppressed?
- What will be the American attitude toward such global problems as environmental protection and the use of the world's air space and seabeds?
- And what will be the American attitude toward the development of new multilateral international institutions that will entail some sacrifice of national freedom of unilateral action?

It will require political leadership of the highest order to explain these broad issues to the American public and to work out responsive U.S. foreign policy positions that are compatible with the ethical and ideological predispositions of a majority of the American people.

How Much Ideology?

The question, then, is not whether there should be *some* ideological component in foreign policy, but whether that ideological component should be greatly enlarged or made predominant. In assessing that question, it must first be recognized that even a high degree of ideological content in our foreign policy will not produce consensus, eliminate debate, or provide answers to foreign policy problems. Regardless of the ideological target, the costs and benefits of each new policy decision must be weighed anew, and the issue decided pragmatically on its own footing as it arises.

A high ideological content has not historically been an indispensable element in the successful conduct of U.S. foreign policy, as the experience of the nineteenth century showed. Some of the

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nation's less appealing chapters of history coincided with a high fervor of self-righteousness, notably the Mexican War, the Spanish-American War, and our adventure with old-time imperialism at the turn of the century. Then too, there appear to be hangover costs; when the nation has experienced an ideological "high" in foreign policy, it has tended to be followed by a later "low" and a propensity to withdraw from the world, as the United States did in rejecting the League of Nations, and as many fear the American public may be doing today.

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American diplomacy is easy on the brain but hell on the feet.

Charles G. Dawes

It depends on which you use.

Henry P. Fletcher

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In present-day circumstances it is far from apparent *what* ideological bugle call would arouse a consensus among the U.S. public and spark a moral crusade. The point is not merely that no such consensus of enthusiasm exists at present; it is rather, that the domestic atmosphere at this time of post-Vietnam and post-U.S. *imperium* is not propitious for a remobilization of the moral energies of the nation for a major overseas initiative. Any effort to embark upon a new ideological push at this time would sharply divide, rather than unify, the American people.

The Dangers of Zealotry

Then there are the special dangers that crusades always bring. Once launched, the holy war is the least manageable of all forms of human dispute. For man's greatest suffering at the hands of man we can thank the ideologists and the religious zealots of history—those arrested personalities who cannot live with uncertainty, cannot tolerate difference, and are so certain of their own rightness that they are eager to impose their views on others.

The foreign policy history of the twentieth century has been heavily freighted with that sort of thinking, some of it (though by comparison only a small part of it) contributed by the United States. The costs to mankind of this attitude have been unimaginably great. Western Europe, Japan, the Soviet Union, China and the United States all seem to have concluded of late that they have had enough

of high ideologies in their foreign policy for a while, and all are moving toward the conference table as a preferred alternative to mutual destruction over ideological issues that are, by definition, irresolvable.

Finally, it is now commonplace to observe that the agenda of international affairs is today expanding beyond the traditional issues of security and balance of power to include complex issues of economic interdependence, resource management and global preservation. Issues like these by their nature require multilateral negotiatory treatment, and simply cannot be dealt with on an ideological basis.

For these reasons another call to ideological arms does not at this time offer a promising basis upon which to build U.S. foreign policy for the last quarter of this century. For a complex nation in a complex world, single-minded pursuit of some fixed ideological objective will deprive that nation of gains that might otherwise have been made in the direction of multiple objectives that are important to it. It will guarantee a continuously dangerous condition of crisis and confrontation with others; it will lead to misassessments of objective realities and the nation's capacity to change them; and it will lead to division and self-destructive tendencies within the body politic itself—all as we have recently experienced in our Vietnam involvement.

A Role for the U.S.

And yet there remains an important moral role for the United States to play in the world.

As the world's preeminent military power, we can expect to produce in others some fear and also some awe. As the world's most efficient producer, we can expect to excite criticism and also some admiration. As the world's richest nation, we can expect to generate in others some envy and also some esteem. But we cannot expect to achieve the inspiration of others except through spiritual leadership. The United States has in the past provided that inspiration to the world. It is not doing it now. But it can, one day, do it again.

No contemporary American can be unaware of the deficiencies, shortcomings and blind spots that still mar the social landscape of the United States today, and the painful slowness with which we have sometimes moved to correct these failings. But, for all its blemishes, the United States stands in the forefront of the world in its commitment to the proposition that the individual human being should be free—free to think what he wants, write what he wishes, assemble as he will, read as his curiosity leads him, paint as his eye uniquely sees, worship as to him seems right, and espouse whatsoever political position he finds congenial, so long only as he accords

those same privileges to his fellow citizens.

The United States has been imbued with this spirit of individual liberty since its founding, and its institutions are imbued with it today. There is no doubt whatsoever in my mind that this urge for individual self-expression has ever been the ultimate revolutionary aspiration and always will be. In this sense, the United States remains the most progressive revolutionary society in the world.

We are, however, living in a transitory period in which the vocabulary of revolutionary aspirations is turned upside-down; today's revolutionary voices have little or no interest in, or are actively opposed to, the ideal of individual expression. The reasons are not hard to find. Over the course of this century, the unindustrialized former colonies of the world, the backward fastnesses of Russia, and the traditionalist frozen-in-amber static society of China have all grimly determined that they will somehow, at whatever cost, make the twentieth century the era in which they asserted their full nationhood, garnered for themselves the bounty of modern technology, and shattered the social, political, and wealth structures they have inherited from the past. Future historians will see this century as a period of the most extraordinary achievement for these countries, as they set out to try to bring themselves abreast of the industrialized West and as they are, in varying degrees, making progress in so doing.

Attitudes toward Developing Nations

The United States has in the main misunderstood the process that is taking place in the unindustrialized countries in this century. In some degree we have grasped that economic modernization is being pursued and in some degree we have sought to assist in that regard. To a degree we have understood that basic human social services are needed in the developing countries and, again, we have done something to try to help with programs for schools, medical care and the like. But we have had little or no understanding of the demand for change in the ancient social orders of these countries or the demand for national self-expression. We have, as a result, for the most part comported ourselves toward these countries so as to appear to be opposed to their internal forces of modernization and in league with their domestic forces seeking to maintain the status quo.

Sometimes we have been negative toward some of these new societies because our democratic preferences—especially those of our liberal ideologues—have been repelled by the authoritarian character of their new governments. Sometimes we have been negative toward them because our free market preferences—especially those of our conservative ideologues—have been repelled by the planned economy preference of some of the new governments. Some-

times we have been negative because some private U.S. economic interest groups stood to suffer immediate losses from a change in the status quo. Sometimes the leaders who have arisen in the nonindustrialized countries have seemed to us to be demagogues, or worse. Sometimes we have been negative because the economic policies

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The United States has no mandate from a high to police the world, and no inclination to do so.

Robert S. McNamara

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pursued by the new regimes have been not only harmful to U.S. interests, but downright suicidal for themselves. But most often the question of U.S. attitudes toward a newly developing country became wholly confounded with and dominated by the global confrontation of the cold war. We thought it at times necessary to support the forces of the status quo because the alternative seemed to be an extension of dangerous Russian global influence.

In many of the emerging countries there has been some validity in one or a number of these U.S. perspectives. But the ultimate underlying truth was that the time had come for the industrially backward people of the world to move into the twentieth century, and move they have. More often than not, the United States has wound up on the wrong side of that historic evolution. As a result, the United States stands today in deep disfavor among many of the developing countries, and is often portrayed as the main external adversary opposing their national development, internal modernization, and economic advancement.

False Expectations

We must look to the future. In part, what happened during the post-World War era was that the United States completely misunderstood the revolution we were witnessing in the emerging post-colonial countries. Naively, though understandably enough, we thought our own history would be relived by these new nations. In keeping with our anticolonial traditions, our position immediately following World War II was strongly in favor of granting prompt independence to the colonies of those wartime allies. So far, so good.

But we then expected the newly independent countries to start at once to behave politically like the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in 1776—complete with parliaments, voting, free press, private entrepreneurship, and the like. We based our policy on that premise—and were promptly disappointed, as in almost no case did the emerg-

ing countries follow those expectations. Circumstances in the new unindustrialized countries of this century were wholly different from ours in 1776, and it was not yet time for our kind of revolution. It was time instead for the pursuit of three great goals "at whatever cost"—the building of nationhood, economic modernization, and internal social restructuring.

In those three efforts, some (not all) of the new societies have made extraordinary progress. But they have had to pay a large price for that progress. The price has been paid largely in regimentation, submergence of the individual, suppression of dissent, discouragement of inquiry, public misinformation, and imposed conformity. Many of the new nations have become conscript societies. It will be long debated whether up to now it has been necessary to become a conscript society in order to achieve the goals that were set. But now, as collective social progress has been made, the time is coming, so far most noticeably in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, when the seeds of individual expression are stirring and seeking an outlet to sprout. The rustlings of personal expression will not be confined there.

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I am not very keen for doves or hawks. I think we need more owls.

George Aiken

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
Inevitability of Freedom

It is not a credible proposition, for example, that the magnificently civilized, creative, colorful and sophisticated Chinese people will for long be content to be compelled to look at only the same eight politically authorized operas, and to spend their lives in gray formations doing responsive readings in unison. Throughout the authoritarian world, the stage is slowly being set for the next evolutionary if not revolutionary move forward, the resumption of the ancient craving for individual liberty. No amount of internal secret police work will stop it. And bit by bit, whatever totalitarianism of the right or left may achieve today in the realm of forced-draft social modernization, tomorrow's reformers will see the political structures of these conscript societies for what they are—authoritarian and repressive.

Revolutionary movements of the past century have all begun as movements toward idealized collective economic and social systems. But once installed in power they have become primarily distinguished by, and are likely to be most remembered for, their innova-

tive and unique systems of rigid political control. (Their origins as conspiratorial semi-military undergrounds may account for a part of this.) When eventually the counterpressure to these repressive systems mounts, the thrust will not be toward new social and economic ends, but toward the ancient goals of political freedom and individual self-expression.

It is debatable whether the developing nations that have adopted central economic planning systems will ever welcome the return of fully free market forces to their economies. But if America preserves at home its steadfast stand in favor of the claim of the free individual, and also continues to make progress in dealing with its own internal social inequities, the United States will eventually regain its moral leadership among the nations of the world—not by force of its economic power or its arms, but by virtue of its ideological example of a society of free men.



THE POSSIBILITIES OF ARMS CONTROL

By Duncan L. Clarke



The Biblical injunction to turn swords into plowshares may be considered the first call for total disarmament. If so, it is a call that has not been heeded and is unlikely to be in the foreseeable future. But arms control, argues Professor Clarke, is both feasible and essential in a world of often hostile nation-states. Here he examines what has been done in this field and suggests areas for future efforts.

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Until recent years, nations have devoted little attention to the immensely important problem of controlling armaments. Foreign policy has been dominated by considerations of economics, political diplomacy and national security—and security itself has been viewed as something apart from and more vital than arms control.

Today, however, many statesmen acknowledge that progress in arms control is the key to genuine long-term security and international stability. It is also a key to raising living standards worldwide—particularly in the developing countries. By 1972, these countries were spending almost the same proportion of their Gross National Product on defense as the developed countries. Obviously a viable international program of arms control could free more money for economic growth, both from within and from without, in the form of investment and aid.

Arms control is a more comprehensive concept than that of disarmament. Disarmament refers simply to the abolition or reduction of arms. Arms control, however, calls for a *policy* of internal and external restraint on the level of arms, their character, deployment or use. Arms control advocates are pragmatists; they favor a step-by-

step approach, seeking areas of partial agreement, and agreement that furthers *both* national and international security. They recognize three things:

- No nation will restrain itself unless convinced that its essential interests will be preserved.

- But arms control must ultimately transcend self-interest and move on to advance the general welfare of all nations, or it will be counterproductive.

- Although the reduction of armaments (nuclear and conventional) is a major objective of arms control policy, "general and complete disarmament" is not a realistic goal under present conditions of nationalist feeling and suspicion between states.

An arms control approach rests on the assumption that, while there are hostile nations, and military force must remain a factor for the foreseeable future, there are instances where a nation's own armaments pose a greater threat to its security than does some foreign nation. That is, weapons can become so destructive and costly that the risk of using or even possessing them can exceed their utility. At that point, nations may turn to arms control to strengthen their economy and, paradoxically, enhance their security. It is this realization (that fewer arms may actually improve security), and its fairly recent translation into negotiated agreements, that explain the arms control successes of the past fifteen years.

Complexities and Problems

Most nations are now parties to arms control agreements of one kind or another. They are inevitably imperfect instruments, for we live in a world of ambiguity and conflict. There are no universally enforceable codes of conduct; nations differ on the definition of what constitutes "aggression"; and ultimately human nature is a dichotomy of good and evil.

A host of large problems complicate attempts at sound arms control agreements. For instance, there is the felt need for "balance." But, given the disparate scientific, military, political, and economic conditions in the United States and the Soviet Union, how could an accord on strategic nuclear weapons be reached that would be equally advantageous to both sides? Clearly, no symmetrical mathematic balance is possible. Both parties must settle for a rough equivalence.

Another problem revolves around the question, "How much risk are we willing to run, and where?" It is prudent to be cautious; but a state might decide that it is wiser to be more than prudent, to assume the worst of others, that arms control would be more dangerous than a continuing arms race, and that it should attempt to secure an unequal advantage in negotiations.

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On the other hand, a state might decide to take the opposite course: to assume that, until otherwise proven, the other state is to be trusted, and that on, "balance," arms control, however uncertain, better serves its national interests than the risks inherent in a perpetual arms race.

Points of View

There is a fable by the Spanish historian and philosopher Salvador de Madariaga that provides a particularly apt illustration of how clashing attitudes make balanced accords difficult.

One day the animals gathered and decided to disarm. The eagle, with an eye on the bull, suggested that all horns be razed off. The bull, with a squint at the tiger, thought that all claws should be cut short. The tiger, glaring at the elephant, was of the opinion that tusks should be pulled out, or at any rate shortened. The elephant, staring at the eagle, thought it indispensable that all wings should be clipped. Whereupon the bear, with a circular glance at all this brethren, cried out "Why all these half-way measures? Let all weapons be done away with, so that nothing remains in the way of a fraternal, all-embracing hug.

So the first problem is that every nation naturally sees its own security needs as most important, and tends to minimize the needs of other nations.

A second problem is that many nations refuse to sign arms control treaties. How workable can the Non-Proliferation Treaty be if potential nuclear nations like Argentina, Brazil, Israel and South Africa are not parties?

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Idealists maintain that all nations should share the atomic bomb. Pessimists maintain that they will.

Punch

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Then, there is the *verification* problem. Without mutual trust, there is a need to verify compliance with treaty obligations. New electronic, photographic and seismic techniques make verification easier. But it will remain a central concern.

Weapons technology is dynamic, and constantly threatens static treaties. In one sense arms control seeks to put political restraints on military technology. But while agreements have been somewhat successful in restricting deployment of weapons, pure research and development, which is difficult to verify, has virtually escaped controls.

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Then, again, domestic forces may impede arms control efforts. Within the U.S. government, for example, the Defense and State Departments may disagree, and their differences must be reconciled. By law the U.S. Congress must ratify any arms control agreement, which also means that the agreement must be generally acceptable to the public. Under every form of government, crucial internal differences of opinion must be compromised.

These are only *a few* of the many problems. There are still others; e.g. the tendency for states to fear the loss, with arms control, of commercial advantage, or that allies might feel threatened.

Grounds for Hope

But while excessive optimism is unwarranted, so too is excessive pessimism. Many nations recognize that, despite political differences, either they live together or, literally, they will perish together. This is not rhetoric but fact, and fear has certainly contributed to the urgency of arms control.

There are other grounds for hope.

- In the United States there are forces in Congress, in the executive branch of government and in the public pressing for action.
- The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was established in 1961 by President John F. Kennedy, and this Agency plays an important role in the American policy process, with new responsibilities added by Congress in 1975 to assess the likely impact of new weapons systems on arms control policy.
- Technology cuts both ways—it is a potential danger but also a potential promise; without the dramatic breakthroughs in photographic verification techniques, which permit Moscow and Washington to analyze each other's strategic forces and verify mutual understandings, today's world would be even more hazardous.
- Demands for economic well-being compel leaders to question the wisdom of costly weapons systems.
- Finally, several truly significant arms control agreements have been concluded, and there is now a large body of precedent for restraint and a certain international momentum for controlling weaponry.

Early Efforts

More than fifteen years elapsed after World War II before *anything* was accomplished. There were many reasons for this: the Cold War atmosphere; the lack of sophisticated technical means of verification to eliminate the need for on-site inspection, to which the Soviets objected; the emphasis on general and complete disarmament; the fact that the nuclear proliferation issue was not pressing, as only the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United King-

dom were nuclear powers; and the fact that the then unquestioned American nuclear supremacy meant that a precondition for major negotiations—balance or “parity”—was absent.

In 1946 the United States proposed the Baruch Plan, the first comprehensive proposal for eliminating atomic weapons. Its key idea was that the sole ownership and control of all atomic activities, both “dangerous” and peaceful, would center on one strong international body. The United States, which then had a monopoly on atomic weapons and the means to produce them, would stop manufacturing atomic weapons and destroy its stockpile. The U.S. offer was conditioned on outlawing the bomb internationally, destroying all weapons stocks, and providing veto-free sanctions against violators. A majority of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission supported the plan. The Soviet Union, however, rejected it and went on to develop its own atomic weapons in 1949. Further U.S. efforts toward nuclear disarmament failed to win Soviet agreement on an acceptable basis for verification, and disarmament negotiations tended to become exercises in propaganda.

Agreements in the 1960s

The first modern arms control agreement was the Antarctic Treaty (1961), which insures that that continent will be used only for peaceful purposes. It was an “easy” agreement, since Antarctica had little military value and all parties were permitted freedom of inspection; but it was a beginning.

This was followed in 1963 by two other agreements, one minor and one major. The Hot Line accord between Washington and Moscow established a direct teletype communications link between the two capitals, whose necessity was underscored by the Cuban missile crisis; it was later replaced by an even faster satellite communications system. The Limited Test Ban Treaty, made possible by technical improvements in detecting nuclear explosions, forbade any nuclear explosion in the atmosphere, under water or in outer space. Underground explosions were permitted. Today only China (non-signatory) continues atmospheric testing; hence, the health dangers from radioactive fallout have greatly diminished. The treaty’s wide support (104 nations, including potential nuclear powers like Brazil, India, Iran and Israel, are parties) and proven success helped make arms control “respectable.” That none of the parties has withdrawn suggests that, for them, the treaty has jeopardized neither national nor international security.

Two “nonarmament” accords, modeled after the Antarctic Treaty, have been negotiated and ratified; the Outer Space Treaty (1967) and the Treaty of Tlatelolco (1968). The former, with sixty-eight states including the United States and the Soviet Union

as parties, stipulates that the exploration and use of outer space (including the moon and other celestial bodies) is to be for exclusively peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all nations. Additionally, nations cannot orbit around the earth or otherwise station in outer space nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction. This ban foreclosed a major area of possible military confrontation; although in 1967 it was thought to have only modest significance, in the light of modern aerospace technology the Outer Space Treaty represents a considerable achievement. It also set a cooperative tone for space exploration, as symbolized by the 1975 Soviet-American joint space flight.

A Latin American Initiative

The Treaty of Tlatelolco (Mexico), a Latin American initiative towards arms control, prohibits the possession of nuclear weapons, direct or indirect. Since the vast majority of Latin American nations (including Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela) are full parties, without reservation, much of Latin America has become a de facto nuclear weapons free zone. However, since neither Cuba nor Argentina are full parties, and since Brazil and Chile, though ratifying the accord, have stipulated that it will not enter into force for them until all eligible countries have fully ratified, the zone is incomplete. Furthermore, neither France nor the United States has acceded to Protocol I, which calls upon non-Latin American states with territories in the zone to place them under treaty restrictions. And the Soviet Union has not agreed to Protocol II, requiring nuclear weapons states to respect the zone's status and to refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against contracting parties.

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Nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more.

Bible: Book of Isaiah

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Still, the treaty is important. It is the first nuclear weapons free zone in a populated area; it has considerable moral force throughout the region; and the accession to Protocol II by the United States and the People's Republic of China is significant. For this represents the first time the United States has formally agreed to restrict the use of nuclear weapons, and the Treaty of Tlatelolco is the first arms control agreement with which Peking has associated itself.

During the 1960s, arms control gained credibility. No longer was it dismissed as “impractical,” “for academics and theologians,” or

even "unpatriotic." It was evident that in many functional and regional areas arms control offered a path to international stability and well-being. This was so not because it was an alternative to national security but, quite the contrary, because it bolstered that security.

Agreements in the 1970s

The 1970s have witnessed a number of accords, which may be divided into three categories: the good, the dubious, and the essential. In the "good" category fall two Soviet-American bilateral agreements. One of these forbids the kinds of provocative maneuvers between the two states' navies that have occurred in the past. The other, an "Accidents Measures" agreement, obligates each side to notify the other of accidental or unexplained incidents involving the possible detonation of a nuclear weapon that could create the risk of war. Both qualify as tension-reducing agreements.

The Seabed Treaty (1972), to which there are already fifty-two parties, is a partial nonarmament treaty. Parties are forbidden from emplacing on the ocean floor (or subsoil), beyond a twelve-mile coastal zone, any nuclear or other weapon of mass destruction. The treaty does not prejudice any party's position on general law-of-the-sea issues. It does not cover conventional armaments, antisubmarine warfare devices, or submarines. But it does foreclose an area of possible military competition; indeed, prior to this agreement the United States Navy had done advanced research on seabed nuclear armament.

The Geneva Protocol (1928), which forbids the *use* of poison and gases as well as bacteriological and noxious chemicals in warfare, finally became universal when it was ratified by the United States in 1975. Three years earlier, the Convention on Biological and Toxin Weapons had been opened for signatures. Under the Convention, parties agree to "never . . . develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain" biological toxins or agents, except as they are justified for medical or other peaceful purposes. Parties further agree to destroy existing arsenals of such weapons.

Actually, the Convention on Biological and Toxin Weapons was the first important *disarmament* agreement since World War II. President Gerald Ford announced in 1974 that the United States had completed destruction of its biological and toxin weapons. The convention lacks verification procedures. However, analysts do not consider this to be a serious weakness, as the military utility of such weapons is slight because the effects are uncontrollable.

A major agreement that has aroused considerable debate is the Threshold Test Ban Treaty signed in 1974. This treaty put a ceiling of 150 kilotons (equivalent to 150,000 tons of TNT) on all underground

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nuclear explosions except those that are for "peaceful purposes." Critics have argued that a comprehensive test ban forbidding *all* underground nuclear tests would be far more verifiable, and that the proposed threshold is so high (ten times that of the Hiroshima bomb) as to allow most military significant tests. But the more serious flaw in this treaty was that it allowed "peaceful" nuclear explosions. Its critics pointed out that American experiments and studies seeking to use nuclear blasts for commercial and economic development have been almost uniformly disappointing. They also argued that it was virtually impossible to verify that a nuclear explosion is *solely* for "peaceful" purposes. Some of this criticism was answered by the parallel Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty (PNE) signed in May 1976, which placed exactly the same limit of 150 kilotons on any individual nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes, such as an engineering project. Also the Soviets agreed, for the first time in the modern history of arms control, to permit limited on-site inspections in the Soviet Union. While this is a noteworthy advance, such inspections are limited to "peaceful" nuclear explosions at or near the 150 kiloton level. (It should be noted that these two treaties do not become legally binding unless and until both the United States and the Soviet Union ratify them.)

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which seeks to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, is an "essential" arms control development. It grew out of a consensus between both nuclear and non-nuclear states that more nuclear powers would inevitably increase the likelihood of disaster. Hence it was in everyone's interest to structure a regime that would both prevent proliferation and insure to all nations the potential benefits of nuclear energy. Ratified by ninety-five parties so far, the NPT constitutes an important achievement.

The future of this treaty, however, is uncertain for the following reasons:

- India's 1974 nuclear explosion, which was not vigorously condemned by either Moscow or Washington;
- the incredible demand—spurred by the energy crisis—for nuclear energy, which will vastly increase the prospect of illicit plutonium diversion;
- the persistent although usually erroneous view that nuclear weapons augment security;
- the possible acquisition of such weapons by terrorists; and the fact that some nations critical to the success of the treaty are not members.

But the heart of the problem, as expounded by many delegates to the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in May 1975, is that the NPT freezes an unjust imbalance between nuclear "haves"

and non-nuclear "have nots." Defenders of NPT reply that it protects signers from each other, whereas proliferation could create new dangers and exacerbate old rivalries.

SALT Agreements

The major effort at Soviet-American self-restraint has been SALT (the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks), which began in 1969. SALT's success is essential for the future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. But it is also the keystone of East-West detente. Should SALT talks fail, an intricate web of political-economic-scientific cooperation could be imperiled.

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For the first time, an agreement has been reached on bringing the forces of nuclear destruction under international control This . . . is not a victory for one side; it is a victory for mankind.

John F. Kennedy

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SALT I (1972) produced two major instruments. The ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty ranks as among the most significant arms control accords concluded. It restricted both sides to two ABM deployment areas (later reduced to one). The permissible strategic defensive systems are so severely curtailed that the treaty really amounts to a de facto ban on all of them. Considering the presently available exotic weapons now undeployable because of this treaty, this is an enormous accomplishment. It saves billions of dollars (or rubles) and prevents an ABM arms race.

Less dramatic was the Interim Agreement; it was a five-year temporary freeze, at existing levels, of each side's offensive strategic ballistic missile launchers and permitted an increase in SLBM (Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile) launchers up to an agreed level if corresponding numbers of older SLBM or ICBM (Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile) launchers were dismantled.

The Interim Agreement's future was addressed in Vladivostok (1974) by President Ford and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev in what is now being called SALT II. In a joint statement, which by February 1977 had not yet assumed treaty status, they outlined a new ten-year "agreement," which limits each side to 2,400 offensive strategic delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs and long-range bom-

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bers). Of this number, 1,320 can be equipped with MIRVs (Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicles).

SALT II was immediately criticized by some nongovernmental American arms control specialists. Of their criticisms, two were particularly telling: that the ceiling is too high and the conceivable number of MIRV'd warheads that could be deployed would far exceed legitimate needs for a credible deterrent; and that it is not even a partial disarmament agreement.

In response to these objections, supporters argue that without SALT II, Soviet and American strategic armaments would each have greatly surpassed the 2,400 figure by 1985; indeed, the Soviet Union in 1974 already had *more than* 2,400 offensive strategic launch vehicles. Furthermore, this is the first time Moscow has accepted the principle of "equal aggregates" in offensive strategic weapons. Never before had bombers come within an arms control agreement. Salt II secures the gains made in the ABM Treaty, as the United States had reserved the right to opt out of that accord if there was no follow-up agreement for offensive arms.

Finally, while SALT II sets high limits it *does* set limits, so it may now be possible to really work toward *reductions*.

The Future?

Even an incurable optimist in 1960 would not have imagined such activity in the arms control field. The future is no easier to predict today, but it may be useful, or at least provocative, to speculate about arms control over the next decade.

Most of the \$2.5 *trillion* the world spent for military security between 1963-1973 went for conventional arms and conventionally related expenditures. Yet all present arms control measures have done little to control conventional weapons. Because they are easy

“The hydrogen bomb is history's exclamation point. It ends an age-long sentence of manifest violence.

Marshall McLuhan


to manufacture or otherwise acquire, because they are seen as vital for security, and because arms suppliers stand to gain economically, conventional weapons will remain the least promising area for arms limitations. One hopeful sign was the 1974 Declaration of Ayacucho where, with Peru's initiative, eight Latin American nations pledged not to purchase "offensive weapons of a sophisticated nature." Perhaps the Declaration, rooted in a desire to mitigate tensions and

channel more money into economic development, will be a model for others, though the history of similar attempts is uniformly dismal.

Among the more feasible arms control measures currently under consideration are additional nuclear weapons free zones (perhaps in sub-Sahara Africa and Southeast Asia); pledges not to be the first to use nuclear weapons; and a comprehensive nuclear test ban. However vital, progress in retarding nuclear weapons proliferation is not certain, but some useful and equitable developments seem probable. Helpful SALT II and perhaps SALT III accords are likely, unless there is a major disruption in East-West relations. Most foreseeable are various tension-reduction accords involving many nations, and a treaty on environmental modification prohibiting alteration of weather and environmental patterns for military purposes.

Man's capacity for justice and farsightedness makes true peace possible, but his inclination toward injustice and shortsightedness makes peace imperative.


Significant, yet insufficient, progress has been made. We have discovered that changing habitual modes of behavior, even suicidal ones, is a monumental task. The outlook is bleak, yet hopeful. The scope, variety and danger of modern conflict exceeds that of any historical period; but this very fact has compelled nations to take unprecedented measures to unite against common threats. There is ground for cautious optimism in the growing recognition among major as well as lesser powers that arms control has become an essential element of national security.



THE NOTE OF WONDER IN AMERICAN WRITING

By Irving Howe

What is unique in American writing, says the author, is its quality of voice, a note of wonder that ranges from amused, often comic, pleasure to muted ecstasy. Disdaining the thick social detail of European fiction, American writers explored the wildness of nature and the mysteries of self.



Irving Howe holds the title of Distinguished Professor of English at the City University of New York. He is also editor of *Dissent*, a journal of political and social comment. His books include studies of William Faulkner, Sherwood Anderson and Thomas Hardy, several collections of literary essays, and most recently *World of Our Fathers*, which describes the experience of Jewish immigrants to the United States. His article is reprinted from *The New York Times Book Review*.

With America, a new idea comes into the world; with American literature, a new voice. Originally a dream or fantasy of overburdened Europeans, the idea speaks of a new start for humanity on unsullied ground.

In the colonies themselves and in the newborn republic, this idea remains preliterate, mostly discursive and declamatory; it is still bound to the stateliness of England's English. The new voice comes in the first half of the 19th century, through the growth of an American style—really a complex of styles—in poetry and prose. Thought and language, idea and image fold into a new being, and we have the flowering of our literature.

It begins upon a note of wonder, glistening with expectation, marveling at the freshness of native earth. Cooper, Emerson, Thoreau, Melville, Twain—all, during their earlier years, seem overawed by the sheer good fortune, the *chosenness*, of American mankind (or, as we now want sadly to amend, its white segment). American stories about trappers, river pilots, seamen and isolate philosophers are bracketed by a rich, comforting silence—the silence of woods, rivers, plains. Space comes to be the commanding presence and metaphor of the American imagination: a sacred emptiness of space.

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The American Review

Except for Poe, who might almost have been born in Paris, major American writers of the 19th century strike this chord of ecstasy. It is an ecstasy of essential man, free of social bonds, in relation with the tangible world. In this vision, every man defines himself a pioneer of spirit. Every man makes and remakes himself, defining his character as an endless series of second chances. If Eve never bit nor Adam fell.

A century later, poignantly recognizing that innocence is lost, in recovery, William Faulkner summons this American memory: "most pathless," the earth was marked only "by the tracks of ungulates—bear and deer and panthers and bison and wolves and alligators and the myriad smaller beasts. And unalien men too." Southerner of Southerners, Faulkner yet shows his half-secret kinsman to the sages of Concord, Massachusetts.

Starting Fresh

American writers of the 19th century begin with the notion that if you are an American you can leap past, or out of, the constraints of European history. More radically, that you need not suppose that you have found your necessary home. Edenic visions posit an end to history, but the American one goes farther: it posits an end to the mere history. Emerson calls himself "an endless seeker with no past at his back." He is wrong, the past clings to everyone's back; but not Simon Suggs, rogue hero of "old Southwest" humor, offers his remedy: "It is good to be shifty in a new country." Shifty means here not striking hard bargains, American style, but getting away from the crush of history, the enfeeblements of cultivation. Whitman, the shiftest writer as ever lived, keeps shifting from improvised to improvised self in his *Song of Myself*; Melville's Ishmael (in *Moby Dick*), sick with routines of the land, takes himself off to sea, to find meditation, a self without scales; Thoreau starts out for Walden Pond because he wishes "to front only the essential facts of life, which for him, as for many of his contemporaries, are not to be found in cities, families, societies.

All this remains wonderfully charming, even today. These American writers are by no means primitive; some are well educated, some have as their background the decay of the more stringent version of early American Christianity. But they can adopt youthful postures; they can hum melodies of individualist freedom without, without seeming willful or sentimental. To read again Twain's *Old Time and the Mississippi*, or Emerson's journals, or the opening chapters of *Moby Dick*, or most of Whitman's and some of Dickinson's poems, is to be delighted with voices of democratic friendliness and amiability.

Later, as they grow older and experience the Civil War, these writers will often succumb to despair—they look about them

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America has become and it chills their hearts. But in their salad years they fall naturally into the comic mode. It is an open-throated speech, a sort of modest sublime, a loose-limbed musing or amused pleasure at the quickness of life in a setting not yet worn down or out. Emerson writes: "A bird's voice, even a piping frog, enlivens a solitude and makes world enough for us." Whitman, having learned from Emerson that spirit enkindles matter (at least in the North American climate), grapples for "a knit of identity" even while smiling at how grandiose his claims must seem; and then, more relaxed, admits that "I find no sweeter fat than sticks to my bones." Melville puns, jokes, piles up mounds of comic erudition. Emily Dickinson, noticing "a certain slant of light," finds that it yields "internal difference"—the outer world and her inner mood unite in ecstatic recognition: brief, solitary, comic to the point of gravity.

This muted ecstasy comes not only in apprehensions of nature and a linked metaphysics of the self; it comes also in celebrations of work, ordinary daily work. Twain's apprentice pilot is supremely happy learning his trade on the Mississippi; Melville's Ishmael, content when working with his fellow sailors. In the plebeian ranginess of 19th-century American writing, where transcendence seems to drop lightly from an open sky, there is also a hard-headed, this-worldly pleasure in doing the job, mastering a craft, bringing together the useful and the beautiful. "The face of the water in time," says Twain's apprentice, "became a wonderful book—a book that . . . told its mind to me without reserve, delivering its most cherished secrets as clearly as if it uttered them with a voice." What Emerson would grasp through orphic divination and Thoreau through particulars of nature, Twain reached through a mastery of craft: the world as "wonderful book."

American literature is incorrigibly romantic. So it has always been; so, in darker ways, it seems likely to remain. It is a romanticism somewhat different from its European sources, for it proposes

Walt Whitman



Ralph Waldo Emerson



Herman Melville



what no European imagination ever could—an end-run past history, into the freedom of unconditioned selfhood, or in its more moderate versions, into a mini-utopia of friends. That illusion burst, our writers fall back on bleakness of spirit, soreness of heart. In their greatest work, however, they hold together hope and disenchantment, vision and collapse.

American romanticism differs, also, from that of Europe in retaining alloys of Puritan moralism, or at least an excessive liking for the high-minded ethical, so that in the work of a novelist like Henry James there is a complex interlocking between a desire for personal absolutism and the pressure of constricting social arrangements. Still, no matter how qualified, our native strain is romanticism, a faith in the beatitude of the singular.

Emerson is everywhere. From Whitman to Mailer, from Melville to William Carlos Williams, from Thoreau to Wallace Stevens, it is Emerson who dominates, our angel with broken wings. Over and over again one hears in American writing echoes of his call for the self-reliant man, follower of instinct and conscience, with the two happily blurred in the gassy regions of the Oversoul. Over and over again one hears echoes of Emerson's ethicized romanticism asserting man's share in the godhead, providing a semi-religious sanction for democratic largesse, indeed, for individualist overreaching.

Our 19th-century masters search restlessly for "open" forms—large-motioned narratives, rangy styles—with which to encompass the national experience. The social "thickness" of George Eliot's novels, the Parisian sophistication of Balzac's, the historical substantiality of Tolstoy's: these barely appear in 19th-century American writing. About the complications of society, the abrasions of marriage, the allurements of sex, the inner life of women, the power of money, about things hard, mundane, and conditioned, our literature of the 19th-century tells us rather little. But there are other values. There is charm, freshness, a brisk energy and a direct symbolic penetration to man's condition in the new world, unencumbered by historical memory or social convention.

A New Language

Responding to the uniqueness of their circumstance, the American masters created a new literary language. Twain began with the spoken language of his childhood, the drawling hyperbole of the "old Southwest" humorists and the traditional resources of English prose; from these he fashioned a new style, pure and easy, concrete and lyrical, a kind of intoxicated vernacular. Melville worked out a polyphonic prose ranging from humorous rendering of plebeian speech to an elaborate philosophical rhetoric drawing upon Shakespeare and Milton. Thoreau, probably our greatest stylist,

The Note of Wonder in American Writing

hammered out a muscular, knotty and spare prose devoted, above all, to exact naming.

In verse there were innovations just as remarkable. Whitman linked the phrase or clause of speech with the verse line as rhythmic unit, and at their best, his cadences are beautifully calculated for humor and intimacy. Emily Dickinson drew upon the meters of the English hymn to make cryptic poems bristling with the tart economies of New England wit. Coming when the country still seemed young, Whitman and Dickinson could write as if, indeed, they were endless seekers with no past at their backs.

I have been exaggerating, of course. Visions of absolute selfhood and unconditioned freedom do, in fact, dominate 19th-century American literature, but much of its strength comes from a recognition of how unlikely, limiting, and even insufficient such visions turn out to be. You can't keep Huck and Jim on that raft forever, and once they leave it, they must confront the brutalities of society. Especially the horrors of slavery in the land of Washington and Jefferson. For a good many of our writers, slavery seems the ultimate mockery of our native pretensions, blotting all our moral claims.

In the late decades of the 19th-century, there begins a change of mood and consciousness that still shapes our lives. The legacy of blood from the Civil War; the growth of ugly, soul-breaking cities; the spread of corruption; the entry of millions of immigrants assigned to the donkey-work of society; the recognition, in short, that this country too must bear the pains of a rampant capitalism and the shocks of class war, all lead to a new view of things.

Disabused Realism

Emersonian "transcendentalism" comes to seem toothless, a genteel evasion. "Wherever men of cultivation looked," writes the historian Richard Hofstadter, "they found themselves facing hostile forces and an alien mentality." Somewhat later this revulsion from the grossness of our ruling classes would be expressed with a classical fastidiousness in *The Education of Henry Adams*. But now, by the 1890s, there occurs a shared deflation of American dreams, American vanities. Life hardens; the landscape grays. American writing moves from visions to problems, from ecstasy to trouble, from self to society. Land of the free? Yes, but also home of the exploited.

Realists of small town and slum life break into American literature. They care less for glassy ideals than for the detail of repression, loss, vulgarity. Between Emerson and Dreiser, between 19th and 20th centuries, stands William Dean Howells, a sweet-souled American whose conscience drives him to witness the sufferings of life in the city and to speak for a kindly sort of socialism. Stephen Crane's


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Maggie brings something of the tone, if not quite the method of naturalism. Edith Wharton, perhaps the only important American writer untouched by Emersonianism, produces harsh novels of the cheapness of the new commercial world; she sees life as a mine, the human creature as a fly trapped in a bottle. Adore Dreiser, the American writer most successfully congenial with stupidity, brings into our literature all those people of town and city who spend their lives in the drabness of the sadness of not even being able to recognize unfulfilled

Perhaps the most remarkable of the American writers of the last century is Edwin Arlington Robinson. If only because he is a New Englander, a bit of Emerson lingers in his work, though it is a flicker than flame. But what moves him most is the ordinary human defeat. He is the first American poet of stature to bring commonplace people and experience into our literature—not just of circumstance but also of character. Whitman had glorified ordinary people, even rhapsodized over them, but they appear as individual figures in his poetry. Robinson understands, however, that ordinary people, “act their own mental tragedies” and live a far deeper and wider life than we are inclined to believe. His great poem, “Eros Turannos,” brings the passion of a Greek tragedy into a Maine village; his pastoral, “Isaac and Aram,” makes New England farmers look at ease in blank verse.

Robinson's acceptance of human limits becomes transferred to Robert Frost's poetry into a caustic, sometimes terrifying revelation of cosmic emptiness. Emersonian in stance and method, Frost's deepest sense of things is skeptical, grim. One of his best poems, Frost writes, “learned of finalities/Besides the gravities mark his best poems, “Design,” “The Most of It,” a dozen others. Sometimes Frost will flaunt that skepticism, reduce it to mere staginess; but at his greatest, he has left behind him the American 19th century and entered the wastelands of literary modernism.

Wallace Stevens



F. Scott Fitzgerald



Edwin Robinson



The Note of Wonder in American Writing

The Persistence of Emerson

And yet we cannot so easily abandon our ancestors. The very Emerson who claims he has no past comes to be the past, half inspiration and half nuisance, hovering over that generation of superbly gifted writers—Hemingway, Fitzgerald, Faulkner, Stevens, Hart Crane, Williams, perhaps even T.S. Eliot—who start publishing in the 1920s. These writers feel bruised by modern history as no 19th-century American quite could. They have suffered the disenchantments felt by every sensitive person after the First World War. They have been exposed to drafts of European modernism, with its stress on the problematic, its refusal of fixed values and forms, its hunger for experiment. They cannot see America any longer as a unique destiny, for they have encountered history, Europe, war, revolution. Yet with irony or yearning, sometimes the two together, they still respond to those American ancestors who did see America as a unique destiny.

For the earlier native mythology remains powerful in the imagination of writers who can no longer give it unqualified assent. Hemingway's hero in "Big Two-Hearted River," seeking in the stillness of a Michigan river to calm his war-shattered nerves, is, on one line of descent, a grandson of the settler at Walden Pond—just as Hemingway's prose has a major source in Thoreau's. Dos Passos' young people turning leftward politically retain more of the Emersonian sensibility than they or, at the time, even he can realize. Hart Crane's poetry is inconceivable without the American 19th century; Williams' very language draws from one side of Emerson.

Later still, in our own decades, the 19th-century masters will continue to leave their mark. Mailer mixes, improbably, Emerson and Wilhelm Reich; Ellison ends *Invisible Man* with an affirmation of absolute freedom more persuasive in relation to the literary past than to the black experience he renders; Bellow keeps clamoring for personal renewal, as if he came from Concord rather than Chicago, and in *Henderson the Rain King* composes a pure Emersonian fiction.

But let me confine myself now to two writers of the 20th century, F. Scott Fitzgerald and Wallace Stevens. Fitzgerald understood with his bones that romanticism is our fate. At the end of *The Great Gatsby* he writes his overwhelming passage about the hope, the loss of America:

For a transitory enchanted moment man must have held his breath in the presence of this continent, compelled into an aesthetic contemplation he neither understood nor desired, face to face for the last time in history with something commensurate to his capacity for wonder.

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These words link him, if only by way of poignant negation, with the 19th-century masters, yet Fitzgerald is utterly a creature of our own century, a voice of dismay, chaos, fragmentation.

It is a mark of his seriousness that Fitzgerald tried to give an heroic cast even to his awareness of cultural loss, an American reduced from, say, Ahab to Gatsby. He understood that this heroic cast could no longer be projected with romantic sublimity; it had to be hedged with ironic complications, tragic undertones. That his central figure should simultaneously remind one a little of the voice dominating "Song of Myself" and also be a bootlegger by profession is part of Fitzgerald's design as an American latecomer.

The Modern Note

He said once that the mark of a first-rate mind is the ability to hold two ideas at the same time. What makes him central to the course of our literature is that he seems, more than any contemporary, to write with a rich awareness of the Emerson-Whitman tradition and an equally rich awareness of all those forces of social and moral disaster which Eliot dramatized in *The Waste Land*. With writers like Fitzgerald, Hemingway and Faulkner, American fiction moves beyond the idyll and the epic, and into the torn substance of common life, such as we encounter in the European novel. In his most moving book, *Tender Is the Night*, Fitzgerald registers as much of the tragic, as much of Europe, history, the stricken nature of mankind in our century, as an American of our time could. The romantic has stumbled and suffered into the caves of pain; and all that had made charming and delightful earlier American literature can no longer be given simple credence.

These turnings of sensibility are, in the poetry of Wallace Stevens, taken for granted, as part of the "given," which a 20th-century intelligence must accept. Some of Stevens still goes back to the American sublime, but another side remarks laconically, as if talking to Emerson, "And though one says that one is part of everything, / There is a conflict, there is a resistance involved." Beyond the openness of the American 19th century, but also beyond the tragic soundings of Fitzgerald and Faulkner, Stevens ruminates about the deflations of modern history, the effort to wring minimal persuasions out of a shameful time, the possibilities of attending to our own consciousness. He writes with Emersonian innerness, but without Emersonian transcendence:

*The earth for us is flat and bare,
There are no shadows. Poetry
Exceeding music must take the place
Of empty heaven and its hymns,
Ourselves in poetry must take their place...*

I have sketched a scheme, no more than that, for looking at American literature. Like all schemes, it leaves out too much and too many. But the virtue of this scheme, I think, is that it recalls us to the charm of beginnings. If a glance at our public life today is likely to fill one with despair, there is pleasure to be had from recalling that we are the grandchildren of Emerson, the raftmates of Twain, the friends of Fitzgerald. I myself would like to fancy that by some turn of history I could regard myself as a distant cousin, on the socially less-distinguished side, of Herman Melville—that wonderful writer who celebrated the fraternity of all human beings on American earth.

SILENCE

By Stephen Dobyns

Author of two books of poetry and two suspense novels, Stephen Dobyns lives in Cambridge, Massachusetts where he is at work on a third novel. His poem is reprinted from *The New Yorker*.


I am the music you were born to.
Then you put me aside, wanting your own;
like sticks scratching together, you wanted your own.
I am the song you will sing longest.

I am the clothing you were born in.
Then you changed me for bright reds and blues;
like a clown or bridegroom you wanted everything perfect.
Death is a marriage; you will wear me to the wedding.

I am the house you were born in.
Then you left me and went travelling;
like a child without parents or fortune you went travelling.
I am where you are going.

DISSECTING THE 20TH CENTURY

By Richard Kostelanetz



Hannah Arendt, who died in New York in December 1975, was one of those remarkable women who fulfilled their unique potential before "women's liberation" became a militant movement. Her writings on the politics of totalitarianism were not only brilliantly original but enormously influential. Her special quality, Mr. Kostelanetz points out, was a capacity for sustained and powerful thought applied to some of the crucial experiences of our century.

Richard Kostelanetz is a prolific author who writes on a wide range of subjects from political philosophy to the arts. His books include *Master Minds: Portraits of Contemporary American Artists and Intellectuals*, *The Theater of Mixed Means*, and *The End of Intelligent Writing*. He has also edited various anthologies, including *Social Speculations: Visions for Our Time* and *The Edge of Adaptation: Man and the Emerging Society*.

It is commonly understood that Hannah Arendt was not only one of the most brilliant women of modern times, but also a political sociologist and philosopher of the first rank. During a career of almost continuous intellectual engagement, she produced two of the most illuminating and profound studies of the modern experience—*The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951) and *Eichmann in Jerusalem* (1963)—in addition to several other seminal books on politics and culture. Her masterworks are the incomparable results of the prolonged encounter of a difficult subject with an extraordinary, illuminating mind. They succeed in comprehending phenomena that previously seemed incomprehensible, for her principal subject was how people think about unprecedented political experience. Nobody else in the modern world was quite like her, which is to say that, had she not existed, her thinking would not have been thought. There are few intellectuals of whom that can be said.

Her two greatest books confronted a single great question: What is the nature of the governments that evolved, in the 1930s, in Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia? Concomitantly, how do these freedomless societies differ from previous dictatorships? The Marxian sympathies of many American intellectuals during the 1930s made them quick to object to Hitler, but less willing to recognize Soviet similarities with Nazi Germany. Thus, the first Americans to make

these equations with new perception were either eccentric conservatives, such as Peter Viereck in his *Metapolitics* (1941), or refugee scholars, often of social democratic background, who had suffered totalitarianism at first hand, such as the psychologist Bruno Bettelheim in his essays on concentration camps published during World War II; Franz Neumann, in his important book on the Nazi state, *Behemoth* (1942); and Sigmund Neumann, whose *The Permanent Revolution* (1942) regarded the Nazi and Soviet governments as basically alike. In this context came, in 1951, a book that surpassed them all in its intellectual rigor, encompassing scope and historical profundity—Hannah Arendt's *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. The earlier essays by others seemed, in retrospect, an implicit preparation for her unsurpassed culmination of a certain line of thinking.

Despotism vs. Totalitarianism

It was Arendt's theme that Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, their contrary political sentiments notwithstanding, represented the same kind of unprecedented society, and that Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin were two competitors (and sometime collaborators) torn from similar cloth. What differentiated their new dictatorships from classic tyrannies was the extent of their control; for whereas earlier authoritarian despots cared primarily about political and economic dominance and the suppression of political opposition, the totalitarian regime had more comprehensive aims. It wanted not just to abolish dissent but to inculcate a particular social morality and political belief, in the name of an ideology claimed to be absolutely true.

To this end, the totalitarian regime aimed to control not just politics but *everything* in society, including education and the communications media; it wanted to control how its citizens thought; thus obliterating the traditional distinctions between society and the state, and between society and the individual. Arendt wrote:

Terror is no longer used as a means to exterminate and frighten opponents, but as an instrument to rule masses of people who are perfectly obedient. As techniques of government, the totalitarian devices appear ingeniously effective. They assure not only an absolute power monopoly, but unparalleled certainty that all commands will always be carried out.

Secondly, whereas the old-style dictatorships ruled in the name of conquest or of traditional privilege, often avowedly opposed to the will of the majority, the totalitarian dictator rules both in the interest of a proclaimed ideology *and* in the name of the majority whose support, through his total control of the media of communication, he can often gain. The ultimate aim of a totalitarian regime is

the obliteration of organized political or cultural or religious minorities in order to achieve a uniform society—a classless, groupless, socially undifferentiated mass.

Another index of the difference between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes is this: An authoritarian state suppresses opposition in the name of public law; thus, its most natural ally in exercising authority is a power *outside* everyday society—the army. Since the totalitarian regime, by contrast, demands daily universal obedience on behalf of its social vision, the principal means of enforcing its hegemony is a power already within society—the police, often in collaboration with the regime's most fanatical sympathizers. As the authoritarian state would limit freedom, the totalitarian would *abolish* it.

Total domination [Arendt wrote] does not allow for free initiative in any field of life—for any activity that is not entirely predictable. Intellectual, spiritual, and artistic initiative is as dangerous to totalitarianism as the gangster initiative of the mob, and both are more dangerous than mere political opposition.

It was Arendt's typically penetrating insight that both Hitler and Stalin were, to be precise, post-revolutionaries whose hegemony depended upon the eradication of tradition, which was represented not only by the earlier regime but by the political system itself; for the passionate realization of an ideal demands complete emancipation from the past by the use of any means, including ruthless and widespread violence by the state.

Idealism and Ideology

It was also Arendt's original (and true) point to see that idealism, not cynicism, ultimately animated the totalitarian imagination (though the belief that everything envisioned by the movement's ideology is immediately possible could nonetheless serve as the rationale for cynical means). Indeed, one of the more distressing implications of *Origins*—one which was subsequently developed in *On Revolution* (1962)—was that a totalitarian society would be the inevitable result of every successful total revolution; for in order to realize the ideal of remaking society from the ground up, the revolutionary leader must separate his masses from all edifices reminiscent of the old world.

However, since the normal recalcitrance of a society prevents the immediate realization of the total transformation outlined in the ideology, one inevitable result of revolution is a gap between intention and result. Rather than admit defeat, not only as social leaders but as agents of an historical mission, the "revolutionaries" resort first to continual falsification and then to dependence upon "total



Hannah Arendt

terror," the threat of concentration camps, and, finally, genocide "to translate into reality the law or movement of history."

Not content with merely characterizing this new society, Arendt devotes the first two sections of *Origins* to outlining those forces in modern history that made totalitarianism possible. In these chapters Arendt continually combines historical knowledge (elaborately footnoted) with a philosophical intelligence capable of perceiving crucial distinctions, positing viable categories and following an unconventional line of thought to an original conclusion. (Perhaps her principal fault is a willingness, if not eagerness, to incorporate so much within

her overarching ideas; at times Arendt seems an inadvertent victim of her own Hegelian idealism.) Her philosophical training also shows in her portrayal of historic individuals as the embodiment of ideas, and in her capacity to see the familiar unfamiliarly and therefore astonishingly.

Racism and Politics

The modern evolution of anti-Semitism she relates to the secularization of the traditional religious idea of messianic chosenness, shared by many Jews and non-Jews alike. It is Arendt's unusual contention that a widespread philo-Semitism abetted Hitler's fantasy of Jews as the hidden motors of society. She notes that the most virulent anti-Semitism deals not in visible Jews but in imaginary, fanciful, "invisible" ones—the hidden conspirators (identified in the counterfeit *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*) who are portrayed as related to visible (but innocent) Jews. Therefore, so the ideology ruled, the exile to concentration camps (and subsequent extermination) of all visible Jews and part-Jews would eventually eliminate the invisible ones too. Analogously, in Stalin's ideological system, the invisible demons were "counter-revolutionaries"—a term which Stalin suddenly applied to various groups in the course of eliminating millions of Soviet citizens in several great purges. Toward the end of his life, in his attack on the "Jewish doctors," Stalin appropriated Hitler's anti-Semitism.

Arendt also connects racism to imperialism, which became the economic palliative for late-nineteenth-century depressions. She argues that racism provided the rationale for subjugating primitive, non-Caucasian peoples, in addition to mobilizing mass support more effectively than other issues. It is a characteristic Arendtian insight to note that one kind of racism historically inspired not only the propagation of another kind but also the idea that a messianic design could be realized by the elimination of contrary (or impure) races. Within Germany and Russia grew pan-German and pan-Slavic movements to which, as Arendt puts it, "Nazism and Bolshevism owe more [respectively] than to any other ideology or political movement. This is most evident in foreign policies, where the strategists of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia have followed so closely the well-known programs of conquest outlined by the pan-movements before and during the first World War."

A final cause of totalitarianism lay within twentieth-century politics itself—the collective discrediting not only of parliamentary parties and regimes but of the democratic system itself, in the name of social ideals that claimed to be *above* politics (and cumbersome political processes). Arendt documents how German Fascists and Communists mutually collaborated, both explicitly and implicitly, in this polarization to the political extremes.

Finally, her book conveys a profound disillusionment with both secular idealism (especially in the Hegelian-Marxian tradition) and the rootless opportunism of the age; both are criticized by Arendt for putting such a cheap value on individual human life. This disillusionment informs Arendt's profound neo-conservatism in her philosophical masterwork, *The Human Condition* (1958), as well as her subsequent sociological essays, riddled as they are with such sentences as: "Authority has vanished from the modern world."

The "Banality" of Evil

Arendt returned to her great subject in the 1966 revised editions of *Origins* (which is now available in three paperback volumes) and also in *Eichmann in Jerusalem* (1963). The latter is a highly perceptive and devastatingly profound essay, more readable than *Origins*. Whereas the earlier book dealt in sociological categories portrayed with remarkable detachment, *Eichmann in Jerusalem* focuses upon an individual enmeshed within the Nazi system who was a radical product of totalitarianism—a personally cordial bureaucrat who not unjustly claimed that he "never killed anyone" and thus broke no law known to him. Nonetheless, his "innocent" responsibility to his bureaucratic job (transporting Jews to extermination camps) contributed to horribly inhumane results—the devastation of European Jewry.

In Arendt's complex portrayal, Eichmann is not an evil ogre but a psychologically "normal" bureaucrat, not unlike millions of other methodical executives around the world, who follow the orders of their superiors and are, as Arendt perceived, "genuinely incapable of uttering a single sentence that was not a cliché." Eichmann was less a murderer than a mediocrity who occupied a crucial position in a murderous system. What made Arendt's portrayal so depressing was the realization that what Eichmann did could just as easily have been done by someone else. "The trouble with Eichmann was precisely that so many were like him." He epitomized the modern "banality of evil," which is the absence of any correspondence between the evil doer and the evil done. Needless to say, many reviewers found this characterization disagreeable, and the book's publication inspired a storm of heated reviews.

Debate over Resistance

The other controversial theme of *Eichmann in Jerusalem* held that one reason why so many Jews died was the complicity of Jewish community leaders, who early in World War II found it opportune to make deals with the ruling Nazis. Arendt does not exonerate the killers but suggests that the victims collaborated in their own demise.

It was Arendt's devastating (and debatable) paradox that without this willful collaboration Hitler's extermination could not have succeeded so well. In her country-by-country analysis, Arendt shows in swiftly articulated detail why Jews in some countries mostly survived, while those in other countries were almost totally destroyed. In Denmark, the exemplary case, the King led his people in wearing Star-of-David armbands, so that the Nazi attempt to ferret out Jews was frustrated by hazards in identification. Many Romanians were saved because, in a social order laced with corruption, individuals could easily buy their freedom. In Hungary, by contrast, few Jews survived, in part because, as Arendt shows, their destruction could be so effectively organized. In my opinion, no one reading these pages can fail to be enlightened, not only about subtle differences within European culture but also about the unprecedented disasters of modern life.

The word "unprecedented" is an important one, since it served many critics as the basis for strong disagreement with Arendt's argument. These critics pointed out that for centuries Jewish community councils in Central and Eastern Europe had acted successfully as intermediary bodies to mitigate the harshness of oppressive governmental decrees. Jewish leaders had had a long experience of using various tactical accommodations, including payments of ransom and bribery, to protect their constituents. Even in Nazi Ger-

many, before the outbreak of World War II, tens of thousands of Jews had managed to leave the country in return for giving up their possessions to the regime. Based on such past experiences, many Jewish leaders believed that they could save lives by continuing the tactics of bargaining and accommodation. Unluckily, by 1940 the Nazis had decided to proceed in earnest with their genocidal plans, and were not to be bought off. The Nazi evil proved to be absolute to an extent outside of all previous experience—and Eichmann's crucial complicity in this evil, said the critics, could hardly be termed "banal." In addition, they argued, Arendt had minimized the extent and heroism of Jewish resistance in the Warsaw ghetto and elsewhere.

A Modern Biography

Whatever the validity of such criticism, it was clear that her books reflected not only remarkable intellectual powers but also her singularly *modern* experience. Born in Hanover in 1906, she progressed rapidly through the German educational system, studying at the universities of Marburg and Freiburg, eventually taking her doctorate in philosophy at the University of Heidelberg in 1928, with a dissertation on St. Augustine's concept of love published the following year. Her principal mentor was the eminent German philosopher Karl Jaspers, who became a central figure in Germany's postwar moral revival.

"Before I left Germany in 1933," she wrote, in a rare autobiographical statement, "the Zionist organization approached me to do some 'illegal' work: to collect data on official anti-Semitism. I accepted gladly and, alas, was arrested with a beautiful collection. After that, I had to leave Germany illegally and rather in a hurry. I went to Paris." As the American political philosopher Judith Shklar put it, "Her own and her contemporaries' most intense and immediate experience was exile."

In Paris she wrote and worked as general secretary for the French branch of Youth Aliyah, a relief agency that shepherded orphaned Jewish children to Palestine. In 1941, as the Germans were invading France, she had the foresight to flee to New York, where for two years she wrote a regular column for the German-Jewish newspaper, *Aufbau*. She later worked as chief editor at Schocken Books and then as executive director of the Commission on European Jewish Cultural Reconstruction, whose function was recovering cultural property looted by the Nazis. Before leaving Europe, she married Heinrich Bluecher, who subsequently became a philosophy professor at Bard College in Poughkeepsie, New York. She learned to speak English and even write it with considerable flair, yet she always insisted that an American friend correct her English prose before it

saw print. She was naturalized an American citizen in 1951, the same year her classic *Origins of Totalitarianism* appeared.

She initially wanted an academic position in the United States, but only after her books were acclaimed did she come to teach—at California, at Princeton (where she was the first woman professor), at Chicago (in 1963, her first permanent position) and finally at the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research in New York. Though the scope of her thinking transcended conventional categories, the title she chose for herself was “professor of political philosophy.” She received honorary degrees from Dartmouth, Smith, Notre Dame, among other American universities; and in 1975 she became the first American (and first woman) to win Denmark’s Sonning Prize for her “contributions to European civilization.”

A Passion for Thinking

By the 1950s, she had become a distinguished cultural figure who frequently lectured around the world and contributed regularly on literature, philosophy and politics to prominent American magazines, including *The New York Review of Books* and *The New Yorker*. (The latter commissioned her analysis of the Eichmann trial.) Her essays and lectures were collected in several books, including *Between Past and Future* (1961; revised edition, 1968), *On Revolution* (1962), *Men in Dark Times* (1968), and *Crises of the Republic* (1972). Some of these essays credited America for avoiding the pitfalls of totalitarianism—for having conducted the sole successful modern revolution; but she never ceased being critical and apprehensive about her adopted country. Her neoconservatism never became, as it did with others, a rationale for patriotic celebration. What struck most people about Hannah Arendt was the intensity of her commitment to both exploratory thinking and rational discourse. In her passionate devotion to intellectual processes she seemed almost a descendant from another world.

An example of the way she illuminates common concepts is to be found in *The Human Condition*, her most difficult but for some readers her most profound and prophetic book. Here she divides the human condition into three spheres—labor, work and action. She defines labor as toil that is never finished, toil that has to be begun again the moment it is completed, like women’s housework or the tilling of fields. Labor leaves no trace behind it when it is done; it is consumed like a loaf of bread or, in the case of the tilled field, requires renewed and incessant labor. In contrast, the products of work have a life beyond the biological process. Objects like a table of a house or a sculpture belong to the manmade world. They make man feel at home in nature and affirm his stability and “permanence.”

The third and highest sphere of human behavior Arendt calls

"action," the world of words and deeds, where man reveals neither his skills nor his products but *himself* in his relations with other men. Action would thus include the life of politics and thought, the ordering of society and of ideas—corruptible, of course, but still capable of man's noblest efforts. From these basic definitions, Arendt evolved an elaborate, pessimistic view of the modern world where automation tends to convert work back to labor and where the formulas of science block rather than aid human communication. But she believed that we can avoid the dangers of passivity and sterility if we "think what we are doing," and if we retain the political freedom which nurtures the life of free thought.

At her death from a heart attack on December 4, 1975, she was working on a philosophical trilogy, tentatively entitled *The Life of the Mind*. The initial volume, entitled *Thinking*, was already completed at her death; the second, *Willing*, passed through several drafts; the third, *Judging*, was only in rough manuscript. Since she had no children or close living relatives, the obituary in *The New York Times* stated that "Dr. Arendt leaves no survivors." Indisputably, however, she leaves an intellectual legacy of major importance and durability. The distinguished philosopher Hans Jonas has said of her:

She did not strive for originality, she just was original. Things looked different after she looked at them. Thinking was her passion, and thinking for her was a moral activity Whatever she had to say was important, often provocative, sometimes wrong, but never trivial, never negligible, never to be forgotten.




SLOWING URBAN GROWTH

By Lester Brown

The conventional wisdom is that the movement of people from farms to cities will continue throughout this century. The author finds this urbanizing trend neither inevitable nor desirable. He calls for a better balance between rural and urban populations, starting with efforts to improve living conditions and productivity in the countryside. His article is adapted from a talk he delivered in June 1976 at the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements in Vancouver, Canada.

Lester Brown is the president of Worldwatch Institute. Formerly a Senior Fellow at the Overseas Development Council, he was also Administrator of the International Agricultural Development Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, which coordinated efforts to expand food production in some forty countries. His books include *Seeds of Change: The Green Revolution*, *World Without Borders*, and *By Bread Alone*.



According to present United Nations projections, city areas will continue to grow rapidly in the final quarter of this century. A world which was 29 percent urban in 1950 and 39 percent in 1975 is projected to be 50 percent urban by the year 2000. Can this rate of urbanization continue?

The basic premise that urban growth will continue unaltered, rests on three implied assumptions:

- that food surpluses produced in the surrounding countryside or imported from abroad will be sufficient to feed the burgeoning urban populations;
- that cheap energy will be available to underwrite the additional energy cost of urban living;
- and that sufficient productive employment will become available in the cities.

These conditions are not likely to hold true in the future, nor will the urban growth that depends on them.

The Food Assumption

In order for people to move from the countryside to the city, there must be a surplus of food produced in the rural areas that can be

used to feed the dependent urban populations. These surpluses may come either from domestic supplies or from foreign sources. From the first urban settlements several thousand years ago until the middle of the century, cities were sustained largely, if not entirely, by the food produced in the surrounding countryside. Since 1950 more and more cities have come to depend on food imports, largely from North America.

Food Deficits

Forty years ago North American grain exports averaged 5 million tons per year. As of 1950 they had increased to 23 million tons, and by 1970 to 56 million tons. During 1976, North America will export an estimated 94 million tons of grain. The farmers of North America are exporting enough grain to feed, at their respective consumption levels, 560 million Indians or 115 million Russians.

The world food trade pattern has been altered profoundly in recent decades. A generation ago, Western Europe, which was the most urbanized region, was also the only importing region. Each of the other continents was exporting grain in some quantity. By 1976, that situation has been changed beyond recognition. Virtually the entire world has come to depend on North American food exports. Asia, Africa, Latin America, Western Europe, and Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union, are net grain importers. Much of the food imported into these regions is used to feed the cities.

Growing deficits in some countries are due to the inability of expanded food production to keep pace with rapidly multiplying populations. In other countries, these deficits are the result of mismanagement and of agricultural neglect, a policy of treating agriculture as a stepchild while giving the cities priority for new investments. All too often, deficits are the product of both factors.

If the trends of the past several years continue, the collective import needs of more than 100 importing countries will eventually greatly exceed the exportable supplies from North America, particularly when the harvest is poor. The trend of cities becoming more and more dependent on imported food is everywhere evident, from Leningrad to Lagos, Cairo to Santiago, Tokyo to Bombay.

It is not likely that this rapid growth in dependence on imported foodstuffs from North America can continue for much longer. Yet the current trend toward urbanization will lead toward ever greater dependence on North American food. Forward-looking Canadians foresee the day when the domestic demands of a growing, increasingly affluent population may reduce the exportable surpluses of food, much as they already have done for energy. Overwhelming dependence by the world's cities on imported food supplies from a single geographic region in a world of food scarcity brings with it a

vulnerability to external political forces and climatic trends that is risky indeed. This being the case, countries would do well to re-examine urbanization policies and consider whether continued rapid urbanization and the associated growing dependence on distant food supplies is in their national interest.

The Energy Assumption

Urbanization and the availability of energy are closely related. The emergence of the first cities appears to have been closely associated with agricultural breakthroughs, such as the harnessing of draft animals, the domestication of new agricultural plants, and the development of irrigation systems. In effect, these enabled humans to exploit more energy—to capture more solar energy in plants, or in the case of draft animals, to convert otherwise unusable roughage into a form of energy that could be used to increase the food supply. Important though these new energy sources were, the agricultural surpluses they made possible were never enough to support more than a small proportion of the population living away from the land. Indeed, as recently as 1800 only 2.2 percent of the population of Europe resided in cities of 100,000 or more.

The energy breakthrough which permitted much larger populations to be sustained in cities was the discovery of fossil fuels, initially coal and later oil. The use of fossil fuels to generate steam for industrial power gave birth to the industrial revolution, permitted the concentration of economic activity, and ushered in a new era of urbanization.

The large-scale migration of people from countryside to city requires an abundance of energy. In an urban environment, additional energy is required to satisfy food, fuel, housing, and transport needs. Assuming no change in consumption levels, each person who moves from the countryside to the city raises world energy requirements.

In the case of food, urbanization raises energy requirements on two fronts. As the urban population increases relative to the rural food-producing population, additional energy is required in agriculture to generate the requisite food surplus. At the same time, more energy is needed to process the food and transport it to urban areas.

As more and more people move into the cities, each person remaining in agriculture must produce an ever larger surplus. This, in turn, requires the broad substitution of mechanical energy for physical labor in food production. In a world where energy is becoming scarce and unemployment is rising, this wholesale substitution of machines for people in countries with large, unemployed rural populations makes little sense.

It is customary to point with pride to the small percentage of the population living on the land in industrial nations such as the

United States; where 5 percent of the society living on the land provides food for the remainder. But this level of labor productivity in agriculture requires vast amounts of energy. Professor David Pimentel, writing in *Science*, illustrates the magnitude of the requirement. If the current 4 billion world population were to be fed at U.S. consumption levels, using U.S. energy—intensive agricultural production techniques, and “if *petroleum* were the only source of energy, and if we used *all* petroleum reserves solely to feed the world population, the 415 billion barrel reserve would last a mere twenty-nine years.”

Rising Energy Needs

Although the amounts required for production are large, they are dwarfed by comparison with the amount of energy used to transport, process, and distribute food in a highly urbanized society. Within the United States, one-fourth of the energy used in the food system is used to produce food. Three-fourths of the total is used to transport, process, and distribute that same food once it leaves the farm.

The difficulties in meeting the food needs of city dwellers are in many ways paralleled by the difficulties in meeting their fuel needs. Both food and fuel supplies must either come from the countryside (in the form of charcoal, firewood, etc.) or be imported (as kerosene, fuel oil, etc.). A few nations have adequate domestic sources of hydroelectric or petroleum power. But most nations face the grim alternatives of an ever-widening barren area around their cities, as they outgrow indigenous forest reserves, or they face growing dependence on unreliable and expensive fuel imports.

Urbanization also requires more energy for waste disposal. In the village, waste disposal is not a major problem. Organic wastes are returned to the soil to enrich it, an important and integral part of nature's nutrient cycles of phosphorous, sulfur, and nitrogen. Village wastes thus contribute to the food supply. But once large numbers of people congregate in cities, waste is no longer an asset. Indeed, efforts to safely dispose of it often represent an additional drain on scarce energy resources.

The rapid urbanization in so much of the world during the third quarter of this century occurred during an era of cheap energy, an era which may be historically unique. Oil production has already peaked in some major producing countries, including the United States and quite possibly Romania. Production declines in other countries will follow. With the end of the petroleum age now clearly in sight, the world must turn to other forms of energy, forms which may by their very nature affect the pattern of human settlement.

Until recently, it was assumed that the world would move from the fossil fuel era into the nuclear era. After a quarter century of experi-

ence with nuclear power, the world is beginning to have second thoughts about continuing down the nuclear path. Failure to devise any satisfactory techniques of waste disposal, the inevitable spread of nuclear weapons together with nuclear power, and the prospect of terrorist groups acquiring nuclear materials and weapons—all these considerations are raising doubts concerning the advisability of nuclear power. Also under question are the economics associated with nuclear power. In 1975 there were twenty-five times as many nuclear reactors cancelled or deferred in the United States as there were new orders placed. A principal executive within a company producing nuclear reactors has described the industry as sick. It is undoubtedly sick; the real question is whether or not it may be terminally ill.

Given this very real possibility, urban planners need to consider the possibility of a world which will move not from the fossil fuel era to the nuclear era but toward growing reliance on solar energy. If the world moves toward a solar era, it means, among other things, that the population will need to be broadly distributed, for the simple reason that solar energy itself is broadly dispersed.

The mechanisms for capturing solar energy vary widely. They include solar collectors, which are used both for heating and cooling; photovoltaics, which convert solar energy into electrical energy (the form that powers COMSAT's international communications satellites); and indirect forms of solar energy, such as wind, water, and firewood. All forms of bioconversion including firewood are, of course, solar-based. The great attraction of solar energy is that the source is safe, secure, virtually endless, and rather widely available.

If the world goes solar, the optimum size of human settlements is likely to be far smaller than it would otherwise be. Planners should be considering the prospect of numerous relatively small communities, widely distributed for energy efficiency, rather than masses of people living in large megalopolises.

The Employment Assumption

A third assumption implied by the projections of urbanization trends is that jobs will be available in the cities. But this assumption is at least as questionable as those on food and energy. One of the most intractable problems facing governments in the years ahead is that of providing employment for the rapidly swelling numbers of young people coming into the job market. Projections by the International Labor Organization indicate that the industrial countries will need to create 161 million additional jobs during the 1970-2000 period, or an increase of 33 percent. The developing countries meanwhile must attempt to create 922 million new jobs, nearly double the number of jobs that exist today.

The labor force of India alone is expected to increase by 63 million during the current decade. Already plagued with widespread unemployment and underemployment, India is now beleaguered by 100,000 new entrants into the labor force each week. Mexico, with its comparatively small economic base, will shortly have nearly as many young people entering the job market each year as in the United States.

The creation of jobs requires capital. Even the industrial countries with a relative abundance of capital have had difficulty in recent years in expanding employment rapidly; hence they have had the highest levels of unemployment since the Depression of the 1930s. What has been a problem for the industrial societies is becoming a crisis for the developing countries.

This explosion in the number of job seekers is coming at a time when it is becoming more difficult to raise capital for investment purposes. A growing body of economic literature is documenting the difficulty in maintaining satisfactory levels of capital formation. The United States, traditionally a source of capital for the rest of the world, is having difficulty meeting its own requirements. Japan's foreign investment rate has been cut severely. The centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are now borrowing heavily from Western capital markets.

With capital projected to be in short supply, as many jobs as possible must be created with that which is available. Creating jobs in the urban industrial sector requires far more capital than the creation of jobs in the rural agricultural sector. Thus employment considerations also argue against rapid urbanization.

The Urbanization Prospect

In sum, there are three reasons why urbanization trends cannot continue as projected until the end of the century:

- the inability of the countryside to produce sufficiently large food surpluses;
- the disappearance of the cheap energy needed to underwrite the urbanization process;
- and the impossibility of creating enough jobs in urban settings.

If the flow from the countryside to the city should continue unabated, some harsh correctives will likely begin to operate in the not too distant future. Among these will be food shortages in the cities, energy shortages that will hamstring the economy, and rising levels of unemployment. The secondary signs of stress will be uncontrollable inflation, increasing nutritional stress, growing dependence on external food and energy imports, and an associated rise in external indebtedness. Finally, rising urban unemployment will possibly lead to social unrest and political instability.

Given this possible scenario, would it not be wise for governments to devise policies to slow urban growth before the constraints of natural and social systems limit their options? Before attempting to answer this, it would be well to examine the forces leading to the wholesale movement of people into cities. The forces at work fall into two broad categories, those originating in the countryside—the push forces—and those serving as attractants in the cities—the pull forces. The delineation is not always clear, with forces often being simply opposite sides of the coin.

Lure of the City

The principal official policies that influence urbanization, both directly and indirectly, almost always reflect a bias toward the city, thus drawing people from the countryside. Food price policies designed to provide unrealistically cheap food for city dwellers through ceiling prices discourage domestic food production. More broadly, urban-oriented food policies discourage private investment in food production, leading to unemployment in the countryside. These policies also help explain the increasing dependence on food imported from abroad.

Secondly, public investment in most developing countries is heavily biased toward urban communities. It is not at all uncommon for a country with 70 percent of its population in rural areas to allocate only 20 percent of its public sector investment to those same areas. In such a situation, investment per person can easily be several times as high for the urban dweller as for those living in the countryside.

The strong urban bias in public investment in social services, particularly education and health, further enhances the attractiveness of the cities. For example, an accident of birth can strongly influence access to a university education. Professor Michael Lipton has pointed out that a child from an Indian town or city is 8.5 times more likely to go to a university than a village child. In addition to being a gross inequity, such a system is inefficient. University places are used to train less able urban children rather than more capable rural children.

A similar situation exists in regard to medical care. With investment in medical facilities concentrated in urban hospitals rather than rural clinics, the less urgent medical needs of the city take priority over the more urgent medical needs of the village. Again, this is inefficient, as well as unfair. It leads to a wasteful allocation of scarce resources which must inevitably take its toll in the form of reduced economic growth.

Apart from the great financial cost of providing jobs in an urban-industrial setting, there is a pressing need to arrest and reverse the

ecological deterioration of the countryside now underway in many heavily populated developing countries. This deterioration takes the form of deforestation, overgrazing, desert expansion, soil erosion, and the silting of streams, hydroelectric and irrigation reservoirs and canals.

During the past several years the global environmental crisis has been defined almost exclusively in industrial or rich country terms, in terms of pollution. The two have become virtually synonymous. But there is another, perhaps even more serious facet of the environmental crisis. Erik Eckholm describes it vividly:

In the world war to save the habitable environment, even the battles to purify the noxious clouds over Tokyo and Sao Paulo, and to restore life to Lake Erie, are but skirmishes compared to the uncontested routs being suffered in the hills of Nepal and Java, and on the rangelands of Chad and northwest India. A far deadlier annual toll is that exacted by the undermining of the productivity of the land itself through accelerated soil erosion, creeping deserts, increased flooding, and declining soil fertility. Humans are—out of desperation, ignorance, shortsightedness, or greed—destroying the basis of their own livelihood as they violate the limits of natural systems.

Perhaps the single most helpful step toward arresting this deterioration and restore the countryside would be to mobilize people for massive reforestation projects. Reforestation serves several important ends. It reduces runoff and soil erosion, lessens the frequency and severity of flooding, slows the siltation of irrigation reservoirs and canals and, over the longer terms, provides an important source of fuel and building materials. There is so much to be gained from a large-scale reforestation project in virtually every developing country that it is difficult to understand why more governments have not initiated programs for this purpose.

A Scarcity of Water

In a number of countries, particularly in Africa and to a lesser degree in Asia and Latin America, desert expansion poses a serious threat to agriculture. This too is an area where the intensive investment of human labor in restoring destroyed vegetation, seeding grass, fencing, and planting tree belts can be very effective and can contribute to the capital stock and productive capacity of the country.

With water rather than land likely to be the principal constraint on efforts to expand food production during the final quarter of this century, local water conservation projects, in the form of small catchments and earthen dams made from local materials, can make

an important contribution to rural water supplies. What is lacking in most countries is the political leadership and the means of mobilizing and organizing unemployed people.

Throughout history, societies have mobilized for very specific objectives. Some of the achievements have been singularly impressive: the construction of the pyramids in ancient Egypt; the massive restoration of the countryside in China over the past twenty-five years (particularly reforestation, water conservation works, and terracing); and the landing of astronauts on the moon by the United States. The objectives, social structure and geographic location of these societies have varied widely; but all have represented rather spectacular accomplishments. The techniques of social organization have differed markedly in the three particular situations, suggesting that each society needs to evolve its own techniques of social organization to achieve its goals.

Here is an opportunity for the mobilization of literally hundreds of millions of chronically or seasonally unemployed people to improve the food production capacity of many countries, particularly developing ones. The need exists, it is a real one, and it is expanding.

Population Policies

Part of the growth in urban populations is due to natural increase in the cities, and part to migration from rural areas. In the most rapidly growing cities, migration is the dominant component. The forces responsible for the human flood of several hundred million people from countryside to city between 1950 and 1975 are a combination of urban pull and rural push.

As we wrestle with the problems of human settlements, of the human habitat, it becomes increasingly clear that we are grappling in some measure with the problems of population. There are now 4 billion of us in the world, a figure we reached, according to the Population Reference Bureau, on March 28, 1976. This landmark occasion was *not* a cause for celebration. The stresses and strains associated with continuing population growth in a world already inhabited by 4 billion people confront us on every front.

In our day-to-day wrestling with problems and events we tend to forget the fateful arithmetic of population growth. Occasionally we need to remind ourselves that a 3 percent annual rate of population growth *leads to a nineteenfold increase in a century*. Algeria, with a 3.4 percent rate of population growth and with 15 million people today, would find itself with 285 million people, more than the total population of North America, just four generations hence. Similarly, if recent trends continue, Mexico, with 60 million people today, will have more than 1.1 billion people in a century. This would exceed the current population of Russia, India, and Bangladesh combined. I

cite these numbers not because they are expected to materialize, but merely to emphasize the urgency of reducing birth rates where they remain high.

I put population policies at the forefront of efforts to cope with urbanization, because if we do not succeed in putting the brakes on population growth, our efforts on other fronts will be for naught. Many planners and analysts believe that the tide from the countryside to the city cannot be slowed or stemmed, that it is inevitable. I am not among those. What is needed is farsighted national policies which give the countryside its due. It is at the national level where most important policies are formulated and programs are designed to shape the process of urbanization. And most of them have an overwhelming bias toward the urban centers at the expense of rural areas.

Correcting this imbalance is not an impossibility. Some countries have made a concerted effort to improve both productive capacity and living conditions in the countryside, and have derived broad social benefits from it. Among these nations—China, Taiwan, the United States, Tanzania, Cuba, and New Zealand—there is no common bond of geography, political system, or culture. The only common element is a desire to improve the lives of those living in the countryside as well as in the city.

In suggesting that the time has come for governments to abandon their urban bias, I am in no way suggesting that the city be abandoned. The evolution of cities represents an important facet of the social evolution of our species. As Barbara Ward has pointed out so effectively in *The Home of Man*, cities are an integral part of contemporary civilization, both repositories and custodians of culture. No one argues against cities—or for a world which is entirely urbanized. There should be a balance between the rural-urban distribution of people and economic activity. The question is what that balance should be in each country, and how it will be affected by the emerging food and energy situation and by changing economic and environmental conditions.

The massive movement from the countryside to the cities has been based over the past quarter century on conditions which do not appear to be sustainable, and on assumptions which are no longer tenable. It is incumbent on political leaders to recognize this and to eliminate the overwhelming urban bias in resource allocation, adopting a much more balanced approach, one consistent with the new food, energy, and employment realities. The most effective efforts to ameliorate the problems facing cities may well be those to improve living conditions and productivity in the countryside.

SCIENTIFIC THEORY AND LABORATORY FACTS

By Stephen G. Brush

In most schools today students are taught that modern science is based on the inductive method, according to which general principles are derived from carefully observed, objective facts. Not so, argues a science historian—the theory, or general insight, comes first, and then facts are searched out that are in accord with the inspired theory. In support of his thesis, Dr. Brush cites the theory and practice of Albert Einstein and other great scientists.

Stephen Brush, a theoretical physicist, teaches the history of science at the University of Maryland. His article is based on research supported by the National Science Foundation, and is abridged from *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. Professor Brush is author of *The*



Kind of Motion We Call Heat (1976), and co-author (with Gerald Holton) of *Introduction to Concepts and Theories in Physical Science* (second edition).

In order to find out what people have been taught about the nature of science in the last few years, I have looked at two widely used texts: *High School Biology* and *Chemistry, An Experimental Science*. Both were written by teams of science educators, backed by substantial government funding and endorsed by committees of eminent scientists.

In the beginning of the biology text is the statement, “In his own special field of work, each scientist bases his beliefs on his own careful observations, checked and confirmed by the observations of others.” To illustrate how discoveries in biology are made, the authors describe the origin of Gregor Mendel’s theory of genetics, proposed in 1865:

First, instead of studying only the relatively small number of offspring obtainable from a single mating, Mendel used many identical matings [of plants]. He then pooled the results of these matings....

Second, by working with large numbers of offspring, he was able to apply mathematics to the results.... He was able to analyze his data and discover definite ratios of characteristics

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among offspring. Then, by using algebra, he was able to show a pattern in heredity that could account for these ratios. In other words, *he developed a theory to explain his data.* (Emphasis added.)

Similarly, the chemistry test states in bold face type at the beginning that "all science is built upon the results of experiments." As an example of this principle, "the atomic theory explains the observation that different compounds of the same two elements have relative compositions by weight that are simple multiples of each other." The reason for this, according to the authors, is that the theory was invented just for this purpose:

The atomic theory was first deduced from the laws of chemical composition. In the first decade of the nineteenth century, an English scientist named John Dalton wondered why chemical compounds display such simple weight relations. He proposed that perhaps each compound is composed of molecules that can be formed only by a unique combination of these particles. Suddenly many facts of chemistry became understandable in terms of this proposal.

In their accounts of how scientific discoveries are made, both of these texts, like many other introductory science books, rely on the "Baconian" theory of science, sometimes known as the "inductive" or "experimental" method. The time has come to investigate whether the Baconian theory is accurate, and whether its acceptance has something to do with current public attitudes toward science.

Baconian Theory

Francis Bacon, a 17th-century British politician, rose to the position of Lord Chancellor, but was forced out of office by a bribery scandal. He spent the rest of his life writing about the philosophy and method of science, though he did not make any scientific discoveries himself. According to Bacon, the way to conduct research is to collect a large number of observations and experiments about a subject and arrange them systematically. One may then propose a hypothesis to explain the data, but it must be tested by further experimentation. Any hypothesis or theory which is disproved by experiment must of course be discarded immediately.

Generally speaking, in Bacon's view, all reliable knowledge comes from experiment and observation. Theories can be developed only after enough facts are established; their purpose is to correlate these facts and suggest experiments to obtain other facts.

Bacon argued that it is not necessary to be a genius in order to make discoveries in science; any person of moderate intelligence can

make a worthwhile contribution by following the Baconian method and working hard enough. This idea appeals strongly to our democratic sentiments; it is also responsible for many of our present difficulties with science. It fosters the notion that research can be accomplished on a "crash" basis; that a national crisis can be handled by training more students to apply the scientific method and assigning them to make new discoveries. It is a common belief that research can solve any problem if we are willing to supply enough money for staff and equipment.

Scientists themselves have encouraged this fantasy and have used it as a justification for extracting as many dollars as possible from governments. But this tactic works to their disadvantage after the crisis has passed; government policy-makers act as if science were a machine which can be switched off when not needed. Our universities, which try to provide a home for basic research in all areas of knowledge, are now being criticized by students and parents who think that professors spend too much time on research and not enough on teaching.

Objective Consciousness

The Baconian view that science is merely a mechanized technique for collecting and analyzing objective facts also provokes criticism of science on moral grounds. This is an old complaint which has recently been revived by Theodore Roszak, in his book *The Making of a Counter Culture*. According to Roszak, "the objective consciousness" which stems from the scientific approach to the world is responsible for a profound alienation of man from nature. It leads us to separate ourselves, as objective observers, from emotional participation in the phenomena we observe. Thus, in Roszak's view both our sense of harmonious co-existence with the rest of the world and our feeling of moral responsibility for actions that affect other beings are destroyed. By adopting objective consciousness the scientist can thus treat people, animals and the environment as experimental objects and can coolly inflict pain or damage in order to observe the results. Yet the results themselves are only mathematical abstractions which don't tell us what the ordinary person really wants to know, that is, what does it all mean?

The defenders of science are handicapped because most of them have also adopted the same Baconian theory of science. But recent studies in the history of science have suggested that some of the most important discoveries were made by violating or ignoring Bacon's rules of procedure. The historical findings may even be a little shocking to those who have been taught to believe that experimental data are sacred objects.

In the textbook description of John Dalton's discovery men-

tioned earlier, it was stated that Dalton first found by experiment that simple numerical ratios, such as two to one, occur in the weights of elements in different chemical compounds. Afterwards, according to this Baconian account, he developed his atomic theory to explain this fact. But a few years ago, it was discovered that the chemical reactions studied by Dalton do not actually yield any such simple numerical ratios, and historians have concluded that he must have developed his theory first and then "corrected" his data to agree with it.

Similarly, in the case of Mendel's discovery, modern statistical analysis makes it very hard to believe that he could have collected the data first and developed the genetic theory afterwards. Again, simple numerical ratios such as three to one are involved, but the reported data are "too good to be true"—the inevitable statistical fluctuations found in any such experiments are missing. Apparently Mendel arrived at the ratios from his theory and then he (or an assistant—one hesitates to impute this to Mendel himself) somehow selected data that agreed with the theoretical predictions.

Einsteinian Theory

These two examples, together with many others uncovered by historians of science in recent years and statements by scientists themselves, indicate that something other than the Baconian method is usually involved in making discoveries. The alternative view of science might well be called the "Einsteinian theory," since Albert Einstein, founder of relativity theory, stated it most explicitly, though only in a few brief remarks.

Einstein asserted, in a lecture in 1933, that the basic structure of any scientific system must come from reason, not experience; its fundamental principles are "free inventions of the human intellect." Moreover, he said:

I am convinced that we can discover, by means of purely mathematical constructions, those concepts and those lawful connections between them which furnish the key to the understanding of natural phenomena. Experience may suggest the appropriate mathematical concepts, but they most certainly cannot be deduced from it. Experience remains, of course, the sole criterion of physical utility of a mathematical construction. But the creative principle resides in mathematics. In a certain sense, therefore, I hold it true that pure thought can grasp reality, as the ancients dreamed.

It follows from Einstein's position that experiments cannot play a *dominant* role in the development of a theory. On the contrary, experimental results thought to have been established before a theory is developed may have to be ignored or rejected on the

grounds that they depend too heavily on "interpretation" based on earlier theory. Once the scientist has become convinced that his theory provides him with an intellectually satisfying structure, compatible with other established theories and with whatever aesthetic criteria he wishes to apply, he will not abandon it merely because the latest results from the laboratory seem to contradict one of its predictions. Of course he will try to muster as many facts as possible to persuade other scientists to support the theory, and will encourage experiments which seem likely to yield favorable results. But scientists like Einstein have not hesitated to suggest that unfavorable results are simply wrong, and to reject competing theories which claim better agreement with experiment; sometimes they have lived long enough to see themselves vindicated.

The Beauty of an Equation

Paul Dirac, the English physicist who achieved the first successful synthesis of relativity theory with the quantum theory of atomic structure, also argued that experimental results do not provide the most important tests of a new idea. He wrote:

It seems that if one is working from the point of view of getting beauty in one's equations, and if one has a really sound insight, one is on a sure line of progress. If there is not complete agreement between the results of one's work and experiment, one should not allow oneself to be discouraged, because the discrepancy may well be due to minor features that are not properly taken into account and that will get cleared up with further developments of the theory.

The Einsteinian theory of science explains why scientists like Dalton and Mendel were more interested in demonstrating the simple numerical ratios which followed from their theories than in faithfully reporting the actual results of their experiments. They knew that "raw data" never lead directly to a single theory or confirm it precisely. What counts in science is not the accumulation of data but the brilliant insight that reveals the regularity lying hidden beneath the chaos of superficial appearances.

One might argue that even if a new theory is initially accepted on the basis of weak or even false data, it won't last very long unless other experiments confirm it. For the most part this is true; yet our confidence in the corrective function of independent experiments is tempered by the realization that many theories now considered wrong did survive for hundreds or thousands of years. It took a lot more than experimental disproof to overthrow the long-held idea that the earth is fixed at the center of the universe, or the theory that space is filled with a stationary "ether."

Einstein himself recognized that experimental data, no matter how carefully they are measured, may not be completely independent of theory. To a certain extent the theory, or at least the general conceptual framework in which the theory is developed, determines what we observe and how we interpret our observations. An elementary example: even today most people "see" the sun rise in the morning. It takes a conscious effort to "see" the earth's horizon moving below a sun fixed in the sky. But once the effort is made, for intellectual reasons, it is no longer *obvious* that the sun moves through the sky.

The Einsteinian view of science throws some doubt on the assumption that science provides a reliable method of solving problems and accumulating knowledge. If science does progress, it must be because of the special genius and efforts of particular scientists, not because there is a foolproof scientific method which anyone can use. In any case we should not expect to get twice as many results by spending twice as much money to hire twice as many scientists to work on a problem. That tactic might work when we simply want to develop the *applications* of discoveries already made, but it can't be expected to yield successful new fundamental *theories* of the atom or the gene.

Man and Nature

Since the Einsteinian scientist works by developing his intuitive feeling for the nature of the universe, Roszak's "objective consciousness" does not seem a very apt description of the scientific attitude. Even the traditional distinction between the observer and the thing observed has been broken down by modern scientific theories. The position of an electron in an atom, for example, is not simply a fact which is "out there" waiting to be measured by the scientist. On the contrary, it acquires reality only through the act of being measured. The full implications of this rather incredible statement are not yet understood, but at the very least we can say it suggests a close link between the scientist and the phenomena he studies, certainly not an "alienation of man from nature." The real alienation is that between the scientist and the person who has misunderstood the scientific viewpoint, partly because that viewpoint has been misrepresented by Baconian propaganda.

As for the complaint that science fails to tell us the meaning of the universe, the scientist can reply that the scientific theories proposed by Copernicus and Darwin, for example, carry a very definite message about man's place in nature, just as the theories proposed by Aristotle and Freud contain a definite message about woman's place. One may reject the meaning of a theory, and one may hope that it will be replaced by another theory with a more acceptable

meaning, but one certainly cannot say that scientific theories never have meaning in human terms.

It is not easy for teachers to convey the essence of the Einsteinian view of science to students who have never done research themselves. There is a danger of going to the opposite extreme, creating the impression that scientific reasoning is completely subjective and unrestrained by any standards at all. The danger can be avoided by closer examination of the way in which experiments are actually used to support or discredit theories. For example, every physics textbook and popular account asserts that Einstein proposed his relativity theory in order to explain the negative result of the Michelson-Morley experiment, which failed to detect any motion of the Earth through a hypothetical "absolute space" or "ether." Yet the best historical research to date indicates that this experiment played only a minor role in the *origin* of Einstein's theory. Nevertheless it certainly helped to persuade other scientists to accept the theory afterwards, and in that sense can be called a "test" of the theory.

We still need to train scientists and engineers who can follow a standardized experimental method in testing and developing new theories. But at some point students—and taxpayers—should learn that, as the Russian physicist Andrei Sakharov has insisted, "the very heart of science, which often turns out to be the most important in terms of practical consequences, [is] the highly abstract theoretical research that is born of the indefatigable curiosity, flexibility, and power of human reason."




1. EQUALITY AND JUSTICE

By Joseph P. DeMarco and Samuel R. Richmond



Joseph P. DeMarco

Samuel R. Richmond



Does the American commitment to political and social equality include one to economic equality as well—abroad, as well as at home? If so, what forms should it take in a world struggling with the problems of growth and underdevelopment? Professors DeMarco and Richmond argue that the ethical imperative of respect for individuals, particularly those who are disadvantaged, should be the determining factor in the distribution of social wealth.

Joseph P. DeMarco and Samuel A. Richmond are associate professors of philosophy at Cleveland State University in Ohio. Their article is abridged from *Worldview*.

Americans are committed by Constitutional ideals to political equality. On the other hand, our economic ideals are libertarian and permit inequalities. Court decisions and federal legislation in the 1950s and 1960s created a strong commitment to the practical realization of political and social equality. Yet we have come to see in the 1970s that economic inequalities make this achievement very difficult. The pressures for economic equality are relatively recent, because both poor and rich in America have in the past assumed the plight of the poor can be relieved most quickly through increases in total production rather than through a change in the distribution of what is produced. The prospect of limited economic growth, or even no growth, in the future dramatically

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shifts the pressures for economic improvement of the poor away from increased production toward greater equality in distribution. The dilemma we face is greatly aggravated by external pressures limiting our ability to draw on the energy and material resources of other nations, and by external demands from other nations for a greater share of what we are capable of producing.

This dilemma is a problem of justice. It is the problem of economic distribution: What is the permissible range of differences in the distribution of goods, services, and burdens? How much economic inequality is morally permissible? How much economic equality is practically feasible?

Americans have never fully appreciated the facts of economic inequality. The needs of the poor have been thought to be temporary. Americans have considered themselves people of plenty, whose expanding gross national product and rising standard of living would eventually be great enough to meet the rising expectations of the poor. While faith in ever increasing affluence as a solution to poverty was never totally realistic, today such a view is myopic. The oil shortages of the winter of 1974 brought the first widely accepted sign that we may have already exceeded the level of production that can be sustained in the long run.

The increases in food prices are even more significant. These came about partly as a result of a vast world shortage of food. Yet at this time, when many are realizing the limits to American growth, we face a heightened call for international aid. Our economy is now a global economy. For political and economic reasons as well as humanitarian reasons the United States is pressed into turning a greater proportion of its wealth toward meeting the world demand for lifesaving food. Our dependency upon the resources of others does not permit us to ignore the dependency of others on us.

Americans face the prospects of a no-growth economy in which there is no hope that inequalities of wealth will be ameliorated by increased production, but only through significant social reorganization. At the same time, foreign demands upon United States production will make domestic reorganization more difficult. It is not likely that poor and middle-class Americans will easily accept international transactions that place further burdens on them.

The new American dilemma is, then, a double dilemma: poverty in affluence set against affluence in world poverty, one apparently at odds with the other. The concern is one of justice, to ourselves and to the world. Problems of justice cannot be decided in an existentialist leap. In times of crucial difficulty we must systematically articulate the basic philosophies to which we look for guidance. We must attempt to determine which of these best serves us in dealing with the difficulties at hand.

Three Theories of Justice

Three traditional theories have been most influential in the past and seem likely candidates in terms of today's problems. Briefly defined, they are:

- *The Social Contract Model*: A society is just when its basic social practices would be consented to by each member if each adopted the view of a rational individual concerned with his or her own long-run interest.

- *Utilitarianism*: The just society consists of those arrangements that yield the greatest sum of goods for the members of the society, each member to count as one.

- *Justice as Respect*: The just society is the one that secures and maintains respect for persons through social arrangements that are in the common interest but not to the greater advantage of some than of others.

The contract view is associated with Hobbes, Rousseau, and, most recently, John Rawls; the utility view with Mill and Bentham; and the respect view with Kant and Martin Luther King, Jr. The contract view has given strong support to political liberty and equality. But the contract view has tended to give priority to liberty of individual action in economic relations, and to be tolerant of inequalities on the assumption that with them people produce more and, as a result, everyone enjoys more.

Utility has provided strong support for welfare legislation and social reform, especially for those policies that benefit the majority. But it has been weak in its support of equality and liberty.

Respect is most often appealed to by reformers seeking to help the worst-off members of the society, especially minority and relatively powerless groups. Thus it gave support for ending slavery, attaining female suffrage, and securing civil rights; and it continues to speak for the interests of the impoverished and the incapacitated.

Each of these conceptions of the proper way to evaluate the justice of human relations has differing implications for how to deal with inequality of income and wealth, given the world context and restricted economic growth. We need to look at each of the three main points of view in order to evaluate their implications for the problems we face. How we deal with pressures for domestic economic equality in a no-growth situation and how we deal with persons of other nations in seeking solutions to our problems may be crucially determined by how we project into the future our past experience with justice.

Social contract theory supported arguments for equal political rights among free male citizens at the time of American independence. The significant claim made by the social contract model is that all potentially politically powerful persons have a role in the

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formation of political policy and the distribution of political liberties and offices. By extension, social contract theory will also argue that economic decisions about what gets produced, for whom, by whom, should be democratically decided and not left to an economic aristocracy made up of corporate owners, executives, and nonrepresentative officials in government agencies.

Doubtless the democratization of the economy that is suggested by a social contract view would work against great inequalities of wealth, just as it tended to work against great inequalities of political power. However it may support arguments for *greater* wealth for the *more* productive, and it may lead us to take a fairly ruthless attitude toward those lying outside the contract, such as non-producers. The contractees are those who have power, and they each enter the contract for their own interest. It is in the interest of each to do so only if it secures the assistance and restraint of others. Nonproducers tend to be ineffective and need not be taken into account in designing the society.

The utilitarian model does not view political consent with the reverence accorded it by the social contract tradition. Instead it claims to look to the primary psychological and ethical motivation of human behavior—the pursuit of happiness. Justice is achieved when the sum of happiness in society is maximized and each person's happiness counts equally in the summation. Its primary purpose in economic terms is to increase the quantity of goods and services produced. As a result utilitarianism offers little guidance for a no-growth economy. It may give some support to equality, because excessive goods for some people do not usually increase their happiness to the extent that would be realized with a more equal distribution. Yet this becomes less and less true as goods become more and more scarce.

In times of scarcity utilitarianism may provide support for the more diligent pursuit of nonmaterial production. It may urge greater education and training in the arts, in athletics, and in human services: All of these can contribute to happiness without using proportionately large amounts of material resources.

Yet the utilitarian model has serious weaknesses. Utilitarianism seems too ready to accept the sacrifice of the happiness of some individuals or groups for a greater totality. Philosophers have long disputed the notion that we can make the accurate calculations of happiness that utilitarianism seems to require. Furthermore, utilitarianism presents social problems as problems of feasibility and efficiency. As a result it tends to encourage nondemocratic institutions staffed by social engineers who are thought to know best how to shape people's behavior in the direction of predetermined objectives. This view is doubtful in times such as these, when

our problems have placed in question many of our objectives.

The third view of society is *the respect-for-persons view*. In philosophical literature this view stems from Immanuel Kant's claim that people must be treated as ends in themselves and never merely as means; the concentration on the equal integrity of each person supports the establishment of the duty of society to provide equally for each person's pursuit of happiness. Politically, respect for persons was the motivating thought of anti-slavery abolitionists; it shaped the three Civil War Amendments to the Constitution which guaranteed individual rights irrespective of race; and it was appealed to by Martin Luther King, Jr., in the drive for civil rights. It places in people inalienable rights that cannot be contracted away, need not be established by contract, and do not depend upon whether they increase the sum of happiness.

More Humane Values

Respect for persons would support arguments in favor of equalizing income for all persons, because it works against making any trait a basis for inequality. Aristocracies of birth, race, sex, wealth, and even ability or merit, which place features that vary from person to person above being a person, are all suspect as disrespectful of persons. Respect will also support greater personal development as opposed to economic development. It will give positive guidance to a shift in our values away from those of a material culture to those of a more personal and social culture.

Respect for persons is rooted in the political traditions having to do with the Bill of Rights, suffrage, civil rights, and political equality. It tends to support the extension of these ideas into the area of economic relations among persons. It gives priority to human welfare over human liberty. People ought not to be free to exploit common resources to their own advantage, destroy good producing land, and ruin the potential harvest of the seas. Each person's equal right to life, and to a decent level of living, has priority over economic liberty. In contrast, the contract view, in its most recent formulation by John Rawls, still gives priority to liberty.

Which conception of the proper relationship of people in society wins our support is of great importance to the future of the world. The view that has currently captured the attention of scholars in America is not a respect view but a social contract view. The view that dominates political officials in America seems to be a utilitarian view. We believe that respect for persons provides the most viable rallying point and the best guidance for the future. The need now is to arrive at a consensus through full-scale debate.


2. A More Pluralistic Ethic

will be further toward the goal of the good society if we recognize the unavoidable complexity of the concerns of its members.

In searching for such a pluralistic ethic we cannot afford to confuse the spiritual and material dimensions of life. By incorporating certain rules or limits on the manner in which human beings are treated we have allowed a spiritual dimension into our calculus. We have placed a barrier to calculations of benefit or distribution. This suggests that the goal of life in the good society cannot simply be human happiness, and that understanding its moral dimension goes beyond questions such as the proper division of units of happiness among individuals.

This point will be strengthened if we consider another spiritual dimension that is left out of individualistic ethics such as that of DeMarco and Richmond or Rawls. While living in and enjoying the everyday world of day-to-day life, human beings also have the capacity to transcend that life by going beyond it. "Nutrition and life-supporting health care services" are important, but they describe, after all, only one dimension of human life. Taken in isolation such goods are best provided in a hospital or sanatorium, or the organized spaces of the *Brave New World*.

A comprehensive ethics must deal with more dimensions, for humankind will and should demand more. Chinese civilization, for example, produced a wide variety of moral, aesthetic, and scientific achievements, and yet these were made possible by the inequalities, rude transgressions, and egregious disutilities of millennia. Nevertheless, we honor those who made possible such achievement more highly than the forgotten peoples in the more egalitarian and more primitive societies on the ever receding periphery of Chinese culture. If we face these facts of human history and human judgment, then we will want our moral concern to lead us to strive to maintain a balance between the satisfaction of transcendent values and the values we derive from utilitarianism, egalitarianism, and the necessity for fixed rules or limits.



3. LIBERTY AND ECONOMICS

By Irving Kristol



What is a "fair" distribution of income? That depends, says the author, on the character of a society and the attitudes of its citizenry. Here he argues for a society shaped by the interplay of free opinions and free economic preferences over one in which ideologists (of right or left) try to impose their definition of "the common good" on everyone else.

Irving Kristol is currently a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, on leave from New York University where he is professor of urban values. He is co-editor of the quarterly, *The Public Interest*, and author of *On the Democratic Idea in America*. His article is reprinted from *The Wall Street Journal*.

I recently received a letter from a magazine which is preparing a special issue on the distribution of income in the United States. The letter asked for my thoughts on such questions as: "How should a society determine wages and salaries? Does our society do a fair job of distributing income?" And so on.

The issue to which these questions are addressed is certainly a crucial one. It is nothing less than the issue of "social justice"—or what used to be known, among political philosophers, as "distributive justice." The change in terminology, as it happens, has its own significance; in politics, the language we use to ask questions is always more important than any particular answer. "Distributive justice" is a neutral phrase—it points to a problem without suggesting any particular solution. "Social justice," however, is a loaded phrase: It blithely suggests that "society" ought to determine the distribution of income. This assumption is now so common that few people realize how controversial its implications are.

The social order we call "capitalism," constructed on the basis of a market economy, does not believe that "society" ought to prescribe a "fair" distribution of income. "Society" is voiceless until the political authorities speak. And the kind of liberal society historically as-

sociated with capitalism was, from its very beginnings, hostile to any political or "social" definition of distributive justice.

It is the basic premise of a liberal-capitalist society that a "fair" distribution of income is determined by the productive input—"productive" as determined by the market—of individuals into the economy. Such productivity is determined by specific talents, general traits of character, and just plain luck (i.e., being at the right place at the right time). This market-based distribution of income will create economic incentives and thereby encourage economic growth. As a result of such economic growth, everyone will be better off (though not necessarily equally better off). The economic growth that ensues may itself shape society in ways not everyone might like. But a liberal-capitalist order does not—except in extraordinary circumstances—concede to any authority the right to overrule the aggregate of individual preferences on this matter.

In contrast, non-capitalist societies—whether pre-capitalist or post-capitalist—have a very different conception of "fairness," based on one's contribution to the society, not merely to the economy. In such non-capitalist societies, economic rewards are "socially" justified, as distinct from being economically justified. Thus, in the Middle Ages it was thought to be fair to compel ordinary people to support the church and the clergy, whose activities were deemed to be of major social significance and social value. Similarly, in the Soviet Union today the Communist Party does not have to defend its budget on any economic grounds—the value of its contribution to the polity as a whole is put beyond question. Such societies, of course, place no high valuation on individual liberty.

No "Pure" Types of Society

Obviously, there is no such pure type as "a capitalist society" or "a non-capitalist society." All non-capitalist societies recognize, to one degree or another, the importance of economic activity and material welfare. They therefore will allow differential rewards—again, to one degree or another—based on one's skill at such activity.

Similarly, all capitalist societies recognize, to one degree or another, that there is more to life than economic growth or material welfare, and they therefore make some provision for differential rewards based on one's skills at literary criticism, music and philosophy. The U.S. network of state-supported universities, for example, is exactly such a provision.

Still, though "pure" types may not exist, the types themselves do, in however impure a form. And there are three important points to be made about these different conceptions of a good society and the principles of "fairness" in income distribution by which they operate.

1. There is no rational method which permits us to determine, *in the abstract*, which principle of distribution is superior. It is absurd to claim that capitalism, anywhere, at any time, is superior to non-capitalism—or vice versa. Any such judgment is bound to be contingent—i.e., based on the particular society's history and traditions, on the attitudes and social habits of its citizenry, and the like. There is no point in arguing that a particular society "ought" to be capitalist or socialist if the overwhelming majority of the people are not of a mind to be bound by the different kinds of self-discipline that these different political philosophies require, if they are to work. And this, of course, holds true for all large political ideals. Which is why Jefferson, living in Paris before the French Revolution, could write—in all good republican conscience—that the French people were not "ready" for republican self-government, and that it would be a mistake for them to try to establish it immediately.

2. A distribution of income according to one's contribution to the society—to the "common good"—requires that this society have a powerful consensus as to what the "common good" is, and that it also have institutions with the authority to give specific meaning and application to this consensus on all occasions. Now, when you have such a consensus, and such authoritative institutions, you do not have—cannot have—a liberal society as we understand it. It can certainly be a good society (if the values behind the consensus are good); but it will not be a liberal society. The authorities which represent the "common good," and which distribute income in accordance with their conception of the common good, will—with a clear conscience—surely discriminate against those who are subversive of this "common good." They may, if they are broad-minded, tolerate dissidents; but they will never concede to them equal rights—even if equality is a prime social value. The dissidents, after all, may be those who believe in inequality.

3. A liberal society is one that is based on a weak consensus. There is nothing like near-unanimity on what the "common good" is, who contributes to it, or how. There is not utter disagreement, of course; a liberal society is not—no society can be—in a condition of perpetual moral and political chaos. But the liberty of a liberal society derives from a prevalent skepticism as to anyone's ability to know the "common good" with certainty, and from the conviction that the authorities should not try to define this "common good" in any but a minimal way. That minimal definition, in a liberal society, will naturally tend to emphasize the improvement of the material conditions of life—something that very few people are actually against. A liberal society, therefore, will be very tolerant of capitalist transactions between consenting adults (to use Robert Nozick's marvelous phrase), because such transactions are for mutual advantage, and

3. Liberty and Economics

the sum of such transactions is to everyone's material advantage. And, consequently, a liberal society will think it reasonable and "fair" that income should, on the whole, be distributed according to one's productive input into the economy, as this is measured by the marketplace and the transactions which occur there.

Liberty vs. Equality

In sum and in short: the distribution of income under liberal capitalism is "fair" if—and only if—you think that liberty is, or ought to be, the most important political value. If not, then not. This distribution of income under capitalism is an expression of the general belief that it is better for society to be shaped by the interplay of people's free opinions and free preferences than by the enforcement of any one set of values by government.

But there are many people in this world—there have always been many people in this world—who do not believe that liberty is the most important political value. These people are sincere dogmatists. They believe they know *the* truth about a good society—they believe they possess *the* true definition of distributive justice—and they inevitably wish to see society shaped in the image of these true beliefs. Sometimes they have prized religious truth more than liberty; sometimes they have prized philosophic truth more than liberty (e.g., the Marxist philosophy); and sometimes they have prized equality more than liberty. It is this last point of view that is especially popular in some circles—mainly academic circles—in the United States today.

Thus Professor Ronald Dworkin—one of our most distinguished liberal legal philosophers—has recently written that "a more equal society is a better society even if its citizens prefer inequality." From which it follows that "social justice" may require a people, whose preferences are corrupt (in that they prefer liberty to equality), to be coerced into equality. It is precisely because they define "social justice" and "fairness" in terms of equality that so many liberal thinkers find it so difficult genuinely to detest left-wing (i.e., egalitarian) authoritarian or totalitarian regimes. And, similarly, it is precisely because they are true believers in justice-as-equality that they dislike a free society, with all its inevitable inequalities.

As one who does like a free society, I have to concede to these people the right to hold and freely express such opinions. But I do find it ironical that their conception of "social justice" should be generally designated as the "liberal" one. Whatever its other merits, an authentic attachment to liberty is not one of them.

WORDS AND MUSIC IN OPERA

By Irving Singer

Composers from Mozart to Stravinsky (as well as listeners) have differed as to the relative importance of words and music in opera. The author believes that this debate has been misleading. Opera, he argues, is neither essentially music nor essentially drama, but a unique art form in which both combine to magnify the expression of human feeling.

Irving Singer is professor of philosophy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His essay, abridged from *The Hudson Review*, will form part of a forthcoming book on the operas of Mozart and Beethoven. His earlier books include *Santayana's Aesthetics*, *The Nature of Love: Plato to Luther*, and *The Goals of Human Sexuality*.

N owadays most people assume that it is the music and not the words that principally determine an opera's aesthetic value. In *Feeling and Form*, Suzanne K. Langer even asserts that "when words enter into music they are no longer prose or poetry, they are elements of the music." Mozart probably thought the same. In one of the letters to his father, he emphatically states that "in an opera the poetry must be altogether the obedient daughter of the music." But Mozart's older contemporary Gluck advocated quite a different relationship between words and music. As Gluck puts it, "I sought to restrict music to its true function, namely to serve the poetry by means of the expression—and the situations which make up the plot—without interrupting the action or diminishing its interest by useless or superfluous ornament."


These two attitudes are usually thought to be contradictory. Certainly these statements of Gluck and Mozart are relevant to different *kinds* of operas. But possibly opera in general can encompass both varieties. Gluck is trying to eliminate musical elements that diminish an opera's dramatic power. Mozart is trying to exclude literary effects that cannot be articulated in music and therefore subvert its expressiveness.

Thus one need not think of Mozart and Gluck as antagonists. In all essentials the two may really agree. Composers often talk about their art as if there were no way of practicing it other than the one that they themselves pursue. For each of them, creating from his own perspective, this may well be true. What serves as convincing autobiography, however, need not be taken as universal aesthetics.

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An Inner Blending

Similar considerations apply to the contradictions that would seem to separate Wagner from Stravinsky. Wishing to synthesize the thesis of Gluck with the antithesis of Mozart, Wagner formulated a notion of music drama in which poetry and musical expression would undergo an "inner blending." Though Wagner seems to have vacillated about the relative importance to be given words or music, he constantly envisaged the writing of operas which would match these elements as ingredients that merge with one another. One might immediately remark that Gluck and Mozart also sought a



Wolfgang Mozart

perfect blending between words and music. But it was Wagner whom Stravinsky and other neoclassicists reacted against in writing works that sought to *separate* words and music, treating them as elements that were to retain their independence instead of melting together. In choosing Latin for *Oedipus Rex*, Stravinsky reports that he no longer felt "dominated by the phrase, the literal meaning of the words." He claims to have emancipated himself from the words as anything but "purely phonetic material."


Wagner advocated his organic approach as a way of revealing an

underlying unity of feeling which characterized reality, whereas Stravinsky defended his method as an austere style that prevents music from falling into sentimentalism. Properly understood, each of them is right in what he says and what he does. For their doing is the creation of works of art, and their saying is part of the self-assertion which gives one the courage to create one's own kind of art. Taken as aesthetics, however, their statements are inaccurate. For example, when Stravinsky makes Queen Jocasta's proud speech sound hootchy-kootchy at times rather than purely regal, he attains his own kind of merging between words and music. The effect may not be sentimental, and it may even seem cynical when compared with Wagner's romanticism, but it too depends upon musical expression.

Once we see that these contrary theories have misled composers, as well as audiences, we may discover ways in which their insights can be harmonized. The earliest term for opera was *dramma per musica*, and it is the word *per* that may provide the basis for agreement. For all the different theories of opera recognize the importance of presenting drama *through* the music, by means of it, and therefore by virtue of musical expressiveness. It is in this capacity of music to express both ideas and feelings that we shall find the distinctive characteristics of opera.

I will not be saying much about non-dramatic music. Abstract music, like abstract painting, expresses fragmentary and indeterminate feelings. The intricate designs to which these feelings contribute are quite different from what one finds in works of art that explicitly depict human events. In the opera, music is "applied," in the sense that it has a function within a dramatic totality. Each mood, feeling, emotion expressed in the music pertains—either directly or indirectly—to the enactment of human situations. One might also say that the abstract in music becomes vital or lived, inasmuch as its expressiveness is now used to portray the flow and fluctuation of some presented experience. While also being enjoyable to the ear, music in the opera concentrates upon just those sound patterns that are

Christopher Gluck



able to portray and even magnify the affective universe through which human beings confront one another.

In this regard, consider the famous letter in which Mozart describes his music for *The Abduction from the Seraglio*. After mentioning that he has written the music for Osmin with a certain performer in mind, one whose voice was renowned for its excellence in the lower bass range, Mozart describes how he makes Osmin's range into something comical. He says that this effect will be achieved by giving Osmin's aria in the first act an accompaniment of Turkish music—in other words, by creating an incongruity between the enraged intensity of the vocal line and the tinkling playfulness in the orchestra. But also, Osmin's range is expressed in a way that divests him of his dignity and causes him to appear ridiculous. In showing how the music does this, Mozart writes to his father:

The passage . . . is indeed in the same tempo, but with quick notes; but as Osmin's rage gradually increases, there comes . . . the *allegro assai*, which is in a totally different measure and in a different key; this is bound to be very effective. For just as a man in such a towering rage oversteps all the bounds of order, moderation, and propriety and completely forgets himself, so must the music too forget itself. But as passions, whether violent or not, must never be expressed in such a way as to excite disgust, and as music, even in the most terrible situations, must never offend the ear, but must please the hearer, or, in other words, must never cease to be *music*, I have gone from F (the key in which the aria is written), not into a remote key, but into a related one, not, however, into its nearest relative D minor, but into the more remote A minor.

Beyond the Mimetic

Mozart is here describing some of the means by which expressive music portrays human emotion and therefore human reality. The relationship between the music and what it depicts is not especially mimetic, for there is only a limited attempt to copy actual sounds. Osmin's voice goes up and down just as it would if he were an angry man in the real world, and his quick notes duplicate the agitated sound of an authentic rage; but the expressiveness of Mozart's music consists in more than imitation alone. It primarily results from the use of auditory signs that function in a metaphoric rather than a literal manner. There is nothing in actual anger which corresponds *directly* to a change in key. Yet in changing keys, Mozart is doing something to the music which suggests a parallel change in the condition of the man. Like an enraged person, the music loses control, "oversteps all the bounds of order, moderation, and propriety." Music does this by violating harmonic and tonal conventions, which is not at all the same as having a tantrum. Going from the key of F into one that is more or less remote is only figuratively similar to

the improper manifestation of aggressive emotions. The former expresses the latter, however, because both deviate from norms of acceptability.

Though these norms are not the same, one dealing with music and the other with manners, they are alike in deriving from recognized conventions. Once we intuit the governing metaphor, we have no difficulty in perceiving the operative effect. Through the drama we see Osmin being angry and through the mimetic properties of the music—the loudness, the rapidity, the stamping sounds—we know that it too is portraying his anger. From the relationships between tempi, rhythms, key changes, etc., we then infer those nuances of character that Osmin's anger expresses.

It is because the expressiveness of music goes beyond its mimetic capacity that Mozart can freely choose between related and remote keys. His decision determines the nature of his metaphors; it is more than just a means of protecting tonal sensibilities in his audience. Later composers have been more daring about the making of unpleasant noises. But whether it shocks or soothes the listener, an opera's ability to express human feelings will always depend on the metaphors it formulates rather than on attempts to duplicate sounds.

Berlioz makes a similar point in his essay on "The Limits of Music." In discussing musical imitation of physical reality, he lays down four conditions for its proper employment: first, that imitation of this sort shall never be an end but only a means—never the main musical idea but only a complement to it; second, that imitation should be limited only to phenomena particularly worthy of attention; third, that imitation should be precise enough to avoid misconception; and fourth, that "physical imitation shall never occur in the very spot where *emotional* imitation (expressiveness) is called for, and thus encroach with descriptive futilities when the drama is proceeding apace and passion alone deserves a voice."

The Importance of Words

Berlioz illustrates this last limitation by citing a momentary lapse in Beethoven's *Fidelio*. While Leonore and Rocco are digging the grave in Act II, they encounter a large rock and have to roll it aside. In a figure for the double basses of the orchestra, Beethoven imitates the dull sound of the stone being rolled. Berlioz calls this imitation "a sad piece of childishness." His judgment may be too severe, but of greater importance is the reason that he gives for making such a judgment. He says that imitation is here an end in itself; it contributes "no poetry, no drama, no truth." In short, it is mere copying and therefore lacks the expressive power that might have been achieved through imaginative use of musical metaphors.

In his letter about Osmin and the way in which his rage has been expressed, Mozart remarks that the music was composed before any words had been written. He makes it very clear that he was not setting music to words but rather getting Stephanie (the librettist) to write the words that he needed for this aria. Mozart says this in the same mood in which he speaks of poetry as the obedient daughter of the music. But as far as expressiveness is concerned, it does not matter what gets written first, nor even whether the composer has written the words himself. For obviously Mozart had in mind—from the very outset—some dramatic characterization which was to be conveyed by the right words in relation to the right music. Even Gluck would not have suggested that a composer submit to just *any* words that are presented by his librettist. They must always be words that will further the ultimate aim of expression. Where they come from, or when, is immaterial.

Similarly, it would be a mistake to think that the expressiveness of operatic music can be appreciated without the words. To listen to an opera for the music alone is like listening to a foreign language that one does not know, hoping to understand what is being said by watching the accompanying gestures and body movements. Certainly these are an important part of the communication, and one can also admit that music in an opera is *more* important than mere gestures in a spoken language; but the fact remains that opera is a type of dramatic performance which cannot be fully appreciated unless one understands its verbal impact.

In saying this, one need not deny that great poetry is usually detrimental to great opera. Various theorists have pointed out that vocal music requires a concentration upon musical sounds which is defeated by the mental processes that must be directed towards the best poetry. W.H. Auden even speaks of the ideal libretto as a "private letter" that the librettist addresses to the composer rather than the public. In part, at least, Auden means that the words must not seek to be interesting in themselves, as they would if they aspired to poetic excellence, but only as a vehicle for musical enjoyment.

A Literary Analogy

In my opinion, Auden's formulation is confused. Though the words in an opera do have importance only as they enable the audience to perceive what is being expressed by music, they are far from being a private communication to the composer. They must be understood, and even savored, by the audience if it is to appreciate how the composer uses them for the sake of musical expression. Of course, one could *refuse* to take an interest in the words, as if one were listening to a concert. But then one would not be having the experience of

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an opera. Aesthetically there would be something wrong, as there is with all works of art when one fails to respond to the complexities of their particular medium.


It is sometimes said that the music in an opera stands to the words in a similar relationship as poetry to prose. There is a measure of truth in this. One need only imagine a prose version of Shakespearian lines on the one hand, and an operatic version on the other, to detect how music resembles poetry in adding expressiveness to ordinary language. Try the experiment with the following lines from *The Tempest*:

Full fathom five thy father lies;
Of his bones are coral made;

Those are pearls that were his eyes;
Nothing of him that doth fade
But doth suffer a sea-change
Into something rich and strange.

There are many prose versions that might communicate a comparable meaning as effectively as Shakespeare's lines. They would be inferior, however, in their ability to express that welter of elusive

Igor Stravinsky



feelings which the poetry conveys. By means of alliteration, rhyme, meter, and other formal devices, the lines suggest a regularity of structure in nature itself, an orderliness that may even govern disasters such as drowning. One feels that this cosmic order may arise from intelligence and possibly prescience, as in the making of poetry itself, and therefore that this occurrence of death is meaningful and not absurd. There is even the suggestion of a beautiful outcome to the event, eyes turning into priceless jewels by some agency of artlike creativity. At the same time, a sense of mystery, a feeling of wonderment, lingers in these lines. What to us is hideous in nature takes on an uncanny loveliness once it is subsumed under aesthetic imagination. Poetry is able to achieve this special expressiveness partly because it prevents us from speaking the lines (or hearing them in our inward ear) with the flatness of insignificant discourse. The lines must be intoned, voiced as tonal vehicles, enunciated for that play of vowels and consonants which adds a musical dimension to what would otherwise be meaningful but only prosaic.

Without limiting ourselves to actual vocal or operatic versions of Shakespeare's lines, we can easily imagine how different songs would express a variety of feelings relevant to them. One might accentuate the loveliness, another the mystery, still another the sense of prearranged orderliness, and so on. As in poetry, the vocal music goes beyond prose in its capacity to express feelings vividly and explicitly. But musical versions differ from the poetic in having a larger range of tonal effects which tend to magnify the element of expressiveness. It is as if each of the affective components in the poetry—the emotions, the feelings, the rudimentary sensations—were enlarged for the sake of emphasis and immediate recognition. This, I think, is the reason why great poetry does not lend itself to the making of great libretti. Either the poetry would be distorted by the process of magnification, or else the music would have to strain for conceptual effects that are too precise—too minute and even too delicate—for it to express.

Opera on Stage

This disparity between poetic and musical expression also accounts for that special affinity to the stage which opera has. We often feel that reading Shakespeare in private can yield an aesthetic experience which a staged performance may possibly fail to provide. For the poetry can be read at home as well as heard in the theater, and often with greater understanding. Poetic effects can always distract one from what is happening on stage, and what is happening offstage can always deflect one's attention from the intricacies of poetry.

With the opera, all this is quite different. What happens may be

more remote from ordinary life than in verse drama, since people rarely sing themselves through emotional situations, and therefore operatic presentations must always run the risk of appearing ridiculous. But no one would think of reading an opera in the way in which we read a verse play. The opera *has* to be performed. Even when we listen to a recording or a broadcast on the radio, we project ourselves into an imagined performance. The magnification and even grossness in opera's mode of expression results from the theatrical context which it al-



Richard Wagner

ways presupposes. If only because it is louder, it covers the stage and pervades the theater in a way that verse drama cannot. This is the aesthetic opportunity of opera; and in art, an opportunity is always a justification.

Beyond the Namable

T.S. Eliot thought that poetic and musical expression both differ from prose in their ability to take us "beyond the namable, classifiable emotions and motives of our conscious life when directed towards action." To say this, however, is to suggest that feelings belong to at least two categories: one pertaining to the world of action, and the other being a fringe that we become aware of, as Eliot says, in a "temporary detachment from action." Doubtless some such distinction can be made, for there are innumerable ways in which feelings may be analyzed, and no matter how we define "action" and "detachment from action" they will surely involve different kinds of feeling.

Nevertheless, no distinction of this sort can do the work that Eliot intended. Poetry and music are alike in vividly articulating feelings or emotions that prose might fail to emphasize; but the feelings and emotions themselves are not necessarily of a different kind. On the contrary, prose turns into poetry once the feelings in our ordinary life are given a linguistic expression that does articulate them vividly. And when music carries the process further, it merely provides a different means of presentation. The feelings and the emotions need not be those that belong to a psychic fringe or a peculiar state of detachment. They are the same affective responses that occur throughout our active life—feelings precisely of the sort that a

biologist or psychologist would find characteristic of man's existence in his environment. They are not themselves special; they are merely treated in a special way and elicited within the special situations of poetic or musical expressiveness.

Opera is often maligned as an "impure" art, and of course it is a *mixed* art. But its purity—that is, its excellence as an art form—consists in its ability to supplement the expressive inadequacies of language by means of music while also supplementing the conceptual inadequacies of music by means of language, both elements being controlled by the necessities of the drama. This does not mean that opera is aesthetically better than either unaccompanied music or unaccompanied language. It only means that it does something different. D. F. Tovey argues that even the expression of emotions can be more powerful in abstract music than in the opera, where one has to put up with the machinery of the stage and all those theatrical makeshifts needed to get characters into position for the singing of an aria. But the examples that Tovey gives, a moment in a Brahms quartet or a Beethoven sonata, are instances where music expresses emotions in a way that is simply foreign to the opera.

What, then, is the value of Tovey's comparison? Disputing that one form of music is more powerful, has more "emotional force," than the other seems to me less rewarding than recognizing that each is a *different* way of expressing emotions. I suspect that artistic success depends upon the composer's genius within his chosen medium rather than an absolute ranking among the media themselves. And in fact when Tovey talks about Mozart's achievement in his operas, he never suggests that the imperfections of musical drama prevented Mozart from writing great expressive music there as elsewhere.

Value of Performance


As opposed to critics like Tovey, some writers have thought that only in dramatic works can emotions be adequately expressed by music. One can see why they may have taken this extreme position. In symphonic or chamber music expressive elements are present but not clearly related to emotions as we encounter them in ordinary life. In an oratorio the music generally expresses feelings for the sake of underlining a message. In a single song, or even a song cycle, the music expresses individual moods, possibly a succession of them, but we do not see emotions acted out, portrayed before us by actors in a scene. The performing of emotions is more readily available to the dramatic imagination, and consequently to the opera as a dramatic phenomenon. What the composer loses in having to make do with the exigencies of the theatre, he regains by having human beings in lifelike circumstances as instruments that supplement the

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ones in the orchestra. In life we all have within us, as Hamlet says, "that which passeth show"—emotions that we cannot express fully and that conventional society hardly recognizes. In the opera, however, dramatic personages shriek their anger and scream their joy. They do so in sounds that are not only expressive but also socially acceptable. For now they belong to the domain of music as well as life.

Operas are to the modern world as Greek tragedies, which also contained musical elements, were to the ancients. In none of the other arts do the feelings of men and women exhibit themselves with the same mixture of publicity and privacy. For though the opera exposes affective impulses that everyday life obscures, it also hides their detailed idiosyncrasies through the sheer abstractness of musical sound. By expressing emotions that are specific in the drama but only generic in the music, the opera enables its audience as well as the characters to undergo a series of inchoate and ambiguous catharses that need never recognize their actual origins.

Through this expressiveness, the music leads us in the audience to suspend our disbelief, our sense of doubt or separateness from the action on stage. It washes over everything that induces scepticism. Where the emotive impact is so strong and the auditory sensations so beguiling, how can we withhold assent? How can we resist this magical unification of entities as different as words and music?



BOOK REVIEWS

WOMEN SELF-REVEALED

By Ann Morrissett Davidson

The reviewer is a free-lance writer living in Pennsylvania. Her review is reprinted from *The Nation*.

Revelations: Diaries of Women. Edited by Mary Jane Moffat and Charlotte Painter. New York: Random House. 411 pp.

An opulent legacy of women's literature has been revealed in the past decade or so, much of it long neglected—and much of it in the private and fragmented form of diaries which have well suited the private and fragmented form of upper-class women's lives. The recent voluminous diaries of the writer Anais Nin are relatively well known, but how many women—let alone men—have read the diaries of Virginia Woolf, George Sand, George Eliot, Sophie Tolstoy, Anna Dostoevsky, Selma Lagerlöf, Ruth Benedict, Käthe Kollwitz and many other women whose names are less known but whose diaries are at least as interesting?

Two California women took on the formidable task of selecting and editing such a compilation, and have produced one of the most exciting and moving collections of women's writing I have yet read. Mary Jane Moffat and Charlotte Painter are both teachers and themselves intelligent writers, as is evident in their

own comments dispersed throughout this thick tome, and in the appropriate framework of Moffat's Foreword and Painter's Afterword. Preceding each woman's diary excerpt, they have interjected brief biographical notes which enlighten rather than intrude.

Most of the women named above have been successful in their fields—as writers, anthropologists, artists; such creative women have found acceptable public outlets, albeit often pseudonymously. Why claim for them the desperate need which has presumably driven other literate but more downtrodden women to pour forth their lives in private diaries? Why do *they* need this form, this ostensible analogue to most women's lives: “emotional, fragmentary, interrupted, modest, not to be taken seriously, private, restricted, daily, trivial, formless, concerned with self, as endless as their tasks”?

Changing Moods

As Moffat writes in her Foreword, “by far the most common emotion expressed in diaries” is loneliness—“stemming” either from physical isolation from normal outlets for discourse, as with Anne Frank, or from psychological alienation from one's milieu, as with Fanny Kemble [married to a

slave-owner] ...or from lovelessness, as with George Sand." Well—and don't most people suffer at least periodically from such states? The answer is of course yes, but most people do not have either the literacy or leisure for such expression, or else they have usually found other more overt and diverting outlets for their passing reflections and emotions, or for avoiding them.

The women represented here explore their feelings honestly, humorously, painfully, wisely. Hear Sophie Tolstoy on a rotten day in the third year of her married life:

I have always been told that a woman must love her husband and be honourable and be a good wife and mother. They write such things in ABC books, and it is all nonsense. The thing to do is *not* to love.... All my pride is trampled in the mud; I am nothing but a miserable crushed worm, whom no one wants, whom no one loves, a useless creature with morning sickness, and a big belly, two rotten teeth, and a bad temper, a battered sense of dignity, and a love which nobody wants and which nearly drives me insane.

But on another day, her tone was very different:

It makes me laugh to read over this diary. It's so full of contradictions, and one would think I was such an unhappy woman.... It would be hard to find a happier or more friendly marriage than ours.

Such oscillations of mood and self-confidence are present too in such presumably fulfilled artists as Virginia Woolf, who wrote at the age of 38, near the beginning of her most prodigious writing:

Why is life so tragic; so like a little strip of pavement over an abyss. I look down; I feel giddy; I wonder how I am ever to walk to the end. But why do I feel this: Now that I say it I don't feel it.... Melancholy diminishes as I write. Why don't I write it down oftener? Well, one's vanity forbids. I want to appear a success even to myself.

And Käthe Kollwitz, plunged into drawing and painting after the death of her son during World War I:

Stagnation in my work. When I feel so parched, I almost long for the sorrow again. And then when it comes back I feel it stripping me physically of all the strength I need for work.

Later, in 1925, she wrote: Recently I began reading my old diaries. Back to before the war. Gradually I became very depressed. The reason for that is probably that I wrote only when there were obstacles and halts to the flow of life, seldom when everything was smooth and even.... I distinctly felt what a half-truth a diary presents....

Living with Men

Rather than "half-truths," perhaps such diaries present whole truths about half one's life, for in the other half most of these women seem to have lived fully and creatively—even, to some extent, those like Sophie Tolstoy and Anna Dostoevsky who were adjuncts to "great men." One of the most interesting and moving excerpts in this volume is by Florida Scott-Maxwell, who began to study with Carl Jung at the age of 50, and at 82 started a diary (published in 1968 as *The Measure of My Days*) in which she wrote:

Age puzzles me. I thought it was a quiet time. My seventies were interesting and fairly serene, but my eighties are passionate. I grow more intense as I age. To my own surprise I burst out with hot conviction....

It could make unexpected history if wives wrote what they saw work—its efforts and its achievements—doing to their husbands; telling honestly how much of the husband is left for human purposes and how good the human quality remains....


We do not often live with the superior side of the man—that is expressed in his work—but more habitually with his weak, tired, shadow side. We indulge him, restore him, and though we exploit him (that is a mutual game) it often seems to us our role and fate to deal with his inferiority, and conceal it from him. We may do it with wisdom and grace, but usually we project our faults onto each other, all can be beneath comment, and there are times when only mutual forgiveness makes us fit to face each other once more....

The hurt that women have borne for so long may have immeasurable meaning. We women are the meeting place of the highest and the lowest, and of minutiae and riches;

it is for us to see, and understand, and have pride in representing ourselves truly. Perhaps we must say to man... The time may have come for us to forge our own identity, dangerous as that will be.

Intelligence and Emotion

One could go on quoting with endless projection and pained pleasure from this absorbing collection, which is somewhat arbitrarily divided into the categories of "Love," "Work" and "Power." It is difficult to apply the usual sort of literary criticism to these women's intimate feelings and searingly honest observations. How to judge these deep-felt emotions, these relationships, these lives? All one can say is that the women represented here have, in their own ways, expressed these "half-truths" of their lives with the articulateness of their intelligence and the anguish of their emotion. I like to think that not only white middle-class women might smile and weep with recognition over this unsentimental volume, but also all women, all races, and all men.



THE LANGUAGE OF MUSIC

By David Cairns

David Cairns is the author of *Responses: Musical Essays and Reviews*, and the translator and editor of *The Memoirs of Hector Berlioz*. His review is reprinted from *The New York Times Book Review*.

The Unanswered Question: Six Talks at Harvard. By Leonard Bernstein. Illustrated with musical examples and phonograph records. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 428 pp.

Leonard Bernstein's communicative genius depends partly on our being there and able to watch and delight in his extraordinary facility for seizing and illustrating, with examples from any and every musical period or culture, the ideas that flash from his teeming brain. Before I read them I wondered if these Charles Eliot Norton lectures, given at Harvard University, would survive transplanting to the cold objectivity of print. The present book comes, in fact, in a box with a special compartment containing six small records, on which Bernstein demonstrates at the piano, with his usual flair and lucidity, a characteristic variety of points—the functioning of overtones, the harmonic principles of *The Afternoon of a Faun*, chromaticity in Schoenberg's *Opus 23*, the “deep structure” of Mozart's *G minor Symphony*, bitonal proce-

dures in Stravinsky, and the Japanese pentatonic scale.

But the records, which are cumbersome to play against the text, are not essential. Bernstein on the page turns out to be as vital and evocative as Bernstein in the lecture hall. The book creates its own physical presence, its rich, coherent world. The only problem is to do justice to that richness and to give any notion of the sheer amount of territory covered by Bernstein's free-flowing, spontaneous-seeming, yet endlessly interconnected arguments.

He begins with a tribute to his old Harvard philosophy professor, David Prall, who taught him that “the best way to ‘know’ a thing is in the context of another discipline”; and in one of its aspects the book is an attempt to pin down that ancient will o' the wisp, the language of music, by using techniques borrowed from the modern study of linguistics. At the same time, there is an educational purpose in setting up “a working analogy with language” that will enable one to “speak about music with intelligent but non-professional music lovers who don't know a stretto from a diminished fifth.”

A further aspect is a kind of bird's eye view of the development of music over the past two hundred years in terms of more and more complex ambiguities of expression, as progressively remoter implications of the



Leonard Bernstein

harmonic series were exploited. Finally, Charles Ives' famous enigmatic composition, *The Unanswered Question*, which the composer himself explained in a metaphysical sense—"What is the meaning of existence?"—is made to stand for the question that preoccupies everyone concerned today with musical creation and communication: "Whither music in our century?"

The book is above all an inquiry into the problem of modern music; and the search for "universals," for an underlying language of music equivalent to Noam Chomsky's hypothesis of an innate linguistic base common to all, is therefore of the greatest relevance, and not just

a fascinating game—though it is that as well.

Bernstein says he had long been haunted by the idea of just such a "worldwide, inborn musical grammar"; but it was only the research which has recently gone into the similar idea of a universal grammar underlying human speech that made him think of basing a series of lectures on it. In his first intoxicated encounter with Chomskian theories he sat up all of one night reconstructing his own speculative "Ur-language," and he vividly conveys the excitement of the chase, particularly when he applies the idea to music. His discovery that the archetypal teasing chant common to

children everywhere comes straight out of the harmonic series, and the parallel he draws between the harmonic ambiguity of the chant and that of the opening of the Adagietto of Mahler's Fifth Symphony, are very suggestive in this context.

The Search for Meanings

I am totally incompetent to assess the validity of his linguistic speculations. Most of them seem highly persuasive. Here and there, however, his analogies raise doubts. But in general he successfully vindicates his experimental method of elucidating music in terms of the linguist's three categories—phonology, syntax and semantics—and of using it to search out music's intrinsic meanings, and the hidden transformations by which they are generated and formed into the surface structures that delight or perplex us. If it's not good linguistics, it's undeniably good musical analysis. And, as he points out, it's a reasonable idea; whereas the linguists' hypotheses have yet to be proved, music has a built in, preordained universal—the harmonic series.

The analogy between musical phrase and the noun, between harmony and the adjective that colors the noun, and between rhythm and the verb which activates it, is in itself intriguing. But beyond this, linguistics has provided Bernstein with a fresh impetus to look at musical expression and see how it works. It has enhanced an already exceptional capacity for teaching music and sharing his experience of it. He analyzes Mozart's *G minor Symphony* in terms both of its diatonic

containment of chromaticism and of its "rhythmic chromaticism"—Mozart "playing" with our instinct for symmetry and "ambiguifying" it by using the equally universal process of what linguists call deletion to work against that instinct. The result is not a withering of our natural response to the music's beauty—far from it—but an enrichment of our understanding of it.


Similarly, the examination of Stravinsky's very precise and organic use of polytonality and rhythmic "dissonance" in *The Rite of Spring*—a work once held by critics, God help them, to be as haphazard and meaninglessly brutal as the music of savages (a double fallacy!)—only adds to our enjoyment and sense of admiration. Bernstein's dissection of Debussy's *Afternoon of a Faun*—ambiguity still just contained within diatonic bounds—is an adventure in itself (here the discs really are useful); and when he comes to the finale of Mahler's *Ninth Symphony*, that triple prophecy of death—Mahler's own, tonality's and civilization's—you follow his words with passionate excitement. It is like a story you cannot put down; yet he merely describes what is there.

With Mahler we reach the crux and heart of the argument: the 20th-century crisis. Here Bernstein's range of allusion is wider than ever; his mind is a racing mill-wheel of ideas. I think he exaggerates the affinities between T.S. Eliot and the tougher, more original Stravinsky, and also the extent to which the great art of the century is the product of protest or despair.

Non-neurotic masterpieces, born of joy, have been written even in the shadow of planetary extinction. But he is wonderfully eloquent and perceptive on Stravinsky and his coolly heroic, masterful revivifying of tonality, and what he says of the Schoenbergian revolution (which threw everything into confusion by coming earlier than it need have done) is full of sense and suggestiveness.

In the end perhaps the very fertility of Bernstein's ideas leads to a certain diffuseness. Logic begins to be replaced by a quasi-mystical optimism. Inevitably, maybe, given the subject; and to a certain extent Bernstein disarms skepticism by his

final words: "I believe...Ives' *Unanswered Question* has an answer. I'm no longer quite sure what the question is, but I do know that the answer is *Yes*." May this conclusion be justified! In any case, Bernstein hasn't set out to prove it: he simply *feels* that the great 20th-century split (which he has explained so brilliantly) is in the process of being healed; that there is a universal musical language whose source is the harmonic series; that a time of reconciliation is upon us; that avant-garde composers are returning to their tonal roots; and that creativity is unquenchable and always with us. His book is at least a living proof of that.



A POET OF UNITIES

By Calvin Bedient

Critic and poet, Calvin Bedient's most recent book is *Eight Contemporary Poets*. His review is reprinted from *The New York Times Book Review*.

Sphere: The Form of a Motion. By A.R. Ammons. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 79 pp.

"When Whitman said 'O Pioneers'"—observed F. Scott Fitzgerald—"he said all." The American urge to "sing possible/changes/that might redeem," in A.R. Ammons' words, has proved stubborn, and our writers' wagons can still be heard heading out of town, as in a Western film, creaking for joy. The Romantic dream of returning at dawn "wet/to the hips with meetings" is quite dead in England, but our own Ammons and W.S. Merwin, among others, are out without their long boots. Like the more troubled Pound, Stevens and Williams just before them, like Emerson, Thoreau, Melville and Whitman in the 19th century, they are poets of a possible redeeming change, a change sought in what Emerson called "an original relation to the universe."

Once oblique and prophetic, Ammons has in his latest book of poetry become also folksy. He says: "I expect to promote good will and difficult/clarities: I'm tired of bum-fuzzlement and bafflement." Ammons' new "good will" is Romantic, but so democratic, so ac-

cepting, so rationalized, that it is almost casual: he is in no haste at all to hitch his wagon to a star. He now seeks "the good of all in the good of each." As for his "difficult" clarity, it is chiefly the "unmendably integral" connection of everything to everything else in the universe. "Touch the universe anywhere and you touch it/everywhere." What survives of his pared Romanticism is the fertile belief that "nothing is separate."

Ammons then goes on to develop explicitly, laboriously, abstractly, the concept of reality as a great fugue, a holy unity. This concept is, as he says, the "mysticism" of modern science, the radiance glimpsed in the cooperative lives of a cell as well as in the long reach of the galaxies. Nothing is separate. Nothing is even different, at the core: there the universal unit, the "nervous atom," "spins and shines unsmirched." Still, "having/been chastened to the irreducible," Ammons says, "I have found the/irreducible bountiful." There are "many rafts to ride and the tides make a place to go."

In colonizing for poetry the structural models of science, Ammons has become an intellectual's Whitman, afoot with a laboratory vision that, for all its abstract vocabulary, he lectures and tweaks into poetry. Because his "idealism's as thin as the sprinkled/sky and nearly as expansive," one can move about freely in

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his sensibility; it is neither frost nor frolic. The appeal of this new, pulled-up Romanticism is its levelness. The cold hand of science has taken the fever out of this prophet's brow.

An Open Form

With his desire for an "open form" that offers "room enough for everything to find/its running self-conscious and expansions, its way" Ammons has created a new poetic structure: the poem as democratic continuum. Where Whitman's numbered sections in *Leaves of Grass* are new breaths, new embraces, Ammons' in *Sphere: The Form of a Motion* are artificial overlays on a non-stop monologue that keeps pace with the "progressing motions" of the universe. Random, flexible, this "form of motion" will turn in mid-line from the "plenitude of nothingness" among galaxies to the "neck-nicking walk" of pheasants—turn as amiably and unanxiously as the universe itself includes the microbe and the Milky Way, being an intermediary to all. *Sphere* means to be a vision of the contrarities and reconciliations of the very motions of being.

At their best Ammons' images glow, simply and literally, with a solar light:

by the snowroad the boulder
floats afire: fir-bark,
skittering under a startled
squirrel,
falls in flames

rattling and flecks the burning
snow...

... in hill-gold sun
mock orange branches
swim windy shadows, like lean
fish
in glass, against the
windowpanes: a golden dream
swims
with the lights, schools
of thoughts burning, bunching,
heading,
down, up....

The description is lovely, but the image evoked is as passive in relation to what it reflects as the window itself. Having sacrificed the dramatic, Ammons has left almost everything to his intelligence, the crispness of his language, the geniality of his tone, and the greatness of his subject, his *reasonable* approach to Romantic "spirituality." Still, in this reader's palm, at first weighing, *Sphere* feels major. Though it has nothing of the feat about it, it has scope, is original and blandly imposing.

Although almost nothing in the poem moves or ravishes, almost everything interests and holds—holds not least because it tests, and finds thin, the spiritual satisfactions available in being a conscious part of a universe afloat in nothingness. The subject is not really, in Ammons, the kind of happiness that threatens to swell into a yelp or surf into silence. But Romanticism has always been in trouble; dissatisfactions is its nature; Ammons is doing what he can.

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THE DESIGN OF HOUSES

By Paul Goldberger

At age 25, the reviewer became architecture critic of *The New York Times*, from which his review is reprinted. His articles have appeared in many journals concerned with art and architecture.

The Place of Houses: Three architects suggest ways to build and inhabit houses. By Charles Moore, Gerald Allen and Donlyn Lyndon. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. 278 pp.

Le Corbusier's housing project for workers at Pessac, France, of 1925, was once composed of pure, clear forms, rationally arranged for light and air. The housing seemed to embody many of modern architecture's formal and social goals. But to many of the occupants, the buildings were just white boxes, not houses; they cared far more that they had been denied decorations than that they were given great amounts of light and open space. The residents wanted, as Charles Moore, Gerald Allen and Donlyn Lyndon put it, an "image of a house," and to get it they added to the original design shutters, decorative moldings and space dividers.

"When we drive through towns and suburbs we notice that not all new houses are 'Modern,'" say Mr. Moore and his co-authors in what could serve as a statement of purpose for their superb *The Place of Houses*. They write:

This is curious because, for instance, in the Georgian or Federal or Greek Revival periods of architectural history, most houses, big and small, looked Georgian, Federal or Greek Revival. Now every suburb or town has at least one or two "Modern" houses, but they are the exception rather than the rule. Most new houses are "traditional" and look vaguely like "Williamsburg" or "French Provincial." ... Possibly this is so because most families are anxious to cultivate images in their houses of their real or imagined ties with the past, rather than face uprooting visions of the future.

No Rules

The premise of *The Place of Houses* (one of whose authors, Mr. Moore, is a housing designer of considerable repute) is that most modern architects design with little concern for human needs and, more significantly, little concern for human aspirations. It is an unusual book in that it is not written from the standpoint of most attacks on the modern movement—it is not a simple-minded call for classicism, or for burrowing underground or for letting technology determine our future. Rather, it is a discussion of houses that takes as its starting point the assumption that pluralism, long detested by the modern movement, is desirable. The International Style saw itself as the

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one true way, bringing a new spirit and a better life to all; Mr. Moore and his colleagues are answering that there is no true way, that there are no rules.

This book in a certain way is a descendant of Robert Venturi's *Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture*, among the first attacks (1967) and perhaps the classic one on modern architecture's orthodoxy. One role a good disciple can fulfill is to take a message and carry it forth to a broader audience, and that is exactly what *The Place of Houses* does. It takes Mr. Venturi's scholarly argument that modern architecture does not work and expands it into a series of guidelines that any reader can use to assist in the planning of a house or merely in the appreciation of architecture.

This is one of the few discussions of houses or of modern architecture that does not use formal analysis to any significant extent. *The Place of Houses* chooses to be more concerned with image than form, and in doing so further defines its break with the orthodoxy of modern architecture, which has traditionally placed great emphasis upon rationality of forms.

Successful Images

"The image of house holds great power over the human mind," the authors write, a statement with which few architects, modern or otherwise, would disagree. But where the modern movement sought to redefine that image (into Le Corbusier's "machine for living in," among other things), Mr. Moore and his colleagues choose, more humbly,

to explore the images houses have held in the past. The book opens with a review of three places the authors feel are laudable examples of successful images: Edgartown, Massachusetts, an old village; Santa Barbara, California, a false Spanish environment and the one most frankly like a stage set of the three; and Sea Ranch, the mid-1960s California condominium by Mr. Moore, which inspired a whole generation of shedlike, wood-sided houses.

The Place of Houses continues with what the authors call, "in smiling allegiance to classical precedent," three orders: the order of rooms, the order of machines and the order of dreams. These chapters are full of talk of stairways (should they be grand and central or modest and hidden?), of bathrooms (should they be treated as functional spaces or as living spaces?) and of symbolism (should a house suggest openness or a womblike enclosure or an era past?).

The observations here are intended to help readers work the rooms, the machines and the dreams they want and need into a practical house plan. The authors make no attempt to suggest any particular kind of end product but merely try to coax the reader into defining what he wants for himself.

The Place of Houses will obviously be less helpful than the 19th-century house-pattern books, of which it is intended to provide a modern equivalent, in its lack of complete designs. Its value for the potential builder will be far more in terms of helping him to conceptualize his

idea of a living space and thereby define his needs at the early stages of planning.

But the book is most successful of all merely as a statement, from what is increasingly being called the post-modern period, of what a house

should be. *The Place of Houses* says a house can be almost anything an occupant wants it to be, and simple though that statement sounds, it is a significant one indeed in terms of the evolution of contemporary architecture.





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